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2d and 4th Marine Divisions land.
15 June.

27th Infantry Division (Corps
reserve) lands; 165th Infantry on
night 16-17 June, 105th Infantry
on 17 June, 106th Infantry on
20 June.

Japanese launch night tank-
infantry counterattack against 6th
Marines. 16-17 June.

165th Infantry seizes Aslito
Airfield. 18 June.

4th Marine Division reaches east
coast. 18 June.

27th Infantry Division committed
between Mar i ne D i vi s ions, encounters
difficulties in Death Valley.
23 June.

Tonopog

Seaplane

Bose

Marpi Point

Mutcho

Point

Garopon

Agingon

Point

4th Marine Division seizes Kagman
Pen i nsu I a. 25 June.

1st Battalion, 29th Marines,
captures peak of Mt. Tapotchau.
25 June.

2d Marine Division reaches Tanapag
Seaplane Base, pinched from lines.
4 July.

Japanese launch all-out ban za i
attack, hitting the 1st and ?3
Battalions, 105th Infantry, and
the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines.
6-7 July.

4th Marine Division pushes to
island's northern end. Saipan
secured. 9 July.

Kogmon

Peninsula

Nafutan Point

PRINCIPAL GROUND EVENTS
BATTLE OF SAIPAN

IOOO

1000

3000yds

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Major Carl W. Hoffman, »smc

HISTORICAL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS

U, S. MARINE CORPS

Marine Corps Monographs
in This Series

The Defense of Wake

The Battle for Tarawa

Marines at Midway

Bougainville and the Northern
Solomons

The Guadalcanal Campaign

The Assault on Peleliu

Saipan : The Beginning of the End

THE COYER OK THIS NARRATIVE shows Marines pitching grenades at an entrenched
foe. One grenade is in the air, another is smoking and ready to go.

Foreword

SAIPAN mus one of (lie key operations in (lie Pacific War; key
because it unlocked vast potentialities to the United States in pro-
jecting its might against the Japanese homeland; key because it
opened the door of distance which had meant security to the Empire.

Invasion of Saipan provided the supreme challenge in which the
enemy was forced to select one of two alternatives : conserve his naval
resources for a later decision, leaving uncontested this penetration of
his inner defense ; or lash out in a vicious, showdown fight. The fact
that he chose the latter course, and suffered a resounding defeat, is
now7 history.

The conquest of Saipan vTas, among Pacific operations up to that
time, the most clear-cut decisive triumph of combined arms of the
United States over the Japanese. By June 1944, U. S. forces, long
superior in quality of personnel and organization, were finally greatly
superior in materiel with which to fight. Victory at Saipan made this
apparent to all.

C. B. CATES

GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS.
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS.

Preface

SAIPAN is the sixth in a series of operational monographs being prepared by the Historical
Division. Headquarters. I 'nited States Marine Corps, to present for the military student, as well
as the casual reader, a factually accurate narrative of the Marine Corps’ World War II opera-
tions. When these individual narratives are completed and arranged in chronological order, they
will be integrated into a single operational history of the Marine Corps in World War II.

Grateful acknowledgement is made for the valuable information furnished by the scores of
officers consulted by interview or letter and for the assistance provided by the Historical Divi-
sion. I*. S. Navy; the Office of Naval Records and Library; the Office of the Chief of Military
History. Department of the Army: and the Marine member of the Historical Section, Joint Chiefs
of Staff. Maps and sketches were prepared b. the Reproduction Department, Marine Corps
Schools, Quantieo, Virginia. All photographs are official Marine Corps. Navy or Army.

CLAYTON C. JEROME

P.ltIGAl >LER GENERAL. U. S. MARINE CORPS.
DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY.

Contents

Foreword . iii

Preface iv

Chapter 1. Plans and Preparations 1

Strategic Situation />. 1

Historical Background />. 2
Saipan p. 3

Japanese Defenses p. 8
Japanese Organization p. 10
High-Level Planning p. 13
Casablanca Conference p. 13
Washington and Quebec Conferences />. 15
Cairo Conferences p. IT
Campaign Plan Granite p. 18
JCS Directive of 12 March p. 20
Command Relations p. 22
Logistics and Administration p. 23
Intelligence Information p. 25
Tactical Plans p. 27
Training and Rehearsal p. 30
Movement to the ( )bjective p. 31
Naval Gunfire and Air Bombardment p. 35
Related Covering Actions p. 43
Final Approach of the Northern
Attack Force p. 43

Chapter II. D-day — 15 June 1944 45

Pre-H-Hour Preparations p. 45

Tanapag Demonstration p. 47

The Landing p. 48

Red Beach Action p. 51

Green Beach and Afetna Point/?. 54

1 el low Beach and Agingan Point p. 55

Blue Beach and Outran Kanoa />. 58

4th Division Tanks Land p. 60

14th Marines Land p. 62

General Schmidt’s Command Post p. 64

2nd Division Tanks p. 64

M inor Enemy Tank Thrusts p. 65
10th Marines’ 75mm Pack Howitzers
Land p. 66

2d and 24th Marines Land p. 66
Darkness D-Day p. 67
A Noisy and Restless Night p. 71
Reports — Impending Naval Action p. 74

Chapter III. Expansion of the Beachhead 77

D-plus 1 — 16 June p. 77
Spin ance’s Decisions p. 77
6th Mai i lies Consolidate; 8th Captures
Afetna Point p. 79

Remainder of 2d Marines Lands p. 80

Artillery Build-Up p. 81

The Push to O-l p. 81

27th Division Begins to Land p. 84

Night of 16-17 June — Tank Counterattack

p. 86

D-plus 2 — 17 June p. 92
Through Susupe’s Marshes p. 92
The Move to Aslito Airfield />. 94
M ore Corps Troops Ashore p. 96
Night of 17-18 June />. 99
Japanese Air Strikes p. 100
D-plus 3 — 18 June p. 101

Into the Coconut Grove />. 102
I )rive to the East />. 102
Seizure of Aslito Airfield p. 104
Japanese Air Activity p. 106
Night of 18-19 June p. 107
D-plus 4 — 19 June p. 107

Tbe Approach to Nafutan Point p. 107
The 4ili Division Left Progresses p. 108
Active Patrolling p. 108
Artillery Situation />. 109

Rear Installations p. 110
Night of 19-20 June p. 110
Battle of the Philippine Sea p. 112
D-plus 5 — 20 June p. 113
Surge to CM: p. 114
The Capture of Hill 500 p. 114
Securing the Cliff p. 115
Punches at the Point p. 117
Night of 20-21 June p. 120
D-plus 6 — 21 June p. 120

The Pause Before the Northern Push

p. 120

Searching the Swamp p. 121

. . Hold Present Front Lines . . p. 121
Night of 21-22 June p. 123
Summary of Medical Activities to Date
p. 124

Chapter IV. Drive to the North 126

1 )-plus 7 — 22 June p. 126

Intermediate Objective O— 1A p. 126
To Tipo Pale’s Summit p. 128
Commitment in the Center p. 131
Night of 22-23 June p. 132
Japanese Situation p. 132
Air Activity p. 133
D-plus 8 — 23 June p. 134

The Introduction to Death Valley p. 134
Operations at Hill 600 p. 136

. . Focal Points of Combat” p. 137
Night of 23-24 June p. 139
Japanese Plans and Actions p. 140
D-plus 9 — 24 June p. 141
To Garapan’s Outskirts p. 141
The Troublesome Cliff p. 144
To Chacha and Laulau p. 145
General Ralph Smith Relieved p. 146
Night of 24-25 June p. 147
Japanese Thoughts p. 147
D-plus 10—25 June p. 148
Kagman Peninsula p. 148
Failure of a Plan p. 150
Seizure of Mt. Tapotchau p. 151
Stalemate at Nafutan Point p. 155
Night of 25-26 June p. 156
“There Is No Hope for Victory . . p. 156
D-plus 11 — 26 June p. 157

Mop-Up on Kagman Peninsula p. 157
Colonel Stebbins Takes Over 106th
Infantry p. 158

By-Passing the Pocket p. 159
“Seven Lives for One’s Country” p. 161
Progress in Unloading p. 164
Medical Situation p. 165
Related Raids by U. S. Navy p. 166

Chapter V. Swing to Tanapag 167

D-plus 12—27 June 1944 p. 167
Japanese Situation on D-plus 12 p. 167
Rapid Progress on the Right p. 168
Important Localities Seized p. 170
Pinch, Shift, Adjust, Consolidate p. 171
Night of 27-28 June p. 174
D-plus 13 — 28 June 1944 p. 174
Four “Pimples” p. 175
General Griner Assumes Command of
27th Division p. 177
“Hold Present Positions . . .” p. 179
Night of 28-29 June p. 180
D-plus 14 and D-plus 15 (29-30 June) p. 180
Waiting and Patrolling p. 181
V ertical Gap Reduced p. 181
A Successful Ruse p. 182
N ights of 29 and 30 June p. 185
D-plus 16 and D-plus 17 (1-2 July) p. 186
The Limestone Hill p. 186
Gaining Momentum p. 191
The Surge to 0-6 A p. 193
Nights of 1 and 2 July p. 194
Saito Changes His Defense p. 195
D-plus 18 and D-plus 19 (3-4 July) p. 196
Garapan Seized p. 196
The Thrust to Flores Point p. 201
The Struggle for the Hills p. 203
Change of Direction p. 206
Naval Activities from -27 June to 4 July
p. 207

Chapter VI. Saito’s Last Battle 208

D-plus 20 — 5 July p. 208
Tanapag Plain p. 208
From ()-7Z to 0-8A p. 210
Night of 5-6 July p. 212
D-plus 21 — 6 July p. 212

The Ditch and the Gulch p. 212
Expansion of the Front p. 218
Night of 6-7 July p. 221
The Banzai Attack p. 222
The 2d Division’s Mop-Up of 8 and 9 July
p. 230

I )-plus 22, 23 and 24 (7, 8
To the Shore at Marpi I
Naval Activity p. 243
The Crowning Horror
Maniagassa Island p. 246

Chapter VII. Conclusions

Summary p. 247
Naval Gunfire />. 247
Air Support p. 24H
Artillery p. 250
Landing Vehicles p. 251
Tanks />. 253
Engineers p. 254
Signal Communications g.
Logistics p. 256
Medical p. 256
Japanese Tactical Lessons

and 9 July) p. 235 Japanese Strategical Summary p. 259
*oint p. 235 The Assessment p. 261

Appendices

263

Bibliography p. 263

II.

Chronology p. 266

1 II.

Casualties p. 268

Command and Stall List of

Major Units

p. 270

Kyle's Mission p. 275

VI.

Basic Organization -Iligl

her Echelon

Task Forces facing p. 278

\I1.

Task Organization />. 27!)

VIII.

Japanese Order of Battle g.

28 1

IX.

1 he Last Days of General

Saito />. 283

Navy I nit Commendation g

. 285

XI.

Distinguished Unit Citation

g. 286

Vtl

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016 with funding from

University of Florida, George A. Smathers Libraries

https://archive.org/details/saipanthebeginniOOwash

ESHEEKi (BJUS^

CHAPTER I

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Plans and Preparations

STRATEGIC SITUATION

DURING the first months of 1944, determined
thrusts by the Allies were cracking Japanese
defenses throughout the Pacific. On land,
Japan’s hold on Burma was being systemat-
ically whittled down; at sea, the United kStates
Fleet was spreading destruction far and w i de
in preparation for new strategic moves. Sub-
marines were littering the bottom of the Paci-
fic with the wrecks of a large part of Japan’s
merchant fleet. Frequent and shattering attacks
from shore and carrier-based aircraft were tor-
menting the Japanese from many quarters.

In February 1944 the seizure of Kwajalein.
Majuro and Eniwetok in the Marshalls and
Task Force 58’s strikes against Truk Atoll
( 16-17 February) and the Marianas (22 Feb-
ruary) had profoundly affected the strategic
situation in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Seizure of
bases in the Marshalls afforded protected, for-
ward-area anchorages for the entire fleet and
for the assembly of large amphibious forces,
together with sufficient land area for airstrips
suited to all types of aircraft.

Strikes on Truk had rendered that important
enemy base temporarily useless, had revealed
its relative weakness and. coupled with the
Marshalls’ invasion, made the Japanese Navy
realize that its southeastern Pacific bases were
untenable. The withdrawal of Japanese naval
aviation from Rabaul, a process begun in 1944.
was hastened by the rl ruk raids. The United

States “leapfrog" strategy was following a con
sistently effective pattern.1

The carrier strike on the Marianas, following
immediately that on Truk, was conceived as a
continuation of pressure which would keep the
Japanese off balance in their dispositions and
planning. Certainly, a major objective of this
particular strike was the desire to gain aerial
photographic coverage of the island. The
United States had never had complete coverage
of the Japanese Marianas and had taken no
photographs of Guam since that island’s early-
war capture by the enemy.

Strategically, however, the Marianas strike
had the effect of displaying the capabilities of
fast carrier task forces in long-range opera-
tions and emphasizing to the Japanese that
their inner defense line was now seriously
threatened. The stage was set for the next
major operation in the Central Pacific, by
which United States forces proposed to estab-
lish themselves firmly in the inner perimeter of
Japan's defense. This offensive was to he against
the Marianas Islands.

Another carrier raid, one against the West-
ern Carolines (30 March-1 April), though not

1 The basic concept of the “leapfrog” strategy was
to seize those islands essential for our use, bypassing
many strongly held intervening ones which were not
necessary for our purpose. The disparity between our
naval power and that of the enemy made it virtually
impossible for the Japanese to support the garrisons
of bypassed islands, and these bases became innocu-
ous. (Though considerable effort was required to keep
them that way.)

influencing selection of the Marianas as an
objective or the time of the operation’s execu-
tion, exerted a vital, direct impact on the entire
strategic picture.2

The Marianas form a vital link in an almost
unbroken chain of islands extending 1,350 miles
southward from Tokyo. Many of these islands
are small, rocky, and valueless from a military
viewpoint, but others are so located as to pro-
vide a series of mutually supporting airfields
and bases, like so many stepping stones, afford-
ing protected lines of air and sea communica-
tions from the home islands of the Japanese
Empire to their island fortresses. Capture of
the Marianas by United States forces would
effectively cut these admirably -protected lines
of enemy communication and provide bases
from which we could not only control sea areas
farther west in the Pacific, but also on which
we could base long-range aircraft to bomb
Tokyo and the home islands of the Empire.3

Of the 15 islands which comprise the group,
only Saipan, Tinian, Kota, and Guam — all in
the southern Marianas (150°. East longitude,
15° North latitude) — were worthwhile military
objectives. The group’s northern islands pro-
trude in precipitous, conical peaks from the
surrounding seas. Anatahan, for example, is
onty a fraction the size of Saipan, yet rises over
a thousand feet higher. (See Map 1.)

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When Magellan discovered the islands in
1521, he was impressed by the sailing ability of
the native boys and named the group “Islas de
las Velas Latinas” (Islands of the Lateen
Sails) ; but his officers, angered by the natives’
thieving habits, called them “Islas de los Lad-
rones” (Islands of Thieves). The latter name
stuck until Queen Maria Anna, second wife of
Philip IV of Spain, sent missionaries and sol-
diers there and, thus, gave the group the name
Marianas.

2 USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, 204,
hereinafter cited as Campaigns. The War Reports,
Admiral King’s Report, 586, hereinafter cited as King.
Ltr from Adm R. K. Turner to CMC, 4Jan50, here-
inafter cited as Turner.

3 King, 589

The native Marianas’ islanders, the Chamor-
ros, were of small stature, brown-skinned with
scanty beards, and had the slanted eyes of the
Malay. Through the years, however, the ap-
pearance changed; the present Chamorros are
ethnically-mixed descendants of the Spanish,
Mexican, and Philippine soldiery who gar-
risoned the islands. The natives’ language was
permanently influenced by the Spanish domi-
nation.

The Marianas remained under Spanish con-
trol until 1898. The American cruiser Charles-
ton entered the harbor of Guam early in the
Spanish- American War, accepted the island’s
surrender, and. thus, provided the United
States with a much-needed coaling station for
ships en route to the Philippines. After the
war, Guam was retained by the United States.
In 1899, Spain sold all the other islands of the
Marianas and Carolines to Germany for four
and a half million dollars. In contrast to the
Spanish regime, which emphasized missionary
work, the German administration was directed
toward economic development.

Shortly after the outbreak of World War I
in 1914, Japan seized Germany’s Pacific domin-
ions. The League of Nations recognized the
seizure and in 1920 mandated the Marianas,
with the exception of Guam, to Japan.

Japan set about the settlement and develop-
ment of these islands in a vigorous fashion.
Until 1935, she regularly prepared an annual
report for submission at Geneva, in accordance
with the terms of the mandate ; but after 1935.
when she withdrew from the League of Nations,
she ceased her reports and let it be known she
would not tolerate any challenge to her sover-
eignty in this part of the Pacific. Between 1936
and the outbreak of the Pacific War, the ter-
ritory was very jealously guarded against visits
by Europeans. It was generally known, how-
ever. that by 1938 the Japanese immigrant set-
tlers outnumbered the natives and that, in de-
fiance of the terms of the mandate, Japan was
planning powerful naval and air bases through-
out the archipelago. Few of their extensive
plans reached fruition, however. Japan had
long desired possession of Guam, and one of
her first moves after the outbreak of war was
to seize that island.4

SAIPAN

• Forollon De Poj aros

0 Maug

• Asuncion.

* Agri han
* Pogan

1^ Alamogan •

Guguan .

Sarigan *

Anotahon •»

* Medinilla f

f SAIPAN

4 Tinian
■' A g u i j a n

Roto

W Guam

MARIANAS

ISLANDS

100 0

R— _ i

100

NAUTICAL MILES
(APPROX)

MAP

R0 7093

4 The foregoing account of the historical background
is a synthesis of the following sources: Pacific Islands
Under . Japanese Mandate, Tadao Yanaihara, 8-28;
The Pacific Islands Handbook, 191/4, It. W. Robson,
150—151; Encyclopedia Brittannica, Vol. XVII, 4—5;
■IIGPOA Information Bulletin 7 —44, “Marianas,” 5;
Smithsonian Institution War Background Studies
Number Sixteen, Peoples of the Western Pacific,
Micronesia, and Melanesia, Herbert W. Krieger, 35.

Saipan, situated some 1,250 nautical miles
south by east of Tokyo, was closer to the Japa-
nese Empire than any other large Mandated
Island. (See Map 2.) Together with the neigh-
boring island of Tinian (three nautical miles
to the southwest), it formed the key point of
the Marianas defense and was an important
supply base and communication center for the
Central Pacific. Tanapag Harbor, on Saipan’s
west coast, was used as a fueling and supply
station for ships en route to and from the
Empire. A part of the naval task force for
the ill-fated attack on Midway was assembled
t here in May 1912. Surface pat mis for the Mari-
anas shipping routes were based in the harbor.

Two airfields and a seaplane base at Saipan
and two airfields on Tinian served as stopover
and refueling stations for the aircraft ferry
route between Japan and the south. In addi-
tion, a large portion of the planes providing air
cover for the Marianas were based on the Sai-
pan-Tinian fields.

Though used extensively as a rest and re-
placement center and as a training area for
troops, Saipan lacked the natural facilities of a
major naval base. Only a few vessels could find
suitable anchorages at Tanapag Ilarbor.

Irregularly shaped and with its long axis
running generally north and south, the island
of Saipan is approximately 14% miles long
and 6% miles wide. Its area is roughly 72 square
miles. The east coast of the island is free of
coral reefs, except within the limits of Magi-
cienne Bay; the west coast, on the other hand,
is almost completely fringed by reefs which
extend in width from one-fourth to two miles
from the shoreline. Generally, the northern
and eastern coasts are clearly defined by cliffs
along the shoreline (except in Magicienne Bay
and two small areas on Ivagman Peninsula’s
northeastern side) ; the western coast is lower-
lying and offers relatively few natural obstacles
to movement inland.5

5 G-2 Study of the Southern Marianas, V Amphib-
ious Corps, 21, hereinafter cited as 0-2 Study.
JICI’OA Information Bulletin 7-44, 50.

asuTO airfield as seen from the air. Jit. Tapotchau is visible in the background. Magicienne Bay juts from the
right of picture. Black smoke at upper left is coming from the Garapan-Tanapag Harbor area.

Almost in the center of Saipan, Mount Tapot-
cliau humps its back against t lie sky to a height
of 1,554 feet. It seems higher, so steep are its
sides. This mountain, by all odds the island’s
key terrain feature, afforded the Japanese ex-
cellent observation of the beachhead for 10
days after the landing.

Much of the eastern and northern part of
t lie island is a series of hills and rolling plateaus
which tilt sharply down to narrow coastal flats
or end abruptly in high cliffs that drop sheer to
the sea. The southern and western areas, how-
ever, are much flatter, and the land levels off
into a coastal plain.

On the southern flatlands, at a point about
one in ile from the south coast, the Japanese
built Aslito Airfield. Its main runway, on an

east-west axis, was 3,000 feet long and 900 feet
wide. A second, shorter run way ,4 in the form of
an arm, protruded southwestward from the
main strip. The field was hard-surfaced with
crushed coral rock.6

Just north of Charan Ivanoa and but a short
distance inland, the Japanese had half com-
pleted a small fighter strip, then abandoned

6 Unlike other Japanese airfields, Aslito had no
provision for turning circles, but wide runways af-
forded sufficient space for this function. Jutting to
the north from the center of the main runway was
the larger of two service aprons. This apron, 900 feet
long and 600 feet wide, gave access to the three main
hangars. About 250 yards to the east, a secondary
apron (900 feet by 165 feet) fronted two small
hangars.

MARPi point airfield, at Saipan’s northern end, was under construction at the time of United States landings.

the project. This strip ran north and south,
perpendicular to the prevailing east-west wind.
Since such an arrangement is highly undesir-
able from a pilot’s point of view, it is odd that
the work was ever begun. This strip was not
unique, however, inasmuch as other Japanese
airfields, on other islands, were similarly posi-
tioned.

At Saipan’s extreme northern end. amidst a
maze of rocky hills and depressions, there
exists a plateau of sufficient size for the con-
struction of an airfield. 1 1 ere the Japanese were
building the Marpi Point Airfield when United
States landings interrupted their plans. The
shortage of construction equipment, a factor
that had hampered work all over the island,
slowed progress on this field to snail’s pace.

The coastal plain along the western shore
contains most of the settlements of Saipan, in-
cluding the two largest: Garapan and Charan
Ivanoa. In these two towns were some well-con-
structed buildings, most of which were made
of wood and tile, although, in some of the bet-
ter structures, masonry was used. A narrow-
gauge railroad ran around most of Saipan’s
coastal areas.

Just inland and behind the town of Charan
Ivanoa is Lake Susupe, fed principally during
the rainy season and becoming very shallow
during dry periods. Surrounding the lake is a
large swamp, which presented a major obstacle
to movement through the area. There are no
rivers on Saipan, but two springs exist near
Tanapag, on the west coast, and others near

garapan, neat and trim here, was reduced to rubble by United States bombardment. Picture is of northern part
of town.

the village of Donnay, on the east coast.7

The climate on Saipan is characterized by
I wo seasons, the dry winter monsoon that be-
gins in November and lasts through March, and
the wet summer monsoon that starts in April
and ends in late October or early November.
These two seasons’ temperatures show little
variance, but all other phenomena have marked
differences.

During the winter monsoon there is a great
deal of fair weather, broken occasionally by
storms of short duration, but the summer mon-
soon brings thunder-showers and the threat of
typhoons.8 An average of one typhoon yearly
originates in the area (August or September),
but in June and July the local weather is sub-
ject. to the influence of typhoons originating
within 500 miles. Even though Saipan may
escape the storm’s direct path, these “near
misses” often take on the proportions of a con-
siderable gale. The corrugated tin roofs on the

7 Northern Troops and Landing Force, G— 2 Report,
74, hereinafter cited as NTLF 0—2 Report. 0—2 Study,
23.

8 JICPOA Information Bulletin 7-44, 51—52.

native abodes are sometimes flung recklessly
about the island by the winds, providing a
threat to life and limb.

Annual rainfall at Saipan averages between
120 to 125 inches.9 From November to June,
Saipan’s monthly rainfall averages from two
and one-half to six inches, but from July to
October, frequent downpours increase the aver-
age to a foot per month. Due to the regularity
of its precipitation (275 days per year are
rainy),10 Saipan depended largely on rain wa-
ter, collected in tanks placed under the eaves of
buildings, for its domestic water supply. A few
wells existed on the island, but these — and the

9 This is double the amount that annually falls on
New Orleans, our wettest city ; is triple that of New
York City, Washington, D. C. and Philadelphia ; five
times that of Omaha; six times that of San Francisco;
and dwarfs the fall at Yuma, Arizona by 33 times.
Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, World Weather
Records, Vol. XC, 316-356, hereinafter cited as World
Weather Records.

10 Though this seems like considerable rain, Saipan
gets the least of any island in the region (Carolines,
Marianas. Palaus). Sailing Directions for the Pacific
Island, Vol. I. 566.

0-1 RIDGELINE

^ ■■ .Jpl

JHEsihuH

charan KANOA BEFORE the blow fell. 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, after landing north (left) of here, fought along the
coast and seized beach area (Green 3) shown.

already-mentioned springs — furnished only a
small portion of the population with water.11

The average monthly temperature is rela-
tively constant throughout the year, with 76°
in January and February and 80° in June. In
the United States, constancy of temperature
similar to Saipan’s is experienced only by the
inhabitants of Key West, Florida. Saipan’s
hottest days are in June, when the thermometer
occasionally climbs to 95°. February brings the
coolest weather, with periodic drops to 01°.
Relative humidity is high, averaging 78% in
winter and 84% in summer.12

31 0-2 Study, 27.

12JlCPOA Information Bulletin 29-44, Weather
Survey for Carolines and Marianas, 2-3. World
Weather Records, 331.

Saipan’s major industry (under Germany
and Japan) was sugar production. The South
Seas Development Company (Japanese) oper-
ated three large plantations and two sugar
mills. Each mill had a capacity of 1,200 tons of
sugar cane daily, from which 120 tons of crude
sugar were produced. Several plants produced
alcohol and liquors from the molasses by-
product. Part of this was converted into syn-
thetic Scotch whiskey, port wine, and four or
five other beverage concoctions for Japanese
consumption.13

Other than sugar cane, Saipan’s agricultural

13 After D-Day this production stopped, but the flies
did not. Making the most of the situation, these in-
sects embarked on a veritable orgy of feasting and
reproduction.

Japanese boats photographed off Charan Kanoa pier during Task Force 58’s strikes of February 1944. 3d Bat-
talion, 23d Marines, landed on beach shown (Blue 1) on D-Day.

products included tapioca, sweet potatoes, pa-
payas, cotton, and vegetables. None of these
was grown in sufficient quantity for export,
however. In 1930, a little less than ten percent
of the copra collected in the Mandated Islands
came from Saipan. This commodity, together
with sugar and alcohol, formed the chief items
for export. A coffee plantation was established
there in 1928. but results were not particularly
gratifying.

Fishing was also an important industry. In
1936, nearly four and a half million pounds of
bonito and tuna were caught in the Marianas
group and shipped to Japan. This, plus small
amounts of tobacco and tropical fruit, com-
pleted the list of secondary articles for export.

The Japanese on Saipan held most of the
“white-collar" jobs in the towns, while the
Chamorros, for the most part, were farmers,
each possessing an average of 15 to 25 acres of
land. Also included on the island, apparently
as part of a Japanese colonization project, were

a large number of Koreans and Okinawans.
'The latter had been saturated with Japanese
propaganda to the effect that they could expect
only the eruelest handling from the Amer-
icans.14

JAPANESE DEFENSES

Saipan was dependent on Japan for imports
of foodstuffs (mainly rice), manufactured
articles, lumber, building materials, machinery,
petroleum products, dry goods and drugs. With
the advent of war, these imports became sec-
ondary to the more important items necessary
for maintenance of the military establishment.

Apparently, however, the shipment of con-
struction material so vitally needed for fortifi-
cation work was not accorded an early enough
priority. This was due, first, to the rapid pace
of the United States thrust through the Gil-
berts and Marshalls and the bypassing of the
Central Carolines, which left the Japanese little

14 JICPOA Information Bulletin 7-44, 58-60.

storage vault for 120mm dual-purpose gun ammunition.
Powerfully constructed positions such as this would
have been more common at Saipan if Japanese had not
been hampered by a shortage of cement and other
materials.

time for shipment of these supplies; second, to
the devastating effectiveness of United States
submarine activity, which was exacting a heavy
toll of enemy shipping intended for Saipan;15
and, third, to the incorrect assumption by the
Japanese that the next United States objective
would be the Palaus, causing them to assign a
priority of construction material to those is-
lands.

Time and time again, ships loaded with
cement and steel (as well as personnel) had
been sent from the Empire only to be sunk by
American submarines. The effect of this is in-
dicated in a Japanese document, dated 10 May
1944, entitled “Present State of Supplies and
Materiel in the Southern Marianas:

The current freight shortage, which is caused by
shipping losses, has deprived the area of much needed
materiel. One ship out of three is sunk, and a second
damaged, by enemy action.

It was this situation, largely, which caused the
Japanese Chief of Staff, 31st Army, to com-

t Report on Japanese Defense Plan for the Island
of Saipan, Southern Marianas, prepared by the En-
gineer, Expeditionary Troops (TF 56), July 1944, 1,
hereinafter cited as TF 56 Engineer's Report.

plain to the Chief of Staff. Central Pacific
Fleet, that

.... we can not strengthen the fortifications appre-
ciably now unless we can get materials suitable fin-
permanent construction. Specifically, cement, barbed
wire, lumber, etc., which can not be obtained in these
islands. No matter how many soldiers there are, they
can do nothing in regard to fortifications but sit
around with their arms folded, and the situation is
unbearable. I would like this matter of supply of
construction materials dealt with immediately.16

That the Japanese defenses were incomplete
at the time of our 15 June landings is partially
explained by the fact that their defensive in-
stallation building plan called for completion
about November 1944.17

Another indication that the Japanese time
schedule was not adequately keyed to the situa-
tion is found in an enemy document, published
on 20 May 1944 (less than a month before
United States landings), entitled “Outline of
Defensive Plan of Northern Marianas Force: "

The various Tmits will so prepare their defensive
strength, beginning with the immediate construction
of defensive positions, that when they are fully de-
veloped they can destroy the enemy landing force on
the beach. We will transform these islands into a
fortess so that we can expect, absolutely, to hold our
airfields. On account of this, although it is tardy,
[author’s italics] we will complete our field positions
by the first ten days in June and thereafter we will
rapidly construct permanent defensive positions in
strategic places.

It is interesting to note that no specific mention
was made of the construction of permanent de-
fensive positions inland. The whole Japanese
scheme of defense was committed to “destroy-
ing the enemy landing force on the beach.”18

As indicated, the Japanese failed to exploit
fully the defensive potentialities of Saipan. The
island’s natural features — including excellent
observation, long fields of fire, natural obstacles
that canalized movement, cover and conceal-
ment— made it nearly ideal from a defense
viewpoint.

16 CTNCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9652.

17 NTTjF 0-2 Report, 6.

18 Task Force 56. (Expeditionary Troops), 0—2 Re-
port, hereinafter cited as TF 56 0-2 Report, 7.

889590°- 50—2

open trenchworks were employed extensively by the Japanese at Saipan, because they lacked adequate amounts
of construction materiel.

JAPANESE ORGANIZATION

lhe Japanese organization on Saipan was
extremely complicated ; in some cases there were
three possible nomenclatures for a single unit.
Marly in the war, Japanese army organizations
were known as “expeditionary forces” and re-
ceived numerical designations relating to the
islands upon which they belonged; thus, the 1st
expeditionary Force was on Saipan, the 6th on
Guam, etc. In May 1944, because of numerous
inter-island transfers and the influx of rein-
forcements, the Japanese changed their system
of nomenclature. Infantry personnel was or-
ganized into “independent infantry battalions”
and numbered consecutively. The battalions
then became part of “independent mixed bri-
gades." to which were attached one or more

battalions of artillery and an engineering com-
pany or antiaircraft unit, or both. These bri-
gades were, in turn, assigned numbers. In addi-
tion, there were numbered regiments, variously
composed, to complicate the picture further.

The intricacies of this organization were
either not explained or insufficiently explained
to the individual Japanese soldiers, who habit-
ually identified themselves by their original
unit names. Certainly the mystery caused
United States intelligence agencies more head-
aches than code names ever could. Thus, with
their flair for making the simple difficult, the
Japanese delayed United States identification
of enemy units and establishment of an accurate
order of battle.

American submarines further abetted the

confusion. Numerous ships were sunk in waters
adjacent to Saipan with the result that many
survivors and stragglers made their way to the
island, arriving without records or equipment.
In addition, a number of units intended for
transfer to more remote stations were trapped
on the island by our landings. The order of
battle, as now reconstructed, is the result of a
careful cross-check of operation orders and
maps, quartermaster and mess hall records,
tables of organization, field orders, casualty re-
ports, and prisoner of war interrogations.

Saipan’s forces were jointly commanded by
Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo and Lieutenant
General Yoshitsugu Saito. Admiral Nagumo,
Commander Central Pacific Fleet and 5th Base
Force, was an illustrious officer, having estab-
lished his fame on 7 December 1941, as com-
mander of forces afloat during the Pearl Har-
bor attack and, later, at Midway and Santa
Cruz. His Central Pacific Fleet command was
a newly-created administrative unit which, as
a practical matter, never progressed beyond the
paper stage.

The senior officer in the area, Lieutenant
General Hideyoshi Obata, commanding general
of the 31st. Army and the Army administrative
command for the Marianas-Bonins-Marslialls-
Carolines, was at Palau on an inspection trip
at the time of the United States landings. The
actual command of Saipan’s defense devolved,
therefore, upon Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu
Saito, commanding general of the Northern
M arianas Army Group and the 43d Division
(reinforced).

The two basic army fighting units were the
43d Division (reinforced) and the 47th Mixed
Brigade. The former, directly under Saito’s
command, was composed of three infantry regi-
ments (118th. 135th [less 1st Battalion], and
136th) and additional units to perform trans-
portation, medical, ordnance and communica-
tion services. The 47th Mixed Brigade,19 com-
manded hy Colonel Oka, was made up of lliree
independent infantry battalions (316th, 31.7th
and 318th), three battalions of artillery, and
an engineer company.

19 This unit was the original Saipan garrison force
and prior to the change of its name had been called
“1st Expeditionary Force.” In his order of 8 June

Also important to Saipan's defense but not
part of the two major army units were a tank
regiment, an infantry battalion, an antiaircraft
regiment, two regiments of engineers, and two
transportation companies.

In addition to these regularly-assigned army
units, there were numerous straggler units. In
most cases, these were ill-equipped and poorly-
organized and could not participate as effi-
cient fighting organizations. But, certainly, in
sniping and infiltrating roles, these units per-
formed valuable service for the Japanese.
Army forces on Saipan totalled 22,702.

The Japanese Navy was also well repre-
sented, the two principal fighting units being
the 55th Naval Guard Force (Maizuru Keibi-
tai) and the 1st Yokosuka Special Naval Land-
ing Force. All naval units were commanded
by the combined staff of the Central Pacific
Fleet Headquarters and the 5th Special Base
Force, both under Vice Admiral Nagumo. In
addition to the two major naval forces, there
were units to handle details of communication,
construction, supply, transportation, pay and
routine administration.

Most of the air personnel originally based in
the Marianas had left those islands during May
and early June to provide air support for the
reinforcement of Biak Island, near New
Guinea’s north coast. Operational losses, as
well as disease, claimed a large percentage of
these personnel. During the second week in
June, the survivors were ordered b;tck to the
Palaus and Marianas. Few, however, reached
even the Palaus on the return trip, and, appar-
ently, none ever got back to the Marianas.
Small detachments of several air organizat ions
remained at Saipan, indicating that the Jap-
anese had planned to send planes back in time
to contest a United States incursion.

Though the totals changed from day to day,
the number of naval (including air) personnel

1944, LtGen Obata had ordered that the 47th Inde-
pendent Mixed Brigade he transferred to Tinian and
relieve the 50th Infantry Regiment of the task of de-
fending that island. The 50th would then go to, and
defend, Rota. The transfer was to commence about
15 June 1944, but United States landings on that date
disrupted Obata’s plans. CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item
#9645.

these Japanese 8-inch guns, still loaded on flatcars, are but three of the scores of weapons unemplaced at the
time of United States landings.

on the island on 15 June 19*14 was approxi-
mately (>,960, bringing the total of Japanese
military forces on Saipan to 29,662.20

For the defense of Saipan, the Japanese
divided the island into four defense sectors (as
shown in Map 3): the northern sector included
the northern third of the island to Tanapag;
the Navy sector included Tanapag, Garapan
and Mutch o Point: the central sector included
the western beaches upon which the 2d Marine
Division landed on D-Day; the southern sec-
tor. by far the largest, included all of the area,

-1’ A 7X7 Cl— 2 Report, 66-69 and App. J. For a de-
tailed Order of Rattle, with strengths of individual
units, see Appendix VIII.

Cliaran Kanoa-Agingan Poin't-Aslito Airfield-
Nafutan Point -Magicienne Bay-Kagman Pen-
insula. The unit assignments to sectors were:

Northern sector, 135th Infantry Regiment.

Navy sector, 5th Special Base Force (Navy
unit).

Central sector. 136th Infantry Regiment (less
two companies).

Southern sector, 47th Mixed Brigade.

In addition to those units assigned to spe-
cific sectors, a reserve of four infantry com-
panies and two shipping companies was sta-
tioned in the Chacha-Tsutsuuran area with
orders to “train principally in seaborne maneu-
vers.” One mountain artillery regiment and

Mar pi Point

RD 7093

JAPANESE DEFENSE
SECTORS

1000 0 1000 3000 Yds

MAP 3

one battalion of field artillery, stationed in the
vicinity of Mt. Fina Susu, were designated as
I he “artillery defenses of Saipan.” A tank
regiment was located in the Clmcha-Laulau
area. Antiaircraft artillery employed the bulk
of its strength to protect Aslito Airfield; a
smaller force covered the air over Tanapag
Harbor. Most of the service elements were
located on the west coast in the Charan Ivanoa-
Garapan base area.21

By counterattacks, launched during the night
from specified points, the Japanese hoped to
“demolish the enemy landing units at the
water’s edge.” These thrusts were to employ
1 loops in the vicinity of the area to be coun-
terattacked, plus reserves from other parts of
the island if necessary. A plan was prepared
in which assembly areas, firing positions, and
directions of movement were shown for coun-
terattacks on the most likely areas of United
States penetration.

The same plan designated those areas con-
sidered strategically and tactically important.
(See Map 4.) A peculiarity of this terrain
evaluation is that Mr. Tapotchau did not fall
into either category, although that feature
certainly dominates most of the island.22

Even the best informed Japanese commanders
could not fully appreciate the great need for
speed. By 14 June, however, Admiral N agum.o
was forced to the conclusion that “the Mari-
anas are the first line of defense of the home-
land,” and, “it is a certainty that the Americans
will land in the Marianas Group either this
month or next.” The landing on Saipan took
place the next day.

Large numbers of heavy weapons (ranging
from 200mm mortars to 5-inch coastal defense
guns) and literally dozens of searchlights and
antiaircraft guns still remained in naval depots
or loaded on railroad cars or still packed in
cosmoline near partially excavated gun posi-

21 Ibid., 8-9. It will be noted that the 118th Infantry
Itegiment was not assigned a specific mission. This
unit arrived during the first week in June and. there-
fore, was too late for the defense order. Its pres-
ence, however, afforded General Saito a sizeable re-
serve to use wherever he chose.

22 Ibid., 8-9.

tions. The high ground in the island's center
had received little attention in the defensive
preparations; and, indeed, beach defenses them-
selves were in many cases far from complete.

In this small theater, so suitable for the em-
ployment of field artillery, the Japanese had
neither horses nor adequate vehicles to provide
necessary mobility for that arm. Apart from
manpower, the only means for moving field
guns were rear-drive trucks designed for use
on roads, a factor which led to abandonment
of a great number of artillery pieces as the
Japanese withdrew.

In so far as training in defensive warfare is
concerned, Japanese forces displayed a marked
deficiency; there was little evidence of organi-
zation of the ground, the principal airfield
(Aslito) was virtually undefended against
ground troops, and their counterattack plans
were poorly conceived.23

Despite the apparent deficiencies of the de-
fensive installations and plans, one vital char-
acteristic of a good defense was present — the
individual defender was determined to hold
the island and was willing to give his life to
realize this end. It was this characteristic which
would present the greatest difficulty to our
forces throughout the battle for Saipan.

HIGH-LEVEL PLANNING
Casablanca Conferences

As already indicated, the Japanese were

23 TV 56 Engineer’ s Report, 1—2. ,

undamaged 75MM FIELD PIECE captured by the 27th Divi-
sion. Lacking suitable prime-movers, the Japanese
were forced to abandon many artillery pieces.

the enemy, possessing fighting characteristics of which
any nation could he proud, generally favored death to
surrender. This superior private, among the 3 percent
of Japanese soldiers taken prisoner, poses in an in-
ternment camp.

well aware of the Marianas’ importance in the
defense of their homeland. There was almost
unanimous recognition that a United States
attempt to move into the Marianas area would
precipitate a struggle which could decide the
war’s outcome. Most Japanese felt that, given
enough time, the outcome of such a battle
would be favorable to themselves.

Some United States planners, notably Ad-
miral Ernest J. King, attached the same im-
portance to the Marianas and, likewise, pre-
dicted that an all-out naval engagement would
be provoked. Many other top-echelon planners,
however, were unconvinced of the necessity for
Seizing the Marianas. As will be seen, the
selection of the Marianas as an objective ( was
in no sense inevitable or obvious; the selection
could more accurately be termed a development
in tbe strategic situation. Because the develop-
ment was an integral part of the strategic

planning for the entire Pacific, it will be
necessary to discuss the over-all planning which
took place.

Although the Joint United States Strategic
Committee had begun preparation of a stra-
tegic plan for the defeat of Japan in August
1912, this was not completed by January 19-13
when the Combined Chiefs of Staff24 met at
Casablanca. In fact, there was no final, ap-
proved plan in existence for the defeat of
Japan at this time. Pre-war strategic plans,
while helpful, could serve only as a general
guide, since many of the assumed conditions
and situations did not obtain. In the absence
of a concrete, detailed, written study, Admiral
King orally presented to the Combined Chiefs
his analysis of the strategic picture. In it he
indicated that Rabaul and the Philippines were
major objectives, while Truk and the Marianas
would constitute vitally important interme-
diate objectives. The latter islands King consid-
ered the “key,” because they lay athwart the
Japanese lines of communication in the Central
Pacific.

From the January 1913 Casablanca con-
ferences emerged a strategic outline, similar
in many respects to prewar plans, which Avas
to serve as a framework for later formal,
written plans. That framework was this : a
line of communications through the Central
Pacific to the Philippines would be opened,
following a route through, the northwestern
Marshalls and thence to Truk and the Mari-
anas.25

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in
Chief Southwest Pacific, disliked the Central
Pacific route from the outset and made himself
voluble on the subject on many occasions. In
his Reno I (campaign plan for the Southwest
Pacific area), published on 25 February 1913,
M a c Arthur expressed the opinion that the
Central Pacific route avouIc! be “time consum-
ing and expensive in our naval poAver and

24 These were the American and British Chiefs of
Staff meeting together. It is pertinent to note that,
in the war Avith the most amphibious characteristics
of any in history, no senior United States Marine was
included on the high planning level.

25 CCS 56th Meeting, 14Jan43.

LEGEND

Expected points of U.S. landings.
Japanese counterattack routes

Areas Japanese considered strategi-
cally important

Areas Japanese considered
tactically important

M a r p i Point

Agmgan

Point

Kagman

Peninsula

Nafutan Point

RD 7093

Change troop dis-
positions accord-
ing to this plan
as direction of
enemy attack varies.

Each unit will con-
solidate strategi-
cally important
points and will
carry out counter-
attacks with reserve
forces and tanks
against the ^enemy
landing units and
will demolish the
enemy during the
night at the water’s
edge .

JAPANESE COUNTERATTACK

PLAN

1000 0 1000

MAP 4

3000 rds

shipping'.” In addition, a reorientation of an
established front in the South and Southwest
Pacific areas would be required and the use
of land-based air support would not be pos-
sible. On the other hand, MacArthur felt, an
approach through the Southwest Pacific, north-
westward along the north coast of New Guinea,
offered much better chances for success.-0

Mac Arthur’s objections notwithstanding, the
United States Joint Chiefs presented a plan
to the Combined Chiefs at Washington in May
of 1943 which concluded that the Central Pac-
fic route was t lie better one, since success here
would have more decisive strategic results.
The British representatives agreed and the
Joint Chiefs’ proposal was adopted.27

Washington and Quebec Conferences

At the Washington Conference, Admiral
King again discussed the Marianas as a specific
objective. Speaking in much the same tenor as
he had at Casablanca five months before, the ad-
miral described the Marianas as the “key” to
the Pacific situation because of their location
astride the Japanese Central Pacific communi-
cation lines. It appears that the admiral’s in-
tense interest in the Marianas stemmed from a
realization on his part that the true importance
of this target was not unanimously felt. Sig-
nificant in this connection is the fact that the
M arianas had not been prescribed as a specific
objective even at this time.28

News of the decisions of the Washington con-
ferences was not happily received in General
MacArthur’s headquarters. In protest, Mac-
Arthur pointed out that the Central Pacific
route was a return to pre-war plans, which had
not assumed the availability of Australia as a
staging base for offensive operations.29 On 3
August 1943, Headquarters Southwest Pacific
Area promulgated Reno II. a revision of Reno

2« RENO I. 2r>Keb4.8.

27 .TPS 07/4 : JOS 287 and 287/1 ; Minutes JOS 76th
and 80th Meetings.

2* TRIDENT, 21 May43. 92d Meeting.

29 Radio message, CINCSWPA (Gen MacArthur) to
WARCOS (Gen G. C. Marshall) 0-3302, 20.Tun43,
OM-IN 13149.

I based upon limitations imposed by the Com-
bined Chiefs’ decisions.30

Further evidence that many officers on the
joint planning level were not whole-heartedly
convinced that the Marianas were a necessary
target is found in the fact that these islands
were not mentioned in the written plans which
the Joint Chief of Staff took with them to the
Quebec conferences in August 1943. Once there,
however, Admiral King again mentioned the
Marianas, and, in addition, the Combined Stall
Planners, a subordinate committee of the Com-
bined Chiefs, listed the Marianas as a possible
objective. The result of this was that the Com-
bined Chiefs approved the Marianas as an
objective, noting that it might be a “necessary
or desirable” campaign. But, in formulating a
time schedule for all operations in the Pacific
and Far East, the Marianas were again omitted.

Perhaps the most significant decision reached
at the Quebec conference was that Rabaul
would not be occupied. This departure from
previous plans, together with the “approval"
of the Marianas, constituted the major changes
from the Washington conferences four months
earlier.31

General MacArthur was very disappointed
by the conclusions reached at the Quebec con-
ferences. The weight of evidence indicated —
to the general — that the Combined Chiefs
planned to give the United States Navy re-
sponsibility for the prosecution of the war
against Japan and that Southwest Pacific op-
erations would be terminated at the Vogel kop
Peninsula, New Guinea’s western extremity.32

Realizing that General MacArthur was dis-
appointed with the decisions, General George C.
Marshall, a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, sent M acArthur a lengthy message ex-
plaining the decisions and allaying any fears
that Southwest Pacific forces were assuming a
position of unimportance from the strategic

30 RENO II. 3Aug43.

31 CCS 313, 1SAug43, Appreciation and Plan for
the Defeat of Japan: Minutes CCS 110th Meeting.
17Aug43.

32 Radio message, CINCSWPA to WARCOS, C-G131.
28Sep43, CM IN 19656.

THREE TOP admirals look al Saipan. From left to right: Admiral Spruance, who commanded the fleet of which the
landing force was a part: Admiral King, who pressed for the operation's execution on the JCS-CCS level; Ad-
miral Nimitz, who allocated ships and troops from his Pacific Forces to take Saipan.

point of view.33

Based upon this message and the decisions of
the Quebec conferences, General M aci Arthur
published another revision of Ids Reno plans,
this one called Reno III.34

From what has already heen written it may
be seen that the selection of the Marianas as a
target area was far from a random one. By the
autumn of 1943, however, this objective was
receiving more prominent mention, if not
unanimous agreement. On (> September 1 9,43.
the .Joint Mai- Plans Committee, on its own
initiative, prepared a study entitled “Outline
Plan For The Seizure Of The Marianas, In-
cluding Guam." This study was circulated for
consideration of the Joint Staff Planners, who

83 Radio message, AVARCOS (for .TCS) to CINC-
XWPA 8679, 20143, (Al OFT 030.

34 RENO ITT. 200.143.

agreed at their 99th meeting to inform the
Joint Chiefs that the study had been prepared
and was available. One interesting feature of
this particular study is the prediction that the
Japanese fleet would likely contest the move.35
This was not necessarily an original prediction,
however, since Admiral King had made it
earlier.

Unlike General MacArthur, Fleet Admiral
Chester Aik Nimitz had found little to protest
in the Combined Chiefs’ decisions. As Com-
mander in Chief United States Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Area, Nimitz would com-
mand operations over the Central Pacific route,
designated the main effort. In a letter to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 30 September 1943.
Nimitz outlined his garrison requirements for
1944. assuming in his letter that all operations

35 JPS 264, 6Sep43.

scheduled or approved by the Combined Chiefs
would take place. For planning purposes, oper-
ations would advance to the western Carolines
(Palau and Yap) by the end of 1944, the latter
offensives commencing 31 December. In regard
to the Marianas, the letter commented that
these would constitute a satisfactory alternative
for the Palaus. Thus, the axis of advance
through the Central Pacific could follow either
the Gill >erts-Marsha 1 ls-Carol ines-Pa la us-Phi 1-
ippines axis, or detour northward through the
M arianas-Bonins and thence to the Japanese
home islands.36

Cairo Conferences

In preparation for the next meeting with
their British counterparts, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff discussed two matters which would have
tremendous weight in the selection of objectives
in the Central Pacific. These matters, con-
densed to single terms, were Truk and the B-29.

Truk had long been recognized as a formid-
able enemy stronghold, one which would exact
a dear price from attackers. Yet because of its
dominance of Central Pacific sea lanes, it
seemed to demand seizure. During meetings on
15 and 17 November 1943, the Joint Chiefs
probed a possibility which had not before been
officially considered: the feasibility of by-pass-
ing Truk. Before arriving at a firm decision in
this respect it was decided the the United States
Navy should launch strong carrier attacks
against Truk as soon as possible to determine
and test the strength of that mysterious posi-
tion. The results of these attacks would be the
influencing factor in a by-passing decision.37

The Army Air Forces’ huge new bomber, the
B-29, now being produced in quantity, was
scheduled to deliver attacks against the Japa-
nese homeland from bases in China at the
earliest possible date. During the November
meetings, General Henry II. Arnold, com-
mander Army Air Forces and a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, voiced a doubt that had
been under discussion by Air Force planners for

38 Ltr from A dm C. W. Nimitz to the .TCS, 30Sep43,
subject: “Garrison Requirements in the Central Paci-
fic Area.”

37 The Truk strikes had the additional purpose of
covering the landings at Eniwetok.

some time: could the Chinese protect the B— 2‘d
bases from Japanese ground capture!' General
Arnold pointed out that it would be a normal
enemy reaction, after the first raids against the
homeland, to launch inspired ground offensives
toward the China B— 29 bases. Fate of the B— 2!)
plans, then, would rest in the hands of the
Chinese, in whom General Arnold expressed
lack of confidence. Without recommending any
drastic rearrangement of plans in regard to
the use of China bases, Arnold suggested that
these plans be expanded to include use of air-
fields in the Marianas Islands. These, the gen
eral considered, would be next to impossible
for the Japanese to recapture, once United
States forces were in possession. As an impor-
tant technical matter, General Arnold assured
the other JCS members that the B— 29 ’s could
carry their maximum bomb load from the
southern Marianas to the Japanese home is-
lands.

At last Admiral King was enjoying active
support in his long struggle for recognition of
the Marianas as a “key” objective. With the
added weight thrown behind the project by the
Army Air Forces, the question was no longer
in doubt. The Joint Chiefs decided that, al-
though the first B— 29 raids would be launched
from China bases commencing in early June
1944, strikes from the Marianas would start
in December of that year.38

Following these mid-November JCS agree-
ments were the late November-early December
1943 meetings in Cairo, Egypt. While the con-
ference— code named SEXTANT — concerned
itself chiefly with discussions and decisions re-
garding operations in Europe, some vital agree-
ments pertaining to Pacific operations were
also reached. The Combined Chiefs’ “Report
for the President and Prime Minister,” a sum-
mary of agreements and conclusions of a long-
range. global nature, was approved and ini-
tialed by Roosevelt and Churchill.39 Included

38 JCS 123d and 124 Meetings, 15 and 17Nov43.

39 Churchill classified the report as a “masterly sur-
vey of the whole military scene” and gave his opinion
that when military historians came to adjudge the
decisions of the SEXTANT conference, they would
find them fully in accordance with the “classic articles
of war.” SEXTANT, 5th Plenary Meeting.

in the report were two documents which were
to serve as a foundation for more detailed
planning: “Specific Operations for the Defeat
of Japan” and “Over-all Plan for the Defeat
of Japan.” 40

The former paper established a time schedule
for planning purposes in 1944 and included an
operation for the “seizure of Guam and Japa-
nese Marianas” on 1 October 1944 and the
initiation of “very long range bombing of vital
targets in Japanese ‘Inner Zone'41 from bases
in M arianas.”42 That the time schedule was for
planning purposes and not intended as a hard
and fast calendar of events, was indicated by
an enclosure to the document which pointed
out that certain “developments” might make
possible a speedup. These “developments”
which might permit short-cuts were : first, de-
feat of the Japanese Fleet at an early date;
second, sudden withdrawal of enemy forces
from certain areas (as from Iviska) ; third, an
earlier defeat of Germany than 1 October 1944.
coupled with an increase in Allied means (such
as by acceleration of the assault ship building
program) ; and, fourth, Russia’s early collabo-
ration in the war against Japan.43

The other document, “Over-all Plan for the
Defeat of Japan,” was approved in principle
and would be the basis for further investiga-
tion and preparation.44

The revised plan, circulated to Nimitz and
Mac Arthur on 23 December 1943, established
the strategic concept within the Pacific. This
concept prescribed “two series of operations”
which would be undertaken concurrently and
would be mutually supporting. One of these
“series” would be MacArtlnir's route along the
New Guinea-Netherlands East Indies-Philip-

40 “Report, to the President and Prime Minister,’'
CCS 42G/1. CCS 130th and 137th Meetings, 5th
Plenary Meeting.

41 The “Inner Zone’’ included: Japan proper, Man-
churia, Korea, North China, Karafuto (Japanese
Sakhalin) and Formosa.

42 “Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan.”
CCS 397 revised.

43 Enclosure to CCS 397 (revised).

44 “Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan." CCS
417 and 417/1. CCS 130th, 134th and 137th Meetings.
1st and 2d Plenary Meetings.

pines axis; the other, Nimitz’ route through the
Central Pacific, embracing the Mandated Is-
lands. The latter route would be favored where
conflicts in timing or means developed, since
it promised a “more rapid advance toward
Japan and her vital lines of communication,"
would provide “earlier acquisition of strategic
air bases closer to the Japanese homeland.”
and would be “more likely to precipitate a
decisive engagement with the Japanese Fleet.”
The concept envisaged that both series of
operations should progress to a point from
which to launch a “major assault” against the
Formosa -Luzon-China area in the spring of
1945. 45

Campaign Plan Granite

Decisions reached at the Cairo Conference,
together with the discussions and deliberations
of the Joint Chiefs prior to those meetings,
provided Admiral Nimitz and General Mac-
Arthur with considerable detail for the for-
mulation of their own plans. Some changes in
both officers’ previous planning was neces-
sitated by the new decisions. For example, the
Mai ■ianas as an objective was no longer a flex-
ible matter; it was now a definite, scheduled
operation. In addition, a carrier strike against
Truk had to be executed at an early date.

Admiral Nimitz’ campaign plan GRANITE,
preliminary draft published on 27 December
1943, planned the Central Pacific operations
for 1944. This document tentatively established
the sequence and timing of operations for the
Pacific Ocean Areas and of Southwest Pacific
operations requiring support of major Pacific
Fleet units as follows :

Tentative

Operation Target Date

Capture of Kwajalein 31 January 1944.

Capture of Ivavieng and

air attack on Truk 20 March 1944.

Capture of Manus 20 April 1944.

Capture of Eniwetok 1 May 1944.

Capture of Mortlock 1 July 1944.

Capture of Truk 15 August 1944.

Capture of Tinian, Saipan,

and Guam 15 November 1944.

45 Ibid., CCS 417/2. 23Dec43.

As may be seen, the Marianas operation was
planned as the final and culminating operation
of 1944. GRANITE emphasized, however, that
the sequence and timing were purely tentative,
that if means became available more rapidly
than could be anticipated, the program would
be accelerated. The plan pointed out. more-
over, that a major fleet action, although it
might delay amphibious operations for a brief
period, would greatly accelerate them there-
after. Likewise, a successful action might, by
decreasing the size and strength of forces re-
quired to protect lines of communication, jus-
tify the omission of an operation even as im-
portant as the capture of Truk.46

On 13 January, only 17 days after publica-
tion of the preliminary draft, another GRAN-
ITE was issued. This one changed certain of
the operation dates of the previous draft :
operations to seize Mortlock and Truk were
moved to 1 August; and, if carrier strikes
against Truk should indicate its capture un-
necessary, it could be by-passed and Central
Pacific forces could move direct to the Palaus
(which had not been mentioned in the previ-
ous draft) on 1 August. This eventuality
would change the first Marianas’ landings to
the first of November. Of particular interest
in this plan is the revelation that, at least for
a short time, Admiral Nimitz was thinking in
terms of seizing the Palaus and then backing
up to take the Marianas.47 This scheme did not
reappear in subsequent documents, however.

Representatives of the South, Southwest and
Central Pacific assembled at Pearl Harbor on
27 and 28 January 1944 to discuss, coordinate
and integrate their planning. In addition to
considering a general speed-up of all Pacific
operations, the conferees discussed two alterna-
tive schedules proposed by Admiral Nimitz:

(a) Truk, 15 June; Marianas, 1 Septem-

ber; Palaus, 15 November.

(b) Truk, bypass; Marianas, 15 June;

Palaus, 10 October.

The second alternative seemed the most favor-
able to the assembled officers; but, also, there

4,1 GRANITE, 27I)ec43, 7.

47 GRANITE, 13.Tan44.

were many present who favored bypassing the
Marianas too. Their reasoning was that the
M arianas, because of an almost complete lack
of good harbors, would alford poor staging
bases. Moreover, they felt that the proposed
B-29 operations from the Marianas would not
be particularly effective. Further, this group
(a decided majority at this conference) felt
that the Marianas would be a costly operation,
the price of which would not be justified by
results achieved.48

While these discussions of the 27—28 January
Pearl Harbor conference are interesting, it is
apparent that the final decisions in regard to
the Marianas had already been made by the
Joint Chiefs, and the Truk-by-pass decision
would await the results of the carrier strikes.

General MacArtlmr continued his opposition
to the Central Pacific route as late as February
1944, when he sent his deputy, Lieutenant Gen-
eral Richard Iv. Sutherland, USA, to Washing-
ton in a desperate effort to convince the Joint
Chiefs that both Truk and the Marianas should
be by-passed and that the impetus should be
along the New Guinea-Mindanao axis of ad-
vance. General Sutherland had been in Wash-
ington but a short time when he found it
necessary to advise MacArtlmr that the die
was, indeed, cast : the Marianas operation was a
certainty; the Central Pacific route was inevi-
table.49

Also arriving in Washington for conferences
with the Joint Chiefs during the month of
February 1944 was Admiral Nimitz. The latter
pointed out certain factors which had been
under discussion at Pearl Harbor a month be-
fore: the Marianas did not offer satisfactory
bases for the fleet and, if Truk were by-passed,
other fleet bases would be required. Nimitz rec-

48 Radio Message, OTNCPOA to CINCSWPA,
070521/Z Jan44, CM IX 8330; Radio Message,
CINCSWPA to WARCOS. C-1217. 2Fel>44, CM-IX
1443: Memo from Col W. L. Ritchie to Gen T. T.
Handy, 4Feh44, subject: Brief of Pacific Conferences,
Pearl Harbor 27-28Jan44; General Kenney Reports,
George C. Kenney, 347-349.

49 General Marshall's Incoming-log: telephone con-
versation between Gen R. K. Sutherland (in Wash-
ington) and Gen R. J. Marshall in Brisbane, WD
Telecon 192, 15Feb44.

ommended Ulitlii, 400-odd miles southwest of
Guam, as an objective, since it would provide
an exceptionally good base for the projected
offensive against the Luzon -Formosa-China
coast area.50

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, for some time, had
been looking to acceleration of the entire
Pacific offensive, but the Truk imponderable
forbade drastic speed-up alterations in exist-
ing plans. When, on 17 and 18 February 1944.
(lie Truk carrier strikes 51 removed the trap-
pings of mystery surrounding that position,
and it was revealed as considerably weaker
than supposed, the Joint Chiefs agreed that
substantial changes in plans were in order.

Not that the results of the Truk strikes,
which indicated that by-passing would be feasi-
ble. were the only consideration. Other devel-
opments had their influence: the Marshalls
operation (30 January— 20 February) had been
executed with greater speed and less cost than
had been anticipated; General MacArthur’s
Southwest Pacific forces had advanced the in-
vasion of the Admiralties from 1 April to 29
February; MacArthur’s RENO It' plan (pre-
sented to the Joint Chiefs on 5—6 March) con-
templated by-passing the PTansa Bay and We-
wak areas and advancing directly to Hol-
landia; Admiral Nimitz had recommended
launching a major- amphibious operation
against either Truk or the Marianas in mid-
June, followed by an assault on the Palaus
about 1 October; and. in addition, the Army
Air Force was again pressing for early cap-
ture of the Marianas.

■° JCS Memo for Information No. 200, 7.\Iar44, sub-
ject: Sequence and Timing of Operations, Central
Pacific Campaign, a report by CINCPOA. Supple-
mentary minutes, .TCS 150th Meeting, 7Mar44.

51 This was the occasion for a message from the
British Chiefs of Staff: . . warm congratulations on

the brilliant success of the operations in the Pacific
which have culminated in the devastating bombard-
ment of Truk and have led to the dismissal of Field
Marshal Sugiyama and Admiral of the Fleet Osami
Nagano. . . . May Truk be but the prelude to even
greater successes on the way to final victory in the
days that lie ahead.” JCS 14Sth Meeting 22Feb44.

JCS Directive of 12 March

The culmination of these early-1944 devel-
opments and the termination of a number of
debates was the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive
of 12 March 1944. This directive ordered Gen-
eral MacArthur to cancel the operation against
Kavieng and to isolate that island and Rabaul.
Hollandia was to be occupied, target date 15
April 1944, using forces originally assigned for
Iv avieng-Manus with the exception of Marine
units assigned for those operations, fast car-
rier groups and old battleships.

The directive further ordered General Mac-
Arthur to return all Pacific Fleet transports,
cargo vessels and command ships, which had
been allocated for Ivavieng-Manus-Ffansa Bay,
as well as Pacific Fleet combatant vessels, to
Admiral Nimitz not later than 5 May. Follow-
ing seizure of Hollandia, MacArthur was to
conduct operations along the New Guinea
coast and such other operations as were deemed
feasible in preparation for operations against
t he Palaus and Mindanao.

The occupation and development of the Ad-
miralties was to be expedited, so that suitable
bases would be provided for the neutralization
of Rabaul. Kavieng, Truk and the Palaus. If
additional air base facilities were required.
Emirau 52 and Mussau were to be occupied and
developed.

The same JCS directive ordered Admiral
Nimitz to “institute and intensify” aerial bom-
bardment of the Carolines and to conduct ear-
lier attacks on the Marianas, Palaus, Carolines
and other profitable targets. The Southern
M arianas were to be seized, target date 15 June
1944. and B-29 bases and secondary naval facil-
ities developed there. Admiral Nimitz was also
to “provide cover” for General MacArthur’s
moves against Hollandia and other operations
in the Southwest Pacific.

M acArtliur and Nimitz were further ordered
to coordinate their plans to provide for mutual

52 Plans for the seizure of Emirau were well under-
way before the Joint Chiefs' 12 March directive. The
4th Marines (reinforced) landed on Emirau 20 March
1944. See Marine Corps Historical Monograph “Bou-
gainville and the Northern Solomons.”

support of all impending operations.53

It will be noted that the directive did not
include CJlithi, which objective Admiral Nimitz
had recommended in his late February visit to
Washington. This omission would seem to in-
dicate that the Joint Chiefs felt that the fleet
could find satisfactory anchorages within the
Palaus.

Immediately after receiving these changes
from the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Nimitz sent a
secret dispatch (13 March) to major subordi-
nate units directing that the Truk planning
cease and that highest priority be assigned to
the preparation for the Marianas operation. At
the V Amphibious Corps Headquarters, tenta-
tive plans for the seizure of Truk had been
evolved simultaneously with fhose for (he
M arianas, but with Nimitz’ new order, all ef-
fort was concentrated on the Marianas.54

On 20 March, the CTNCPOA FORAGER
Joint Staff Study was issued. This document
contained a recapitulation of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff directive and set forth the assump-
tions upon which the Marianas operation was
based. Essentially, these assumptions were:
first, that Hollandia, the Admiralties, and
Emirau had been seized and were available as
bases; second, that neutralizing attacks were
continuing against enemy air installations at
Nauru. Wake, Ponape and in the Marshalls;
third (hat Truk had been subjected to both
destructive carrier attacks and sustained bomb-
ing from the Marshalls and Bismarcks; and.
fourth, that United States sea and air forces
had been able to prevent effective use of Truk
by major Japanese Fleet units and that United
States air superiority and control of the sea in
the area of operations had been maintained.

The purpose of the operation, as stated in
the study, was to establish bases from which
to attack the enemy’s sea-air communications,
support operations for the neutralization of
by-passed Truk, initiate B-29 bombing of the
Japanese home islands, and support further
offensives against the Palaus, Philippines, For-

:: .K'S 713/4, 12Mar44.

‘Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops), G-5 Re-
port, 1, hereinafter cited as TF 56 G-5 Report.

niosa and China. More generally, the purpose
was to “maintain unremitting military pres
sure against Japan” and to “extend our con-
trol over the Western Pacific.” 55

The Marianas operation involved the am-
phibious assault and seizure of three fortified
islands 1,200 miles from the nearest American
base and from 4,000 to 7,000 miles from the
areas in which troops would be mounted. The
Fifth Fleet, the largest ever assembled in the
Pacific with control over more than 800 ships,
was assigned to transport, land, cover, and
support the landing and garrison forces of
Task Force 56. The forces of Commander
South Pacific, Admiral William E. Halsey.
USN, and of Commander in Chief Southwest
Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur. ESA.
were already performing long-range air search
and attack missions against the Carolines and
Palaus to interdict any enemy threats from

CIXC’POA, FORAGER Joint Staff Study. 20Mar44.

VICE ADMIRAL RICHMOND K. TURNER, commander Joint Ex-
peditionary Force and Northern Attack Force.

those areas. Submarines of Task Force 17
would continue to provide their supporting
operations west of the Marianas.

Since the original GR ANITE was no longer
in effect, a new campaign plan — GRANITE
II — was issued on 3 June. The sequence and
timing of the projected operations Avas much
changed; the Marianas operation was listed as
the first of the period, instead of last. GRAN-
ITE II established the tentative schedule of
operations as follows :

Target Date

Operation Tentative

Capture of Saipan,

Guam and Tinian __15 June 1944.

Capture of Palau 8 September 1944.

Occupation of

Mindanao 15 November 1944.

Capture of Southern
Formosa and

Amoy 56 15 February 1945.

Capture of Luzon 15 February 1945. 57

COMMAND RELATIONS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had designated
Admiral Nimitz to command the over-all Cen-
tral Pacific campaign of Avhich the Marianas
was a part. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance,
USN, Commander Fifth Fleet, was, in turn,
designated to direct all forces engaged in the
operation. Charged Avitli command of the Joint
Expeditionary Force, which included all task
organizations employed in the amphibious op-
erations at all Marianas’ objectives was Vice
Admiral Richmond Iv. Turner, USN. The
Joint Expeditionary Force Avas divided into
live major and several minor (the latter chiefly
garrison) task forces and task groups. The
major task groups and forces Avere : Support
Aircraft Headquarters, Expeditionary Troops.

ro This operation, never actually executed, would
have employed all of the Marine Divisions except the
3d ; the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions would have con-
stituted part of the Formosa assault force, landing
on 15 February 1945: the 4th. 5th and 6th Divisions
were to seize the port of Amoy. China, on 7 March
1945.

7 GRANITE II. 3.T un44. 9-13 and 25-26.

Northern Attack Force, Southern Attack
Force, and Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve.
Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly, USN, com-
manded the Southern Attack Force (Guam),
while Turner, himself, operating in a dual
capacity, commanded the Northern Attack
Force (Saipan). Rear Admiral Harry W.
Hill, USN, second-in-command of the Joint
Expeditionary Force, commanded the Western
Landing Group,58 which actually executed the
Saipan landings.

Embarked in Admiral Turner’s flagship or
ashore Avas the Commanding General, Expedi-
tionary Troops, Lieutenant General Holland
M. Smith, avIio commanded the landing force
for (he entire Marianas operation. During the
assault phase, Smith also commanded garrison
troops ashore. His command was exercised at
the respective objectives through the Command-
ing Generals of the Northern and Southern
Troops and Landing Forces. General Smith,
like Admiral Turner, served in a dual capacity
as Commanding General both of Expedition-
ary Troops and of Northern Troops and Land-
ing Forces. Major General Roy S. Geiger was
Commanding General, Southern Troops and
Landing Force.

All troops ashore Avould remain under Hol-
land Smith until Admiral Spruance decided
that the capture and occupation phase at a
given objective was completed, whereupon
command ashore Avould shift to the island com-
mander. Saipan’s island commander was Major
General Sanderford Jarman, USA, Avho, at
such time as Spruance directed, would be re-
sponsible for base development, civil affairs,
and other matters of the island’s administra-
tion.59 (See Appendix VI for basic organiza-
tion of high echelons.)

Because of General Smith’s dual role, it was
necessary to reorganize the headquarters of the

58 The AVestern Landing Group Avas composed of the
Northern Troops and Landing Force, Assault Trans-
port Group, LST Flotillas, Control Group, Gunboat
Support Group, Beach Demolition Group, Beaclnnaster
Group, LST Flotilla, and the Pontoon Barge Unit.

59 Amphibious Operations, Invasion of the Marianas.
Commander in Chief United States Fleet, P-007, 1-9,
hereinafter cited as COM INCH P-007.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOLLAND M. SMITH, Commanding Gen-
eral Expeditionary Troops and Northern Troops and
Landing Force. In the Marianas, General Smith had
the largest force commanded by a Marine General op
to that time.

Y Amphibious Corps to form two stall's so that
each echelon would be represented.80 Actually.

60 Col Robert E. Hogaboom, who served as As-
sistant Chief of Staff, G-3, of ttie Northern Troops
and Landing Force during the Marianas Campaign,
points out that General Smith actually had a triple
status at the time: “First, he was the administrative
commander for certain designated Marine Forces in
the Pacific ; second, he was Commanding General,
Expeditionary Troops; and third lie was Command-
ing General, Northern Troops and Landing Force.
Accordingly, General Smith initially had three staffs
functioning under his command. One staff under a
deputy commander remained in Pearl Harbor to con-
duct administrative matters during the campaign. A
second staff, Expeditionary Troops staff, was em-
barked in the flagship of the Expeditionary Force and
remained aboard that ship throughout the operation.
A third staff, Northern Troops and Landing Force,
initially embarked on the flagship of Rear Admiral
Hill, went ashore on Saipan directly under General
Smith.” Ltr from Col R. E. Hogaboom to CMC,
30 Apr 47.

the preliminary planning was accomplished
prior to the reorganization on 12 April, but
after that date these staffs became known as
the “lied Staff” and the “Blue Staff.” The
former subsequently became the staff for Com-
mander, Northern Troops and Landing Force
and the latter for Commander, Expeditionary
Troops. The two groups operated in separate
office spaces at Pearl Harbor but had identical
sources of information on which to draw as de-
tailed plans were prepared.61

In keeping with principles of concurrent
planning, the V Amphibious Corps Staff had
anticipated future actions and initiated plan-
ning; a rough operation plan for the Marianas
was completed as early as 14 March. This
served as a basis for the final Expeditionary
Troops Plan.82

Available to the Northern Troops and Land-
ing Force for the Saipan landings were the
2d and 4th Marine Divisions, commanded by
Major Generals Thomas E. Watson 83 and
Harry Schmidt, respectively. General Geiger’s
Southern Troops and Landing Force would be
composed of the 3d Marine Division and the 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade. In Expedition-
ary Troops reserve, prepared to land at either
objective, was the 27th Infantry Division.
United States Army, commanded by Major
General Ralph E. Smith. The 77th Infantry
Division, United States Army, was to be held
in the Hawaiian Islands as strategic reserve
and called into the Marianas area after D-plus
20. This time schedule was demanded because
it would take that long for ships carrying as-
sault echelons to return from Saipan to Oahu.

LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION

The logistical support plan progressed con-
currently with operation plans. Early in the
planning phase, close liaison was established
between all major units in order to transmit

81 Northern Troops and Landing Force Report, 2-3,
hereinafter cited as NTLF Report.

62 TF 56 0—5 Report. 1.

63 The 2d Marine Division was commanded by
Major General Julian C. Smith until 10 April 1944
when General Watson assumed command.

available information without delay. Confer-
ences between key logistical officers insured
that uniformity and consistency would prevail
throughout the preparation. Experiences in
previous operations, availability of shipping
space, and the tactical situation, determined
initial supply requirements. The Marianas
would be a departure from atoll type opera-
tions to a campaign on a limited land mass;
still, important lessons had been learned which
would be invaluable to logistical planning.
Initial supplies to be taken by assault forces
were as follows:

Class I (Rations) 32 days.

Class II (Organi-
zational and In-
dividual equip-
ment) 20 days.

Class III (Fuels
and Lubricants) __20 days.

Class IV (Miscel-
laneous supplies) __20 days (except med-
ical supplies which
were 30 days).

Class V (Ammuni-
tion) 7 units of lire ground

weapons; 10 units
of fire for antiair-
craft weapons.

Resupply shipments were set up in 3,000-men
blocks for 30 days of Class 1. II. III. and IV.
Items suitable for the block shipment plan were
shipped separately in “optional loaded ships.”
Class V, ammunition, would be loaded in spe-
cially designed ammunition ships containing
no other type or class of supply. To offset pos-
sible losses of initial or resupply shipments,
mobile reserves were established in the Mar-
shals area, subject to the call of the Com-
mander, Expeditionary Troops.

All major units were required to submit a
consolidated list of organizational equipment
to Headquarters, Expeditionary Troops for
screening. This was done to assure that the
equipment did not exceed shipping allocations
and. also, for the purpose of coordinating the

equipment of assault and garrison units to pre-
vent unnecessary duplication.64

Details of hospitalization and evacuation
presented at least one major innovation: civil-
ians would need medical care during and after
the battle. Our own needs would come first,
however. Nineteen APA’s, five AP’s, six
AKA’s, and three LST’s were to be available
at Saipan for evacuation of casualties. The
three LST’s had been especially equipped with
supplies and personnel to receive casualties
from the beach for further transfer to the
transports until such time as the tactical situa-
tion permitted transports to approach beaches
near enough to warrant transfer of casualties
direct to the transports. The plan would place
one LST off of the beaches upon which the 2d
Marine Division would land and one off the
4th Division’s beaches. The third LST would
relieve whichever LST received 100 casualties
first.65

The sequence of building the logistical plan
continued with base development considera-
tions. Great quantities of construction material
would need shipment to the objective area in
order that the base might develop its neces-
sary facilities. Several preliminary confer-
ences were held at CinCPac Headquarters to
discuss the amounts and types of materiel
needed, shipping required, and related prob-
lems. A rear echelon of the Expeditionary
Troops G— 4 section remained in Oahu to co-
ordinate all activities.

The Marine Supply Service formed the 5th
and 7th Field Depots to support Marine units
initially and in the ensuing garrison phase. To
afford assistance by augmenting the divisions’
shore parties, representative portions of the
5th and 7th Field Depots were embarked in
assault shipping. Other echelons of the field
depots were scheduled to arrive in early gar-
rison shipping.

64 Task Force 56 ( Expedit ionary Troops), G— 4 lie-
port. 2-11 hereinafter cited as TF 56 G—$ Report.

65 Task Force 51, Operation Plan A10-44, Annex H,
Medical, 2. Each of the three LST’s had one doctor
and eight hospital corpsmen aboard. Since this num-
ber was inadequate to care for the expected number
of casualties, two doctors and 16 corpsmen would be
transferred to each LST after arrival in the transport
area.

The rehabilitation plan was conceived with
a view to economizing materiel, effort, and
shipping. Since the 4th Marine Division would
leave the Saipan-Tinian area after the opera-
tion and the 2d Marine Division would remain,
the 4th would turn its organizational equip-
ment in to the 7tli Field Depot for processing,
repair, and reissue to the 2d. A similar plan
was evolved for Guam, from whence the 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade would leave after
the operation, while the 3d Marine Division
would remain. By this plan, shipping space
was conserved and possible damage to equip-
ment enroute eliminated. In addition, man-
hours were saved because equipment was not
loaded back aboard ships.

To permit coordination and to reduce possi-
bilities of misinterpretation, all major units
submitted advance copies of their administra-
tive orders to Headquarters, Expeditionary
Troops, for checking and comparison.66

Requirements for shipping in which to em-
bark the Northern Troops and Landing Force
were submitted to the Commander of the
Northern Attack Force. When the available
shipping was provided, NTLF prepared gen-
eral loading plans and allocated shipping to
subordinate units. A schedule for loading, pre-
pared in conjunction with the Navy, fitted as
closely as possible the time of availability of
the ships and the time desired by the troops.
This posed a considerable problem in view of
limited harbor facilities from which to mount
such a large force. By careful and complete
planning, however, the entire force was loaded
on time and in the manner necessary to fit the
tactical plans.

About a week prior to commencement of
loading, the Transport Group Commanders
and either the captain or cargo officer of each
ship visited the unit whose troops their ships
were embarking. This early liaison settled
many questions regarding loading arrange-
ments in a most satisfactory manner.67

66 TF 56 0—1/ Report, 11-15.

67 NTLF Report, 7-8. This procedure was not pos-
sible in all instances, however; two transports as-
signed to the 2d Marine Division were on the west
coast of the United States at tins time. Ltr from
Col It. J. Straub to CMC, 13Jan50.

The work of the G— 1 Section of the Expedi-
tionary Troops staff during the period of prep-
aration consisted of its normal functions — sup-
plying replacements to units committed to the
operation, attaching reinforcing units to the
divisions, organizing specialized units to be em-
ployed, alerting units for embarkation, assign-
ing billeting space for staff officers and men
aboard ship, and furnishing personnel data
required by other sections of the staff.68

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

The Corps G-2 Section was handicapped
during the planning stage, as no accurate in-
formation concerning enemy installations in
the Southern Marianas was available until the
carrier strikes of 22-23 February. On the basis
of these strikes, intelligence studies were begun.
The studies were necessarily incomplete because
of inadequate photographic coverage. The car-
rier photographs of 22—23 February, partly
covering Saipan, Tinian and Aguijan, were not
supplemented by full coverage until 18 April.
Lack of subsequent photographs prior to de-
parture from Pearl Harbor was a source of
some irritation to the G— 2 Section and greatly
complicated its task. Corps had requested
photograph coverages on D-minus 90, D-minus
GO, D-minus 30, and D-minus 15 days, hut this
schedule, because of many other demands upon
the Navy, could not be completely met. There
was, therefore, a consequent lack of timely in-
telligence information which would have been
helpful during the planning and assault phases.
At Eniwetok, enroute to the objective, Saipan
photographs of 28 May were delivered to the
attack force. These were interpreted and dis-
seminated to the divisions’ headquarters prior
to departure from Eniwetok. The slower
travelling LST groups, carrying the initial as-
sault elements, however, had already departed;
M arines were required to make their 15 June
landings on the basis of 18 April information
of the enemy situation.69

68 Task Force 5G (Expeditionary Troops), G— 1 Re-
port, 1, hereinafter cited as TF 56 G-l Report.

69 TF 56 G—2 Report, 1-2. Some tine submarine
photographs (taken by the Greenling) of the target
area were available ; but the preferred landing beach
areas on Saipan were not included.

885)590° 50 — 3

These inadequacies in aerial photographic
coverage were due to the prevailing naval situ-
ation and not to faulty cooperation between
Navy and Marine higher echelons. In all in-
stances, the Navy made sincere effort to com-
ply with any and all reasonable requests. It is
obvious that Marine planners were desirous of
obtaining as many pictures of the objective as
possible, and that they would tend to base their
requests upon that desire. It is also apparent,
however, that the Navy was confronted with
a tactical situation which made it virtually im-
possible to comply with all requests. According
to Admiral It. K. Turner, it was necessary for
“naval fliers to pick and choose among the very
numerous items in Corps requests and then to
obtain what coverage they could while fighting
battles.” 70

It is interesting to note that Admiral
Spin ance, commander Fifth Fleet, gave care-
ful consideration to making a second raid on
the Ma rianas before the actual landings. Aside
from the undesirability of pin-pointing the
Ma rianas as the next objective, the scheme was
ruled out because of other demands upon avail-
able ships.71

The 1 : 20,000 battle map of Saipan-Tinian-
Aguijan was based on the incomplete photo-
graph coverage of 22—23 February and on
Japanese charts captured during the Marshalls
operation. The contours shown on the map
were actually “logical” contours adapted from
captured charts and partially revised from
existing photographs. Once the map was in use,
it was ascertained that these contours were not
only inaccurate but that they offered a mis-
leading representation of the basic features of
the island. As examples, sheer cliffs sometimes
appeared as slopes and box canyons as ravines
or draws, a condition somewhat relieved after
the 4th Marine Division captured an excellent
Japanese map of (he island.72 The NTLF G—2

to Turner.

74 Ibid.

72 The exact time and place of this capture are not
indicated in records consulted, but the time is assumed
to he in the period D-Day to D-plus 6, during which
time the advance was toward the east coast.

Section made the latter map available to units
in time to be used during operations conducted
north of the Garapan-Mt. Tapotchau-Magi-
cienne Bay line.73

Another Japanese map, captured by the 8th
Marines (2d Marine Division), was found to
be especially helpful in that regiment’s opera-
tions around Mt. Tapotchau. A great deal of
care had to be exercised in transposing co-
ordinates from Japanese to the United States
maps, however, due to variations in ground
forms.74

Estimates of enemy strength prior to the
landing on Saipan were considerably below the
actual strength encountered. On 9 May the
estimate had been 9,000, to 10,000. On 24 May,
G-2 Summary No. 20 had increased the
estimate :

Should the enemy continue his present rate of re-
inforcement, it seems logical to estimate that by
D-day, combat troops will number 15,000 to 18,000.
This estimate does not include “Home Guard” units.

After the operation the count indicated that
there were approximately 29,602 combatant
Japanese on Saipan on D-Day.75

In all fairness to personnel responsible for
divining enemy strength, it should again be
emphasized that photographic coverage left
much to be desired. Analysis of aerial photo-
graphs was one of G-2’s best sources; and, since
coverage was inadequate, there was a scarcity
of detailed enemy information. It should be
remembered, however, that a vast expanse of
water separated Saipan from the closest United
States holdings, and the Navy’s problems were
many. As (lie G— 2 of the Northern Troops and
Landing Force (Lieutenant Colonel Thomas K.
Yancey, USA) writes:

Usually, photographic planes accompanied attacking
fighter planes on sorties against enemy bases . . .
[and] honest effort was made to obtain adequate
and complete coverage of the target area. However,
during the spring and early summer months in the
Marianas area, there are few days when the sky is
not partially covered with low cumulus clouds, ob-

73 TF 56 G—2 Report, 4. These maps were repro-
duced by the 64th Engineer Topographic Battalion.

74 Ltr from BrigGen C. R. Wallace to CMC, 27Dec40,
hereinafter cited as Wallace

75 NTLF G—2 Report, App. A and P>. 7.

scuring some of tlie most important installations or
key terrain features. . . . This, of course, was un-
fortunate, but clouds handicapping the photographer
provided protection for fighter aircraft.

Strikes against enemy bases were mainly for the
purpose of destroying . . . enemy installations, and
photographic coverage, while important, was usually
reduced to a secondary consideration.76

In addition to difficulties already discussed,
the fact that Saipan was serving as a staging
area further contributed to the G— 2’s prob-
lems. Many Japanese units were just pass-
ing through when the United States blow fell;
others were shipwrecked survivors whom fate
had guided there. Probably even the Japanese
would have found it difficult to determine how
many troops they had on the island.

TACTICAL PLANS

As stated before, the CinCPac Joint Staff
Study of 20 March 1914 assumed the capture
of certain bases for the support of the Mari-
anas campaign. By 22 April General Mac-
Artlmr’s Southwest Pacific Forces had suc-
cessfully effected the capture of Hollandia and
the Admiralties, and the 4th Marines had occu-
pied Emirau. The following day Admiral
Nimitz published his Operation Plan 3-44 for
the Marianas. Subsequently, orders were issued
by the Commander, Fifth Fleet (Admiral
Spruance) and by the Commander, Joint Ex-
peditionary Force (Vice Admiral Turner).
The mission of Task Force 56 (Expeditionary
Troops) was to capture, occupy and defend
Saipan, Tinian and Guam, and to be prepared
for further operations.77

That part of the mission pertaining to Saipan
and Tinian was assigned to the Northern
Troops and Landing Force (NTLF) with the
following major units being assigned:

Corps Troops flAdministrative and Serv-
ice Elements).

1st Battalion, 2d Marines.

2d Marine Division (Reinforced) (less 1st

76 titr from LtCol T. R. Yancey, USA, to DirPub-
Info, 8Jul49, hereinafter cited as Yancey. This offi-
cer was one of several United States Army officers
who served on the Corps staff.

77 Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops), G-3 Re-
port, hereinafter cited as TF 56 G-3 Report, 2.

Battalion, 2d Marines) (plus 1st Bat-
talion, 29th Marines).78

4th Marine Division (Reinforced).

XXIV Corps Artillery.

Saipan Garrison Force (Task Group
10.13).

Tinian Garrison Force (Task Group

10.12). 79

In Expeditionary Troops reserve, prepared
for commitment on Saipan, Tinian, or Guam,
was the United States Army's 27th Infantry
Division. This division prepared 21 separate
plans for possible employment on any of the
three islands, 16 of these in anticipation of
Saipan landings. As the planning of higher
headquarters progressed, a few plans were dis-
carded.80

Concurrent planning was the rule; the day
following issuance of the Expeditionary Troops
plan, NTLF Operation Order 2—44 (Tentative)
was published. This plan and a later one
(Operation Plan 3—44, issued on 1 May 1944)
ordered the two Marine divisions to land on
Saipan’s western beaches in the Charan Ivanoa
vicinity, 2d Division on the Red and Green
Beaches (north of Charan Kanoa) and 4th
Division on the Blue and Yellow Beaches
(facing the town itself and the area south of
it). After the simultaneous landing, both divi-
sions would advance rapidly inland to objec-
tive 0-1, the first dominating ground inland.
Thereafter, the 2d Division would push up and
seize Mts. Tapotcliau and Tipo Pale, while the
4th Division would shove across to the island's
east coast, capturing Aslito Airfield on the

78 The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, had been at-
tached to the 2d Marine Division to fill the vacancy
created when the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, was
assigned a special mission under landing force con-
trol (see below). Formed from personnel of the 2d
Division, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, was later
to join the 29th Regiment (6th Marine Division) for
the Okinawa campaign. This “orphan” unit remained
with the 2d Division throughout the Saipan operation.

79 Task Force 56, Operation plan 3-44 (26 Apr 44),
Annex Able, Task Organization. For the detailed
Task Organization, see Appendix VII.

8° 27th Infantry Division, G-3 Report, 6, hereinafter
cited as 27 Inf Div G-3 Report.

CHARAN

KANOA

GREEN RED

BEACHES BEACHES

BLUE

BEACHES

YELLOW

BEACHES

preferred BEACHES on saipan. Beef demanded that the ship-to-shore movement be executed in amphibian tractors.

way. (See Map 5 for scheme of maneuver.)

As part of the same plan, the 1st Battalion,
2d Marines (Reinforced), was ordered to
“land on the night of D-minus 1-D-Day, on
selected beaches of Magicienne Bay, move
rapidly inland, seize Mt. Tapotchau 81 before
daylight, and defend same until relieved.”

This mission, intriguing to the imagination,
was later fortunately cancelled. Not, however,
before the battalion had altered its organiza-
tion to fit assigned shipping (six destroyer
transports), or before its supplies and heavy
weapons were embarked aboard two escort car-

81 At first glance it may appear that there was dup-
lication in the mission assigned to the- 2d Division
and the 1st Battalion. 2d Marines, inasmuch as both
were instructed to seize Mt. Tapotchau. It should be
pointed out, however, that the battalion could seize
only the summit of the mountain, leaving the expan-
sive slopes to the division. Elements of the 2d Divi-
sion were to move up and join the battalion at the
peak.

riers (with plans to parachute-drop needed
items from torpedo planes), or before it had
completed considerable specialized training. As
will be seen, these arrangements caused much
inconvenience.82

Even with the cancellation of the mission,
the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, remained as an
immediate subordinate unit of the Northern
Troops and Landing Force with orders to “be
prepared after How-hour [author’s italics] to
land on order on selected beaches of Magi-
cienne Bay, or on other beaches to be desig-
nated.”83 (For a detailed analysis of the orig-
inal mission and its subsequent cancellation,
see Appendix V.)

Both divisions, it will be noted, had been
ordered to “seize Objective 0-1” after landing.
This objective embraced the first commanding

82 Ltr from LtCol W. B. Kyle to DirPublnfo, 13Nov4S,
hereinafter cited as Kyle.

83 NTLF Operation Plan 3—44, Change No. 1.

ground inland from the beaches, a distance
varying from 1,200 to 1,500 yards in (lie middle
and tapering to the beach on both flanks. It was
essential that this line be occupied rapidly,
since, until then, no relief from the enemy’s
direct tire weapons could be expected. Every
man was impressed with the fact that the high
ground was the immediate goal and that this
should be seized as soon as possible. As will be
seen, however, the two divisions, though actu-
ated by the same purpose, chose different means
to achieve this end.

A diversionary demonstration, beginning
shortly before the actual landing and continu-
ing sometime thereafter, was to be conducted
in the area northwest of Tanapag Harbor.84
This effort, for the purpose of diverting enemy
reserves and supporting tires from the area of
the actual landing, would be afforded added
realism by supporting fires from Fire Support
Unit Four (TU 52.17.4), including battleships
Maryland and Colorado , light cruiser Louis-
ville and four destroyers.85

The divisions wasted no time after receipt of
the NTLF Operation Plan. Soon, tentative
plans were submitted for approval. Actually,
the divisions had carried on planning, based
on tentative drafts and conferences, before re-
ceipt of the formal NTLF plan. The 2d Divi-
sion planned to land with the 6th and 8th
Marines86 abreast, 6th over the Red Beaches,
8th over the Green Beaches.

The 4th Marine Division would employ the
23d and 25th Marines in the assault, the 23cl
landing over the Blue and the 25th over the
Yellow Beaches.

For the demonstration at Tanapag Harbor,
the two divisions would use infantry elements
not committed to the initial assault. These in-
cluded the 2d Marines and the 1st Battalion,

84 NTLF Operation Plan 3-44.

85 Task Unit 52.17.4 Report, 7.

86 Throughout this monograph, the designation “8th
Marines,” “23d Marines,” etc., will he used rather than
Regimental Combat Team 8 (RCT 8), ROT 23, etc.
Thus, reinforcing troops (which make a regiment an
RCT) are considered included in the 8th Marines (23d
Marines) designation. In like manner, the 1st Bat-
talion, 2d Marines, is used rather than BLT 1/2.

29th Marines, from the 2d Division, and the
24th Marines from the 4th Division.

In the event that later intelligence informa-
tion indicated that the Charan Ivanoa (pre-
ferred) beaches were too strongly defended to
permit landings, an alternate plan was con-
ceived. This plan contemplated landings to the
north of Garapan on beaches Black and Scar-
let. The 2d Division, in the event this plan
were used, would land on Black Beach at
H-Hour, followed three hours later by the 4th
Division, which would land on Scarlet Beaches
in Tanapag Harbor.88 Some excellent sub-
marine photographs made careful study of the
alternate beaches possible, and all hands were
as well briefed on this plan as the preferred
one.

Since the preferred beaches on Saipan were
fringed by a reef and since it would be im-
possible to negotiate a crossing of the reef in
conventional landing craft, the landing plan
contemplated the use of LVT’s (Landing
Vehicles, Tracked, often called “amtracs”) as
the principal assault vehicle. LYT's were to
be transported to the objective abroad LST’s
(Landing Ships, Tank). Sufficient LYT's were
allocated to allow for the preloading and direct
landing of assault units as well as one reserve
battalion for each division. By making other
LYT ’s available after arrival in the transport
area and by executing transfer operations from
landing craft to LYT’s, it would be possible
to land the bulk of the two divisions in these
vehicles. LYT battalions were assigned as fol-
lows: 2d Marine Division — 2d, 5th and T 15th
Amphibian Tractor Battalions (the latter an
Army Battalion) ; 4th Marine Division — -534th
and 773d Amphibian Tractor Battalions (both
Army) and the 10th Amphibian Tractor Bat-
talion. less its Company A and plus Company
C of the 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

Preceding the first wave of troop -carrying
LYT’s would be a wave of armored amphibian
tractors (LYT(A)’s), each of which mounted

87 2d Marine Division Report, Section V, 2-3, here-
inafter cited as 2d Mar Dir Report. 4th Marine Divi-
sion Report, Section VI, 13, hereinafter cited as Jftli
Mar Div Report.

88 NTLF, Operation Plan 4-44 (3May44).

a 75mm howitzer 'in an armored turret. These
vehicles were to cover the landing and move-
ment of assault waves to 0-1. Preceding the 2d
Marine Division was the 2d Armored Am-
phibian Battalion, while the Army’s 708tli
Amphibian Tank Battalion would provide a
similar mission for the 4th Division.89

The 10th and 14tli Marines (artillery regi-
ments of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions,
respectively) were each assigned four LST’s
for the operation. One LST was capable of
lifting the howitzers and about 275 men of one
artillery battalion. The remaining personnel
was carried in transports (APA’s). Of this
latter group, some were transhipped from
APA’s to LST’s at Eniwetok Lagoon for the
final leg of the trip. Organic motor vehicles of
the artillery regiments, with drivers, were car-
ried to the objective in cargo ships (AKA’s).90

The 10th Marines loaded all four of its
organic battalions (two battalions of 75mm
pack howitzers, two battalions of 105mm
howitzers) in LST’s. The pack howitzers were
preloaded in LYT’s and the 105’s in DUKlY’s
(amphibious trucks, normally called “ducks”).
The 10th Marines had been reinforced with the
2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, V Amphibious
Corps, whose guns, ammunition and equipment
wei'e loaded aboard three AKA’s and most of
the personnel aboard APA’s.91

The 14th Marine Regiment was organized in-
to live battalions, the 1st and 2d armed with
75mm howitzers; the 3d, 4th and 5th with
105mm howitzers.92 The 14th Marines used

89 NTLF Opn Order 3-44, Annexes A and K. 2d
Armored Amphibian Battalion Operation Order No. 2.

00 J/tli Mar Div Report, Annex C, 2. 2d Mar Dir Re-
port, Section It. I. Ltr from LtCol II. N. Shea to CMC,
13.Jan50, hereinafter cited as Shea.

91 10th Marines Report, I, hereinafter cites as 10th
Mar Report, the Field \rtillcry Journal, Mar-Apr
48, “Amphibious Artillery,” Maj E. J. Rowse.

92 Technically the nth Battalion had already been
designated “4th 105mm Howitzer Battalion, V Am-
phibious Corps” ; but, since it was administratively
and operationally attached to the 14th Marines, it
was most often referred to as the 5th Battalion. After
the Tinian operation the unit received 155mm howitzers,
and its designation was changed to “4th 155mm How-
itzer Battalion, V Amphibious Corps,” under which

three LST’s to lift the three battalions of
105mm howitzers pre-loaded in ducks. The
fourth LST allotted them carried 75mm pack
howitzer ammunition. The two pack howitzer
battalions of the 14th Marines were loaded
aboard transports. It was planned that the 75’s
would land after transfer from landing craft
(LCVP’s) to ducks which would return after
landing the 105mm battalions. This part of
the plan was not carried out, however, due to
the slow return of the ducks after debarking
the 105’s, and the 75mm battalions were sub-
sequently landed in LYT’s.93

TRAINING AND REHEARSAL

As over-all plans for the Marianas operation
evolved and specific tactical plans developed,
the concurrent assembly and preparation of
forces was being accomplished. Initially, train-
ing of units was general in nature; but, as more
detailed information relative to the scheme of
maneuver, the terrain features, and the enemy
forces became available, the program was sup-
plemented to conform to the expected char-
acter of the operation.94

For a period of several months prior to the
operation, Headquarters, Y Amphibious Corps,
prepared participating elements so that a state
of advanced readiness would exist prior to the
target date. This preparation involved filling
existing personnel shortages, provisions for
supply and logistical support of assault and
garrison elements, and an extensive training
program. The latter involved a period of over-
all instruction, a period of amphibious training
and. finally, full-dress rehearsals.

The divisions and separate elements were
issued training directives based on Corps
standing operating procedures and experience
gained in past operations, designed to prepare
the units for their assigned missions. Emphasis
was placed on individual and small unit train-

name it participated at Iwo .Tima. Ltr from LtCol D. E.
Reeve to author, 11Aug49, hereinafter cited as Reeve.

93 4th MarDiv Report, Annex C, 11. Interview with
LtCol F. .T. Karch 6Jan49, hereinafter cited as Karch.

94 TF 56 G-3 Report, 3.

D-Doy l5June

PLANS FOR LANDING

IOOO 0 2000 Yd»

(Si 2 H
l (Si 29
(S) 24

Morpi PI

Tanapag

GREEN 3

Agmgon Pt

Cope Ob

ilSU

Night Of
14- 15 June

Kogmon

Peninsula

ing (which had paid such big dividends in
previous campaigns), on the integration of the
infantry-tank-artillery-engineer team, and on
the use of the battalions, regiments and entire
divisions as units. All weapons were fired in
problems involving units the size of a squad to
a division. Exercises were conducted both day
and night in terrain varying from that of
jungle and cane fields to that typical of larger
volcanic land masses.

Several key Japanese phrases, like “ Tag -
oh-ah-geh-tay-deh-tay-koi ” (put up your hands)
and the Japanese equivalents of “hurry up,”
“come out and we will give you food and
w' . ,” etc., were introduced into the vocabu-
laries of all hands with the hope that some of
he routine conversational exchanges would not
require the services of an interpreter. These
lessons were administered to the Marines at
their most receptive time: before the evening
movie.95

r,'he phases of general training culminated
+‘or all divisions in a period aboard ship. The
2d Marine Division conducted amphibious
maneuvers during the period 12-31 March on
beaches at Maalaea Bay, Maui, with all of its
: elements participating. Similar training was
| conducted in the same area by the 23d and 25th
Marines of the 4th Marine Division during the
period 13—26 April. The 24th Marines and 4th
Division Troops participated in several prelim-
inary boat exercises, using the facilities of the
Maui Amphibious Training Center. During the
! later part of April, the 27th Infantry Division
executed its shipboard training at Maui. The
elements of the Corps Special Troops were in-
structed initially by Corps; but once attached
to divisions, these elements participated in
division training to familiarize them with their
roles and to acquaint them with the infantry
> units with which they would operate.96

95 15y the time these expressions had received the
treatment of a Brooklyn accent, with occasional pro-
fanity added, the effect was both humorous and con-
using. Later, many Marines became quite wrathful
when the Japanese could not understand them.

»8 'j'p ,5 t; cj-3 Report, 4—5. //th MarDiv Report, Sec-
I tion 3, 6.

The divisions did not accomplish their train-
ing without difficulty, however; the 2d Divi-
sion’s camp on the island of Hawaii and the
4th Division’s camp on Maui were incomplete
in many respects. Considerable time was neces-
sarily spent making these camps liveable. At
Camp Maui, the ubiquitous red clay caused
much annoyance. In dry weather, everything
was covered with red dust, in wet weather, with
red mud. Camp Tarawa, the 2d Division's
camp at Kamuela, was located near vast,
sprawling lava fields, and movement through
these was dangerous. Many sprained ankles
and bruised knees resulted from marches over
the jagged gray eruption.

On the credit side of the ledger, both divi-
sions had ample room to conduct firing exer-
cises. The artillery regiments of the two divi-
sions, in particular, enjoyed the wide open
spaces which allowed them to spread out and
fire at long ranges. Much attention was de-
voted to coordination and integration of the
various arms throughout the period of prepara-
tion.

One device which proved very fruitful wTas
that employed by the 2d Marine Division at
the culmination of its training program. This
was a “wa lie through” rehearsal, executed on
dry land but using the identical scheme of
maneuver to be employed at Saipan. As ex-
plained by Major General Thomas E. Watson,
the division commander:

In preparation for the exercise, the successive phase
lines which had been designed to control the advance
of the Division from the landing beaches to the Force
Beachhead Line were laid out on the ground exactly
to scale. In front of the staked-out beaches were
marked the adjacent water areas over which the ship-
to-shore movement w'as to take place off Saipan. Over
this terrain game board the entire division was moved
in accordance with the time schedule calculated for
the actual assault and employing the scheme of
maneuver designed for the attack. In this manner,
every officer and man learned the part he was to play
in the landing and came to appreciate the time and
space factors involved. Yet, only a few commanders
and staff officers of the thousands of men who par-
ticipated in this rehearsal actually knew the real name
of the target.97

97 Ltr from LtGen T. E. Watson to DirPublnfo,
9Jun49, hereinafter cited as Watson.

Both Marine Divisions had previous am-
phibious combat experience: the 2d at Guadal-
canal and Tarawa, the 4th at Roi-Namur.
Portions of the 27th Division had served with
the V Amphibious Corps before: the 165th
Infantry Regiment during the Gilberts opera-
tion at Makin and the 106th in the amphibious
assault against Eniwetok Atoll. The XXIV
Corps Artillery was newly-organized, its
155mm gun battalions being former coast artil-
lery units. All eight amphibian tractor bat-
talions assigned (four Marine and four Army)
were well trained. Of these, one of the Army
battalions and two of the Marine battalions
had previously experienced combat.

Concurrently with the final training and
preparation for the rehearsal and final embar-
kation of the assault forces, the garrison forces
were assembled. Major General Sanderford
Jarman, USA. was assigned as Commanding
General, Saipan Garrison Force, and Major
General James L. Underhill, USMC, as Com-
manding General, Tinian Garrison Force. In
close harmony with the plans of the assault and
naval forces, these units prepared for their mis-
sions. The 864th Antiaircraft Artillery Group
under Colonel Kenneth M. Barager, USA, part
of the Saipan Garrison Force, was ordered to
land with the assault forces on Saipan to “fur-
nish antiaircraft protection in the zones of ac-
tion of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions.” 98

On 17 May a full-scale Corps landing was
undertaken at Maalaea Bay, Maui. The 2d and
4th Marine Divisions landed abreast with a
tactical problem ashore to simulate the actual
planned scheme of maneuver to be employed
on Saipan. Owing to the habitation of Maui,
no live ammunition could be fired there. On
19 May, another exercise was undertaken at
Kahoolawe, Hawaiian Islands.99 Troops boated

98 NTLF Report, 4-5.

99 Kahoolawe, just south of Maui and east of Lanai,
absorbed more rounds than any island in the Pacific
— and looked the part. Under Marine officer super-
vision, thousands of rounds of naval ammunition
were expended monthly, concurrently providing train-
ing for ships and shore fire control personnel. In this
manner, naval gunfire officers participated in firing
exercises with the ships they would control in com-

in LVT’s approached to within 300 yards of
the beach under actual naval gunfire bombard-
ment and aerial support but did not land. Im-
mediately following this rehearsal, shore fire
control parties of the Landing Force landed
on Kahoolawe and conducted fire missions with
their initially assigned fire support ships.100

Similar rehearsals were conducted by the
27th Infantry Division with the naval elements
of the Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve be-
tween the 20th and 24th of May. As plans for
a special commitment of the 1st Battalion, 2d
Marines, were still under consideration, that
unit with Company A of the Corps Amphibi-
ous Reconnaissance Battalion conducted a sep-
arate final rehearsal at Hanalei Bay, Kauai.
Air drops of supplies, made during this exer-
cise, proved the method employed satisfac-
tory.101

Three unfortunate operational accidents
occurred during the rehearsal phase which re-
sulted in two dead, 17 missing and 16 in-
jured.102 Aboard LST 485, which was trans-
porting a portion of the 2d Battalion, 8th
Marines, men were sleeping in a Landing Craft
Tank (LCT 988) which was secured on the
deck of the LST. The weather was rough and
the strain on the cables was too great; at 0230
on the morning of 14 May the craft was pitched
overboard with the sleeping men aboard. Nine-
teen men were either missing or killed, and
five were injured as the craft wras rammed and
sunk by the next LST in column.

Similar accidents occurred aboard LST’s 71
and 390, when LCT's 999 and 984 slipped over-
board. Losses on these two,- however, were not
as great. LCT 999, its ramp door closed, suf-
fered little damage and was towed back to

bat. Ships that were available to fire the Kahoolawe
course were unmistakeably superior in shore bombard-
ment technique to those that were not. Courses sim-
ilar to the one at Kahoolawe were located at San
Clemente and in the Guardalcanal area. Marine Corps
Gazette, “Naval Gunfire Training in the Pacific,” Jun
48, LtCol R. D. Heinl, Jr. Turner.

100 tf 56 G-3 Report, 5-6. TF 56 Naval Gunfire
Officer’s Report, 8, hereinafter cited as TF 56 NGF
Report.

101 Kyle, 3. TF 56 G-3 Report, 6.

102 TF -)Ch G_1 journai t iq May.

Pearl Harbor. LCT 984, however, had its ramp
and engine doors open when launched and
became so badly waterlogged that it capsized
and sank slowly, assisted at the end by gunfire.
The search for survivors continued throughout
the night, and many were rescued.

An investigation of the accidents revealed
that insufficient and. perhaps, improper secur-
ing, plus the fact that at least two of the LCT’s
were carrying heavy loads of fresh water, may
have been chiefly responsible for the accident.
The weight of extra ammunition for the LCT’s
4.2— inch chemical mortars may also have been
a contributory factor to the mishaps.103

The rehearsals proved particularly valuable
in the training derived from the 'sliip-to-shore
movement — involving over 700 LVT’s — and in
the test of the overall communication plan.
Critiques wei'e held following the rehearsal,
and minor defects that had been discovered
were pointed out and corrected in so far as
practicable. Benefit was derived from the ex-
perience and familiarization gained by various
elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force
actually working together under circumstances
closely paralleling those expected during the
actual operation.

When the rehearsal was completed on 19
May, the hulk of the force returned to Pearl
Harbor and Honolulu for rehabilitation. One-
half of the LST's with embarked assault troops,
however, remained at Maalaea Bay, Maui. With
such a lai'ge force at Pearl Harbor, sufficient
facilities and space for exercising the troops
were not available. It was possible, however,
to bring small units ashore each day for recrea-
tion. At the same time, the remainder of the
loading was accomplished.104

On 21 May, with ships tightly clustered at
Pearl Harbor readying for the final approach
to the objective, disaster struck.

LST 353, tied up at West Loch unloading
its 4.2— inch mortars and ammunition for those
weapons, suddenly, unaccountably, burst into

103 Joint Expeditionary Force Report, TF 51, Enel
A, 2, hereinafter cited as TF 5/ Report. Annual Sani-
tary Report For The 2d Marine Division 1944, 91.

104 TF .5 6 0-3 Report. 0-8. NTLF Report, 5-6.

flames and exploded.101 Black smoke billowed
wildly from the scene, shattering explosions
rent the air as the tire spread to five more
LST’s. Other ships in the vicinity of those
doomed hastily got underway to prevent fur-
ther spread of the destruction. Marines and
sailors aboard the burning ships dived into
the water, leaving weapons, clothing and equip-
ment behind in their frantic efforts to escape.
Many swam ashore with only a pair of trousers
or shorts left of their possessions.

As the fires continued, small ships equipped
with fire-fighting apparatus moved in close to
LST’s and tried to subdue the inferno.
Personnel watching the catastrophe stood with
nervous anticipation, fearing further explo-
sions which would mean almost certain death
for the fire fighters. Their devotion to duty
excited the admiration of all onlookers. Perched
precariously on their tiny red craft, these men
moved closer than safety or common sense
would dictate. Continuous small blasts sprayed
the area with fragments of shells and pieces of
equipment, and there was no assurance that the
entire area might not go up in one gigantic
explosion at any moment. But the fire fighters
remained stubbornly at their posts.

In the end, they could not save the ships that
were burning, but they were successful in pre-
venting a spread of the damage. By dark, six
LST’s were lost 100 with heavy resultant casu-
alties in personnel and equipment. Bv good
fortune, however, most of the amphibian trac-
tors and DUKW’s had debarked from the ships
for routine checkups ashore prior to the fire.

105 At the time of the explosion, LST 353 had on
board the only LOT with 4.2-inch mortars that had
not gone overboard on the tragic night of 14—15 May,
An investigation, following the accidental launchings,
had concluded that the excessive weight of 4.2-inch
mortar ammunition was a contributory factor in the
mishaps. This, plus the fact that it was too late to
get more craft fitted with 4.2-inch mortars anyway,
caused Admiral Turner, commander Joint Expedition-
ary Force, to order the project’s abandonment. LST
353 was in the process of complying when the acci-
dent occurred. Turner.

106 These were LST’s 39. 179, 480, 43, 09 and 353.
The hitter three had LCT’s aboard which were also
lost in the disaster.

As the LST’s were transporting assault
troops and in view of the imminence of the
operation, the losses were especially critical.
The 2d Marine Division lost a total of 95 men
and the 4th Division 112 in this disaster.
Rumors were rife that sabotage had caused the
disaster, but an investigation failed to reveal
that it was other than an unfortunate acci-
dent.107

Immediately following the explosion, all
agencies concerned were called into action to
assist in caring for the injured and surviving
troops. Clearing stations were organized
through which survivors were directed to the
hospitals or to the Transient Center, V Am-
phibious Corps. Replacements had to be sup-
plied as soon as possible. This was accom-
plished promptly from personnel at the Re-
placement Center.108

The DST’s were to have sailed on the morn-
ing of 24 May, less than three days after the
costly lire. It was apparent that a delay in
departure would be demanded. But for how
long? The gears of the attack machine were
meshed to an established target date; delays
could upset the smooth timing. Concern along
these lines was soon relieved, however, as effi-
cient staff work paid off. Ships, personnel,
equipment and supplies were replaced in four
short days and LST’s sailed only 24 hours late,
with the lost day being made up en route.109

MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

The Northern Attack Force departed from
Pearl ITarbor in echelon. The slow-moving
I, ST groups with assault troops, LYT’s and
artillery embarked, left on 25 May. Attack
( troup One, embarking the remainder of the 4th
Marine Division and Headquarters, Expedi-

107 TF 51 Report, Enel A, 2. 2d Mar Div Report,
See. VI, 1. )tli Mar Dir Report, 11. Interview with
Col M. C. Horner, 13Jul49.

to8 7'/,’ c,-l Report, 2-3. The commanding officer
nf the 23d Marines, the regiment that suffered heav-
iest in this accident, commented that though the re-
placements were adequate in numbers, they “were not
trained to carry out the functions of those lost.” Ltr
from MajGen L. It. .Tones to T.tCol G. D. Gayle 8Feb50,
hereinafter cited as /,. R. Jones.

i™ NTLF Report, 8.

tionary Troops, sailed on 29 May. Attack
Group Two, with the 2d Marine Division and
Headquarters, Northern Troops and Landing-
Force embarked, left Pearl Harbor on 30 May.
Other echelons of Garrison Forces and re-sup-
ply shipping were scheduled to depart at later
dates.

En route to the objective, every individual
was thoroughly briefed on the plans for the
attack on Saipan. Schools and staff exercises
were conducted, lectures were given; photo-
graphs, relief maps, terrain models and charts
had been prepared and furnished all units.
Every individual was completely informed of
the detailed plans for the attack. The force
arrived at Eniwetok Lagoon for final staging
between the 6th and 11th of June.110

The troop-carrying limitations of LST’s pre-
cluded the comfortable embarkation of complete
tactical units for the lengthy voyage from
Ha waii to Saipan. Though each of these vessels
carried sufficient amphibian tractors to lift an
entire rifle company, they failed to provide
adequate sleeping spaces for the full comple-
ment of troops. It was therefore ordered that
surplus personnel, who could not be thus accom-
modated, travel from Hawaii in the compara-
tive comfort of AP’s and transfer to appropri-
ate LST’s at Eniwetok. Tactical advantages of
arrival at Saipan as integrated assault units
warranted the overcrowding during the last
six days of the trip, and despite the fact that
the Marines were packed like sardines during
this period, there is no evidence that fighting
efficiency was impaired.* * 111 At all times crews
and maintenance details for embarked LYT.’s
and LYT(A)’s were billeted in LST’s bearing
their vehicles.112

110 Ibid., 9. Eniwetok was also used as an assembly
and staging point for all shipping moving to and from
the Marianas. A convoy and routing organization was

set up to control ships of all types, and was designed
to prevent an undesirable congestion of ships in the
Marianas, while at the same time making promptly
available in that area such ships as were required.
Fifth Fleet, Final Report on the Operation to Capture
tiie Marianas Islands, 2, hereinafter cited as 5th Fleet
Final Report.

111 Aggressiveness was perhaps increased. After six
crowded days aboard an LST, many Marines were
ready to fight anybody.

112 2d Mar Die Report, Sec. II, 2.

NAVAL GUNFIRE AND AIR BOMBARDMENT

While LIST’s and transports carrying assault
forces churned toward Saipan, preparatory
bombardment of targets areas had begun. On
the afternoon of 11 June, Vice Admiral Marc
A. Mitsclier’s Task Force 58 113 initiated three
and one-half days’ intense bombardment of
Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Kota and Pagan.

Originally, softening of the target was to
have begun to 12 June; but this was changed
when Admiral Spruance approved Mitscher’s
recommendation that a fighter sweep be exe-
cuted on the afternoon of the lltli. Mitsclier
gave as the principal reason for this alteration
the desirability of varying the pattern of strikes
and taking advantage of the opportunity for
surprise. “Heretofore,” reported Mitscher after
the operation, “all of our carrier attacks had
been made in the early morning. It was believed
that the enemy had become accustomed to this
and would expect us to continue this prac-
tice.” 114

While the carriers were still 200 miles east of
the islands, a 225-plane fighter sweep surprised

113 TF 58 contained eight large carriers ( Hornet ,
Yorktown, Franklin, Hunker Hill, Wasp, Enterprise,
Lexington and Essex), eight light carriers (Bataan,
Cabot, Belleau Wood, Monterey, Princeton, San Ja-
cinto, Cowpens, and Langley), seven new (fast) battle-
ships ( Alabama, South Dakota, Indiana, New Jersey,
Iowa, Washington and North Carolina), 13 cruisers
(Boston, Baltimore, Canberra, Oakland, San Juan,
Santa Fe, Mobile, Biloxi, Vincennes, Houston, Miami,
San Diego and Reno) and 58 destroyers. From its 16
carriers, TF 58 could provide an air fleet of 900 planes.
Fifth Fleet Operation Plan 10-44, 12-13. The Nary's
1 ir War, Aviation History Unit OP-519B, DCNO
(Air), edited by Lt A. It. Buchanan, USNR, 204-205,
hereinafter cited as The Navy’s Air War.

114 qtf 58 ser. 00388, HSep44, 31. Some histories
have mentioned the reason for the speed up was that
a Japanese search plane had spotted the Task Force
as it sortied from Majuro and that Mitscher had de-
cided to move as rapidly as possible. Admiral
Spruance, however, says that this is incorrect. “A
Japanese search plane . . . made a high altitude recon-
naissance of Majuro a day or two before Task Force
58 sailed and again about three days after it had
gone.” This had no effect upon the change in the
fighter sweep, however. Ltr from Adm It. A. Spruance
to CMC, 17.Tan50, hereinafter cited as Spruance.

flic Japanese in (lie Marianas and destroyed
150 plans in the air or on the ground. This
crippling blow depleted the local air strength
by about one-third and thereafter prevented the
enemy from reacting in strength. The United
States advantage, once gained, was never lost.
“Control of the air,” reported Admiral Nimitz,
“had been effected by the original fighter sweep
on If June.”115 The tactic of the afternoon
strike had proved feasible and, according to the
commanding officer of one of the participating
air groups, was “an excellent innovation . . . .” 1111

On 12 June the serious bombing began; Sai-
pan and sister islands felt the impact of tons
of high explosives dropped upon airfields and
installations. The 13th brought a resumption
of the rain of bombs. With most of their planes
either burned on the ground or missing in ac-
tion, the Japanese responded only with sporadic
dusk and night attacks during this preliminary
phase of the operation.

The inability of the enemy to foresee the im-
minent danger to the Marianas left two vulner-
able convoys in the area when Mitscher’s Task
Force entered. The first of these, a formation of
20 ships, fleeing on a northerly course 125 miles
west of Pagan Island, was attacked on the
afternoon of the 12th bv planes of Rear Ad-
miral William K. Harrill’s Task Group 58. .4
To the south, 135 miles west of Guam, the other
convoy (six ships) became the target for a
special attack mission sent by Rear Admiral
Joseph J. Clark, commanding Task Group 58.1.
Between the two attacks 12 cargo ships, three
submarine chasers, and one patrol-torpedo boat
were sunk.117

Surface ships of TF 58 began to bombard
Saipan on 13 June (D-minus 2). The fast bat-
tleships fired their main and secondary bat-
teries for nearly seven hours into the western
coast of Saipan and Tinian, turning the im-

115 CINCPOA Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas.
.1 ui)44. 30.

118 Yorktown, ser. 0020, 29Jun44. 52.

117 The Navy’s Mr War, 205—206; King. 590; “Japa-
nese Naval and Merchant Ship Losses During World
War TT By All Causes.” Joint Army-Navy Assessment
Committee (JANAC), 12 and 60—61, hereinafter cited as
JAN AC.

pact areas into scenes of desolation. Aircraft,
aviation facilities, antiaircraft emplacements,
coast defense guns, canefields and enemy in-
stallations of many types were struck. At
night, the persistent harrassing tires of TF
58's destroyers denied the Japanese even an
hour’s relaxation. This “around the clock”
shelling prevented last minute improvement
and repair of positions and greatly complicated
the enemy commanders’ tasks of readying their
commands.118

The enemy’s reaction to Mitscher’s strikes of
11-12—13 June is indicated by the diary ac-
count of a Japanese tank noncommissioned
officer, Tokuzo Matsuya :

11 June — At a little after 1300, I was awakened
by the air raid alarm and immediately led all ipen
into the trench. Scores of enemy Grumman fighters
began strafing and bombing Aslito Airfield and Gara-
pan. For about two hours, the enemy planes ran
amuck and finally left leisurely amidst the unparal-
leledly inaccurate anti-aircraft fire. All we could do
was watch helplessly.

12 June — With daybreak enemy planes (even more
than yesterday) made a sudden attack. The all day
strafing and bombing was much heavier. It must have
caused great damage at Garapan and Aslito Airfield.

13 June — At 0030, enemy naval guns began firing in
addition to the aerial bombing. The enemy holds us
in utter contempt. If only we had a hundred planes
or so.110

Sitting in a ringside seat on Tinian (six
miles south of Saipan), an unidentified Japa-
nese noncommissioned officer wrote in his diary
on 12 June:

Of all the tens of Japanese planes one can’t see
even one during a raid. The planes which cover the
sky are all (be enemy's. They are far and away more
skillful than Japanese planes. Now begins our cave
life. Enemy planes overhead all day long — some 230
in number. They completely plastered our airfields.
. . . Where are our planes? Not one was sent up. Our
A A guns spread black smoke where t he enemy planes
weren’t. Not one hit out of a thousand shots. The
Naval Air Group has taken to its heels.120

As already indicated. Admiral Mitscher’s
Task Force inflicted considerable damage and
contributed much to the eventual successes on

118 Kino, lor. rit. Naval Gunfire Support in the
FOIIAGER Operation, 10. hereinafter cited as
FOR l HER XGF Report.

110 CINCPAC— CINCPOA Ttem #10,238.

120 OINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #11,405.

Saipan, but its effectiveness was limited by sev-
eral factors which are worthy of note. First, the
seven fast battleships were required to remain
beyond the range of shore batteries and outside
possible mined areas. In regard to this. Admiral
Spruance has written “. . . the broad shelf to the
westward of the island gave minable depths. As
the minesweepers did not arrive and start
sweeping until D-l Day (14 June), the fast
battleships obviously ought not to steam
through what might be mined waters to conduct
their bombardment.” 121

As a result, fires were delivered from ranges
in excess of 10,000 yards. Experience in the
Gilberts, Marshalls and Eniwetok had taught
that ships must close (he range and fire direct
lire, spotting from the ship itself, if complete
destruction of installations, and fortications
were to be realized. In contrast to the desired
employment, there were instances of battleships
firing 5-inch 38 at ranges in excess of 16,000
yards — too great for destruction of point targets.

The fast battleships, as a group, lacked the
training and experience necessary for effective
shore bombardment.122 This type of firing, in-
volving methodical, patient adjustment, was
fundamentally different from the firing neces-
sary to succeed in an engagement at sea. Where
ships had not received specific training in shore
bombardment, their effectiveness on this mission
was considerably reduced. Task Force 58. of
necessity, had devoted the bulk of its training
and thinking to lighting surface engagements,
with due emphasis on speed and maneuver-
ability. Consequently, the special difficulties
attendant to the destruction of small land tar-
gets had received hut scanty attention. Both in
size and distinctiveness, a well-camouflaged
pillbox presented an entirely different type of
target than an enemy ship.

Since TF 58 was dependent on air spotters
for adjustment of its fires, it follows that these

121 Spruance.

122 The exception that proves the rule: LtCol Joseph
L. Stewart, Assistant G-3, NTLF, comments that “the
North Carolina [one of the fast battleships of TF 58]
was one of the best shooting ships T ever fired.’’ Ltr
from LtCol J. 1.. Stewart to CMC, 0.Tan50.

undamaged Japanese pillbox harmonizes with surrounding terrain. Such inconspicuous targets received scant atten-
tion from bombarding ships. Only those positions receiving direct hits were silenced.

spotters should be adept in locating and recog-
nizing important enemy ground installations
and defenses. Spotters, in most cases, lacked the
vital training necessary to develop this ability
and, consequently, directed fire on obvious
buildings and terrain features which made in-
teresting but unprofitable targets. A case in
point is the sugar mill at Charan Ivanoa. This
building, a prominent landmark, easily identi-
fied. had been riddled with shot and shell. The
Japanese, however, were not inside, nor were
they using the mill for military purposes.

In addition to those reasons already given,
the effectiveness of TF 58’s bombardment was
further limited because of an overemphasis on
covering all assigned areas, (so-called “area-
shooting”) to the neglect of specific point tar-
gets within those areas. Intercepted radio
transmissions indicated that ships often shifted
(o new targets without applying the air

spotter’s last correction and adjustment.128

A comment by Admiral Spruance in regard
to the employment of the fast battleships for
shore bombardment is pertinent:

The use of the fast battleships . . . was done with a
view to increasing the number of large bombardment
shell that could be carried in the heavy ships . . .
without too great a reduction in the armor piercing
rounds that t lie [fast battleships] must carry for a
tieet engagement. This served a useful purpose, but it
was never intended to take the place of the close-in
tire of the [old battleships] to which it was a useful
preliminary.124

On 14 June (D-minus 1) fire support ships of
the Northern and Southern Attack Forces
(TF’s 52 and 53), under the command of Rear
Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, arrived off Saipan
and joined TF 58 in a blasting bombardment

123 FO It 1(7/772 NOF Report. 2-10. NTLF, Naval Gun-
fire Report, f>, hereinatfer cited as NTLF NOF Report.

124 Sprunnce.

sugar mill IN charan kanoa, an obvious target, received more naval gunfire than it deserved. Smokestack pro-
vided one ingenious Japanese an observation post for several days after United States landings.

of beaches and installations. For the D-minus
1 and D-Day naval gunfire preparation, Ad-
miral Turner divided the islands of Saipan and
Tinian into seven fire support sectors and as-
signed a lire support unit to each. (For sectors
and ships assigned to each, see Map 6.) Fire
Support Unit Eight was not assigned a specific
sector for the D-minus 1 bombardment and was
to “deliver counterbattery fire only as required.”
On D-Day, with its ammunition supply virtu-
ally intact, Unit Eight would move into the
western portion of Sector 6 and deliver “intense
enfilade fire at the Charan Kanoa beach instal-
lations.”

Ships firing in critical Sector 1 (which in-
cluded the preferred landing beaches) would
furnish covering fire for mine sweepers and
underwater demolition teams as well as to
“destroy beach defenses . . . particularly includ-
ing Afetna Pont.” These ships were also to
destroy all buildings and installations at
Charan Kanoa except those facilities that might
later be converted to our own use.

The six destroyers of Fire Support Units

Two and Three would participate in the D-Day
bombardment only. On D-minus 1, these ships
would afford protection to the advancing LST’s
and transports of TF 52. It will be noted that
sectors 2 and 3 were smaller segments of sector
1, with the range very much reduced. The
reason for this preponderance of power off the
western coast was that the Charan Kanoa
beaches had been selected as preferred landing
areas.

Fire Support Unit Four, in addition to cov-
ering mine sweepers and underwater demolition
teams operating within its sector, would prepare
the alternate landing areas for possible use and
cover the Demonstration Group.

Fire Support Units Five, Six and Seven
would destroy enemy guns and installations
lying within their sectors.

In addition to the specific targets assigned,
supports ships were to “fire all unburned cane
fields (using WP projectiles) within their
sectors.” 125

125 Task Force 52 Attack Order All— 14, Annexes A
and C.

00 Bennett

FIRE SUPPORT SECTORS

NAUTICAL MILES

MAP 6

The bombardment of 14 June generally pro-
ceeded acording to plan; certain alterations,
however, were demanded by the development of
the situation. Rear Admiral Howard F. King-
man’s Fire Support Unit One experienced diffi-
culty in destroying Japanese installations on
Afetna Pont; combined fires of Birmingham
and Indianapolis throughout the morning
failed to achieve destruction or, indeed, even
complete neutralization, inasmuch as mortar
lire, apparently emanating from the point, con-
stantly menaced the ships. Because of this
situation, Admiral Kingman issued orders to
Tennessee , California and Birmingham to con-
centrate on Afetna Point during the afternoon
instead of assigned targets in Charan Kanoa.
In addition, two strafing-bombing strikes were
placed on the point during the afternoon. The
result of all this was that defense positions
appeared to be neutralized but not destroyed.120

Fire Support Unit Four (commanded by
Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, who also
commanded the Task Group) did not experience
the expected opposition from Flores Point or
from Ma niagassa Island, and Maryland and
Colorado were therefore directed to concen-
trate on Japanese batteries in the vicinity of
Mutcho Point. The cruiser Louisville took over
the missions formerly assigned the two battle-
ships.127

Rear Admiral Robert AY. Ilayler’s Fire Sup-
port Unit Five covered its assigned sector on
Saipan’s east coast, though it experienced diffi-
culty in locating enemy installations. This unit
was assigned to remain off Saipan, delivering
harrassing fires throughout the night of 14—15
June, while the remainder of the task group
retired to the westward.128

Operating in Sector G was Rear Admiral
AValden L. Ainsworth’s Fire Support Unit
Six,129 covering its assigned area without special

126 Task Unit 52.17.1 Report, G-7.

127 Task Group 52.17 and Task Unit 52.17.4 Re-
port, 7.

128 Task Unit 52.17.5 Report, 1-3.

129 Admiral Ainsworth was also in command of Task
Group 52.10, which included Fire Support Units Six,
Seven and Eight. Ships of these three units were from

incident. One point of interest, however, is
found in the fact that the battleship Pennsyl-
vania., after firing at Nafutan Point (on the
southeast tip of the island) for approximately
eight hours, failed to achieve complete neutrali-
zation. Almost as soon as the Pennsylvania's
lire ceased, a Japanese shore battery impudently
opened fire upon, but failed to hit, the cruiser
Montpelier. This again illustrated that neither
destruction nor neutralization was guaranteed
even by relatively long periods of bombard-
ment.130

Fire Support Unit Seven, commanded by
Rear Admiral George L. Weyler, bombarded
the west coast of Tinian throughout the day in
accordance with its instructions, while Rear
Admiral Charles T. Joy’s Fire Support Unit
Eight observed Tinian’s east coast to protect
Unit Six from Japanese shore batteries.131

With the arrival on 14 June of the old battle-
ships, cruisers and destroyers of the Joint Ex-
peditionary Force, the quality of the shore bom-
bardment improved greatly. The reason for
this was no mystery; these ships had devoted
considerable time to shore bombardment, both
in training and battle experience. During the
rehearsals at Kahoolawe, a month prior to the
operation, the old battleships had received valu-
able experience. They knew the necessity of
slow, painstaking adjustment in shore bombard-
ment, that merely covering an area was not
sufficient. At Tarawa, where the development
of the technique was still suffering growing
pains, the fallacy of area-shooting was clearly
revealed. Methodical pin-pointing of targets,
complex bookkeeping, careful weighing of
priorities, and studious damage assessment are
requisites to efficient shore bombardment.132

AAThile the old battleships practiced, TF 58’s
new battleships had been far at sea executing
raids, with little or no opportunity to train in

the Southern Attack Force, earmarked for fire support
at Guam.

13° Task Group 52.10 and Task Unit 52.10.0 Re-
port, 1.

131 Task Unit 52.10.7 Report, 2. Task Unit 52.10.8
Report, 2.

132 Marine Corps Gazette , “Naval Gunfire Support in
Landing," Sep45, Maj R. P. Heinl, Jr., 42.

shore bombardment. This, plus the afore-
mentioned range restriction, resulted in area-
shooting rather than systematic pin-pointing.

Even with the improvement of shore bom-
bardment beginning with the arrival of the old
battleships, however, certain factors limited a
really effective preparation. First and foremost
was the shortage of time with respect to the
very large number of targets. Since t lie older
battleships did not arrive until D-minus 1,
allowing them to participate in only one day of
preliminary bombardment (as distinguished
from the D-Day tires), it is apparent that ade-
quate time for these ships did not exist. Second,
was a failing already discussed in relation to
TF 58 — lack of training of air spotters in dis-
tinguishing important targets ashore. (Here,
again, obvious targets attracted entirely too
much attention.) Third, was the necessity that
support ships of TF 53 (Fire Support Units
Six, Seven and Eight) conserve ammunition
for the bombardment of Guam, expected to take
place within a few days. On D-Day another
restrictive would be added — targets farther
than 1,000 yards inland were to be attacked
only by aircraft until H-Hour. Although done
in the interests of employing both supporting
arms to the maximum without using precious
time coordinating their efforts, it resulted in
some targets escaping the fires of the weapon
best suited for their destruction.133

Operation reports mention a number of
reasons which contributed to prevent satisfac-
tory neutralization or destruction of targets on
Saipan — the size of the island, the large number
of defensive installations, the enemy’s excellent
use of camouflage, and the mobility of many of
his weapons.134 These same characteristics,
however, could as well apply to many other
islands (Guam for example), and do not
represent conditions peculiar to Saipan.

Operating under cover of naval gunfire three
underwater demolition teams (UDT’s)135
moved close inshore during daylight of 14 June

133 FORAGER NOF Report, 11.

134 Ibid., CO MI NCR P-007, 3-2.

135 Each team consisted of approximately IB officers
and 80 men, all Navy except for one Army and one
Marine liaison officer per team.

to perform their hazardous tasks. There, with
eyes anxiously searching for signs of enemy
activity, skilled hands prodded the reef floor
for obstacles, mines, and the like. Once found,
such obstacles had to be removed or destroyed.
Teams were assigned as follows: Beaches lied
Two and Three and Green One and Two- UDT
#5; reef at the north side of Tanapag Harbor,
leading to Beaches Scarlet One and Two (alter-
nate plan beaches)— UDT #<>; Beaches Blue
One and Two and Yellow One and Two- UDT

#7.

UDT #5 (covered by California and Birm-
ingham) and UDT (covered by Maryland ,
Colorado and Louisville) proceeded according
to plan, neither team suffering casualties. For
the men of UDT #7, however, it was a different
story; heavy fire from Beaches Blue and Yellow
greatly complicated their tasks. To assist them,
Tennessee and Indianapolis laid down an in-
tense 5-inch and 40mm barrage along the
beaches but were unable to neutralize enemy
positions sufficiently for UDT #7 to conduct a
complete reconnaissance. Hostile tire notwith-
standing, UDT #7 executed its reconnaisance
to the following distances from beaches: Blue
One — Waterline; Blue Two — 75 yards; Yellow
One — Reconnaissance impossible except lip of
reef; Yellow Two — 100 yards.

At 0956, Commander UDT #7 requested
smoke to screen rescue of survivors — including
seven wounded. For this screen, the destroyer
W adleigh fired 87 rounds of 5-inch .38 white
phosphorous. The battleship Tennessee also
fired several white phosphorous rounds along
the beach to assist in the evacuation. This con-
stituted the Navy’s only use at Saipan of
screening smoke for other than screening trans-
port areas and anchorages.136

136 A detailed smoke plan had been prepared which
included the screening of the front and flanks of boat
waves ; except as stated, however, the plan was not
used. Adm Harry W. Hill, Commander Western Land-
ing Group, stated that smoke was not used in the
ship-to-shore movement because it was unnecessary.
“Smoke is a double-edge weapon. Though it screens
the enemy’s observation, it also greatly complicates
control and coordination. We felt that more was to
he lost than gained by the use of smoke in the ship-
to-shore movement at Saipan.” Interview witli Adm

889590°— 50— 4

No one was disappointed to find that pre-
assault demolitions would be unnecessary at
Saipan. But, despite the lack of obstacles, the
UDT’s were able to provide some valuable in-
formation to the landing force, information
concerning reef conditions, depths of water,
channels, surf, tide, current, and defenses on
the beach.137

More information in this connection had been
acquired on 13 June (D-minus 2) by Com-
mander William I. Martin, USN. Leading his
torpedo-bomber squadron (VT 10) from the
carrier Enterprise in strikes against beach
defenses, Martin’s plane was downed by Japan-
see antiaircraft fire near the radio station north
of Charan Ivanoa. Although his two crewmen
were killed, the commander swam out to the
reef. While awaiting rescue, lie noted down a
number of pertinent facts regarding tidal con-
ditions, depth of water over the reef, and na-
ture of the reef floor. This report was trans-
mitted to the landing force prior to D-Day.138

Also jotting down notes was Japanese non-
commissioned officer Tokuzo Matsuya. In his
diary entry for 14 June, he reveals bitterness at
the failure of Japanese planes to appear over
Saipan, coupled with very realistic philosophy:

Where are our planes? Are they letting us die with-
out making any effort to save us? If it were for the
security of the Empire, we would not hesitate to lay
down our lives but wouldn't it be a great loss to the
“Land of the Gods” for us all to die on this island?
It would he easy for me to die but for the sake of
Japan’s future I feel obligated to stay alive.139

Actually, this NCO saw through the picture
more completely than did most of his superiors,

Hill on 20Sep49. To this, Adm Turner adds: “Ac-
tually, at Saipan we had too much smoke during
the landing. The ship bombardment set up a heavy
wall of smoke, due to the light off-shore breeze, that
did not dissipate until after about the second wave
had landed. Turner.

137 Details of UDT operations at Saipan are a syn-
thesis of the following sources: COM INCH P—007,
4-1 and 8-1 ; Task Force 52 Attack Order Alt-44,
Annex G, 1-2: Task Unit 52.17.1 Report, 5—6.

138 Naval 1 ir Operations In the Marianas, Naval
Aviation History Unit OP-501D, C-32. hereinafter
cited as Naval Air Operations In the Marianas.

139 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #10,238.

who thought that it was just a matter of time
until the mighty Japanese air arm asserted
itself.

The imposing array of sea power off Saipan
might have frightened a less persistent foe to
silence, but the Japanese periodically emerged
from cover to answer the challenge. In most
instances their shells only churned the water,
but twice on 14 June they found their intended
mark. Destroyer Braine (of Fire Support Unit
Seven) and battleship California (of Fire Sup-
port Unit One) were hit by one shell each while
engaging in shore bombardment. Though
neither ship suffered critical damage, the shell-
ing had its effect; Braine' s number 2 torpedo
mount and after fireroom were put out of com-
mission by a 6-inch shell from Tinian, and
Californians main battery director and forward
radar were rendered inoperative by an explod-
ing missile (estimated 105mm) from Saipan.
The destroyer had three men killed and 15 in-
jured, the battleship one killed and nine
wounded.140

It should be noted that preliminary bom-
bardment of Saipan was limited to carrier and
surface strikes. There was no land-based air
support prior to the landing. While land-based
air assisted the operation indirectly by attacks
on other islands, none could be employed
against Saipan itself because of distances in-
volved. Also, there was no possibility of ar-
tillery support prior to the landing from lesser
islands within suporting range, as had been
possible at Kwajalein, Roi-Namur, and Eni-
wetok. There was no continued preparation of
any sort over an extended period of time, such
as that which was to prove so effective in the
preparation for the Guam and Tinian oper-
ations.141 In this connection. General Holland

140 Fifth Fleet, Initial Report on the Operation to
Capture the Marianas Islands, 15-16, hereinafter cited
as 5th Fleet Initial Report. TF 51 Report, Enel L. 1.

141 This opinion is not shared by Adm Turner, who
writes : “After a great deal of thought, I have come to
the conclusion that the prolonged bombardments of
Guam and Tinian actually had very little good effect.
. . . In any case, it would have been unwise and imprac-
ticable, from the standpoint of major tactics, to have
had a longer preparatory period for Saipan. . . .”
Turner.

Smith later wrote : “The initial mistake was
this : we did not soften up the enemy sufficiently
before we landed.” 142

Saipan was the most heavily defended of
the three islands, despite the fact that the
Japanese defensive preparations were incom-
plete at the time of our landing. One may only
speculate on how much more costly the opera-
tion would have been if the Japanese defensive
plans had reached fruition. Likewise, we may
only speculate on how much less costly it would
have been if preparatory fires had been acle
quate.143

RELATED COVERING ACTIONS

The scope and extent of the Saipan venture
demanded that many areas in the Pacific be at
least temporarily neutralized, so that the Japa-
nese would have false clues as to the target area
and so that our approach and landing would
not be strongly contested by enemy aircraft.
This build-up was vital to success.

Among the far-removed covering actions
were the operations of the Eleventh Army Air
Force, flying from its bases in Alaska and the
Aleutians against Japanese installations in the
Kurile Islands. This unit’s raids, mounted in
the face of harsh Arctic conditions, affected the
Saipan operation in an indirect — yet impor-
tant— manner: a portion of the Japanese air
force was diverted from the Central Pacific
and sent to defend the icy north.144

Wake and Marcus, which flanked on the
north our approach to the Marianas, were the
targets for a carrier raid almost a month be-
fore the Saipan landings. This raid, under the

142 Coral and Brass, Gen H. M. Smith. 162. here-
inafter cited as Coral and Brass.

143 Analysis of these inadequacies in preparatory
fires is drawn from hindsight, a much easier proce-
dure than determining — before an operation — what
the needs will be. In this connection, VAdm Harry W.
Hill has written : “It is my recollection that during the
planning period everyone was pretty well agreed that
the naval gunfire, while not greatly in excess of re-
quirements, certainly appeared to be adequate for the
job.” Ltr from VAdm Hill to CMC, 12.Tan.r>0.

144 The War Reports, Second Report of the Com-
manding General of the Army Air Forces, Gen H. H.
Arnold, 388, hereinafter cited as Arnold.

tactical command of Rear Admiral Allred E.
Montgomery, USN, was designed both to neu-
tralize the threat to the projected supply line
from the Marshalls to the Marianas and to in
doctrinate several new air groups. Three car-
riers participated — Essex, Wasp and San Ja-
cintoJ45

Wake and the by -passed atolls were methodi-
cally bombed by the land-based Army planes
of Major General Willis II. Ilale, USA, acting
under the general direction of Vice Admiral
John H. Hoover, USX. Truk, also, was kept
neutralized by these forces in coordination
with land-based planes from the South and
Southwest Pacific.140

More intimately keyed to the target date
were the strikes on the Palaus. Executed by
aircraft of MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific
Forces, the bombardment began on ?> June:
from 9 June until the Saipan landings these
islands and others in the western Carolines
were harassed daily. This activity minimized
possibilities of trouble from the south and
southwest.

To prevent the Japanese from staging air
craft through the Bonins in the north, two task
groups (Clark’s 58.1 and Harrill’s 58.4) of TF
58 departed Saipan on 14 June for an attack.
This move was the deepest penetration of Em-
pire waters ever made by a carrier striking
force up to this time. In the teeth of a growing
gale, fighter sweeps and bombing missions
were launched against Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima
and Haha Jima; and, despite airborne opposi-
tion and unfavorable flying conditions, the
mission was accomplished and the effective-
ness of the Bonins as an aircraft staging area
was greatly reduced.147

FINAL APPROACH OF THE NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE

Details of staging at Eniwetok Lagoon,
meanwhile, had been completed on time, and
the Northern Attack Force departed by eche-
lon on the 8th, 9th and 10th of June. The en-

143 7’7ie Nary's Air War, 204.

146 Arnold, 384—385. A History of the United States
Nary, Dudley W. Knox, 555, hereinafter cited as Knox.

147 The Na vy's Air War, 206

tire movement to the objective was uneventful,
the weather was pleasant, and no portion of
the Northern Attack Force was detected. Dur-
ing the movement of the attack force to Eni-
wetok, while there, and in the subsequent move
to Saipan, radio silence (except on very high
frequency ) prevailed.148

LSI 's with assault waves embarked and
transports of the Joint Expeditionary Force
arrived at the target area before dawn of 15
June. Strategic surprise appears to have been
gained, but the bombardment which had begun
on 11 June, together with the work of the
Underwater Demolition Teams, denied any
hope of tactical surprise.

148 Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops), Signal
Ofiicer’s Report, 8.

The armada now in position off the western
coast of Saipan was tremendous. One hundred
ships were required to transport the Northern
Landing Force, plus four to five times that
number of supporting vessels.149

Personnel aboard those ships had been much
heartened during their approach by an opti-
mistic dispatch from Admiral Mitscher (whose
Task Force 58 had been pummeling Saipan
and sister islands for several days) : “Keep
coming, Marines; they’re going to run away.”
But, on an island only fourteen and one-fifth
miles long and six and one-half miles wide, there
isn’t much room to run — -if, indeed, one wished
to run.

449 COMINCH P-007, 1-3 and 5-4. TF 56 O-S Re-
port, 13.

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

CHAPTER II

D-Day — 15 June 1944

PRE-H-HOUR PREPARATIONS

At about 0400, 15 June 1944, the landing-
force, readying itself aboard ships for the
supreme test, received an anxiously awaited
report : that of the underwater demolition
teams. These had accomplished their danger-
ous mission on D-minus 1 under cover of naval
gunfire. Their report cleared up many points:
the reef itself ottered no obstacles, natural or
artificial, to a crossing by our amphibious
vehicles; the depth of the water in the lagoon 1
was a little greater than had been expected; no
mines had been found on the reef, or in the
lagoon; tanks could be landed on the reef, al-
though a path to the beach was undetermined ;
the beach was organized throughout the land-
ing area with an occasional pillbox and many
trenches; and mobile artillery was observed
shifting into position.

Generally the report was not too disappoint-
ing. The presence of tetrahedron obstacles and
barbed wire on the reef would have compli-
cated the landing. From the reports received
t here was no cause to alter plans. One factor,
not revealed in reports of underwater demoli-
tion teams, which later complicated the ship-
to-shore movement: mortar and artillery regis-
tration flags on the reef and in the lagoon.

1 Lagoon, as here used, refers to the expanse of
water between the reef’s edge and the beach.

These markers, which enabled the enemy to
place accurate fire on assault waves, could be
plainly seen on the morning of 15 June even
from ships many thousands of yards oil' shore.
It is possible, since underwater demolition
teams made no mention of them, that the flags
were placed after the teams’ 14 June reconnais-
sance.2

Transport Groups A and B, with portions of
General Watson’s 2d Marine Division and Gen-
eral Schmidt’s 4th Marine Division embarked,3 4
moved into position in the transport area
18,000 yards offshore of Charan Ivanoa at 0520.
Aboard the Rocky Mount* Admiral, Turner’s

2 Lieutenant Colonel Wendell H. Best, executive
officer of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, at Saipan,
writes: “One Japanese artillery firing chart which we
captured indicated pre-fired data on the reef, lagoon,
and beaches. ... It is my opinion that the fire would
have been equally devastating without the flags.” Ltr
from LtCol Best to CMC, S.TanoO, hereinafter cited
as Beat.

3 These “portions” included everyone of the two divi-
sions not embarked in LST’s.

4 The Rocky Mount , like her sister the Appalachian,
is an especially designed amphibious command ship
(designated “AGC”) for the use of the attack force
and landing force staffs. Special features include: a
teletype screen upon which all incoming messages are
flashed, large conference rooms to facilitate coordina-
tion and integration of staff actions, and extra com-
munications to insure an uninterrupted flow of mes-
sages.

flagship, was General Holland M. Smith and
his Expeditionary Troops staff. With Admiral
Hill (Turner’s second-in-command) aboard
the Cambria was General Erskine and the
NTLF Staff.

Silhouetted in the hazy east was Mount
Tapotchau and the rocky hills which form the
island’s spiny backbone. As light improved,
the town of Charan Kanoa and the reef chan-
nel opposite its pier could be discerned. To the
north was the island capital — Garapan. Far-
ther north at Tanapag Harbor were several
beached, half-sunken, smoking ships — the re-
sults of the preparatory air and naval gunfire
bombardment. Also in Tanapag Harbor was
tiny, fortified Maniagassa Island.

Fire support ships were climaxing efforts of
previous days to destroy enemy installations.
Off Tanapag Harbor, Transport Divisions 10
and 30 proceeded to their assigned area. These
two transport divisions, with the 2d and 24th
Ma rines and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines,
embarked, composed the Demonstration Group
which was to conduct the diversion off beaches
northeast of Tanapag Harbor.* * * * 5 *

At 0542, Admiral Turner ordered, “Land the
Landing Force.” H-Hour was set for 0830.
Aboard all ships, everything was ready. A sub-
stantial breakfast had been nervously de-
voured; guns and winches were manned, boats
being lowered, hatches cleared : troops were
alert and keyed to the occasion. The day was
clear — there would be no serious trouble with
the weather.

Shortly after 0700, the LST Flotilla was in
position in its area about 1,250 yards in rear of
the line of departure. After troops and LYT's
were debarked, most of the LST’s (except the
three designated as hospital ships) were to re-
tire to seaward until again needed. There were
34 LST’s carrying the assault elements of the
2d and 4th Marine Divisions in position nearest
the line of departure. Slightly behind them
were eight LST’s with both divisions’ artillery,
two LST’s with the antiaircraft artillery, and
two LST’s with XXIV Corps Artillery em-
barked. Two Landing Ships Dock (LSD's),0

5 TF 56 G-3 Report, Enel It. 2-4.

6 These ships were originally designed to transport
LCT’s from the United States to Europe. When it

carrying tanks in Landing Craft Mechanized
(LCM’s) , were in rear of each division’s beach.

Control vessels with Marine and Navy repre-
sentatives embarked moved to their assigned
positions. All vessels flew flags to designate
the beach approaches over which they would
exercise control. A special control vessel was
designated to handle traffic in the narrow
channel that existed in the reef near Charan
Kanoa (off Green 3). 7

Since dawn, naval gunfire support ships had
hurled salvo upon salvo at Saipan. At 0730,
Admiral Hill (Commander Task Group 52.2)
assumed control of Fire Support Unit One
(TU 52.17.1), in order that fires on the selected
beaches would be coordinated by the officer in
command of the landing itself.8 In addition
to the ships of the previous day, the six de-
stroyers of Fire Support Units Two and Three
delivered screening fires on the Charan Kanoa
beaches as they escorted tractor groups into po-
sition. (See Map 6.) Tractor Group Able,
which consisted of the LST’s carrying assault
elements of the 2d Marine Division, was es-
corted by Fire Support Unit Three (TU 52.-
17.3, commanded by Captain Harry B. Jarrett,
USN ) ; Tractor Group Baker, transporting
assault elements of the 4th Marine Division,
was escorted by Fire Support Unit Two (TU
52.17.2, Commander Phillip H. Fitzgerald,
USN). On bombardment stations by 0800,
these two task units delivered intense fires on
the landing beaches, close to the waterline.9

Fire Support Units One and Four, com-
mencing at dawn, continued their fires against
Saipan’s west coast, with particular emphasis
on the points which dominated landing beaches.

was found that LST’s could perform this carrying

service, the LSD’s were diverted to another purpose
— transporting tanks, embarked in LCM’s. The pecu-

liar design of the LSD’s allowed water to enter the

shell of the ship, whence LCM’s (carrying tanks)
could move under their own power. When debarka-

tion was complete, water could either be expelled or

the ship could stand by to repair damaged craft (up
to and including LCT’s).

7 NTLF G-3 Report 13-14.

8 Task Group 52.17 Report, 8.

0 Task Unit 52.17.3 Report, 1. Task Unit 52.17.2
Report, 1.

Agingan Point felt the impact of Tennessee’s
14-inch shells; Afetna Point was shattered
with a variety of shells: 14-incli from Cali-
fornia, 8-inch from Louisville and 6-inch from
Birmingham; Mutcho Point and Maniagassa
Island were pounded by 16-inch shells from
Maryland. Affording the enemy positions from
which to direct enfilade lire against our land-
ing waves, these areas rightfully received much
attention. But, even with this volume of lire,
enemy troops and guns remained in action in
these areas.

Fire Support Unit Five concentrated its
efforts on Saipan’s extreme northeastern tip.
while Units Six and Seven fired counterbattery
missions against Tinian.

At H-Hour minus 90 minutes, all naval gun-
lire lifted and air operations began: first a
bombing strike, then a strafing attack. As
planes retired after pounding the islands for
30 minutes, warships again picked up the prep-
aration.10

Admiral Joy’s Fire Support Unit Eight
(TU 52.10.8), which had bided its time and
protected Unit Six during the 14 June prepa-
ration, assumed the starring role from II -minus
60 to H-minus 30 minutes. After exchanging
jobs with Unit Six, Admiral Joy’s ships
focused enfilading fire on the Charan Kanoa
beaches and frontal fire into a spur extending
southwestward from Aslito Airfield toward
Cape Obiam. This spur was the site of 11
Japanese installations, ranging from a com-
mand post to dual-purpose guns. The pall of
smoke and dust which cloaked the island made
damage assessment impossible.11

At H-minus 30 minutes, the Red, Green, Blue
and Yellow Beaches were subjected to renewed
hammering by Fire Support Units One, Two
and Three. (See Map 7 for fire support dis-
positions in close support of D-Day landings.)
Tennessee pumped 100 high-capacity 14-inch
shells into the Blue and Yellow Beaches; Cali-
fornia fired the same number into the Red and
Green Beaches; Afetna Point, dangerous be-
cause it separated the two divisions' beaches

1,1 Task Force 52, Attack Order A 11-44. Annex C.

" Task Unit 52.10.8 Report, 2.

and a potential thorn in the sides of both divi-
sions, received 450 high-capacity 6- and 8-inch
shells from Birmingham and Indianapolis}'1

Interesting in connection with the disposi-
tions of supporting ships for the landings is
Admiral Turner’s comment that “this was the
first time the Close Support firing vessels had
been anchored, or stopped, very close to the
beaches, to shoreward of the Line of De-
parture. There were eleven Close Support ves-
sels, whose average distance from the beach
was 2,500 yards. . . .” 13

The area near the line of departure showed
greater activity as control vessels, guide boats,
and 24 light gunboats (LCI(G)’s) nosed into
position. These latter craft were scheduled to
precede the first landing waves as far as the
reef, firing their 4.5-inch rockets and 20 and
40mm guns at point-blank range onto the
beach. Armored amphibians, constituting the
first wave, would provide fire support for troop-
carrying LYT’s from the reef to the beach and
thereafter would execute fire missions as re-
quired. Farther out, hundreds of landing ve-
hicles circled dizzily as boat waves organized.14

At 0753, Admiral Turner ordered a delay of
H-Hour from 0830 to 0840 to allow boat waves
more time to complete formation.15

It had been estimated that the 4,000-yard run
from the line of departure to the beach would
take about 27 minutes. Shortly after 0800, the
central control vessel hoisted its signal for the
24 LCI(G)’s to head for the beach with guns
blazing. Excitement mounted at 0812, when
flags were hauled down (or “executed”) from
yardarms. This was the signal, like a nod of
confidence, for the first wave of amphibian ve-
hicles to head full-speed for the beach. At short
intervals, the remaining assault waves roared
beach ward.

TANAPAG DEMONSTRATION

Off Tanapag Harbor, meanwhile, the Dem-
onstration Group, consisting of the 2d Marines,

12 Task Force 52, Attack Order A 11-44, Annex Cl.

13 Turner.

14 2d Mar Dir Report, Section V, 1.

15 Task Group 52.17 Report, 9.

the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, and the 24th
Marines, was executing its feint. The diversion
was afforded realism by supporting naval gun-
fire from Fire Support Unit Four (TU 52.-
17.4) as landing craft approached the beach to
within 5,000 yards, circled for a few minutes,
wheeled about, and returned to their ships.
Troops were not embarked in boats for the
feint, although personnel of the 2d Marines’
regimental intelligence section went along as
observers.10 Boats were hoisted in at about
0920, and an hour later the transports arrived
in their assigned area off the Charan Kanoa
beaches. Intelligence reports later indicated
that the Demonstration Group, by remaining
a constant threat from before H-Hour until
sometime thereafter, effectively contained at
least one Japanese regiment — the 135th Infan-
try— in the northern area. Landing craft drew
no lire during the feint, and no activity was
observed on the shore. There is no indication
that the 135th Infantry suffered more than

1,1 The 24th Marines used its regimental intelligence
section in a different manner. One lieutenant and
three scouts accompanied each of the assault regi-
ments (23d and 25th). The lieutenant remained with
regiment in each case, while the scouts were por-
tioned one per battalion. By this means, the 24th
Marines received timely enemy information prior to
actually landing. Interview with Maj A. B. Hanson,
16Feh49.

light casualties from the naval gunfire in sup-
port of the demonstration.17

THE LANDING

Soon after the first wave of the real landing
started for the beach, a few rounds of enemy
artillery fell in the area of the line of de-
parture. Any hope that the Japanese defend-
ers would be reduced to the status of shell-
shocked ineffectives was hastily dispelled. As
leading LVT’s approached shore, the volume
of naval gunfire decreased — main battery fires
lifted when landing vehicles were 1,000 yards
off the beach, 5-inch fire at 300 yards. At
Afetna Point, between the two divisions, how-
ever, 6- and 8-inch fire of Birmingham and
Indianapolis continued until the last possible
moment.

From the time the leading wave approached
to within 800 yards from the shore and last-
ing until the first craft landed, beach areas

17 TF 56 G-3 Report, Enel B, 4. 2d Marines Report,
Enel A, 1, hereinafter cited as 2d Mar Report. 24th
Marines Report, Section II. IS, hereinafter cited as
2 4th Mar Report. In an interrogation after the opera-
tion, Major Kiyoshi Yoshida, intelligence officer of the
43d Division, stated that the Japanese did not think
that our forces would actually land in the Tanapag
area but that they were not sufficiently sure and,
therefore, retained the 135th Infantry Regiment in
that area.

troop-carrying ivi's, here churning toward the shore. Ability of tliese vehicles to climb over the reef and move
directly to the beach obviated the necessity of troops wading ashore from the reef.

were subjected to intense, almost constant,
strafing attacks. For this mission, Carrier
Support Groups One and Two each furnished
24 fighter aircraft (YF) and 12 torpedo bomb-
ers (VT), those of the former group Hying
against 2d Division beaches (Red and Green)
and those of the latter against 4th Division
beaches (Blue and Yellow). Direction of these
attacks was west to east, perpendicular to the
beaches, available planes being organized into
divisions of eight fighters and four torpedo
bombers each. The latter, each carrying a full
5-inch rocket load, followed the fighters on the
first pass at the beach, firing all rockets at that
time. In addition to rocket loads, torpedo
bombers of Carrier Support Group One each
carried ten 100-pound bombs. As landing craft
approached to within 100 yards of the beaches,
strafers moved their points of aim inland, so
as to maintain a minimum safety interval of
100 yards at all times.18

Little difficulty was experienced by the as-

18 TF 51 Operation Plan A10-44, Addenda to Annex F.
Turner.

sault waves proceeding as far as the reef. But,
beginning there, the enemy commenced placing
automatic weapons, antiboat, artillery and
mortar fire on the approaching LYTs. These
fires increased in intensity with the 2d, 3d, and
4th waves.19 Terrifying, indeed, was the sound
of enemy shells bursting around the amtracs.
particularly the high-angle shells which
whistled ominously at the bobbing targets. And
the Marines, clustered in these “sitting ducks. ”
hoped or prayed that none of the shells would
find its intended mark. Some, however, did.

Those few curious individuals who felt im-
pelled to peer over the ramps of the LYT’s on
the way to the beach were greeted with the
uninviting spectacle of parched sand clutching
partially uprooted shrubs and small trees.
Through occasional holes in the dirty blanket
of smoke and dust, the battered escarpment
backing the beaches could be seen. Most of the
Marines were content to crouch low in the am-
tracs, preferring to contemplate Saipan in

19 2d Mar Dir Report. Section V, 2. J/tli Mar Dir
Report. Section VI, 14.

8,000 troops and 700 lvt's beached in the first 20 minutes at Saipan. Resulting congestion on certain beaches pro-
vided excellent targets for those enemy mortars and artillery pieces not silenced by United States naval gun-
fire and air strikes.

terms of brightly colored maps, transparent
overlays, and bold blue arrows.

The first wave, comprised of the 2d Armored
Amphibian Battalion and the Army’s 708th
Amphibian Tank Battalion began firing their
weapons about 300 yards from the beach. Some
troop-carrying tractors, because of their su-
perior speed, crossed in front of the armored
amphibians between the reef and the beach,
masking their fire. Of the 68 armored amphib-
ians which preceded the 2d Division, three
were disabled before reaching the beach, and
28 more were disabled between the beach and
the tractor control line,20 200-500 yards in-
land.21

Though some of the LVT’s were hit in the
water, the majority churned slowly onward.
At about 0843, men of the 6th and 8th Marines
of the 2d Division and the 23d and 25th Ma-
rines of the 4th Division hit the beach and im-
mediately came under intense mortar and ar-
tillery fire. All units suffered heavily. There
was no hesitation, however; the Marines were
well oriented, and the attack moved forward.
Within 20 minutes, 700 LVT’s and 8.000 troops
were ashore. Many leaders were hit. but their
responsibilities were rapidly assumed by their
immediate subordinates. Shells showered on
the beach.22

On the left, the 2d Marine Division’s land-
ing tended north of its assigned beaches (see
Map 8). This error was partially the fault of
the Xavy boat guide officers responsible for
guiding craft to correct beaches.23 Much of the

20 Not to be confused with the transfer control line
which was used as a coordinating point for the trans-
fer of troops from LCVP’s to LVT’S for the final move-
ment to the beach. The tractor control line is an easily
distinguishable terrain feature (in this case a railroad
track) where LVT's stop to debark troops.

21 2d Mar Dir Report, Section V, 2. Armored Am-
phibian Rattalion, Operation Order No. 2.

22 XT LI’ Report, 11. In an undated Japanese battle
plan for the Saipan Artillery Units, standard expendi-
ture of ammunition (expressed in percentage of total
amounts on hand) was established as follows: De-
struction of enemy landing craft — 15% : Engagement
at beach — 15%; Engagements following development
of situation — 20% ; Reserve — 50%. CINCPAC-CINC-
POA Item #0004.

23 Although Marine officers and men consulted on
this point unanimously agree that the Navy boat guide

difficulty, however, occurred between reef
(where guide boats were forced to stop) and
beach. Extremely heavy fire, registering on the
southern approaches to the Green Beaches,
caused landing vehicles to veer to the north to
escape it. Another reason for the shift in land-
ing was the northern drift of the current
within the lagoon, which markedly affected
the course of the amphibian vehicles. Troop
passengers aboard LVT’s did their best to cor-
rect the situation by encouraging the drivers
to bear to the right, but their efforts were un-
successful.

The fact that this northerly current was un-
expected is worthy of closer examination. At
first glance it would appear that this condition
should have been noted by the underwater
demolition teams in their 14 June reconnais-
sance. That they did not is explained by the
fact that their observations had been made
under different tidal conditions, at a different
time of day, and with a smooth sea.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe’s 2d
Battalion, 8th Marines, scheduled to land on
Green 2, landed instead on Green 1. The 3d
Battalion, 8th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel
John C. Miller, Jr.) also landed on Green 1,
with resultant dangerous and unfortunate
massing of troops. The two assault battalions
of the 6th Marines (the 2d, commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray, and
the 3d. commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John
IV. Easley), scheduled to land on Beaches Red
2 and 3, landed about 400 yards north of their
assigned beaches — more nearly on Red 1 and 2.
All four assault battalion commanders of the
2d Marine Division became casualties during

officers were at least partially responsible, the Com-
mander Expeditionary Force, Admiral Turner, does
not agree: “The naval boat guide officers, on both
flanks of each regimental assault wave, were em-
barked in LCV(P)’s . . . the first assault wave of each
regiment was guided on each flank by an LCC [land-
ing craft control]. All these boats were in excellent
communication with Transport Group and Transport
Division Control Vessels, in which staff officers of
Division (troop) and Regiments were respectively em-
barked. The LCC’s and LCV(P)’s necessarily had to
turn back at the edge of the reef . . . and thereafter
the LVT’s, manned by troops, were on their own.”
Turner.

the early hours of the battle. Despite loss of
leaders, confusion, and mixing of units, Ma-
rines moved out on their assigned missions.24

The 4th Division, on the right, landed on its
assigned beaches. From right to left, the as
sault battalions were: 1st Battalion, 25th Ma-
rines (Lieutenant Colonel Hollis U. Mustain),
2d Battalion, 25th Marines (Lieutenant
Colonel Lewis C. Hudson), on the Yellow
Beaches; 2d Battalion, 23d Marines (Lieu-
tenant Colonel Edward ,1. Dillon), 3d Bat-
talion, 23d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John
J. Cosgrove), on the Blue Beaches. (See Map
8.) It had been planned, and hoped, that Ma-
rines in the first waves might stay aboard their
LVT’s and continue inland to the 0-1 line,
where they would debark and form a beach-
head perimeter. Several troop-carrying LYT's,
acting independently or in small groups, car-
ried out this assigned mission.

On the left of the 4th Division, in the 3d
Battalion, 23d Marines’ zone, the armored
LVT’s, in some cases, did not proceed inland
but, rather, committed themselves to unneces-
sary fire fights in the streets of Charan Ivanoa.
This situation caused troop-carrying LVT’s of
the 2d and 3d waves some delay, until several
detoured the engaged LVT(A)’s and moved
inland.

The problem was altogether different on the
division right. In the zone of the 1st Battalion,
25th Marines, troops were forced by a prohibi-
tory fusillade of frontal and enfilade fire to
debark at the water’s edge.

4 he division’s two center battalions exj)eri-
enced similarly-varied situations. While nearly
half the 2d Battalion, 25th M arines, was car-
ried 500 to TOO yards inland prior to debarka-
tion, most of the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines,
was stopped and forced to debark only 100 to
200 yards inland.

All along the shallow beachhead, enemy ar-
tillery tire took a heavy toll. Although impos-
sible to locate the source of this fire or to judge
accurately its caliber, it now appears that it
issued from the guns of Lieutenant Colonel
Nakashima s 3d Independent Artillery Regi-
rnent. firing from positions in the vicinity of

24 2d Mar Div Report , Section Y, 2-3.

Tsutsuuran (behind Hill 500 and some 5,000
yards east of Charan Ivanoa). In the words
of the 4th Division action report : “. . . its in
tensity never varied in the slightest amount." 2

Even as late as arrival of the Gth wave, a
persistent Japanese light machine gun em
placed on the left center of Beach Blue 2 chat
tered at the men of the 2d Battalion, 23d Ma
lines, as they landed. The reason that this
weapon remained in action after so many Ma-
rines were ashore is that the gunners became
silent and hid when troops actually hit the
beach and remained so until the next wave
came into range. Lieutenant Colonel Dillon,
commanding the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines,
finally observed this weapon firing on one of
bis waves and ordered an LVT(A) of the
Army's 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion to
destroy it. The LVT(A) proved equal to the
task, and no more difficulty was experienced
from that particular source.26

RED BEACH ACTION

On the Red Beaches, the 2d and 3d Bat
talions of the Gth Marines encountered still re-
sistance and suffered heavy losses in personnel
and equipment. Debarkation at or near the
shore was necessitated by heavy resistance and
unavailability, in some cases, of routes of egress
from the beach. Those few LVT’s successful
in running the gantlet of fire and finding a
route from the beaches were soon stopped by
rocks or swamps beyond. As a matter* of fact,
the 2d Division had never contemplated move-
ment to O-l aboard LVT’s (as had the 4th Di-
vision), so this represented no variation be
tween plan and execution.27

25 htlx Mar Dir Report , Section VI, 13-14. 3d Bat
talion, 23d Marines Report, 1, hereinafter cited as
3d tin, 23d Mar Report.

20 Interviews with Col E. .T. Dillon, 17Feb49 and
5Jul49, hereinafter cited as Dillon.

27 The 2d Marine Division, from the outset, had been
unconvinced of the tactical soundness of the plan to
move aboard LVT’s to O-l. On several occasions,
General Watson had expressed his opinion on this sub-
ject to General Holland Smith. Watson was against
tlie plan for the following reasons: first, the terrain
would not permit it ; second, it would mean loss of
control while troops were embarked in LVT's ; and

ON the double this Marine crosses an open, fire-swept area to join his comrades in expanding the shallow beach-
head during early hours of the battle. Dud in foreground is one United States naval shell which did no good
at Saipan.

After landing, the 6th Regiment could force
only ti shallow, 75 to 100 yard beachhead across
the coastal road. Company F of the 2d Bat-
talion already had elements on the 0-1 line,
however, because this unit had landed north

third, it would needlessly expose congested groups of
men to enemy tire. General Watson finally secured
General Smith’s permission to change the concept
within the 2d Division’s zone to the extent that the
armored LYT’s would clear the immediate beach areas
and cover the landing by fire. The first wave of troop-
carrying LYT's would follow them and discharge
troops beyond the beach. All succeeding waves were to
debark on the benches, and I.YT’s carrying them were
to retract and return to their rendezvous area off the
reef as rapidly as possible. The tractor control line
was the maximum distance any LYT’s were to move
inland under any circumstances. Watson.

of its assigned beach at a point that coincided
with 0-1. Between Company F (along the
beach) and Company E existed a gap which
was subsequently filled by Company I of the
3d Battalion.

The normal difficulties attendant to the es-
tablishment of a beachhead were multiplied
in the 6th Marines’ area by shell explosions
from several burning LVT(A)’s nearby. These
crippled vehicles, hit as they crawled onto the
beach, were particularly troublesome to the 2d
Battalion on the left flank and to the wounded
men lying on the beach awaiting evacuation.
Many of the latter were hit again by the ex-
ploding shells.

At 1000, Colonel James P. Riseley, com-

mantling the 6th Marines, landed and com-
menced establishment of his command post
near the center of Beach lied 2. Entrenching
tools were no more than poised for serious dig-
ging when 15 to 25 Japanese charged down
the beach from the north, striking into the
congested beach area occupied by the regi-
mental command post, rear installations of the
2d Battalion, and the wounded. This enemy
force represented either a group that had been
by-passed or, more likely, a group that had
filtered through the gap between Companies
E and F. The Marines quickly rallied to the
somewhat unexpected outbreak, established a
firing line, and annihilated the Japanese force.

Coincidental with this thrust, an enemy tank
near the water’s edge, previously considered
abandoned, suddenly came to life and opened
devastatingly upon the LVT’s carrying the 6th
Marines’ reserve, Lieutenant Colonel William
Iv. Jones’ 1st Battalion. With unerring ac-
curacy the tank gunner scored 37mm hits upon
several LVT’s, including one carrying members
of the battalion staff. The Japanese gunner
could enjoy his choice targets only briefly, how-
ever; Marines ashore quickly converged ba-
zooka and antitank grenade fire upon the ve-
hicle and permanently silenced it. Jones’ bat-
talion, weathering its warm reception after
losing many key personnel, landed on Beach
Bed 2 at about 1040.28

Amid the shells and confusion at Bed Beach,
it was difficult for Colonel Biseley to determine
the battle’s progress. From reports, it ap-
peared that his right assault battalion (the 3d)
was having difficulty maintaining momentum.
Staff casualties were high; the 3d Battalion
commander (Lieutenant Colonel Easley), Bn—
2. Bn— 3, Bn— 4 and Assistant 81mm Mortar
Platoon Leader were all hit early. Colonel
Easley, though wounded, retained command
of the battalion until the following morning,
when he was evacuated. These critical losses,
plus many additional ones incurred from
grazing machine-gun fire as the unit moved
inland, caused Colonel Biseley to order the
1st Battalion to pass through Easley’s lines
and continue the attack toward the first

22 Ur from LI Col L. E. Hnffner to CMC, 9Dec49.

high ground inland (designated as 0-1).

Staff casualties were not reserved for the 3d
Battalion alone. At 1400, the 2d Battalion
command post received a direct hit from a
Japanese mortar shell, injuring Major Howard
J. Bice, who had taken over the unit when
Lieutenant Colonel Murray was wounded. An
observer, Lieutenant Colonel William A.
Ivengla, took command pending the arrival of
Major Leroy P. Hunt, Jr., at 1600.

The enemy machine guns, so troublesome to
the 3d Battalion, could not be located. The
terrain, flat or gently rolling, was ideal for
long-range grazing fire — and the smoke and
confusion made it difficult to discern the fire’s
origin. The enemy’s frequent changes of posi-
tion further complicated the task. Probably
nothing was so frustrating as receiving fire
from an “invisible” foe — yet that was the
normal situation throughout the operation.

When passed through by the 1st Battalion,
the 3d would become regimental reserve. No
sooner had the passage been accomplished,
however, than a potentially dangerous gap was
reported between the 6th Marines’ right and
the 8th Marines’ left — caused by the incorrect
landing — and Companies K and L of the 3d
Battalion were ordered to fill it. Even with the
advent of these two companies, however, the
gap was not filled, although it was possible to
cover the area by fire. Fortunately, the Japa-
nese had not located (his vulnerable point. By
late afternoon, all companies of all three bat-
talions of the 6th Marines were in the lines.

The regiment’s advance up the gently-rising
ground towards O-l could not proceed at a
rapid pace without presenting contact difficul-
ties with the 8th Marines, since the two regi-
ments were necessarily diverging in their di-
rections of attack.29 Fighting an enemy adept
in infiltration tactics, emphasis constantly had
to be given to the maintenance of contact. A
weak spot located by the enemy might well
have been a weak spot exploited.

29 nth Marines Report, Enel A, 1—2, hereinafter oito<l
as 6th 3 fur Report. Interview with LtCol .T. E. Itentseh,
12Jan49, hereinafter cited as Rentsch. Ltr from Maj
T. II. Fisher to author, 31Jan49, hereinafter cited as
Fisher. Ltr from Maj It. E. North to author, 17Jan49.
hereinafter cited as North.

GREEN BEACH AND AFETNA POINT

Tlie landing of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 8th
Marines, on the same beach (Green 1) de-
manded that the 2d Battalion spend the
greater portion of D-Day fighting to secure
the beach on which it should have landed. The
2d Battalion’s difficult scheme of maneuver re-
quired Company G to attack south along the
beach toward Afetna Point and the other two
companies (E and F) to fan out to the south-
east. This caused a wide dispersion as each
company set out for its assigned objective from
the point of landing.

Company G, moving through the sand dunes
along the beach, met strong resistance in the
form of a series of mutually supporting pill-
boxes (normally housing 37 or 47mm guns)
covered by riflemen in open trenches. Individ-
ual Japanese actually charged from foxholes
with bayonet or sword to contest Company G’s
advance. For its task of seizing Afetna Point,
this company had been supplied with weapons
unusual to combat : shotguns. The reason for
this becomes apparent when it is realized that
the unit was attacking straight towards the 4th
Marine Division’s left flank, making a short-
range weapon (and one with a wide dispersion
pattern) desirable. (See Map 9.) The entire
8th Marines’ supply of shotguns was allotted to
Company G, making available about one shot-
gun per two Ma rines. Men thus armed also
carried their normal weapons for later use. The
shotguns, generally, worked well; particularly
against sword-wielding opponents, but some
difficulty was experienced because most of the
cartridge jackets were made of cardboard
rather than metal. The cardboard-jacketed
cartridges often became misshapen in the sea
air, and would not enter shotgun chambers.30

Every yard of Company G’s advance toward
Afetna Point was hotly contested. Since it was
moving with its left flank along the small

30 Of interest in this connection: the 6th Marines
had been issued shotguns for the Guadalcanal cam-
paign and had had poor results front the cardboard-
jacketed shells. It had been recommended at that
time that only brass-jacketed cartridges be issued and
used in the future. Comment by LtCol R. M. Tompkins
on rough manuscript, 6.Tun49.

Charan Kanoa airstrip, Japanese riflemen as-
sumed positions on the eastern side of the strip
and fired into that flank, making the most of
the flat, open terrain. These remained in posi-
tion until knocked out by the Marines’ 60mm
mortars or machine guns.

Attached combat engineers, with their flame-
throwers, bazookas and demolitions, were in-
valuable in destroying enemy pillboxes. In sev-
eral instances, Marines of Company G came
upon Japanese in pillboxes firing to seaward
at boats carrying in reserves and supporting
weapons. Despite imminent danger to them-
selves, the Japanese often continued these fires
rather than turn their weapons upon the Ma-
rines. This Japanese devotion to their as-
signed mission made it possible for Company
G to work around to the rear or blind side of
the pillbox, move in, and destroy. But prog-
ress was slow and costly. Almost every sand
dune on the point turned out to be an enemy in-
stallation, with very-much-alive Japanese in-
side, this in spite of the tremendous tonnage of
shells thrown into the area by naval support-
ing vessels.

Seizure of Afetna Point was important for
another reason than denying the enemy excel-
lent, positions for enfilading our landing craft ;
possession of the point would make Beach
Green 3 available for landing of the tanks of
both divisions. Because of an open channel off
Green 3, LCM’s carrying tanks could proceed
directly to the beach without crossing the
troublesome reef that fenced all other beaches.
Once through the channel the craft could either
move straight in to Green 3 or fan out to the
north or south and put the tanks ashore,
wherever it was desired. The same channel
could also be used for logistical purposes after
tanks were ashore. As will be seen, however,
Afetna Point proved more of a headache than
expected, and the tanks had to land by a much
more difficult method.

While Company G struggled southward
through the sand dunes, Companies E and F,
8th Marines, pushed inland, the latter unit
roving across Susupe swamp. Upon discover-
ing that no friendly forces were anywhere
near, however, Company F pulled back to the
western side of the swamp. An interesting in-

cident arose from this minor excursion: an en-
terprising Japanese soldier somehow correctly
identified the Marine company and its location ;
but, after plotting his information on a rough
but readable sketch, he robbed himself of al-
most-earned glory by losing the sketch (and
probably his life). The sketch was picked up, or
off, by an equally -enter prising Marine from
Company F and turned in for intelligence
processing.31

Since the 3d Battalion landed on its correct
beach, no change in the unit’s attack plans was
necessitated, and its objective was reached on
time. Colonel Clarence R. Wallace, command-
ing the 8t,h Marines, landed between Beaches
Green 1 and 2 at about 09d5. This placed him
and his regimental command post in the front
lines for a period of a few minutes as Company
G struggled southward toward Afetna Point.

At 0950, the 1st Battalion (Lieutenant
Colonel Lawrence C. Hays, Jr.), in regimental
reseiwe, was ordered to land. Once ashore,
Company B was attached to the 2d Battalion
and immediately committed on Company G’s
left flank, relieving that unit of further flank
worries as it battled toward Afetna Point. The
other two companies (A and C), committed
between the 2d and 3d Battalions, attacked to
the eastward into the swamp which ran from
Lake Susupe to the vicinity of the radio station.
Before they were halfway through the thigh-
deep muck, lengthening shadows of late after-
noon forced an abandonment of the swamp
crossing. Colonel Hays then pulled his bat-
talion back to better defensive (and more com-
fortable) terrain on the west edge of the
swamp.32

Early in the afternoon, the division reserve,
1st Battalion, 29th Marines33 (Lieutenant
Colonel Guy E. Tannyhill), which had partici-
pated in the Tanapag demonstration, landed

31 Interview with Maj W. C. Chamberlin, 17Jan50,
hereinafter cited as Chamberlin.

32 Interview with Maj H. G. Gunter on 4Feb49, here-
inafter cited as Gunter. 8th Marines Report, 1, here-
inafter cited as 8th Mar Report. 1st Battalion, 8th
Marines Report, 1, hereinafter cited as 1st Bn, 8th
Mar Report. Wallace.

33 See footnote 78, page 27, Chapter I.

and was attached to (he 8th Marines. Company
B of this battalion was ordered to fill a gap
which had developed in the zone of the 2d Bat-
talion, 8th Marines. Owing to lack of knowl-
edge of the terrain and the absence of guides,
however, Company B ended up in the wrong
area.

It remained, then, for Company A. 29th
Marines, to fill the gap. Darkness was falling
by the time the unit got started, and the Ma-
rines experienced difficulty maintaining direc-
tion. About halfway to its assigned sector.
Company A was immobilized by a thundering
barrage of Japanese artillery fire. By this t ime,
however, Company B had located its originally-
assigned position, and it was discovered that
Company A would not he needed. The latter,
therefore, holed up for the night as a reserve,
along with other uncommitted units of the
battalion.

That units could sustain casualties without
actually participating in more than “gap-
tilling” operations is evidenced by the fact that
the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, suffered about
30 — mainly from Japanese artillery fire —
during the day.34

YELLOW BEACH AND AG1NGAN POINT

In the meanwhile, the -1th Marine Division
had its own share of trouble. The situation on
both flanks was causing great concern. At the
end of the first hour, the 1st Battalion, 25th
Marines, on the right flank, had clawed but 12
yards of beach depth in a situation differing
little from Tarawa. Because many LYT's of
the 773d Amphibian Tractor Battalion left the
beach before the unloading of anything but
personnel could be accomplished, the battalion
was desperately short of communication equip-
ment for three days. The dependable SCR
300’s, however, filled the bill until replacement
gear arrived. The hasty departure of the LYT's
was apparently occasioned by enemy artillery
and mortar fire which hammered the congested
beach areas. This was no comfort to the fight-
ing men on the beach. Not only was the short-
age of communications gear felt, but some

8th Mar Report, 1. 1st Battalion, 20tli Marines
Report, 1, hereinafter cited as 1st Bn, 29th Mar Report.

mortars and machine guns, together with am-
munition for them, were still aboard when the
LYT’s pulled out.

Heavy flank resistance from Agingan Point
and the sparsely -wooded beach area to the
south, coupled with frontal fighting, produced
extremely heavy casualties on the 1st Battalion,
25th Marines. Agingan Point was a honeycomb
of Japanese installations, originally constructed
lo fire to sea but capable of bringing flanking
fire to bear against troops on shore. At 0930, the
enemy attempted a counterattack from the di-
rection of Agingan Point, and small groups of
Japanese were observed moving over the ridge
on the right flank of the 0-1 line. Lieutenant
Colonel Mustain, the 1st Battalion’s com-
mander, immediately called for an air strike on
these targets. Within five minutes, a bombing
and strafing attack was delivered, achieving
good coverage of the area although it was im-
possible to judge results. Fires of the battleship
Tennessee were invaluable in keeping the Jap-
anese off balance in their efforts to push the 1st
Battalion into the water. Mustain requested
that tank support he provided his battalion as
soon as possible, as well as an additional rifle
company from l he reserve battalion (the 3d).

Playing havoc with the 1st Battalion efforts
to get reorganized into an effective fighting
body were at least four direct fire artillery
pieces (about 75mm) emplaced on the high
ground 800 yards inland. For these Japanese
gunners a movement by three or four Marines
was a sufficient target ; and they made the most
of their excellent observation. It was apparent
lo all hands that the situation would not be
relieved until the high ground had been seized,
although naval gunfire and air were proving
helpful.35

( )n Mustain's left, the 2d Battalion fared
somewhat better, although mortar and artillery
fire rained mercilessly upon them. The terrain
in the 2d Battalion’s sector afforded very litfle
cover or concealment, and the unit sought the
best, solution to the problem by moving inland

:ir' 25th Marines Report, it, hereinafter cited as 25th
War Report. Isi Battalion. 25th Marines Report, 2-7,
hereinafter cited as 1st Hi). 25th Mar Report. Inter-
view with Maj F. .T. Mee, 15Feh49, hereinafter cited
as Wee.

as rapidly as possible. About half the assault
Marines of this battalion were carried to a rail-
road embankment (500-700 yards inland) prior
to debarkation from LVT’s. Until it reached
there, the battalion was subjected to frontal
small-arms fire from Japanese behind the em-
bankment. There the small -arms fire ceased,
but mortar and artillery fire continued. From
the direction of Nafutan Point came shells
which burst overhead, apparently from antiair-
craft guns depressed to fire at ground targets.
And, as if troubles to the front and flanks were
not enough, two enemy mortars began firing on
the Marines from positions 500 yards to the
rear. Before a request for assistance could be
made, friendly planes spotted the mortars,
attacked, and silenced them.36

Much credit for the 2d Battalion’s success
in pushing inland goes to the LVT(A)’s of the
Army’s 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion,
which, according to the Marine battalion com-
mander, Lieutenant Colonel Hudson, took
“more than their share of punishment” and
“diverted enemy attention from the amphibious
tractors carrying troops ... I shall always re-
member the excellent support given to my
battalion by the Army LVT(A)’s.37

Shortly after Lieutenant Colonel Justice M.
Chambers’ 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, crossed
the line of departure on its way to the beach,
an order from regiment directed that one com-
pany be attached to the 1st Battalion upon
landing. Chambers selected Company K, his
battalion reserve, for this mission. Upon arrival
at the beach, however, Chambers learned that
guides from the 1st Battalion had met his
leading units, including two platoons from
Company I. and one platoon from Company
L, and had led them to the 1st Battalion’s zone
where they were immediately committed to ac-
tion. Chief disadvantage of this rearrangement
was that a complete tactical unit was not pro-
vided. but in the normal confusion of an am-
phibious landing, miscarriages of this type
were neither unusual nor inordinately serious.

36 Interview (undated) with Ma.i V. J. Barringer,
hereinafter cited as Barringer. Interview with Maj
II. V. .Toslin. 15Feb49. hereinafter cited as Jo si in.

37 Ltr from Col L. C. Hudson to CMC, 12.Tan50.

BARELY ON the beach, these 4th Division Marines lie flat and try to spot the source of the tire which lias them
immobilized.

With the remainder of his unit, Chambers
moved about TOO yards inland to the scanty
protection afforded by the railroad embank-
ment. Here the battalion halted, dug in, and
awaited orders.

At 1300, Company K was detached from the
3d Battalion and attached to the 1st Battalion.
Later in the afternoon, with the right flank sit-
uation still dangerous, the remainder of Com-
pany I was sent to assist Mustain’s busy unit in
cleaning out the Agingan Point pocket of re-
sistance. Company I subsequently reported
killing approximately 150 Japanese on Agingan
Point. Locating the enemy there was a difficult
job; the usual Japanese tactic was to remain
concealed in their “spider holes” 38 until the

38 This type of position is a hole dug into the ground
with a camouflaged lid fitting snugly over it. A care-
fully constructed spider hole is next to impossible to
locate as long as the lid is down, since it is flush with

Mai ■ines had passed by them; then the lids of
the holes would be opened and rifle or light
machine-gun fire directed at the Marines' rear.

Colonel Merton J. Batchelder. commanding
the 25th Marines, came ashore about noon and
established his command post against the west
side of the railroad fill. This choice was a
fortunate one; the embankment provided a
shield against flat trajectory tire and the instal-
lation functioned without excessive trouble
from the Japanese. All personnel, including
supporting elements of the combat team, were
ashore by 1800.39

the ground and consonant with surrounding vegeta-
tion.

30 lath Mar Report. A. Ad Battalion. 25th Marines
Report, A- I, hereinafter cited as .id Bn. 25th Mar Re-
port. I.tr from Col J. M. Chambers to CMC, !Dec49,
hereinafter cited as Chambers.

BRnsno0 bo — 5

aerial photograph of Charan Ksinoa area had led 4th Division planners to believe that Mt. Fina Susu could be
reached without debarking troops from LVT’s. Difficult terrain, including a swamp extending south from Lake
Susupe, foiled the plan.

BLUE BEACH AND CHARAN KANOA

The 23d Marines’ advanced through Charan
Ivanoa was hindered only by sporadic rifle fire,
and the 3d Battalion, on the left flank, pushed
through the town without encountering serious
difficulty. Eight troop-carrying and three
armored LVT’s actually travelled to 0-1 as
called for in the plans. These LYT’s, restricted
by the terrain from moving abreast, were forced
to proceed in column along the road south of
Lake Susupe until Mt. Fina Susu (0-1) was
reached. Minor opposition en route was offered
by Japanese riflemen lying in drainage ditches
perpendicular to the road. Fire from the LYT
machine guns (manned by personnel of the 3d
Battalion, 23d Marines) accounted for most of
these trouble-makers.

Once the Marines reached 0-1, however, the

situation changed for the worse. Direct Japan-
ese artillery fire (probably fired by the 3d
Mountain Artillery Regiment), coming from
positions 500 to 700 yards to- the north and east,
plus mortar and machine-gun fire, kept the unit
constantly pinned down. The situation was fur-
ther complicated by the fact that the armored
amphibs refused to move to the top of Mt. Fina
Susu and provide the necessary support and by
the absence of any friendly forces on either
flank.

A short 100 yards east of the high ground of
the O-l line, small groups (squads or smaller)
of Japanese darted about a coconut palm grove.
Throughout the day these made periodic at-
tempts to infiltrate the left of the 3d Bat-
talion’s slender salient. Alert to these move-
ments, the Marines discouraged the Japanese

with well-aimed small-arms lire.40

Lieutenant Colonel Dillon’s 2d Battalion ex-
perienced some difficulty after landing owing
to the fact that some tractors stopped after
advancing a short distance while others con-
tinued somewhat farther. The reasons for these
valuations were not only the intense mortar and
artillery lire hammering the beach (and finding
the LVT’s a favorite target), or the action of
individual Japanese riflemen and machine gun-
ners, but also the nature of the terrain. Trac-
tors landing in the center of Blue 2, for
example, found themselves confronted with an
incline rising almost vertically to a height of
four to five feet — sufficient obstacle to stop
movement from the beach. Farther inland,
near the southeastern edge of Charan Kanoa,
was a swampy area, which canalized vehicles
to the one good route in the area — Aslito Road.

Tn view of the terrain difficulties and the
character of enemy resistance, the 4th Divi-
sion’s plan to move aboard LVT’s to the high
ground (0-1) some 1,200 to 1,500 yards inland
was impractical from the outset. It is not sur-
prising that planners had been too optimistic
in this respect, when it is remembered that the
aerial photograph coverage of Saipan had left
much to be desired. From available informa-
tion, it had appeared feasible; in actual
practice, it was not.

Only three LVT’s and five LVT(A)’s oper-
ating with the 2d Battalion reached O-l as
planned. Because of the difference in debarka-
tion points, the battle developed into a series of
actions by separated tractor groups. Confusion
was at a minimum, however, as good training
paid off; leaders organized whatever men were
nearby, regardless of unit affiliation, and
pressed the attack. By the middle of the after-
noon, control had been regained.

Shortly after noon, the battalion commander
requested tanks in his zone. The type of enemy
resistance encountered — rifle and machine-gun
fire — was well suited to the employment of
tanks, even though they would have to remain

40 23d Marines Report, 30-33, hereinafter cited as
23d Mur Report. 3d Bn, 23d Mur Report, 1. Ltrs from
Maj F\ S. Treitel to author, 21Feh49 and to CMC,
301 >ec49, hereinafter cited as Treitel.

on the road until the swamp was passed. Relief
from the almost constant shelling would be
obtained only by destruction of the Japanese
weapons. Dillon requested that aircraft try to
spot the enemy guns, but the pall of smoke over
the island hindered the planes and helped the
Ja, tanese. The latter knew where they wanted
to fire, the Americans could not be sure.

Only two tanks (M-4’s from Company C, 4th
Tank Battalion) had been landed on Blue
Beach at this time, but the 23d’s commander.
Colonel Louis R. Jones, acting on Dillon's
request, ordered them to report to the 2d
Battalion.41

Since the 2d Marine Division had not planned
to use Beach Green 3 in its initial landings, it
was apparent that a gap between the two divi-
sions would exist for some time. (The 2d
Division’s shift in landing further delayed the
juncture.) This situation, which would leave
the 4th Division’s left flank exposed, indicated
the desirability of landing the reserve battalion
of the 23d Marines at an early hour. Also, the
plan of moving to the O-l line prior to debarka-
tion from LVT’s demanded that by-passed
rear areas be mopped up by a reserve unit.
Accordingly, the 1st Battalion (Lieutenant
Colonel Ralph Haas) landed at 1055 and moved
to an assembly area about 300 yards inland of
Beach Blue 1. This move, hampered only by
the ubiquitous artillery and mortar fire and an
occasional exchange with Japanese riflemen in
the ruins of Charan Kanoa, placed the battalion
iu position to protect the left flank. Until later
in the day when it was committed into the front,
this unit spent its time mopping up by-passed
Japanese and stopping minor infiltration
thrusts.

The advance command group of the 23d
Marines, under the executive officer, Lieutenant
Colonel John R. Lanigan, landed about noon,
followed at mid-afternoon bv the regimental
commander, Colonel Jones. Established in a
small depression, between Beaches Blue 1 and
2 and. subsequently, between two artillery bat-
talions, the command post received almost con-

41 Dillon. 23d Mar Report, 33. 2d Battalion, 23d
Marines Report, 1-2, hereinafter cited as 2d Bn, 23d
Mar Report.

stunt pounding from Japanese mortars and
artillery.42

A great portion of the 4th Division’s difficul-
ties on D-Day (and, subsequently, on D-plus
1) originated from a capably-prepared series
of positions in the vicinity of the 0-1 ridgeline.
About these, Lieutenant Colonel Gooderham L.
McCormick, the division intelligence officer
(D-d), has written:

On the forward and reverse slopes of the edge of
the saucer which followed our 0-1 line the enemy had
placed batteries of 75mm and 105mm field pieces.
They were all well placed, with excellent fields of
fire and artful concealment. Crew’s quarters and am-
munition were all below ground. . . . Entrances were
invariably well back on the reverse slope.

Wall diagrams in observation posts marked regis-
tration points on the reefs, the channels, the beach
lines, roads and intersections adjacent to the beach.
These points were interdicted long after the O.P.’s had
been rendered inoperative.43

4TH DIVISION TANKS LAND

The tank situation in the 4th Division was
not good. Based on the early morning reports
of the underwater demolition teams, two meth-
ods of getting tanks ashore were planned.
First, and most desirable, was by means of the
channel oil’ Beach Blue 1. through which LCM’s
could proceed directly to the beach and debark
tanks. The other was by beaching LCM’s on the
reef and allowing tanks to move ashore under
their power.

Two complicating details which UDT per-
sonnel could not foresee, however, made the
landing of tanks a serious problem. First, the
channel was intermittently interdicted by heavy
mortar and artillery lire, making movement
through it hazardous. And second, in regard
to the reef landings, heavy swells had built up
by early afternoon, making it difficult to beach
LCM's. Yellow Beach, with the best reef sur-
face for tank landings, was the scene of the
heaviest swells.

Difficulties notwithstanding, the 4th Tank
Battalion endeavored to land throughout the
afternoon. It was a costly operation.

42 28 Mar Hr port, 33. j//i Mar Dir Deport, Annex C,
4-5. I.. It. Jones.

43 l.tr from I.tCol (!. It. McCormick to CMC. 21Feb50,
hereinafter cited as McCormick.

Company A, which advanced 600 to 700 yards
across the coral reef to land on Beach Blue 2,
lost two medium tanks in the movement to the
beach when salt water drowned out their elect-
rical systems. A third was damaged while
attempting to tow a tank from another com-
pany ashore. After landing, Company A, im-
mediately moved out to assist the 1st Battalion,
25th Marines, in the fight around Agingan
Point.

Of Company B’s 14 medium tanks, only four
reached the beach in working condition. While
departing from the LSD upon which the com-
pany was embarked, one LCM (with its medium
tank loaded on board) sank. Another tank
had its fording equipment smashed in an un-
expected shift of weight on board the LCM
upon which it was embarked. As chance would
have it, this LCM later received a direct hit
from a Japanese artillery shell, setting it afire.44
Three tanks were sent through the Charan
Kanoa channel, arriving ashore safely, but
under so much artillery fire that the control
vessel ordered the next three tanks to move
across the reef to Blue 1. Of these three, one
nosed into a “pot-hole” (a large depression in
the reef), and another was temporarily out of
commission because of the effect of water on the
electrical system.

Six of the company’s tanks had yet to make
the trip to the beach. These received orders at
the control vessel to land on Beach Green 2, a
2d Division beach some 1.100 yards away from
their parent division. The cause for this radical
misdirection, which was made in spite of the
tanks platoon leader’s protests, its not indi-
cated; and, in view of the subsequent fate of
these tanks, no one can be expected to assume
the blame voluntarily. Perhaps this was
ordered in the hope that a Green Beach landing
would lie less costly or, perhaps, it was a matter
of misunderstanding. The order was issued,
however, and the six tanks made the effort.
Only one of the six reached the heach, the rest
falling into a span of quite deep water about
halfway in. The one tank that did get ashore
was immediately pressed into service by the 2d

44 The tank, oddly enough, was retrieved on D-plus 1
and moved ashore.

ammunition, dumped on the beach by the leading waves of LVT's is readily available to Marines clustered behind
a medium tank nearby. Though uneven, this method solved many early supply problems.

Tank Battalion and did not return to the 4th
Division until several days later. So, for all
intents and purposes, Company B had only four
tanks of its original 14 available for the support
of the 4th Marine Division.45

Company C fared much better. Landing on
Beach Yellow 2 after an 800 yard trip across
the reef, the unit moved, intact, to an assembly
area just inland from Beach Blue 2. Shortly
after arrival there, orders were received from
the commander, 2d Battalion, 23d Marines (to
which the unit was attached), to attack to the
high ground designated 0-1. The tanks of
Company C immediately moved out. It was
soon discovered, however, that those machines
not actually on the road bogged down and had

43 Later, however, most of the disabled vehicles of
Company P> were retrieved anrl restored to parent con-
trol. The unit, thereafter, rendered effective support
to the 4th Division’s operations. It is important to
note that, since Company R had not been assigned to
support an assault regiment after landing, its shortage
of vehicles did not have critical implications.

to be abandoned. After these experiences, the
tanks stayed on the road, attacking in a column
towards 0-1.

Spraying their machine guns at enemy rifle-
men and machine gunners and directing their
75’s against specific enemy strong points, the
tanks lumbered to the east towards the high
ground. With their advent, the men of the 2d
Battalion, 23d Marines, felt some of the pres-
sure lift, and the advance resumed. Aside from
the fact that the tanks knocked out pockets of
enemy resistance, their arrival had a heartening
effect upon the infantrymen.

Company D, the light (flame-thrower) tank
company of the 4th Tank Battalion, landed 10
of its 18 tanks safely on the Blue Beaches
throughout the afternoon of D-Day. Those
landed were not employed in the D-Day fight,
however, but instead were ordered into an as-
sembly area 150 yards inland from Beach Blue
2 for the night. The remaining eight light
tanks of the company, unable to get sufficient
LCM’s for a D-Day landing, came ashore on the

afternoon of D-plns 1 and joined the tight.46

The most decisive action executed by any unit
of the 4th Tank Battalion on D-Day was that
of the 1st Platoon, Company A (later joined
by the 3d Platoon and one tank of the 2d Pla-
toon ) . F ollowing its landing on Beach Blue 2,
the 1st Platoon, Company A, moved off to the
support of Mustain’s 1st Battalion, 25th Ma-
rines, on the extreme right Hank. The platoon
arrived just as two companies of Japanese at-
tacked from Agingan Point. This was the
strongest effort of the day, following a series of
smaller actions which had harrassed the bat-
talion since the landing. The Japanese counter-
attack. designed to push Mustain’s right flank
into the water, was an ideal target for the
newly-landed medium tanks. With the aid of
the 1st Battalion, the tanks vigorously drove
against the enemy attackers. Nearly the entire
Japanese force was massacred in the short-
lived melee.

After checking the hostile surge, the tanks
ranged out upon the point, crushing and de-
stroying Japanese installations. All this was
accomplished without the loss of a single tank.
In the withdrawal, however, one tank lost a
track in a shell hole and had to be abandoned
until the next day, when it was retrieved. The
tank action improved the situation of the 1st
Battalion, enabling it to resume the infantry
advance.47

14TH MARINES LAND

As a result of Colonel Jones’ noon recom-
mendation that artillery be landed, the 14th
Ma rines (Colonel Louis G. DeHaven) com-
menced landing at 1315 and the entire regiment
was ashore by dark. The 3d Battalion (Lieu-
tenant Colonel Robert E. MacFarlane), after
losing one of its 105mm howitzers during the
ship-to-shore movement (due to a mechanical

40 The foregoing account of the landing of the 4th
Tank Battalion is a synthesis of the following sources:
4th Tank Battalion Report, 3; Company A, 4th Tk
Bn Report, 1-2; Company B, 4tli Tk Bn Report, 1-2;
Company C, 4th Tk Bn Report, 1 ; Company D, 4th
Tk Bn Report, 1 : Dillon : Ltr from LtCol R. K. Schmidt
to CMC, 5Dec49, hereinafter cited as R. K. Schmidt.

47 Mee. Company A, 4th Tk Bn Report, 1-2.

failure and subsequent sinking of the DUIvW
transporting the howitzer), landed on Beach
Yellow 2 and went into a firing position about
50 yards inland, on the east side of the coast
road. The battalion fired its first rounds (in
support of the 25th Marines) about an hour
and a half after landing.

For the 5th Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel
Douglas E. Reeve) , the ship-to-shore movement
was made without loss of any of its 105mm
howitzers. One “A” frame DUKW, not carry-
ing a howitzer but moving with the 5th Bat-
talion, was hit by a shell from a dual-purpose
5- or 6-inch Japanese gun during the trip into
Blue 2. Although this did not entail a loss to
the battalion, it did have the effect of slowing
up the unloading : by congesting the beach area
and making one less “A” frame DUKW avail-
able to lift 105’s from DUKW’s in which they
were embarked. The 5th Battalion went into a
position area about 40 yards inland from Beach
Blue 2 at about 1400. After registration, the
battalion undertook the destruction of the pre-
viously-mentioned 5- or 6-inch gun, which was
firing from the high ground 1,500 yards inland.
Although the weapon was silenced for the
night — and everyone hoped permanently — it
was quite intact and firing the following
morning.

Lieutenant Colonel Carl A. Youngdale’s 4th
Battalion landed on Beach Blue 2 at approxi-
mately 1700. One 105mm howitzer was lost
prior to landing when the DUKW upon which
it was embarked sank. The DUKW had run out
of fuel and was in the process of moving aboard
an LST for refueling when it slipped off the
ramp and sank. Once ashore on Blue 2, four
howitzers were knocked out by Japanese artil-
lery and mortar fire. All were subsequently
returned to action, however. Youngdale’s bat-
talion moved inland about 350 yards and set up
along the coast road. In spite of continuous
enemy artillery fire which complicated its work,
the battalion was laid and ready to lire at 1812,
about one hour and 12 minutes after landing.

The 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Harry
J. Zimmer), scheduled to land in the returning
DUKW’s of the 4th Battalion, was landed
instead in LYT's when the DUKW’s failed to
become available. This involved disassembling

the 75mm pack howitzers and transferring them
from LCVP’s to LVT’s by hand. After landing
on Yellow 1 at about 1700 (the battery com-
manders had been ashore on reconnaissance
since 1430), the battalion moved to a position
about 100 yards off the beach. This placed (he
unit only about 50 yards forward of the 3d
Battalion, not a desirable arrangement but
necessitated by the shallow beachhead and the
congestion in the area.

For the 2d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel
George B. Wilson, Jr., the difficulties of land-
ing and getting established ashore were a mag-
nification of those of the other battalions. Dur-
ing the transfer operations, in which LVT's be-
came available singly and at irregular intervals,
some sections of the battalion became separated
from the others and landed on different beaches.
Part of the battalion, still in LCVP’s, was

ordered to move through the channel and land
on Blue 1, but heavy fire chased the craft back
to sea. Later, in a second attempt, the channel
route was successfully used. Another group
landed on Blue 1 in LVT’s, another on Blue 2.
still another on Yellow 1. Two pack howitzers
of the latter group were not unloaded, as the
LVT’s carrying them were ordered out to sea
by the shore party commander who claimed that
the vehicles were drawing fire to the beach.
Later, when these LVT’s attempted to negotiate
the Yellow 1 reef, the two howitzers were
pitched overboard by an especially vicious
surf.48 Two more howitzers were hit by Japa-
nese shelling of the beach areas, although it was

48 This did not constitute a permanent loss, how-
ever ; pieces were retrieved and the howitzers were
back in action by P-plus 2.

75MM PACK HOWITZER blasts away during the early hours of the battle. The tst and 2d Battalions of the 10th and
14th Marines were armed with these versatile pieces. Tapotclmu massif may be seen in background as this
crew trains its weapon toward the east coast.

possible, by exchanging parts, to salvage one
howitzer out of the two. Losses in personnel
ancl equipment necessitated reducing the firing
batteries from three to two. The battalion went
into firing position just inland of Beach Blue 2
and was firing by about 1700.

The executive officer of the 14th Marines,
Colonel Randall M. Victory, landed with the
regimental command group at 1300 on Beach
Blue 2. From there the command post moved
about 500 yards inland into a grove of trees
containing a series of abandoned Japanese
trenchworks. The choice proved a wise one; the
14th Marines’ command post endured only an
occasional artillery round and the harrassing
activities of few snipers located to the rear.
During the afternoon two of these were killed
within 40 yards of the command post, and a
Japanese machine-gun nest in a clump of bushes
only 50 yards to the left rear was destroyed.49

GENERAL SCHMIDT’S COMMAND POST

The 4th Marine Division advance command
post was established ashore on \ellow 2 at
1630 by Colonel Walter W. Wensinger. the
D-3 (operations officer of the division). Gen-
eral Schmidt arrived there and opened the
division command post at about 1930. The lo-
cation had little to commend it. but there was
no alternative on the shallow beachhead. The
palm grove which looked somewhat inviting on
the map had been shattered into a group of
skeleton trunks and stumps; the terrain was
like a pool table — flat and open; there were no
abandoned Japanese installations to occupy,
although digging was easy in the dirty sand;
a stockpile of partially buried gasoline drums
was located nearby, providing a constant source
of worry. In addition to the command post's
other weakness, there was the matter of the
14th Marines’ firing batteries nearby. These
not only drew Japanese counterbattery fire

,n14th Marines Report. 1, hereinafter cited as JJ/th
Mar Report. Maj .T. F. Ryan. Observer from oth
Marine Division. Report of Saipan Operation (Arty).
7-8. hereinafter cited as •/. F. R pan. Knrch. Reeve.
Rtr from Maj W. McReynolds to CMC, 14.Tan50, here-
inafter cited as McRepnolds. Ltr from LtCol G. R>.
Wilson to CMC, 8Feb50, hereinafter cited as Wilson.

into the area, but their presence greatly lim-
ited dispersal room ; and the command post was
congested into a small space (about 50 yards
wide and 100 yards deep). A search for a bet-
ter location, undertaken by the division in-
telligence officer (D-2), Lieutenant Colonel
Gooderlnim L. McCormick, proved unfruitful,
and it was decided that nothing would be
gained by moving.

With all of the command post’s bad features,
however, the 4th Division headquarters car-
ried on all its functions. Later, when assault
troops progressed farther inland and it was
possible to move about more easily, the com-
mand post was spread out and the congested
condition relieved. Brigadier General Samuel
C. Cumming, Assistant Division Commander,
remained on board ship on D-Day. He and his
staff, reported ashore shortly before noon on
D-plus l.50

2D DIVISION TANKS

Shortly after 0900 on D-Day, the 2d Marine
Division commenced efforts to land tanks. A
pilot tank made the trip from the reef to
Beach Green 1 under extremely heavy fire,
marking a route as it moved. On reaching the
beach, it was disabled by direct 37mm and
47mm fire from Afetna Point, and the crew
was forced to abandon it. The route had been
marked, however, and beginning at 1300 tanks
started crossing the reef in groups of two and
three under almost continuous Japanese artil-
lery fire. Here, again, it was impossible to de-
termine the exact source .or caliber of the
enemy fire, except the antiboat-antitank fire
which came from Afetna Point. It is assumed
that the long-range, high-angle tire emanated
from the eastern slopes of the island’s spiny
backbone, where the guns of Lieutenant Colonel
Xakashima’s 3d Independent Mountain Artil-
lery Regiment as well as numerous heavy mor-
tars were emplaced.

By 1530, all LSD-embarked tanks of the
division had groped their tortuous way to the
beach. Tank liaison teams had been furnished

50 .)tli Mar Dir Report. Section VI. 15-16. Interview
with Col O. 11. Wheeler, 21 Feb49, hereinafter cited
as Wheeler. McCormick.

each combat team headquarters; tanks were
met by a guide at the beach, commanders
briefed, and tanks tactically employed at once.
Barging into the fight with all the confidence
that a few inches of armor plate can instill,
the tanks injected a fresh drive into the late
afternoon attack. With these machines ashore,
infantry commanders could breathe a little
easier; another powerful weapon was available
to meet the expected enemy counterattack.
Eight tanks of the 2d Tank Battalion were
damaged on D-Day, but of this number only
one was permanently lost. Others were repaired
and later played an important part in I he op-
eration.51

MINOR ENEMY TANK THRUSTS

Some of the enemy tanks were also moving
on the early afternoon of D-Day. These were
from the 4th Company of Colonel Goto’s 9th
Tank Regiment. The 4th Company’s 14 tanks
(11 mediums, three lights) had been ordered to
defend the western beaches on either side of
Charan Ivanoa. To do this, they had taken
position on the beach itself, with plans to exe-
cute an antiboat mission during the landing
phase. The sheer weight of naval shelling and
the momentum of the assault drove the com-
pany inland before it could perform its
planned function, however. Had this unit re-
mained on the beaches, it might have had the
satisfaction of achieving considerable destruc-
tion of U. S. landing craft. From its with-
drawn positions, the enemy tank company
lashed out in a series of prods against the
M arines’ beachhead.

About noon, two Japanese tanks moved from
covered positions to the north, along the beach
road, and through the lines of Company F,
6th Marines. Apparently not realizing where
they were, they stopped to have a look around,
the leading tank even “unbuttoning” its tur-
ret. At this point, bazookas and AT grenades
from Company F converged on the surprised
visitors and destroyed them.52

51 2d Mar Div Report, Section V, 3.

52 An amusing anecdote in connection with the in-
cident: Lieutenant .Tames It. Ray, leader of the 1st
Platoon, Company F, had carefully briefed his unit
prior to the landing on the fact that the Japanese

At 1300, in another of their uncoordinated
thrusts, three tanks of the 4th Company struck
Companies A and G, 6th Marines (adjacent
flank companies of the 1st and 2d Battalions),
and caused a flurry of excitement. The ter-
rain in the area was open and flat enough for
tank movement, but occasional low. marshy
spots somewhat restricted maneuver. The
bazookamen of the two Marine companies went
to work: two tanks were destroyed before they
could penetrate the front lines; the remaining
one penetrated to within 75 yards of the 6th
Marines’ command post where it, too, was
destroyed.53

In the zone of the 8th Marines, the situation
on the left was still progressing satisfactorily,
and good contact existed with the 6th Marines.
On the right, however, the 2d Battalion, 8th
M arines, Avas still encountering tough resist-
ance in its move toAvard Afetna Point. By late
afternoon, 14 medium tanks of Company A.
2d Tank Battalion, had added their bulk and
firepower to the push toAvard Afetna Point.
The area Avas a maze of pillboxes, open
trenches, and antiboat-antitank installations
Avhich had to be systematically neutralized —
and at a great cost in personnel. SIoav as the
movement Avas, it Avas all forward.54

Brigadier General Merritt A. Edson,55 as-

would likely throw everything — “including the kitchen
sink” — at the Marines. Ray stressed the importance
of establishing a good defensive position after seizure
of the 0-1 line so that an enemy thrust from Garapan
could be stopped. When the peculiarly-designed
Japanese tanks actually appeared — looking, indeed,
like an overgrown piece of plumbing — PFC Nestor
Sotelo of the 1st Platoon raised his head and shouted:
“Pass the word to Mr. Ray that the .1 aps have ar-
rived from Garapan with the kitchen sink.” Fislier.

53 6th Mar Report, 2. Marine Corps Ga zette, Oc-t44,
“Saipan Tank Rattle,” Maj .T. A. Donovan, .Tr., here-
inafter cited as Saipan Tank liattle. Interview with
Maj Donovan on 11Jan49. Fisher.

64 2d Mar Div Report, Section V. 4.

55 General Edson, Congressional Medal of Honor
winner at Guadalcanal and one of the most eminent
Marines in World War II, established a pattern on
D-Day which he faithfully followed throughout the
operation: get to that part of the division front where
(he action was most critical and offer advice, inspira-
tion or even active leadership as required.

sistant commander of the 2d Division, came
ashore in the early afternoon and established
the advance command post on the right of
Beach Green 1. This site, nothing more than
an abandoned Japanese trenchwork, had been
occupied by the 8th Marines’ headquarters,
which moved farther forward after the arrival
of Edson’s group. General Watson followed
at about 1800 with a detachment from division
headquarters, landing on Beach Bed 2. The
command post was then established on the
extreme south flank of Beach Bed 2 with local
security provided by the Division Beconnais-
sance Company.

Soon after the staff settled in this installa-
tion, however, heavy mortar and artillery fire
rained down, interfering with efficient func-
tioning. General Watson then decided to move
northward and inland across the coastal road
into a grove of trees behind the juncture of
Beaches Bed 1 and 2. In General Watson’s
words :

“When I had arrived at the decision to move, the
sun had already set; the distant night was alive with
fires, and shelling from enemy artillery and mortars
was unremitting- I directed Brigadier General Bdson
and his small control group to remain behind until our
new command post could be established. The rest of our
headquarters group moved northward along the beach,
then struck inland across fix' open beach road and,
moving in the shadows of the road, finally reached
the wooded area which had been selected for the new
command post. My staff immediately set about estab-
lishing our command post. We were delighted to find
trenches and shelters already dug in the woods by
the Japanese. Our joy was soon dispelled, however,
when we discovered these trenches and shelters not
only contained dead Japanese who had to be moved,
but dynamite and other high explosives. The dan-
gerous materials were moved out during the night
and early morning and the area served as an excellent
divisional command post for several days thereafter,
although, initially, it was located only a few yards
behind our own front lines.56

One other minor disadvantage of the instal-
lation, initially, was the presence of the firing
batteries of the 1 0th Marines nearby. This was
a disadvantage which could not be avoided on
the shallow beachhead of D-Day, but. neverthe-
less. one which did not lend to the comfort of
the division staff.

56 Watson.

10TH MARINES’ 75MM PACK HOWITZERS LAND

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 10th Marines
(75mm pack howitzers), landed late in the day
and assumed positions prior to darkness : Lieu-
tenant Colonel Presley M. Bixey’s 1st Battalion
on the eastern edge of a small wood 50 to 150
yards inland from Beach Bed 2, and Lieutenant
Colonel George B. E. Shell’s 2d Battalion about
400 yards inland from Green 1 near the north-
ern end of the Charan Ivanoa airstrip. After
executing the ship-to-shore movement without
loss of weapons and fetr casualties (2 killed,
5 wounded), Bixey’s battalion moved on foot
through a small wooded area, apparently un-
observed. No Japanese artillery fire was re-
ceived while going into position or immediately
thereafter. The battalion had its 75’s firing in
support of the 6th Marines at about dark and
maintained this support throughout the night.

Shell’s battalion crossed the naked Charan
Ivanoa airstrip enroute to firing position, and,
unfortunately, the movement did not go unno-
ticed. A Japanese observer, located on one of
the heights which backed all western beaches,
carefully chartered the position. After dark,
soon after the unit fired its first rounds in sup-
port of the 8th Marines, Japanese counterbat-
tery fire thundered down, Battery E bearing
the brunt. Despite the excellent coverage
achieved by the Japanese, however, no howit-
zers were destroyed.

Colonel Baphael Griffin, regimental com-
mander of the 10th Marines, landed with the
2d Division command group at 1730 and estab-
lished his command post just inland from
Beach Bed 2, in proximity to the 2d Division
command post. No other elements of the 10th
Ma rines were landed during D-Day.57

2D AND 24TH MARINES LAND

After participating in the Tanapag demon-
stration. the 2d and 24th Marines awaited the
word to land. Orders came at 1104 for Colonel
Franklin A. Hart’s 24th Marines, and by late
afternoon the regiment had completed landing
and proceeded to assembly areas. The 1st and
2d Battalions beached on Blue 1 after coming
through Charan Ivanoa channel in LCVP’s;

57 10th Marines Report. 2-3. Interview with Col P. M.
Rixe.v, 23Feb49, hereinafter cited as Rixey.

the 3d Battalion used LVT's to cross t lie reef
and land on Yellow 1.

On reaching shore. Lieutenant Colonel May-
nard C. Schultz’ 1st Battalion moved to an
assembly area about 400 yards south of Cliaran
Kano®. Some cover from flat trajectory fire
was afforded by the railroad embankment, but
otherwise the open terrain was devoid of cover
or concealment. Companies A and B were com-
mitted on the right of the 2d Battalion. 23d
Marines, to strengthen the tenuous connection
between that unit and the 2d Battalion, 25th
Marines, rapid progress of which had carried
it from GOO to 800 yards ahead.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Rothwell’s 2d
Battalion, 24th Marines, moved from its point
of landing on Beach Blue 1 to an assembly area
southwest of Charan Kanoa. During the move
along the beach and after arrival in the part ly-
concealed assembly area, the battalion suffered
75 casualties from Japanese artillery fire. In-
termittent harassing fires continued upon the
unit throughout the night.

Two of the LVT’s carrying the 3d Battalion
overturned in the heavy surf, causing heavy
casualties. Orders to the battalion had directed
that it move to an assembly area in LVT’s
prior to debarkation. Once the unit reached
the beach, however, the deluge of hostile artil-
lery fire made the scheme unfeasible. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandergrift, Jr.,
therefore, deployed his battalion and moved it
on foot to an assembly area some 700 yards in-
land from Yellow 1, near a fork in the rail-
road tracks. The men had no more than taken
entrenching tools in hand when a barrage of
well-directed Japanese artillery fire engulfed
them. After the day’s casualties were totalled,
it was discovered that the unit had suffered
heavily, though it had yet to enter the front
line fighting: 25 killed, 72 wounded, 39 miss-
ing (mostly those lost on board the overturned
LVT’s). Other battalions had suffered more
heavily, but the real significance of these
figures lies in the fact that the 3d Battalion did
not arrive on the beach until 1727.58

58 The foregoing account of the 24th Marines’ land-
ing is a synthesis of the following sources: 2/fth Afar
Report, 18; Reports of 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions, 24th
Marines (page 1 of all reports).

Colonel Walter J. Stuart’s 2d Marines boated
and proceeded to the control vessel at about
1400; two hours later came orders to land in
column of battalions on Beach Red 2. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Arnold F. Johnston’s 3d Bat-
talion, and a portion of Lieutenant Colonel
Richard C. Nutting’s 2d Battalion (Company
F and a headquarters echelon ) were ashore by
1900, when orders were issued that no more
LCVP-LVT transfers would be made and no
more troops landed that night. Men of the 2d
Marines ashore were attached to the 6th Ma-
rines, with Johnston’s 3d Battalion taking po-
sitions on the division left flank in support of
the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, and Nutting’s
2d Battalion elements digging-in just north of
Charan Kanoa airstrip.59

It had been planned to land troops and sup-
plies throughout the night, but this became im-
possible due to the heavy seas in the transfer
area. As early as 1730, one of the LVT’s carry-
ing part of the 2d Division headquarters al-
most swamped in the huge waves which had
commenced to run inland across the reef.60

DARKNESS D-DAY

Because of the concentrated mortar and ar-
tillery fire which had struck his troops through-
out the day, the commander of the 23d Marines
(Colonel Jones) estimated that the light forces
on the O-l line (consisting of about one-half of
Companies Iv and L of the 3d Battalion and
only about one composite platoon from the 2d
Battalion) would be incapable of holding there
for the night without being virtually annilii-
liated. In addition, the regimental commander
felt that “pulling back would allow our artil-
lery and air to bring fire on the Jap batteries
a short distance inland, better contact could be
obtained on the right, and the exposed left
flank could be better protected.”

Dillon’s 2d Battalion and Cosgrove’s 3d Bat-
talion were therefore ordered to establish a de-
fense line generally 800 yards west of O-l for
the night. This involved a withdrawal under
cover of darkness of the meager forces on O-l.

59 2d Mar Report, 1-2. Interview with Maj M. P.
Ryan, 3Mar49, hereinafter cited as AI. R. Ryan.

60 AY at son.

2D MARINES, after returning from a demonstration at Tanapag, wait in LCVP’s for transfer to amphibian tractors
in which to move ashore. Only about one-lmlf of the regiment got ashore on D-Day, the rest being held up by
heavy seas which developed in the late afternoon.

The decision to pull back after nightfall, rather
than in the daytime, was a wise one; no casual-
ties were incurred during this phase of the op-
eration. The 81mm mortar platoon of the 3d
Battalion, 23cl Marines, undergoing a particu-
larly severe shelling at the time of withdrawal,
abandoned its mortars near Mt. Fina Susu.
Peculiarly enough, these mortars were found
intact and undamaged when the 23d Marines
returned to the area several days later.

Terrain for the 23d Marines’ night defense
was flat, open and possessing few features
which would hide infiltrating Japanese. “The
lields of lire were excellent,” the 2d Battalion
commander later pointed out, “but there was
nothing to fire at.”

Haas’ 1st Battalion was ordered to relieve
the 3d Battalion, the latter reverting to reserve
with the mission of protecting the exposed left
flank. The 2d Battalion patrolled Charan

Kanoa throughout the night to protect against
Japanese attack or infiltration from the left
(north) rear. Concern about the 23d Marines’
left flank was natural enough, since it was ap-
parent that the “no man’s land” between di-
visions could easily become a direct, nonstop
chute to the beach for the Japanese.61

Colonel Batchelder's 25th Marines, after a
discouraging start, inched forward. By 1400,
some elements of the 2d Battalion had reached
the 0-1 line; but it was not until 1700 that the
entire regiment was on the objective. The ex-
treme. right flank of the O-l line, which in-
cluded a portion of Agingan Point, remained
in Japanese hands and was not secured until
the following morning, but in the remainder of
the sector the objective had been seized. At this
point, units were ordered to prepare defenses

61 23d Mar Report, 31/. 2d Bn, 23 Mar Report, 1-2.
3d Bn, 23d Mar Report, 1. Treitel. Dillon. L. R. Jones.

and gird themselves for whatever might come.02

D-Day had been expensive, both in personnel
and in materiel. Scores of minor wounds were
never reported (and, therefore, escape the sta-
tistics) ; however, deaths and wounds serious
enough to warrant more than “on-the-spot’' at-
tention brought the total casualties to over
2,000.63 Of these, the bulk had resulted from
Jai >anese artillery and mortar fire, the re-
mainder from machine-gun and id lie lire or
close-in bayonet and saber fighting on the
beaches.

Evacuation of casualties on D-Day was by
means of LYT’s as far as the reef's edge, where
wounded were transferred to LCVP’s or
LCM’s; thereafter, about 60 per cent were
taken directly to transports and about 40 per
cent to the three hospital LST’s. This latter
method proved very unsatisfactory, inasmuch
as the LST’s, after receiving casualties, had to
transfer them to transports. This proved a
hardship on the injured.64 Considerable difli-
culty was experienced on D-Day and D-plus 1
owing to a moderate ground swell. Casualties
could not be loaded or unloaded at the ramp of
LST’s as planned but had to be hoisted over
the side. On one LST, Seabees (Naval Con-
struction Battalion personnel) rendered valu-
able service by hoisting stretchers with “cherry
pickers” 65 loaded on the deck. The first casual-
ties were received on board the LST’s about
1040; and, in less than two hours, two LST’s
had over 200 casualties on board, and the third

62 25th Mar Report . 3.

63 The exact number is as elusive to the historian as
it was to personnel officers at the time. Units busy
fighting for their lives had no opportunity to keep
accurate casualty statistics. Keeping records in the
early stages of an amphibious attack was rendered
even more difficult by the fact that many men, because
of the confusion and excitement, found themselves
fighting with organizations other than their own. Also,
there was the added problem of determining how
many men were wounded on D-Day but who remained
in the fight for a day, or several days, before turning
in for treatment or hospitalization.

64 TF 56 G-J/ Report, 26.

65 The “cherry-picker,” often used to lift heavy ob-
jects from the ground onto a truck, is a tractor
equipped with an overhead crane.

was filled with its maximum load soon after.66

Initial supply was accomplished by LYT's
and ducks moving over the reef. Requests for
these deliveries came from commanders on the
beach directly to their representatives on board
control vessels. Helpful in solving the critical
problems of early supply was the preloading
of LYT’s of the second, third, and fourth waves
with standard loads of water, grenades, mortar
and small arms ammunition. These “pre-loads”
were dumped at convenient points inland.
Further, two LYT’s per battalion were carried
on transports or cargo ships, loaded with water,
food, ammunition and critical medical items to
assist in solving supply problems.67

In the early afternoon of D-Day, shore party
teams began to function ashore and initial sup-
plies began flowing over the beaches. Through-
out the planning and execution of the opera-
tion, close coordination was maintained be-
tween Beach and Shore Parties. This excel-
lent spirit of cooperation paid dividends.

During D-Day and D-plus 1, very little
cargo-handling equipment was landed owing
to the nature of the beaches and the character
of the resistance. The Shore Party was handi-
capped during the early stages by the heavy
mortar and artillery fire on the beaches and,
later, by the need for transporting supplies
relatively long distances inland to Marines at
the front.68

As on D-minus 1, when California and
Braine were hit, fire support ships were re-
ceiving occasional answering rounds from the
enemy ashore. Battleship Tennessee was hit by
four 4.7-inch projectiles from a battery located
on Tinian, which killed six and wounded 26
men. Tennessee , in addition to minor struc-
tural damage, had a 5-inch 38 mount disabled
by the rounds.69

At dusk, while retiring to the westward of
Saipan for the night, Carrier Support Group
One (TG 52.14) was unsuccessfully attacked

66 COMINCH P-007, 5-19.

07 2d Mar Dir Report, Section II, 2; Section V, 4.
NTLF O-', Report, Part IT, 1.

68 COMINCH P-007, 4-24.

69 TF 51 Report, 5. Task Unit 52.17.1 Report, 24.

debris on the beach. Picture shows several LVT(A)’s knocked out in the early stages of the battle, testifying to
l lie strength of enemy defense even after naval bombardment.

by a “large formation" of Japanese aircraft.
While I he l . S. task group suifered no damage,
carrier-based l . 8. fighters accounted for three
sure kills and one probable (types not known),
while ships' gunfire knocked down two light
bombers.70

Serving as eyes for the Northern Troops and
Landing Force and both Marine divisions were
air observers, operating in carrier-based planes
(TB.M's). On station from dawn to dusk, these
planes constantly performed missions of obser-
vation and, on at least one occasion, partici-
pated in a ground strike against a critical tar-
get. Air observers assisted the Commander Sup-
port Aircraft by reporting front line positions,

70 TV 51 Report, 6 and Annex 1.

discovery of new targets and evaluation of air
strikes.71

By darkness of D-Day, two facts were clear:
first, the landing had been successful; and sec-
ond. a long hard fight was in prospect.

The two divisions were established ashore on
a 10,000 yard front about 1,500 yards deep,
with almost half of the planned beachhead se-
en red. Everywhere the main problem was to
organize scattered units, tie in flanks, and
await the expected counterattacks. Since con-
tact had not been established between divisions,
it was necessary for both to give careful at-
tention to their respective flanks.

The 2d Division anchored both flanks on the

71 CO MINCH P-007, 2-4.

beach itself, left near a coral excavation pit
about one mile south of Garapan, right near
the middle of Afetna Point. The 4th Division
had tied its right into the beach just south of
Agingan Point (although a portion of the
point remained in Japanese hands) and dis-
posed the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, to protect
the exposed left flank. The southern half of
Afetna Point, between the two divisions, re-
mained unconquered. (See Map 10.)

The Marines’ positions were — all things con-
sidered— quite good, but the enemy’s were much
better. The dominating ridgeline, which ran
parallel to the western beaches, allowed the
Japanese to observe the Marines digging in and
to place fires where they pleased. That these
fires did not exact even heavier casualties than
they did is directly attributable to the inability
of the enemy to mass artillery fires. Further,
the Marines, convinced of the need for deep
foxholes, lost no time burrowing into the
sandy loam or occupying empty Japanese po-
sitions and antitank ditches.72

A NOISY AND RESTLESS NIGHT

As expected, the enemy launched a number
of counterattacks at various points throughout
the night. In the center of the 8th Marines’
zone, several small attacks were repulsed with
no great difficulty. These enemy thrusts, oc-
curring at about hourly intervals, came from
the swamp and struck the 1st and 3d Bat-
talions, 8th Marines. These two battalions, en-
joying excellent fields of fire from their posi-
tions on the west edge of the swamp, stopped
each Japanese incursion with small-arms and
mortar fire. Also helpful were the 75mm pack
howitzer fires of the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines.
At no time was there more than a platoon of
Japanese infantry committed to a single coun-
terattack, and at no time was there a question
of the outcome. These Japanese swamp in-
habitants, probably members of Colonel
Ogawa’s 136th Infantry Regiment, were not in
the swamp by choice; the impetus of the Ma-
rine landings had driven them there from their
beach positions. Theirs was an attempt to
comply with General Saito’s policy to counter-

72 NTLF Report, 14.

attack during the night and “demolish the
enemy landing units at the water's edge.

Shortly before dusk, men of Companies !•
and I. along the left of the 6th Marines lines,
observed large groups of Japanese streaming
down from the hills onto the coastal flats well
to the north of the regiment's lines. Ibis ac-
tivity. portending a sleepless night, was an
ideal target for artillery or naval gunfire. Here,
however, complicating factors were presented:
the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines (assigned to
support the 6th Marines), was firing another
mission;74 the two naval gunfire spotters who
should have been situated in the area were
both casualties, and no replacements were
present; the unit’s organic mortars, though
available, were not well suited to firing on an
area target of this nature. Eventually, after
the Marines relayed the request through the 2d
Battalion command post and after the Japa-
nese had completed their descent to the coastal
plain, the California tired several salvos along
the beach in front of the left flank. The omi-
nous significance of the movement from the
hills had prompted this fire.

A precaution, taken by the 2d Battalion, 6th
Mai •ines, later proved wise: a strongpoint was
established on a small hummock about 75 yards
forward of the lines, covering an area masked
to front line fires and. therefore, a favorable
route of approach for the enemy. When the
Japanese did, in fact, attempt to use this area,
they met withering fire from the .Marine
strongpoint.

The first attack against the left flank took
place at about 2200. Striking along the coast
road against Companies F and I. this effort
was in the nature of a probing, or “feeler,” at-
tack— designed to locate a weak spot for future
exploitation. None was located, however, and
the Japanese withdrew. Probably no more than
a company was committed to this initial thrust.
The action for the remainder of the night was
almost continuous, with only occasional and

73 Gunter.

74 It is pertinent to note that all of the missions
fired by the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, during t lie
first four days were classified by the calling observers
as “urgent.” Best.

welcome lulls in the lighting; all hands were
aware that Japanese lurked in the shadows,
preparing for further attempts. A small wood,
north of the Marine lines, became the enemy as-
sembly area and “nerve center” for the night’s
activities. Unfortunately, this fact was not
known by the Marines until later. It is regret-
table that fires of the 1st Battalion, 10th Ma-
rines, were not directed into this point.

At 0300, after a series of reconnaissance-in-
force actions by the enemy, the final sustained
effort of the night began. A Japanese bugler 75
sounded a loud, clear call on the tense night air,
and with a waving of flags, loud screams, and a
brandishing of swords, the attack was launched.
Added to the din were the shouts of the 6tli Ma-
rines for “flares.” Illumination shells, fired
by the three destroyers, Halsey Powell , Cogh-
lan and Monssen of Task Unit 52.17.3 began
to burst over the area, clearly revealing the
Japanese attackers. Men of Companies F and
1 opened with accurate, devastating lire. Cali-
fornia joined with a tornado of salvos in front
of the Marine lines. The Japanese, stripped
by the illumination of the advantage afforded
by their superior knowledge of the terrain (so
helpful in night lighting), dropped before the
Marines’ fusillade. As Japanese fell, others
replaced them in the determined onslaught.

At one point in the fighting (shortly after
0300), it was feared that the enemy had effected
a penetration of Company I, along the coastal
road. To contain this Japanese prong, Colonel
Riseley shifted one company of the 3d Battal-
ion, 2d Marines (Company U), into the area.
The light of morning, however, revealed that no
penetration had been made and that Company
B had, in effect, formed a secondary line.

By 0545, the Japanese pressure reached a
peak; two Marine 37mm guns near the beach
were knocked out and their crews forced back.
Although the main positions held, a false re-
port reached the 6th Marines’ command post to
the effect that Company F’s lines along the
beach had been forced back about 50 yards.
This erroneous report, probably fostered by
the withdrawal of the two 37mm crews and the

75 The bugle, riddled witli bullet holes, was found
by Marines the following day.

infiltration of small enemy groups to the regi-
mental command post, had no basis in fact.
Five medium tanks from Company B, 2d Tank
Battalion, proved decisive at this juncture.
These machines announced their arrival by
concentrating their cannon and machine guns
against the Japanese. Under the fusillade, the
enemy effort withered and died. As remnants
of the battered force fell back, a blanket of
fires from battleship California , destroyers
Phelps and Monssen , and Lieutenant Colonel
Rixey’s 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, covered
them.

Welcome daylight of 16 June revealed a
battlefield littered with about 700 enemy dead.
Total Japanese troops committed to the night’s
action was approximately one battalion. Al-
though unit identification of these dead is not
indicated in existing records, elements of
Colonel Suzuki’s 135th Infantry were located
on the 6th Marines’ front on the following day,
and it is therefore deduced that the battalion
in question was from this regiment.

The drain on the supply of ships’ star shells
had been considerable; yet the Marines desired
even more. As long as t he enemy could be seen,
he could be stopped. Captain Harry B. Jar-
rett, USN, the commander of the task unit
which supplied t lie night’s illumination, later
commented on the situation :

Definitely, destroyers were not originally supplied
with enough star shells. The first counterattack below
Garapan found the Marines asking for star shells
rather steadily, and it was depressing to hear them
begging for more stars when there were none avail-
able.

The Japanese counterattack had failed, and
most of the evidence of that failure lay
crumpled on the plain north of the Marines’
lines. Not all, however; with the coming of
daylight, it was discovered that several small
harassing and infiltrating groups had pene-
trated to rear areas. Here the intruders set
about a program of causing as much trouble
as possible. Mopping-up patrols from the 6th
Marines’ scout-sniper platoon immediately set
about the task of finding and eliminating the
enemy groups.70

76 Fisher. Forth. 2d Mur Dili Report, Section VI, 1.
Task Unit 52.17.3 Report, 3. 6th Mar Report. 3-4.

The pattern was similar in the 4th Marine
Division zone. Local attacks were unsuccess-
fully launched against the 25th Marines' center
at 0330 and again at 0430, the latter attack
more determined than the first and preceded by
an artillery and mortar preparation. Whether
by coincidence or plan, the 0430 thrust followed
on the heels of the last round of preparatory
fires. This was the principal hint that the at-
tack was coordinated and not merely the result
of aggressive resourcefulness on the part of
subordinate Japanese commanders. In addi-
tion, however, an old — yet effective — ruse was
employed in the second attack: Japanese sol-
diers used a large body of civilians, including
women and children, to shield their approach
to the Marine lines. Because of this trick, Ma-
rines held their fire until an almost critically -
late moment.

From this episode emerged an interesting
story regarding the use of artillery. A forward
observer, 1st Lieutenant James V. Walker, of
the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines, was with Com-
pany C, 25th Marines, at the time of the action.
Like other Marines in the vicinity, Walker
thought that the people advancing towards the
lines were only civilians who desired to sur-
render. When the true status of the advancing
body was determined, Walker called in the
75mm fires of the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines.
At the very crisis of the battle, as the enemy
pressed virtually into the Marine lines, the 1st
Battalion, 14th Marines, notified Walker that
it was out of ammunition and that it was turn-
ing the mission over to the 3d Battalion, 14th
Marines. The latter unit had tracked every
shift of the 1st Battalion and, without adjust-
ment, hesitation or lull, brought its lire crash-
ing into the heart of the enemy force. The
extra punch of the 3d Battalion’s 105mm
howitzers, as compared to the 1st Battalion’s
75mm pack howitzers, broke the Japanese at-
tack, and the fight was won.77

Another circumstance complicating the situ-
ation : just before the 0430 attack, an enemy
artillery shell hit one of the 75mm half-tracks
(in position near Company C, 25th Marines),
causing the vehicle to burst into flames. The

77 Karch.

brightness of the fire silhouetted the Marines
to .Japanese observers who quickly directed ar-
tillery lire into the area. To escape this situa-
tion and also to dodge the burning half-track’s
exploding shells, Company C withdrew about
200 yards. At dawn of 16 June, the original po-
sitions were regained.

In addition to the support rendered by artil-
lery, 37mm guns and 75mm half-tracks of the
25th Marines’ Regimental Weapons Company
figured prominently in the repulse. Captain
Thomas E. Clarke, commander of Company C,
gave the opinion that, had the half-tracks not
been present, the Japanese would have pene-
trated the lines.78

Throughout the night, Japanese artillery
fire swept and raked the beach from one end to
the other. The 23d Marines, while not experi-
encing a concentrated counterattack until early
morning, had to contend with unceasing infil-
tration attempts by the Japanese. Utilizing
the unoccupied slot between divisions, small
enemy groups prodded unsuccessfully at the
left flank throughout the night. Patrols sent
out by the 23d Marines failed to establish con-
tact with the 8th Marines to the north. Scat-
tered individual Japanese who did pierce the
tight security of the left flank were mopped
up by units in the rear, principally Company
Iv, and elements of the Beach and Shore
Parties.

In regard to the latter’s activities, the 23d
Marines’ commander has written : “The left
side of these [Blue] beaches was a hot bed. but
these troops fought and worked and did a good
job. Credit must be given here to the colored
Army units forming part of the Shore
Party ” 79

At approximately 0530, about 200 Japanese
moved from Lake Susupe through the “no-
man’s land” between divisions and struck for
the Charan Kanoa pier. Lieutenant Colonel
Cosgrove’s 3d Battalion. 23d Marines, charged
with the mission of preventing just such a
move, proved equal to its assignment by stop-

78 1st Battalion, 25th Marines Report, 7, hereinafter
cited as 1st li n, 25th Mar Report. Mae.

79 L. R. Jones.

889590° 50—6

ping and destroying nearly the entire enemy
force. Again, personnel of the Beach and Shore
Parties in the vicinity of Beach Bine 1 joined
in the defense of the pier and beach. Those
Japanese successful in infiltrating the flank
were mopped up in the morning by the same
units that had dealt with them during the
night.80

It was not a night of rest and relaxation.

REPORTS — IMPENDtNG NAVAL ACTION

Throughout the day, higher echelons — in-
cluding the staffs of General Holland Smith
and Admiral Turner — had kept abreast of the
situation ashore. Their conception of the at-
tack’s progress was necessarily drawn from re-
ports of the divisions on the ground and the
air observers overhead. From a ship thousands
of yards offshore, it was impossible to get more
than a remote picture of what was taking place
— like attempting to judge the temperature of
a wintry day from inside a heated house.

Shining through the miasma of early, in-
complete reports, however, was the indisput-
able fact that both Marine divisions had
carved out shallow beachheads which, in each
case, bulged in the center and receded on either
flank. A difficult ship-to-shore problem had
been solved, causing Admiral Turner later to
observe: “The Saipan landing . . . was much
the most difficult of any I personally witnessed
during the war. The men who made it, Navy
or Marines, were, on the whole, better organ-
ized and better trained than for any other land-
ing. They did magnificently.” 81

By the close of D-Day, all three infantry
regiments of the 4th Division were ashore, as
well as the artillery and a large portion of the
division's tanks. The 2d Division had about
two and a half infantry regiments, two of its
live artillery battalions, and the majority of its
tanks ashore. A disconcerting gap between the
two divisions existed, but both had taken posi-
tive action to cover it. The flow of supplies
ashore was somewhat less than normal owing
to a moderate ground swell which arose in the
afternoon and later prevented night unloading.

so23d Mar Report, 35. Treitel.

81 Turner.

In addition, handling of supplies on the
beaches was materially hampered by enemy
mortar and artillery lire. While the advance
had not proceeded as rapidly as hoped, suffi-
cient space had been seized for the efficient em-
ployment of supporting weapons. In short,
there was no cause to doubt the eventual out-
come.

Many important gains had been made which
were not visible at the moment. For example,
the Marines, as yet, could not fully appreciate
how much damage had been done to the
enemy's communications (principally by naval
shelling) and how much difficulty Japanese
commanders were experiencing in controlling
their troops.

On the night of D-Day, Admiral Spruance
received two submarine reports which added
up to the disturbing indication that the Japa-
nese Fleet, for the first time since Guadalcanal,
was coming out to do battle. Spruance’s eyes-
uncler-the-sea had obtained two fixes on a large
force of enemy carriers, battleships, cruisers
and destroyers moving from their anchorage
at Tawi Tawi (Southern Philippines) in the
direction of the Marianas and at such speed
that they could attack by D-plus 2. Startling
news, pregnant with possibilities. Should the
attack on Guam, which had been scheduled for
18 June (D-plus 3), be delayed on the basis of
these reports? Spruance would “sleep'’ on the
situation (loose term — he would be awake all
night) and hold a conference with principal
commanders the following morning.82

Actually, this development was no surprise.
Since the initiation of planning, the possibility
— even probability — of the Japanese Fleet
coming out to do battle had been frequently
discussed. So. while the situation was serious,
it in no sense caught the U. S. Navy unpre-
pared. In regard to this, Admiral Turner has
written :

Before Spruance and I left Pearl Harbor, we had
thoroughly canvassed the possible situations that
might occur in case the Japanese Fleet should attack.
It was, of course, impracticable and unwise to try to
provide for all of the various situations by many
separate plans. Therefore, both of us issued schematic,
flexible general plans that could be implemented as

82 5th Fleet Initial Report , 3.

desired by a few simple dispatches. We were in full
agreement as to what to do. Fortunately, when the
time came, the easiest situation of all developed (early
attack from one direction while we were still com-
mitted to a single landing).83

Characteristically, Japanese commanders at
Saipan were sending optimistic reports to
Tokyo. They had observed the activities on D-
minus 1 and judged correctly that the Ameri-
cans would land on the Charan Kanoa beaches.
At 2030 on 14 June, an unidentified Japanese
commander sent a message to “all units con-
cerned” which said :

The units are prepared for the enemy landing;
morale is high and we are in complete readiness.
Although losses, etc. (from American bombardment),
are being investigated, it is expected that they are
very slight.

At 0430 the morning of D-I)ay, Major Gen-
eral Keiji Iketa (chief of staff, 31st Japanese
Army) reported that over 100 enemy ships
could be observed in the area west of Saipan,
but “Morale is high. We are waiting.” Later,
in a document titled “Lessons derived from the
situation before and after opening of enemy
landings,” he indicated a low regard for our H-
Hour preparation:

They did not carry out a large scale shelling and
bombing against the positions on the landing beach
just prior to landing. When they came to the land-
ing . . . our basic positions were completely sound.84

General Iketa’s evaluation of LT. S. preparatory
fires is of interest principally because it was
contradicted time and again by the testimony
of other Japanese on Saipan (see page 248).

Even though Japanase commanders may
have been peering through rose-colored glasses,
the defenders’ morale was high, and they were
far from giving up their original plans to “de-
molish the enemy during the night at the
waters’ edge.”

Prior to 12 June, wishful thinking had
caused the Japanese to prophesy that the next
U. S. move would be against the Palaus or an
objective farther south, an area well suited to
defense by the coordinated efforts of the Com-
bined Fleet. Even Mitscher’s Task Force 58
strike against the Marianas on 11 June shed

83 Turner.

84 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #0983-85, 1-4.

little light on U. S. intentions; the move could
conceivably have been nothing more than a di-
version for another operation. At any rate,
until the fog of mystery had lifted, there was
no cause to alter dispositions. Continuing raids
by Mitscher’s force, plus the 14 June advent of
mine sweepers and underwater demolition
teams, finally convinced the Japanese of the
true U. S. intentions.

Netvs of the Saipan landing was stunning,
indeed. But, then, it was thought to be only a
matter of time until powerful Japanese forces
would destroy the intruders by coordinated ac-
tivities of the base air forces (from I wo Jima,
Guam, Palau, Yap and Woleai) and the fleet
(moving from Tawi Tawi anchor; tge). Ad-
miral Toyoda, commander in chief of the Com-
bined Fleet, had no illusions about the effect
that U. S. seizure of the Marianas would pro-
duce on the home islands. His was the re-
sponsibility of decisively defeating the Y. S.
Task Force; and, if he had doubts as to the
eventual outcome, these were not revealed by
the strenuous line of action which he pursued.85
- Chafing at the bit on Guam was Second
Lieutenant Rai Imanishi, who said in his diary
of 15 June;

The Combined Fleet is about to encase the enemy
in decisive combat ... in the Marianas sector. The
enemy lias already begun landing on Saipan. Truly,
we are on the threshold of momentous occurrences.
Now is the time for me to offer my life for the great
cause and be a barrier against the enemy advancing
in the Pacific Ocean.86

The lieutenant would have to wait awhile, but
the opportunity was not to be denied him.

Elsewhere on Guam, an unidentified Japa-
nese soldier of lesser rank, but equal perception,
wrote :

15 June, 1944 — . . . the enemy landed on Saipan and
a heavy battle is in progress. The situation of our
forces does not look favorable.87

On Tinian, individual Japanese recognized
that momentous happenings were in the offing.
Disgust and disappointment at the poor show-
ing of their aircraft is evidenced in most of the
diaries. This resentment extended beyond the

85 Campaigns, 210-213.

86 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #10,410.

87 Ibid.

fact that naval aviators were not fighting the
IT. S. planes to the satisfaction of the ground
personnel. An unidentified Japanese noncom-
missioned officer wrote:

15 June — The naval aviators are robbers. . . . When
they ran off to the mountains, they stole Army provi-
sions, robbed people of their fruits and took cars.88

88 CINCPAC— CINCPOA Item #11,405.

To a noncommissioned officer (Tokuzo Mat-
suya) of the 9th Tank Regiment — still in an
assembly area in the Chacha-Laulau area on
Saipan — things were not so grim:

15 .Tune — . . . one enemy division landed . . . but
was surrounded by our troops. Our plan would seem
to be to annihilate the enemy by morning.89

89 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #10,238.

sa (pKBHT

CHAPTER III

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Expansion of the Beachhead

D-PLUS 1—16 JUNE

Dawn of 16 June produced mixed reactions,
depending upon which camp one was in. The
Japanese were sorry to see it because it would
mean that observed air, naval gunfire and ar-
tillery would again spread havoc among them;
the Marines were glad to see it — and for pre-
cisely the same reason.

The golden opportunity to counterattack the
beachhead in sufficient strength to drive the
Marines into the water had not materialized.
Several efforts had been made, but in all cases
they had been foiled with heavy losses to the
enemy. The night of D-Day was not to see the
last of the Japanese counterattacks, but cer-
tainly no more favorable opportunity normally
accrues to the defender than on the lirst night,
when the attacker is still somewhat disorgan-
ized.

Persistent enemy movements along the coast
road from the north throughout the night had
indicated convincingly that Garapan was be-
ing used as an assembly area for further coun-
terattacks against our positions. The town had
remained unmolested because of a desire to
conserve the buildings and other facilities for
our later use. Since such a policy was obviously
very helpful to the Japanese, General Watson,
commanding the 2d Division, requested that the
town be bombed, shelled and burned by our
naval forces. This, as will be seen, was later
accomplished.1

1 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 1.

Spruance’s Decisions

The previous night had brought Admiral
Spruance news of a movement of the Japanese
Fleet from Philippine waters. On the morn-
ing of 16 June, after conferences and careful
consideration of the problem, he reached the
following decisions :

(a) The tentative date for the Guam landing
(18 June) would be cancelled, and the desig-
nation of a new date would await a clarification
of the situation. Transports of the Southern
Attack Force would oscillate well to the east-
ward of Guam.

(b) Certain previously warned cruiser and
destroyer units attached to Admiral Turner’s
Joint Expeditionary Force would replenish
ammunition and fuel and join the Fast Carrier
Forces on the 17th.

(c) Unloading at Saipan would continue
through daylight of the 17th, and at dark all
transports and LST’s not required for im-
mediate unloading would withdraw to the east-
ward of Saipan and not return the next day.

(d) Transports and EST’s needed for im-
mediate unloading, plus small craft and screen,
would remain at Saipan. As required, other
transports and LST’s from the group which
retired to the eastward would be returned.

(e) The old battleships, part of the cruisers
and some destroyers of the Joint Expeditionary
Force would cover Saipan from about 25 miles
to the westward during darkness to guard
against the possibility that hostile surface ves-

"mariner” seaplanes alloat oil Saipan's west coast. Searches by these planes, to provide warning of Japanese
naval incursions, commenced on 17 June and continued throughout the operation.

sels might evade our fleet. In addition, ships
from this covering group would provide troop
gunfire support as required.

(f) Escort carriers nearby to the eastward
of Saipan would continue to provide air cover
for all ships in t lie vicinity and to furnish troop
support aircraft ; but no support or cover could
be expected from Fast Carrier Task Forces
after 16 June.

fg) Six patrol seaplanes (PBM — “Mari-
ner") would be ordered to arrive at Saipan on
IT June, prepared to make night radar
searches to 600 miles west of the island. This
six-plane squadron (VP-16) would fly out from
Eniwetok and be mothered b}T the seaplane
tender Ballard?

Admiral Spruance announced these far-
reaching decisions at a conference aboard Ad-

2 Later, this number of seaplanes was gradually in-
creased until five squadrons, based on six seaplane
tenders, were present. The night of 17 .Tune marked
the beginning of such searches from Saipan. TF 51
Report. Enel A, 6.

miral Turner’s flagship Rocky Mount. As
Spruance prepared to leave the ship to re-
turn to his own flagship Indianapolis , General
Holland Smith, who was also embarked in
Rocky Mount , asked him : “Do you think the
Japs will turn tail and run?” “No,” Spruance
replied, “not now. They are out after big game.
If they had wanted an easy victory, they would
have disposed of the relatively small force cov-
ering MacArthur’s operation at Biak (New
Guinea). But the attack on the Marianas is
too great a challenge for the Japanese Navy to
ignore.” 3

It is interesting to note that the approach of
the Japanese Fleet did not seriously affect the
supply situation on Saipan, since even the
transports and LST’s that retired eastward
were close enough so that they could be sent
back to Saipan as required. Some shortages
did develop, however, as will be seen.4

3 Coral and Brass. 165.

* TF 51 Report , 6. Interview with Adm H. W. Hill,
20Sep49.

One disappointing l'esult of the transports’
withdrawal was that few cargo vehicles came
ashore during the period. This caused inland
supply and evacuation to be performed pri-
marily by LVT’s, which did a good job but, in
the process, chopped the existing roads into
nearly impassable condition. In addition, the
LVT’s themselves suffered considerable dete-
rioration, thereby reducing the combat effec-
tiveness of LVT battalions.5

Though the amount of air support for the
landing force was drastically reduced from 17
to 22 June because of the necessity for redispos-
ing available forces, naval gunfire support was
reduced very little. Nearly the full number of
fire support vessels requested by the landing
force were supplied day or night.6

It is not the purpose of this narrative to re-
count the numerous small naval actions in the
waters surrounding Saipan. Suffice it to say
that the surprise thrust into Marianas’ waters
had trapped many vulnerable Japanese cargo
ships. Many of these got underway as soon as
the truth was known, hoping to reach a safe
port. Few were successful; U. S. submarines,
aircraft and surface vessels were alert and in-
tercepted and sank most of them. This happy
state of affairs caused Rear Admiral Charles
A. Pownall, USN, Commander Air Pacific, to
comment: “The Marianas operation flushed
more shipping than it had been our fortune
to contact for a number of months.” 7

Even as Spruance implemented his monu-
mental decisions, Marines of the two divisions
were engaged in cementing their toehold. For
the entire landing force this meant pouring
more troops and weapons ashore and pressing
the attack inland. The principal thrust would
be made on the landing force right, in the 4th
Ms trine Division’s zone, while the left of the 2d
Division would hold the pivot and wait for the
outer arc to swing abreast. F urtber, the 2d
Division left, during its wait, could gird itself
for expected Japanese attacks from the north.

5 Ltr from Col R. .T. Straub to CMC, 13.Tan50.

6 Turner.

7ComAirPac Ker 00888, 27Jul44, Analysis of Pacific

Air Operations, Jun44, 12.

Before the 4th Division could throw its round-
house hook in earnest, it would have to push
farther inland, toward the east coast.

Enemy artillery and mortars, emplaced on or
behind the spiny ridge line which divides the
island, continued destructive fires throughout
the day, particularly in the congested beach
areas. Even though numerous artillery and
naval gunfire concentrations and air strikes
were directed against their suspected posi-
tions, the Japanese clung persistently to favor-
able terrain which overlooked the entire beach-
head. Time and time again after being
“silenced,” enemy shelling would begin anew.8

In both Marine divisions, shore party ac-
tivities continued. On Beach Red 2, the shore
party team which had landed there on D-Day
had received so many casualties that it was
necessary to send in another team to supple-
ment it. Generally, however, the supply situa-
tion was quite good.9

6th Marines Consolidate;

8th Captures Afetna Point

During 16 June, the 6th Marines (on the
left, pivot flank) held the same general posi-
tion, consolidating and reorganizing front
lines. In the afternoon, remaining elements of
the regimental weapons company (75mm half-
tracks and 37mm guns) came ashore and were
incorporated into defensive plans. Only
sporadic activity (mostly mopping-up of Japa-
nese infiltrators and by-passed groups) oc-
curred in the 6th Marines’ zone during the day
and early evening.

Major LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr., now commanded
the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, having replaced
Lieutenant Colonel Murray, who, along with
the executive officer. Major Howard L. Rice,
had been wounded. The 3d Battalion had
changed commanders too : Lieutenant Colonel
Easley, wounded on D-Day, was finally evacu-
ated on the morning of 16 June and replaced
by his executive officer. Major John E.
Rentscli.10

8 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI. 1-2.

9 Ibid. Jfth Mar Dir Report, Section VI, 46.

10 6th Mar Report, 4. Rentsch.

Colonel Wallace’s 8th Marines, meanwhile,
continued its original mission of clearing
Afetna Point, Beach Green 3, and the area
west of Lake Susupe. This task fell principally
to the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, and, to a
lesser extent, the 1st Battalion, 29tli Marines
(attached to the 8th Marines). The 1st and 3d
Battalions held their positions of the previous
day and made minor adjustments in their
lines.

Afetna Point, the D-Day headache, proved
much easier on 16 June; most of the point’s de-
fenders had either retired from the area during
the night or had expended themselves in the
unsuccessful attack against the 23d Marines’
left flank. The few scattered die hards who re-
mained were mopped up by the 2d Battalion,
8th Marines, or flushed into the flank of the
23d Marines, where they met with a quick end.
By 0950, men of Company G, 8th Marines, had
advanced to the Charan Kanoa pier, marking
(he boundary between divisions. The unit then
pushed inland, caught up and established con-
tact with the 4th Division at about 1140. By
early afternoon the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,
had secured its area as far inland as Lake
Susupe. (See Map 11.)

Mopping-up of rear areas continued through-
out the day. mainly hampered by well-directed
Japanese mortar and artillery fire. Company
G, ordered into 2d Battalion reserve after com-
pletion of its Afetna Point mission, became a
popular enemy target despite several moves to
avoid the shelling. Since the rounds seemed to
emanate from positions east of Lake Susupe
and since Company G was well concealed from
enemy observers located in that direction, the
conclusion was drawn that the observer must
be behind, and close by, the company. He
could not be found, however. Many days later
a Japanese, proud of his accomplishments, was
dragged from one of the Charan Kanoa sugar
mill smokestacks where he had remained to
direct fire long after Marines had secured the
area.

Suffering the same ratio of losses in battalion
commanders as the 6th Marines, the 8th Ma-
rines had effected two changes: Major William
C. Chamberlin now commanded the 2d Bat-
talion. Major Stanley E. Larsen the 3d Bat-

talion. These two former executive officers had
replaced Lieutenant Colonels Crowe and
Miller, both casualties early on D-Day.11

Remainder of 2d Marines Lands

On D-Day, slightly less than half the ele-
ments of the 2d Marines (the 3d Battalion, a
2d Battalion headquarters detachment, and
Company F) had arrived ashore. These had
been attached to the 6th Marines. The re-
mainder of the 2d Battalion and the 2d Ma-
rines’ headquarters group commenced trans-
ferring to LVT’s at daylight of D-plus 1 and
were completely landed by 1000. Colonel
Walter J. Stuart, commanding the 2d Marines,
assumed command — on General Watson’s
order — of a composite group including the 2d
Battalion, 6th Marines, and the 3d Battalion,
2d Marines. These two units were located
along the beach on the division left : the former
on the front lines, the latter just behind in re-
serve. After taking over command at 1400,
Colonel Stuart ordered the two battalions to
switch positions (because of the fact that the
2d Battalion, 6th Marines, had endured the
brunt of the previous night’s counterattacks).
This exchange was accomplished prior to
dark.12

Lieutenant Colonel Wood B. Kyle’s 1st Bat-
talion, 2d Marines (still under Northern
Troops and Landing Force control even though
plans to land the unit at Magicienne Bay had
been abandoned), was ordered about noon to
land and report to the 2d Marine Division.
While Kyle was en route to the control vessel, a
message was sent changing Iris orders to the
effect that he was to land his battalion in the
4th Division zone and pass to the command
of that division. This change had been ordered
because the 4th Division’s beaches were receiv-
ing less fire and, also, because there was more
room for commitment in that zone of action.
Kyle, however, had no inkling of this change
until he reported to the control vessel. There
he learned of the change regarding beaches
but not of that relative to attachment. (It is
likely that the control vessel received only that

11 8th Mar Report , 1-2.

12 2d Mar Report, Enel A, 2.

part of the message dealing with the place of
landing.)

Once ashore, Colonel Kyle reported to Gen-
eral Schmidt, the 4th Division's commander.
The general, also unaware of the NTLF
change, directed Kyle to move his unit to the
north and report to the 2d Division. About
1000, the battalion arrived at the 2d Division
command post and was placed in division re-
serve. it was not until the 2d Division con-
veyed the report of Kyle's arrival that the
NTLF staff realized that its change had not
been accomplished. It was decided, however,
that any further movement would be unde-
sirable, and the battalion remained with the 2d
Division.

Kyle immediately set about the task of re-
organizing and reequipping the unit. The pro-
visional organization of five companies for the
Magicienne Bay landings was no longer justi-
fied, and the battalion resumed its conventional
entity.13 As the unit’s heavy weapons (81mm
mortars and .30-caliber heavy machine guns)
were still loaded aboard CYK's in accordance
with the original plans, it remained for these
weapons to be parachuted from carrier torpedo
planes (TBF’s). The drop, made on the small
strip just inland from the 2d Division beaches,
proved very unsatisfactory because of the low
altitude from which it was made. The result :
almost 100 per cent damage to the equipment.14

Kyle’s unit was placed under a definite
handicap by this turn of events but, in spite of
the difficulties attendant to changing its or-
ganization and obtaining heavy weapons, com-
ported itself like the well-trained battalion that
it was.

Artillery Build Up

Since coming ashore on D-Day, the two pack
howitzer battalions of the 10th Marines (1st
and 2d Battalions) had performed excellently
in support of the 0th and 8th Marines. At

13 Three rifle companies and a headquarters com-
pany.

14 Kyle.. MajGen T. E. Watson’s endorsement on ltr
from EtOol W. 15. Kyle to DirPuhlnfo, 20Nov48. Inter-
view with Col It. E. Ilogaboom, I.tCol J. L. Stewart and
LtCol E. W. Durant, Jr., 3Dec48.

about noon on 10 June, Lieutenant Colonel
Kenneth A. Jorgensen, commanding the 4th
Battalion, 10th Marines, landed with his ad-
vance party to reconnoiter position areas. Be-
cause of heavy surf on the reef, Jorgensen de-
cided to have the DLKW's (carrying 105mm
howitzers) use the Charan Kanoa channel, even
though it was under intermittent artillery and
mortar lire. At about 1000, the 4tli Battalion
successfully made the transit of the channel,
moved laterally to the north within the lagoon,
and landed on Beach Green 3.

This move was followed closely by the 3d
Battalion. 1 0th Marines (Mi ijor William L.
Crouch), which used the same route at 1700.

The 4th Battalion went into position in the
vicinity of the radio station, about 000 yards
inland from the northern end of Green 1, while
the 3d Battalion established itself about 200
yards inland from the southern end of Green 2.
By 1800 all the artillery of both ihe Marine
divisions, with the exception of the 2d 155mm
Howitzer Battalion (a corps battalion at-
tached to the 10th Marines), was ashore.15

Brigadier General Arthur M. Harper. I SA,
Commanding General of the XXIV Corps
Artillery, landed at 1515. He had issued orders
before leaving the ship to advance parties of
artillery groups and battalions to meet him on
shore. A tentative command post was estab-
lished about 100 yards inland from the southern
edge of Beach Blue 2. Advance parties of the
Army's 419th and 420th Field Artillery Groups,
the 225th and 531st Field Artillery Battalions,
and elements of the Corps Artillery staff re-
ported there before dark.16

The Push to 0-1

In the 4th Marine Division zone. General
Schmidt prepared to push the attack inland
with the main effort in the center. The division
reserve, Colonel Hart’s 24th Marines, was or-
dered to detach one battalion (the 3d) to rein-
force the 25th Marines, on the right, and
another battalion (the 2d) to assemble in rear
of the 23d Marines to protect the division left

15 TF 56 G-3 Report, 6. 10th Mar Report. 3.

16 NTLF XXI V Corps Artillery, S-3 Report, 5. here-
inafter cited as Corps Arty S-3 Report.

flank. The remainder of Colonel Hart’s regi-
ment was committed in the center between the
23d and 25th Marines. This shifting about
would take time, so the attack hour was set for
1230.

The 24th Marines suffered a serious loss be-
fore it could get committed to action; Lieu-
tenant Colonel Maynard C. Schultz, command-
ing tlie 1st Battalion, was killed by a fragment
from a Japanese shell while at the regimental
command post receiving instructions for the
day’s attack. Major Robert N. Fricke, the bat-
talion executive officer, took over.17

For the 16 June attack, the 1st, 2d and 3d
Battalions, 14th Marines, were in direct sup-
port of the 25th, 23d and 24th Marines re-
spectively; the 4th and 5th Battalions fur-
nished general support. This assignment was
altered many times throughout the compaign
so that each of the five battalions of the 14th
Ma rines, at one time or another or in one com-
bination or another, was in direct support of
each of the infantry regiments.

While no unit on the beach completely es-
caped the Japanese artillery and mortar shell-
ing, it appears that in point of concentrated,
sustained pounding, the 5th Battalion, 14th
Ma rines, suffered the most. The box score, pro-
vided by the battalion commander, Lieutenant
Colonel Douglas E. Reeve, tells the story:

By 0430 [1G .Tune] all of Baker Battery’s guns had
been knocked out — 0500 : two guns in Able Battery
knocked out — 0545 : one gun Charlie Battery knocked
out — 0630: other two guns Able Battery knocked out — -
0730 : one more gun Charlie Battery knocked out. This
left us two guns operative. We fired them.

When I say “knocked out’’ I mean just that— trails
blown off, sights blown off, recoil mechanism dam-
aged, etc. By 1000, with the help of division ordnance
and by completely replacing one or two weapons, we
were back in business — full strength — 12 guns.

Personnel losses to the battalion during this
period included eight killed and over 50
wounded. No one in the battalion had time or
inclination to count the Japanese shells burst-
ing around him, but the battalion commander
estimated “300 rounds in a 21 hour period
( 1200 D-day to 0930 D-plus 1).” 18

17 i ’/tli }[ar Report , 18.

'* Reeve.

When word of the 5th Battalion’s heavy
losses reached the regimental commander, Colo-
nel Louis G. DeHaven, he informed Reeve that
his unit would not be called upon for fires un-
til a reorganization could be effected. As noted
before, the unit was back to full weapons
strength by 1000.19

Meanwhile, the 4tli Battalion, 14th Marines,
had had an unique experience. Shortly after
dawn, personnel of this unit observed a Japa-
nese patrol, numbering about 30 men, moving
toward the beach in route column. Sitting on
top of the 4th Battalion Fire Direction Center,
1st Lieutenant Russell F. Schoenbeck, the
assistant operations officer, adjusted fire on the
enemy group, shouting his corrections after
observing the fall of each volley. The “fire for
effect,” delivered at a range of 1800 yards,
caught the enemy patrol squarely. This inci-
dent provided one of very few examples
throughout the Pacific war in which artillery
personnel, except forward observers, witnessed
a “fire for effect” on other than direct fire
targets.

The boost to morale this incident created was
short-lived; the Japanese quickly retaliated
with counterbattery fire, which scored a direct
hit on the fourth gun section of Battery M,
killing or wounding all the crew except one
man.20

The 23rd Regiment’s 16 June attack would
place the 1st and 2d Battalions in the assault
and the 3d Battalion in reserve. Concern about
the left flank was somewhat relieved by the
presence of Lieutenant Colonel Rothwell’s 2d
Battalion, 24th Marines, which had moved in
behind the 23d Marines.21

After reporting to the 25tli Marines, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Vandegrift’s 3d Battalion, 24th
Marines, was ordered to relieve Mustain’s bat-
talion (on the division right), which had
endured tough fighting on D-Day and was in
need of reorganization. The relief was accom-
plished at 1130, Mustain’s 1st Battalion re-
verting to 25th Marines’ reserve. Since all

19 l '/th Mar Report. Enel A, 2.

20 Ltr from LtCol C. A. Youngflale to CMC, 12Jan50.

21 23d Mar Report, 36.

GUNNERY SERGEANT ROBERT H. McCARD, 4tll Tank Battalion,
posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for remain-
ing alone at his disabled tank on 16 June 1944 and tiring
upon the enemy in order that men of his crew might
make good their withdrawal.

three companies of the 3d Battalion, 24tli
Marines, were needed to cover its broad sector,
one company (B) of the 25th Marines was at-
tached to Vandegrift’s unit at 1600.22

It will be recalled that a large portion of the
3d Battalion, 25th Marines, (all of Companies
Iv and I and a platoon of L) had been attached
to Mustain’s unit on D-Day. With the shift of
Mustain’s battalion into reserve, 3d Battalion
units were returned to parent control. With his
battalion intact once again, Lieutenant Colonel
Chambers moved it to an assembly area just in
rear of the 0-1 line, near the 25th Marines’
left flank. This area proved something less
than quiet. From the left and rear, enemy rifle-
men and two mountain guns announced them-
selves with telling bursts. Further harassment
was felt from the front — just over the 0-1
ridge line — where four dual-purpose antiair-
craft guns were located. These weapons had
originally been emplaced as antiaircraft pro-
tection for Aslito Airfield, but the more per-

22 1st Bn , 2r,1h Mar Report, 7. 3d Tin , 2/, Mar Re-
port, 1-2.

sonal danger occasioned by the Marines close
at hand caused the Japanese gunners to shift
their weapons for ground firing.

Chambers assigned first priority to the enemy
groups to his rear, Company L and six medium
tanks from Company A, 4th Tank Battalion,
assuming the task of elimination. Their efforts
paid off : five machine guns, two mountain guns
and approximately 60 enemy soldiers were de-
stroyed.

After completing its mop-up task to the rear,
Company L joined with the 2d Battalion, 25th
Marines, which was bending every effort to dis-
lodge the four antiaircraft guns on the eastern
slopes of the 0-1 ridge line. In addition to the
previously-heard-from antiaircraft weapons,
three machine guns in bunkers opened on the
Marines as they attempted to move. Despite
a series of well-coordinated tank-infantry
thrusts and the commitment of another com-
pany (K) from the 3d Battalion, the lines
could not advance. The Japanese held. (See
Map 11.)

Principal complication in fighting these par-
ticular enemy positions was their location,
just over the crest of the ridge, making deliv-
erance of supporting fires extremely risky.
During the night, however, mortars of the 2d
and 3d Battalions maintained steady fmes, with
the result that most of the enemy positions were
permanently silenced.23

Against rifle and machine-gun fire, originat-
ing principally from the Mt. Fina Susu area,
the left and center regiments (23d and 24th)
moved up generally abreast of the stymied
25th Marines. Some contact difficulties were
experienced during the day, necessitating the
commitment of a company from the reserve
2d Battalion, 24th Marines; but, by 1730, the
lines were well tied-in generally along the ridge
line designated 0-1. It had not been an after-
noon of spectacular happenings, merely a
costly, tiresome struggle against a determined
foe. Aslito road, the best artery to 0-1, was
almost a solid column of tanks, supply vehicles
and ambulances. Despite the congestion, how-
ever, Japanese artillery did not interdict this

23 Chambers.

toward o-l ridgeline move Marines of the 23d Regiment. The 4th Division G-2 described the ridgeline area as
the “one defensive line worthy of note” in the 4th Division zone of action.

route. As darkness fell, the division dug in
for the night; right flank about 1,000 yards
southeast of Agingan Point, anchored on the
beach; left flank bent back towards Lake
Susupe. The right center of the division front
bulged to within a half mile of Aslito Air-
field.-4 (See Map 11.)

The Northern Troops and Landing Force
staff was already giving thought to a com-
mand post displacement from ship to shore.
The advance party and security detachment
landed at 2030, 16 June, and the following day
established an advance command post at

24 /fill Mar Dir Report, Section VI. 18. NTLF Ct-S
Report, Periodic Report Xo. 2. Dillon.

the battered town of Charan Kanoa.25

27th Division Begins to Land

As noted before, the approach of the Japa-
nese Fleet had forced Admiral Spruance to
his decision to withdraw those transports not
needed for immediate unloading. This de-
manded a decision from the landing force
commander: should the 27th Division remain
with the retiring transports, or should it be
landed? General Holland Smith’s decision to
land the unit was governed by two factors:
First, a long, vicious fight was in prospect, and
it was already apparent that more troops

25 NTLF Cr-l Report. 7.

0-1 ridgeline (Fiua Susu) looking back toward Charan Kanoa and the transport area. Until Marines seized tins
first dominating ground, the Japanese enjoyed this excellent view.

won 1 cl be required. Second, was the general's
stated policy regarding reserves: . . it is

always better to get them on the beach rather
than have them sitting out at sea on ships.
That is why I put in all the Marine reserves
as soon as possible and then ordered the
Twenty-seventh ashore.” As the first step, the
27th Division was released from Expeditionary
Troops reserve to Northern Troops and Land-
ing Force. Orders to land came soon after.20

Since ships carrying the 27th Division were
cruising some distance from Saipan, it re-
mained for these to move to the anchorage and
commence debarkation. Shortly after noon,
Major General Ralph C. Smith, USA, com-
manding the 27th Division, received a warn-
ing order from NTLF : “Be prepared to land
your unit (less RCT 106) on order upon ar-
rival. Report on board USS Cambria for con-
ference.”27

26 Coral and Brass, H54. TF 56 G-3 Report, C>.

2727fh Infantry Division G-3 Journal, l(5,Tun44.

Upon reaching the anchorage (about 1630).
Ralph Smith and his key staff members
boarded the Cambria where they conferred
with Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill and Briga-
dier General Graves B. Erskine (second-in-
command. respectively, for Turner and Hol-
land Smith). At the meeting, Ralph Smith was
informed that 27th Division artillery battalions
were to land as soon as possible to support
Marine divisions already ashore. The leading
regiment (the 165th) would land immediately
and move to the 4th Division’s right flank so
that it could join the Marines in the next day’s
attack. Remaining 27th Division troops were
to land as rapidly as possible with the excep-
tion of the 106th Infantry, which was to re-
main afloat in Joint Expeditionary Troops
Reserve.28

28 Notes on Operations of the 27th Infantry Division
at Saipan, 15-24 June 1044, MajOen R. C. Smith, here-
inafter cited as R. C. Smith.

The 165th Infantry (Colonel Gerard W.
Kelley, USA)29 debarked at dusk and, after a
greatly confused (because of the darkness)
ship-to-shore movement, finally reached the
beach. Here its difficulties did not end; be-
cause of the extreme dispersion of boats car-
rying in troops, a severe challenge to leadership
and discipline was presented. Passing this
test, the 165th’s leading battalions (1st and
2d) assembled their separated boatloads and
moved to an area in rear of the 3d Battalion,
21th Marines (on the extreme right flank),
with orders to pass through that unit and ex-
tend the Marines' Hank the following morning.

Brigadier General Ogden J. Ross, USA,
assistant division commander, landed with the
165th Infantry and proceeded to the command
post of the 4th Marine Division. In General
Ross’ words :

. . . T met the Chief of Staff, Colonel Rogers, and he
explained that it would he necessary for the 165th
Infantry to attack at 7 : 30 that same morning. By this
time it was 3:30. Elements of the 165th Infantry were
coming ashore. They were being collected on the
beaches, from red to yellow a distance of three miles.
After a discussion with the Chief of Staff. 4th Marine
Division, as to the Line of Departure, I instructed
the regimental commander of the 165th Infantry to
assemble the troops as fast as possible and take them
to the extreme right of the line where they were to
extend the flank of the 4th Marine Division.

Due to the shortness of time, the darkness, the un-
familiarity with the ground, and the fact that the units
of the regiment were being unloaded on various beaches,
without regard to organizational integrity, this was an
exceedingly difficult task. . . ,30

Also landed during the night (in accordance
with the landing force’s expressed priorities)
were three battalions of the 27th Division’s
artillery: the 105th. 106th and 249th Field
Artillery Battalions. These were placed under
operational control of the Corps Artillery.31
The remaining battalion, the 104th, did not

29 Throughout this monograph, all Army officers are
designated “USA.”

30 Summary of Operations by 27th Infantry Division
from 16 June to 10 July 1044, BrigGen O. J. Ross,
13.Tul44, hereinafter cited as Ross. 165th Infantry
Operation Report, 2, hereinafter cited as 165th Inf Re-
port.

31 27th Infantry Division. G— 3 Reports, 16-17 June,
hereinafter cited as 27th Dii' G-3 Reports.

land at Saipan until 19 June (D-plus 4). 32

Night of 1 6-1 7 June — Tank Counterattack

The night was reasonably quiet in the 4th
Marine Division zone with the exception of
several unsuccessful infiltration attempts by
the enemy along the 23rd Marines’ front and
the now-familiar Japanese artillery and mor-
tar fire which continued unabated.33

The relative quiet enjoyed by the 4th Divi-
sion was not the rule, however. In the 2d
Division zone, the night produced a fight of
no mean dimensions, the result of an opera-
tion order issued by Lieutenant General Saito,
commanding general of the Japanese 43d
Division.

This order was a masterpiece of confusion,
although, admittedly, translation from Japa-
nese to English has not enhanced its clarity.
Saito based his plan on the reasonable premise
that U. S. troops should be attacked before a
firm beachhead could be established. It is ap-
parent, however, that the beachhead was
stronger on the 16th than it had been on the
15th; and, therefore, the attack was already
one day late for maximum effectiveness. In
other words, nothing had developed, from the
Japanese point of view, which would make a
D-plus 1 attack more successful than one on
D-Day. On the contrary, Marine positions
were much better organized by 16 June, more
supporting weapons, supplies, and ammunition
were ashore, and generally the Marine situa-
tion had improved. The Japanese, although
probably aware of this fact, had been unable
to mount an offensive — because of extensive
damage to communications — on D-Day.

The objective of the Japanese attack was
modest enough: the Saipan radio station, a
short 400 yards behind the 6th Marines’ lines.
This objective, in itself, represented a revision
in Saito’s pre-D-Day policy to “destroy the
enemy, during the night, at the water’s edge."
Seizure of the radio station area would still
leave 500—600 yards distance to the water. On
the other hand, the general was being com-
pletely realistic in his selection, for the objec-

32 27th Infantry Division Field Order 43, 19 June.

33 23d if or Report. 36.

tive was easily recognizable and was possible
of attainment by the troops and means avail-
able.

Principal units involved in t he attack were
Colonel Ogawa’s 136th Infantry Regiment
(which had borne the brunt of the 2d Division’s
assault), Lieutenant Commander Karashima’s
1st Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force,
and Colonel Goto’s 9th Tank Regiment. Kara-
shima’s Special Naval Landing Force would
move down the coast road from the Garapan
area and “cooperate with the tanks to anni-
hilate the enemy’s front line and advance
towards Oreai (Charan Kanoa) Airfield.” Vice
Admiral Nagumo, Commander Central Pacific
Fleet and 5th Base Force, was ordered to com-
mand the attack personally.34 The vagueness
of the mission set forth in this order would
seem to indicate that Saito had some doubts
that the Navy was capable of accomplishing
much and, therefore, assigned this unit a nebu-
lous task in the hope that some good would be
done — and surely no harm. The ambiguity is
further emphasized by this sentence: “The
attack will be made whenever possible.”

To Colonel Ogawa and Colonel Goto the
order was much more specific and much more
confusing:

The center force [13Gth Infantry Regiment] will
attack the enemy in the direction of Oreai with its
full force. The tank unit | !)t li Tank Regiment] will
advance SW of Hill 1G4.635 after the attack unit . . .
has commenced the attack. The Tank Unit will charge
the transmitting station and throw the enemy into dis-
order just before the penetration of the attack unit
into this sector.

If the two colonels read this order with fur-
rowed brows, it is no wonder.

Available to Colonel Goto for the attack were
the 3d, 4th, 5th, and one-half of the 6th Com-

34 There is no indication that he did, however. In
view of the animosity between the Japanese Army and
Navy, Nagumo might very well have ignored Saito’s
order. Little is known of this officer’s activities after
D-Day ; he is conspicuous by his absence. It is safe to
say, however, that t lie Admiral, still basking in the
warmth of his Pearl Harbor fame, was not pleased
with Saito’s order.

3a Hill 164.G (meters) is a small peak that rises above
the north-south ridgeline. A road cuts across the
island to the east coast at this point.

panies of the 9th Tank Regiment. (Goto’s
1st and 2d Companies, plus the remaining half
of the 6th, were on Guam.) The 4th Company
had been virtually eliminated as a fighting
body on D-Day in its close defense of the
beaches, and only three of its 14 tanks remained
operative. Fourteen tanks from the 3d Com-
pany, 14 from the 5th, seven from the 6th, six
from headquarters, and three survivors from
the 4th, brings the total to 44 committed to the
attack.36

It is interesting to note that General Saito
planned the attack to take place at 1700, pos-
sibly with the hope of catching the Marines in
the process of digging in for the night. Sunset
was not until 1849 and darkness at 2009, so it
is obvious that a night attack was not the orig-
inal scheme. Good reconnaissance, however,
would have told him that men of the 6th
Marines had moved but little during the day
and in most cases were well dug in by 1700.
Moreover, the estimate of time required to move
the 9th Tank Regiment into attack position
was grossly inaccurate.37

In addition to the other weaknesses of the
plan, that powerful ally — surprise — was not
present ; Marines, alerted to the possibility of a
counterattack supported by tanks, addressed
much attention to the repulse of such an at-
tack. G— 2 estimates, prior to the landings, had
emphasized this enemy capability.

The attack began at about 0330, and the
brunt struck Lieutenant Colonel Jones’ 1st
Battalion, 6th Marines, (principally Company
B) and to a lesser extent the 2d Battalion, 2d
Marines, (principally the 1st Platoon, Com-

36 This figure, however, does not count the possibility
that at least a few of the tanks were not operative or
broke down while en route to attack position. It is
likely, also, that some tanks were retained to the rear,
out of the fight, as mobile command posts. In a table
of organization for the 9th Tank Regiment, dated 15
May 1944, the 3d, 4th and 5th Companies were organ-
ized into 11 medium and three light tanks per com-
pany ; Headquarters into three medium and three
light tanks. The 6th Company was not shown in this
table, and is assumed to have been organized after
15 May and before 15 .Tune; the exact date is not indi-
cated in documents consulted. CINCPAC-CINCPOA
Item #9304.

37 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #10,531.

Japanese tank-infantry counterattack on the night of 16-17 June was stopped cold by the 6th Marines. The next
morning, Marines finished off enemy survivors around the burning tanks.

pany F). The tanks advanced in groups of
four or five with Japanese soldiers clinging to
them. Poor and ineffective tactics reflected the
inadequacy of Saito’s order; some tanks
cruised about in an aimless fashion, some
bogged down in the swampy ground, some
made an effort to break through the lines, still
others stopped to let off their pugnacious
passengers.

From a psychological point of view, a day-
light attack would have been more frightening
to the Marines. For here, in the dark (even
with the supporting destroyers’ 5-inch star-
shells. called in to light the area), it was im-
possible to estimate the number of tanks em-
ployed. Xo one had reason to suspect the
presence of more than a dozen. But. one dozen
or three, the Marines did not budge from their
foxholes.

The task became one of systematic destruc-
tion. Several of (lotos tanks penetrated the
front lines, but the Marines merely shifted
around in their positions and continued their

fires. Japanese of Colonel Ogawa's 136th In-
fantry riding on, or surrounding, the tanks
were slaughtered by the Marines' machine
guns, mortars, bazookas and rifles. The 75mm
pack howitzer fires of the 1st Battalion, 10th
Marines, were also important in stopping the
thrust. The battalion’s defensive preparation
#1. located in the precise area of the enemy's
advance, made adjustment- unnecessary ; it was
simply a matter of pouring in volley after
volley. Between 0300 and 0115, 800 rounds
were fired; 140 more pounded the same area
from 0430 to 0620.

Augmenting the pack howitzers were the
105mm howitzers of Battery M. 10th Marin®.
This was the only battery of the 4th Battalion
in condition to fire; the others had been im-
mobilized by Japanese counterbattery fire (see
page 91). Battery M expended all its avail-
able ammunition in front of the 6th Marines
during the enemy attack.

The Japanese attack continued until about
0700, when daylight revealed between 24

Japanese medium tank of Colonel Goto’s 9th Tank Regiment which participated in the night thrust against the
6th Marines. Many enemy vehicles, like this one, were slowed down by muddy terrain. All were vulnerable to
infantry-carried bazookas.

and 31 smoldering or burning enemy tanks.38

Since this action represented the first major
tank attack received by a Marine unit in the
Pacific War, it is of particular interest to read
the narrative account of Major James A. Dono-
van, Jr., executive officer of the 1st Battalion,
6tli Marines :

At 0330 on the 17th, Captain C. G. Rollen, command-
ing R Company, called the battalion CP to notify Col-
onel Jones that enemy tanks and troops could be heard
approaching from the hill and valley to their direct

88 Reports on the number of Japanese tanks de-
stroyed in this action vary from a low of 24 in the 6th
Marines report to a high of 31 in the TF 56 report.
Since some tanks were hit by several weapons, it is
difficult to establish an exact number. The Marine
attack continued shortly after the enemy effort was
repulsed, and it was not possible for any of the par-
ticipants to make a detailed count. Observers from
higher echelons naturally counted all tanks destroyed
in the area (including those destroyed on D-Day) and
arrived at the figure 31. The account of the tank battle
is derived from a synthesis of: 6th Mar Report, 4;
Mrs from LtCol W. K. Jones (the first undated, the
second 24Jan49) Mrs from Maj Warren Morris (5Jan49
and 17.Tan49) ; Saipan Tank Rattle; Interview with
Maj J. A. Donovan, Jr., 31Dec48.

front. Rollen requested more illumination. All hands
were alerted, regiment was notified, a nearby medium
tank company was told to man their guns, and Naval
gunfire was directed to keep the sector constantly
illuminated and to get a reserve ship on station.

All prepared concentrations were called down in
front of the forward companies, including 75mm pack
howitzer. 81mm mortar and the companies’ own
weapons. At 0345, the first wave of tanks began to
enter the B Company sector. Their squeak and rattle
could be distinguished above the shell fire and long
bursts of machine gun fire as far back as the regi-
mental command post. . . . The battle evolved itself into
a madhouse of noise, tracers and flashing lights. As
tanks were hit and set afire, they silhouetted other
tanks coming out of the flickering shadows to the front
or already on top of the squads.

Many of the tanks were ‘unbuttoned’, [turrets open]
the crew chief directing from the top of his open turret.
Some were being led by a crew member afoot. They
seemed to come in two waves, carrying foot troops on
the long engine compartment or clustered around the
turret, holding on to the hand rail. Some even had
machine guns or grenade throwers set up on the tank.
The bulk of the infantry followed what appeared to
he the second wave of tanks, but as they came under
the fire of B Company’s heavy machine guns, four of
which were in the line of forward combat groups, the
infantry tried to mount the tanks. Those following
afoot were badly cut up.

889590°- — 50 — 7

The Japanese tanks . . . appeared confused. As their
guides and crew chiefs were hit by Marine rifle and
machine gun fire, what little control they had was lost.
They ambled on in the general direction of the beach,
getting hit again and again until each one burst into
flame or turned in aimless circles only to stop dead,
stalled in its own ruts or the marshes of the low ground.
Some kept their turrets in action, doing damage until
dawn when the Weapons Company’s 75 mm half tracks
entered the fray and quickly silenced any signs of life.

Fortunately, B Company’s ‘bazooka’ teams had been
put in the main line of resistance with the forward
platoons for that night. These teams, with one team
that came over from A Company, did outstanding work
and verified the ‘bazooka’ as a superior ‘tank buster.’
The 37mm section attached to B Company had posi-
tions on each side of the road that entered the center
of the company sector. In addition to the two guns,
this section had one light machine gun, two ‘bazookas,’
and two anti-tank grenade dischargers. The right gun
jammed but the squad held its position with the
‘bazooka’ and other weapons.

Both I and K Companies of the Third Batalion
f K Company had been attached to the 1st Battalion,
6th] had been alerted and by 0400 Captain Bruce
Coburn had been ordered to take his K Company for-
ward and pass through II Company in order that the
latter might reorganize. K Company eventually came
into position between B Company and F Company,
Second Marines, under Captain W. Morris, whose left
units were also involved in hitting several tanks. There
they took part in the last stages of the battle. Men from
K Company hit and helped destroy at least seven tanks.
By 0600 they were actually able to effect the relief
of B Company.

Regiment had alerted the Special Weapons Com-
pany’s half tracks at the first warning and by 0415
they were underway from their position near the
regimental CP. They had rough, slow going over soft
ground and several lines of irrigation ditches. As
dawn broke and the tanks that were not already burn-
ing were disclosed, the 75mm guns made short work of
them.

By 0700 the field was quiet except for the small arms
tire of a few Nip snipers and the answers of the Marines
who mopped them up. . . . The last .Tap tank was spotted
as it climbed the winding road to Hill 790. Its turret
could be seen among a small group of buildings on top
of the hill. The Naval Gunfire officer quickly adjusted
and fired twenty salvos on this target. The tank sent
up an oily smoke and burned the rest of the day.39

As already indicated, the Japanese attack
principally struck Company B, 1st Battalion,
6th Marines, and the left flank platoon (1st,
under Lieutenant Raymond Marion) of Com-
pany F, 2d Marines. One of the machine guns

39 Saipan Tank Battle.

of the latter company fired 40 belts of .30-
caliber ammunition (10,000 rounds) during the
melee. Also contributing much to the eventual
success were two 37mm guns and ‘bazookas’ of
the 2d Marines’ Regimental Weapons Com-
pany. In regard to their work, Major Warren
Morris, commanding Company F, writes:

1 have nothing but the highest praise for the two
37 crews. They went so far as to turn their guns
around and fire, practically point blank, at tanks that
broke through the lines.40

In numerous instances the tires of many
weapons converged upon a single enemy tank,
and more than one Marine, from more than one
unit, often claimed its destruction. Just how
many were knocked out by bazookamen and
how many by 37’s, 75mm half-tracks and tanks
cannot be accurately determined. The impor-
tant thing is that the means available were
adequate for the task. The Japanese effort
was a dismal failure; the enemy had lost a
great number of tanks — and these losses
were irreplaceable. Also, the attack had con-
vinced the Marines that they could stop a con-
centrated enemy tank attack with weapons
organic to the infantry battalion. While this
had been emphasized in training and was no
startling revelation, tangible proof in the form
of smoldering, shattered Japanese tanks had
considerable morale value.

The 2d Division command post and the bulk
of the division’s artillery were only about 500
yards in rear of this action, and an enemy
penetration would perhaps have been disas-
trous. The reader must not get the impression
that the Marines got off scot-free during this
critical attack; the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines
(reinforced), suffered 78 casualties and Com-
pany F, 2d Marines, 19 (principally in the left
flank platoon).41

On the night of 16-17 June, as on numerous
occasions throughout the operation, naval illu-
mination fires spelled the difference between
success for U. S. forces and defeat for the
enemy. In describing the reasons for the fail-

40Ltr from Maj W. Morris to author, 5Jan49, here-
inafter cited as Morris.

41 Ltr from LtCol W. K. .Tones (undated to DivPub
Info. Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 44, “Battalion on
Saipan,” Robert Sherrod. Morris.

ure of the counterattacks, Colonel Takuji
Suzuki, chief of staff of the 43d Division, com-
mented :

... as soon as the night attack units go forward, the
enemy points out targets by using the large star shells
which practically turn night into day. Thus the
maneuvering of units is extremely difficult.42

The supply of star shells was limited, how-
ever, and after the first night it was necessary
to ration their expenditure to six per hour ex-
cept in cases of emergency. Certain errors in
the employment of undeniably important night
illumination are worthy of note. First, instead
of conserving the ammunition for times of
urgent need, troops used it for periodic checks.
Second, there were instances of uncontrolled
illumination in which, during the course of the
night, ships wandered off the target and were
not corrected. And third, the failure to ob-
serve safety precautions caused needless cas-
ualties among our troops. The empty star shell
case weighs approximately 35 pounds and these
often fell within our own lines. The ominous
“whir” of these cylinders was nearly as terri-
fying as Japanese artillery.43

The shortage of star shells available at
Saipan was largely explained by the fact that
neither the Marines nor the fleet was accus-
tomed to using them in large quantities and,
accordingly, had not fully anticipated the re-
quirements.44

Although no record exists of the Japanese
sending a detailed report to higher echelons
of the abortive venture of 16—17 June, Colonel
Eisuke Suzuki,45 commanding the 135th In-
fantry Regiment, mentioned it in his field order
of 17 June:

1. The main strength of the Marianas force carried
out a night attack against the enemy that landed at
Oreai [Red and Green Beach area] during the night
of 16 June. Despite the heavy blow we dealt the enemy,

42 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 7.

43 NTLF, Naval Gunfire Officer’s Report, 8-10, here-
inafter cited as 'NTLF NGF Report.. FORAGER NGF
Report, 13-14.

44 mu.

4 Not to he confused with Colonel Takuji Suzuki,
the 43d Division chief of staff.

he is reinforcing his rear forces in the vicinity of
Oreai, although the process is not yet complete.40

Also sleepless on the night of 16—17 June
were men of the 10th Marines (and anyone else
located near them), who received mortar and
artillery counterbattery fire throughout the
night. This resulted in heavy personnel and
materiel casualties, particularly in the regi-
mental headquarters area and in the position
areas of the 2d and 4th Battalions. Since
Japanese observers had carefully charted the
location of Marine artillery throughout the
day, their fire data was unusually accurate.
With less than 24 hours ashore, Lieutenant
Colonel Jorgensen’s 4th Battalion had five of
its 105mm howitzers put out of action; the 2d
Battalion (now commanded by Major Ken-
neth C. Houston, who replaced the wounded
Lieutenant Colonel Shell) lost three of its 12'
75mm pack howitzers.47

In connection with the operations of artil-
lery units, it may be said that they faced and
mastered, during the first days at Saipan, one
of the most difficult problems posed by any
campaign in the Pacific war. Here was a con-
tradictory situation in which, on the one hand,
artillery was urgently needed ashore and yet,
on the other, one in which the shallowness of
the beachhead made the employment of artil-
lery a dangerous venture. Probably no one
would question the decisions which sent the
artillery into the midst of the “tooth-and-nail”
struggle, even in light of the savage pounding
endured and the losses suffered; support was
needed, even though it forced the artillery into
the center of a bull’s-eye.

At the close of the first two days, U. S.
forces had suffered about 3,500 casualties, or
approximately 20 percent of the total for the
operation.48

46 NTLF G-2 Report, 13.

i7 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 3. 10th Mar Re-
port, 3. Ltr from M/Sgt F. A. Hancock to author,
15Jan50. By exchanging parts, four of the 4th Bat-
talion's five damaged pieces were back in action by
afternoon of 17 June.

48 NTLF Report, 11.

united states medium tank, closely supported by infantry (right foreground), mops up survivors of Japanese
counterattack. Note destroyed enemy tank in foreground. Itidgeline in background was objective 0-2, seized
by the Gth Marines soon after this mop-up.

D-PLUS 2—17 JUNE

Through Susupe’s Marshes

I'lie 2d Marine Division had planned to at-
tack at 0730, 17 dune, with t lie 2d and 6th
Marines moving northeast to 0-2 and the 8th
Marines east to 0-1. At 0715, with troops
poised to launch their attack, an order came
from N I LF directing that t lie move he delayed
until 0030. General Watson recognized that
there was insufficient time for this modification
to he circulated to all front line units and the
division attacked as originally scheduled.

It is a tribute to the excellent training of the
6th Marines (plus the 2d Battalion. 2d Marines,
still attached) that an attack could be launched

on schedule, less than an hour after the coup
de grace had been administered the last Japa-
nese attackers. A 90-minute preparation, fired
by naval gunfire, air and artillery, preceded the
jump -off.

The 8th Marines’ advance was uneven. In
the zones of the 1st and 3d Battalions, the
advance to 0-1 was quite rapid; but, on the
right, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines (at-
tached to the 8th Marines), found the going
much more difficult owing to difficult terrain.
In the marshy land surrounding Lake Susupe,
men carrying machine guns, mortars and am-
munition found themselves sinking waist deep
into the muck. The swamp — extending 1,000
yards north and south of Lake Susupe, much

larger than it had appeared on the map- w as
infested with snipers.

East of the swamp, directly to the Marines’
front, was a hill (coincident with 0—1) con-
taining a series of enemy positions, South of
the hill, directly on the Marines’ right flank,
was a Japanese-infested coconut grove. From
both these areas, small-arms fire contested any
forward movement by the 1st Battalion. 29tli
Marines.

By mid-afternoon, no advance had been
made, and in addition, the battalion com-
mander, Lieutenant Colonel Tannyhill, had
been wounded. By about 1G00, a new com-
mander, Lieutenant Colonel Ratlivon M. Tomp-
kins (formerly assistant division operations
officer), arrived on the scene. Almost simul-
taneous with his arrival, Tompkins spotted
four Marine tanks (of Company A, 2d Tank
Battalion) moving along Laulau Ivoad toward
him. Immediately these were hailed, turned
about, and employed against the enemy on t lie
hill to the front. With this powerful base of
fire, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, regained
the offensive and pushed rapidly to the hill’s
crest. After a quick mop-up, the unit dug in
for the night. The tanks, which had so effec-
tively turned the tide, drove upon the hill also.
There, at point-blank range, they poured round
after round into a large enemy-occupied cave.
From the coconut grove to the south, mean-
while, Japanese fires continued. Each time the
1st Battalion, 29th Marines, fired its mortars
into the grove, a deluge of small-arms fire
answered back.

Though the coconut grove remained to be
seized the next day, an important objective had
been captured which made the beachhead more
secure. As insurance against Japanese night
recapture, the 8th Marines emplaced three
75mm half-tracks from t lie regimental weapons
company on the hill.

The 8th Regiment was in contact with the
6th Marines on the left, but physical contact
did not exist with 4th Division on the right. It
was necessary, therefore, to commit the 2d Bat-
talion, 8th Marines, to refuse the regiment’s
right.49 (See Map 11.)

*9 8th Mar Report, 2. 1st Battalion, 29tli Marines
Report, 2-3, hereinafter cited as 1st Bn, 29th Mar Re-

Colonel Riseley’s 6th Marines attacked at
0730 and made satisfactory progress against
light resistance. Since the direction of attack
was to the northeast and up into the foothills
of Mount Tipo Pale, the regiment’s lines
tended to become over-extended as contact with
the 8th Marines became progressively more
difficult. Upon reaching 0—2, the unit held up
its attack; lines were reorganized and consol-
idated in anticipation of continuing the advance
when progress of the 8th Marines permitted.
All units of the regiment except the Regimental
Scout Sniper Platoon (reserve) had been com-
mitted to the line. To augment this meager
reserve, Company 3 of the 1st Battalion, 2d
Marines,50 was attached to the 6th Marines.51

Colonel Stuart’s 2d Marines advanced in a
column of battalions, regulating its rate on the
6tli Marines, to its right. By 1800, the 3d Bat-
talion, the leading unit, reached 0—2, coincident
at that point with the Force Beachhead Line
and but a thousand yards from Garapan’s out-
skirts. There, with the left flank anchored on
the beach and the right in contact with the 6th
Marines, the battalion dug in.52 (See Map 11.)

During the day’s operations, the 1st, 2d and
4th Battalions, 10th Marines, were in direct
support of the 6th, 8th and 2d Marines re-
spectively, and the 3d Battalion was in general
support.53

Lieutenant Colonel Marvin H. Floom’s 2d
155mm Howitzer Battalion commenced land-
ing at 1700 with orders to support the 4th
Marine Division. Thus detached from 2d Divi-

port. “1st Battalion, 29th Marines, at Saipan,” narra-
tive account by LtCol R. M. Tompkins, 2-4, herein-
after cited as Tompkins.

50 The 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, originally used a
numerical system of designating its companies at
Saipan. See Appendix V.

51 6th Mar Report, 5.

52 2d Mar Report, 2. The 2d Regiment was composed
of two battalions at this time: its own 3d Battalion
and I he 2d Battalion, 6th Marines. Its 2d Battalion was
still attached to the 6th Marines and the 1st Battalion
was still under 2d Division control. One company of
the 1st Battalion was returned to 2d Marines’ control
at 1620.

63 10th Mar Report, 3.

sion control, Floom’s battalion was assigned
position areas about 1500 yards south of Cha-
ran Kanoa. Prior to darkness, reconnaissance
was completed and communications were estab-
lished with the 14th Marines. Traffic conges-
tion at Beacli Blue 1 delayed into the night the
emplacement of the battalion’s howitzers, but
by shortly after daylight the next morning an
air observer was assigned the unit, registration
accomplished, and eight guns were ready to
tire. By noon, the battalion as a complete, 12-
gun unit was delivering concentrations on
enemy targets.54

54 2d 155mm Arty Bn, V Amphibious Corps Report, 2,
hereinafter cited as 2d 155mm Bn Report. Ltr from
CtCol M. II. Floom to CMC, 16Jan49, hereinafter
cited as Floom. Though personnel of this battalion had
been in combat previously, their 155mm howitzers had
not. Prior to March 1944, the unit had been the 3d
Battalion, 10th Marines (armed with 75mm pack
howitzers), and had participated in the Guadalcanal
and Tarawa operations. The unit’s designation was
changed to 2d 155mm Artillery Battalion, V Amphib-
ious Corps, in March 1944 when the old 75’s were ex-
changed for new 155mm Howitzers. Interview with
Maj 10. .1. Bowse, GJan49.

The Move to Aslito Airfield

In the 4th Marine Division’s zone, the 165th
Infantry Regiment, attached on the previous
night, moved through the 3d Battalion, 24th
Marines, and right flank elements of the 25th
Marines and attacked toward Aslito Airfield.
Upon passage of its lines, the 3d Battalion, 24th
Marines, reverted to division reserve. Colonel
Kelley, commanding the 165tli Infantry, re-
quested that the Marine battalion remain in
the area until his 3d Battalion had arrived.
General Schmidt concurred.55

Attacking with battalions abreast, 1st on the
right, 2d on the left, the 165th advanced from
800 to 1.200 yards on 17 June against relatively
light opposition. By 1400, the 2d Battalion had
moved to the southwest edge of Aslito Airfield,
while the 1st Battalion had become involved in
a fight for a dominating ridge line extending
from the airfield's southwest corner to the vicin-

35 !)tl\ Mar Dir Report. Section VI. 17. Report of
Action Saipan Island, 16-27 June, Col Gerard W.
Kelley, hereinafter cited as Kelley.

soldiers OF 16STH infantry move along south coast on 17 June. The following day the zone along the south coast
was assumed by the 105th Infantry. Tinian may he seen in background as destroyers patrol the stretch of
water between the two islands.

ity of Cape Obiam. Infantrymen of the 1st
Battalion (Major James H. Mahoney, USA)
inched slowly up the steep and open slope, so
that, by 1700, a toehold had been gained at the
crest. At this point, however, the Japanese
launched a counterattack and drove the soldiers
back off the hill. Reorganizing and reforming
the lines at the base of the ridge, the battalion
dug in for the night.

As previously noted, t lie 3d Battalion, 165th
Infantry (Major Dennis I). Claire, USA), had
not landed during t lie night of 16—17 dune
with the other two battalions. This unit came
ashore on the morning of 17 June, first ele-
ments arriving on the beach at 0805. By 0945
the entire battalion was ashore and placed in
regimental reserve. In the late afternoon, after
the 1st Battalion had been driven off the ridge,
the 3d Battalion was ordered to move to the
vicinity of the ridge and prepare to attack with
the other two battalions on the following
morning.56 (See Map 11.)

On 165th ’s left, the 25th Marines attacked
in a column of battalions, Lieutenant Colonel
Hudson’s 2d Battalion leading. This unit ad-
vanced approximately 1,500 yards, securing the
favorable, dominating terrain along the 0-2
line. A gap developed between the Marines and
the Army — caused by the Marines’ faster move-
ment—necessitating the employment of Com-
panies I and L. 25th Marines, to fill the gap.
Company I searched the building area just
north of the airfield and Company L patrolled
the airfield itself, thoroughly checking all in-
stallations and dismantling all serviceable
Japanese weapons. Lieutenant Maurice W.
Savage led his platoon from Company L to
contact the Army’s left unit, the 2d Battalion,
165th Infantry. There Savage informed Lieu-
tenant Colonel John F. McDonough, LTSA. the
battalion commander, that all installations in
the airfield area were clear of enemy and re-
quested that the unit move forward and seize
the airfield (and, incidentally, relieve the con-
tact problem). Savage’s recommendation, made
during the late afternoon, was not translated

56 165 Inf Report, 3. Infantry Journal, Sep4G,
“The 27th’s Battle For Saipan," Oapt E. ft. Love, here-
inafter cited as The 25 fit's Rattle /'or Saipan.

into action, however, and the 165th Infantry
remained on the high ground west of the field.

When it was apparent to the 25th 's com-
mander (Colonel Batchelder) that the Army
unit contemplated no further movement for the
day, the 3d Battalion was ordered to shift to
a position on the north side of the airfield,
facing south, denying and protecting the right
flank. Physical contact did not exist between
the 25th Marines and the 165th Infantry as
they dug in for the night. 57 (See Map 11.)

In regard to this situation, the 165th Infan-
try’s commander, Colonel Kelley, has written:

. . . it is probable that tbe 2d Battalion could have taken
the Air Field on the 17th. However, due to the diffi-
culty encountered by the 1st Battalion on their right
flank any advance would extend the 2d too far for good
defense, plus the fact that from their present positions
they had an excellent field of fire against any possible
enemy counterattack. I decided it wise to maintain
position . . . on the night of the 17th and to take the
Air Field in daylight. This also permitted the 2d Bat-
talion to support progress of the other two battalions
from the high ground on which the Air Field was
located.58

Left of the 4th Division center, the 24th
Marines fought over broken terrain towards
the second ridge line, designated 0-2. The 1st
Battalion, hampered by persistent antiaircraft
guns (muzzles depressed from their usual ver-
tical position) firing from positions east of
Aslito Airfield (probably on Nafutan Point),
moved rapidly toward its objective. About
noon, following a 15-minute artillery prepara-
tion fired by the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines,
the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, began the
ascent of the precipitous ridge line. By 1630,
Major Fricke, the commanding officer, reported
the battalion digging in on 0-2.

Lieutenant Colonel Rothwell’s 2d Battalion,
moving to the left of the 1st Battalion, was
destined for a difficult day. Starting off rap-
idly, though weathering fire from a 3-inch
dual-purpose gun in position 300 yards to the
left front, the battalion soon discovered that it
was not in contact with the 23d Marines, and,
therefore, delayed the attack until this detail
could be resolved.

57 25th Mar Report, 4. 3d Bn, 25th Mar Report, 5.

58 Kelley.

Additional discouragement in the form of
friendly rocket lire falling within the lines
slowed the advance and caused 20 casualties.

Despite these difficulties, however, the bat-
talion had reached the approaches to the 0-2
ridge line by late afternoon, when from the
cliff face a short 300 yards ahead came a vicious
hail of Japanese machine-gun, rifle, and knee
mortar59 fire. This fire, completely stopping-
forward movement, caused the battalion com-
mander to order a 400 yard withdrawal to dig-
in for the night. The new position had little to
commend it. Enemy fire continued almost as
before, and the ground, a hard shell of coral
rock, was very unsatisfactory for digging. Sev-
eral rounds of mortar fire (of uncertain origin
—but thought to be friendly) fell in the area,
making it even less desirable. To escape the
bad terrain and the lire, Kothwell ordered his
unit to pull back another 200 yards for the
night’s defense. With the 2d Battalion in its
withdrawn position and the 1st Battalion on
0-2, the 24th Marines dug in for the night.
(See Map 11.)

The 24th Marines’ executive officer, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Aust in It. Brunei li, who had been
with the 1st Battalion during the day, received
orders from the regimental commander to re-
main with the 1st Battalion for the night and
to coordinate defenses in that area. The fol-
lowing day the orders were expanded to the
extent that Brunelli would assume command
of the 1st Battalion, Major Fricke reverting
to battalion executive officer.00

The 23rd Marines, on the division left, made
but little progress during the day. The big,
partly bald hill southeast of Lake Susupe was

59 The knee mortar, in reality a grenade discharger,
is not actually fired from the knee as its small size and
curved base plate would suggest. But since U. S. sol-
diers and Marines habitually referred to it by that
name, knee mortar will he used throughout this narra-
tive.

G02fith Mar Report, 19. 1st Battalion, 24th Marines
Report, 1, hereinafter cited as 1st Bn, 2 4 Mar Report.
2d Battalion, 24th Marines Report, 2, hereinafter cited
as 2d Bn, 2 Mar Report. Ltr. from Col A. R. Brunelli
to CMC, 12Jan50, hereinafter cited as Brunelli. In-
terview with Maj .1. F. Ross, .Tr., 28Mar50, hereinafter
cited as Ross.

occupied in considerable strength by the enemy
and fire from there played havoc with the regi-
ment’s left flank as it tried to negotiate the
swampy ground southeast of the lake. Just
how many Japanese were on the hill is not
known. There were enough, however, to stop
the forward movement of Haas’ 1st Battalion.
Existing records make no mention of this par-
ticular force, but it is assumed to have been
elements of Colonel Oka’s 47th Mixed Brigade.

The 23d Marines had no contact with the 2d
Marine Division, owing to the latter's pre-
viously described difficulties north of the lake.
The 23d’s right unit, the 2d Battalion, made
substantial gains while the 1st Battalion could
make virtually none, and a gap between the
two was created. Into this went the reserve
battalion (the 3d), with orders to tie in the
flanks. Later, Vandegrift’s 3d Battalion, 24th
Marines (passed through by the lGStli In-
fantry earlier in the day), arrived as an attach-
ment to the 23d Marines. Under cover of
darkness, Vandegrift’s unit moved into posi-
tion to relieve the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines.61

As the 4th Division dug in for the night, its
center rested on the dominating terrain along
0-2, but both flanks bent back somewhat. (See
Map 11.)

More Corps Troops Ashore

As the beachhead expanded, more Corps ele-
ments landed. At 1350, 17 June, General
Holland Smith debarked from the USS Rocky
Mount and proceeded ashore; the Northern
Troops and Landing Force (NTLF) command
post opened in Charan Karioa at 1530.62

The site was a good one, affording reasonable
protection from the torrential downpours and
sufficient room for posting maps and charts.
Holland Smith has written of his Charan
Ivanoa command post :

. . . This village was laid out in rectangular blocks
with small, bungalow-type houses built of plaster,
wooden slats and concrete, with roofs of corrugated
iron. Except for the broken windows, some of these
houses were habitable. In backyard quadrangles stood
large concrete cisterns for catching rainwater, fed by
pipes from the roofs. Each house had its air raid

C1 23d Mar Report, 36-37.

62 NTLF Report, 12.

looking east from mt. fina susu. High ground 2,000 yards to the front is objective 0-2. Picture shows zone of 23d
Marines on 17 June.

shelter.63

Although this area was subjected to occa-
sional ineffective Japanese bombing, enemy
artillery never directly shelled the command
post itself. This was peculiar; though on more
than one occasion the installation was brack-
eted with overs and shorts, final adjustment
onto the bull’s-eye was never accomplished.
The command post remained at this sanctuary
throughout the entire operation.

Brigadier General Harper and bis advance
parties from Corps Artillery reconnoitered for
positions and established his command post in
an unfinished Japanese concrete blockhouse
about 200 yards inland from Beach Yellow 2,
Shortly after dawn, advance parties from 1 Be
532d Field Artillery Batallion joined General
Harper and parties that had landed the pre-
vious night. Late in the afternoon, a dispatch
was sent to NTLF with a request to commence

63 Coral and Brass, 183.

landing the Corps Artillery as soon as prac-
ticable. No firing elements of the XXIY
Corps Artillery were landed on the 17th, but
on the following day the unit’s howitzers and
personnel began arriving ashore in a steady
flow.64

Following the 3d Battalion, 165th Infantry,
ashore on the morning of 17 June was the 105th
Infantry (Colonel Leonard A. Bishop, USA)
and Major General Ralph C. Smith with 27th
Division headquarters. Once ashore, General
Ralph Smith took command of 27th Division
units, with the exception of the 165th Infantry
which remained under 4th Marine Division
control. By dusk, all three battalions of the
105th were ashore but very little of the regi-
mental headquarters personnel and communi-
cation equipment. Colonel Bishop’s regiment
thus operated under a distinct handicap inas-
much as the C av oilier , the ship in which the

04 Corps Arty, 8-3 Report, 5-6.

CHARAN KANOA airstrip (looking north) was captured on D-Day. Laid out perpendicular to the prevailing east-
west wind, it was unsatisfactory for anything hut light observation planes. LVT at left has lowered ramp to
unload supplies.

absent equipment and personnel were embarked,
was not completely unloaded until nearly a
week later.65

Though official records do not indicate
whether this unfortunate situation resulted
from poor execution or from poor planning,
Admiral Hill, who assumed command of ships
at Saipan after Admiral Turner’s departure
on the late afternoon of 17 June, significantly
comments :

Embarked with me on the Cumbria were members of
the Corps G— 4, who had loading plans for all ships.
Each day they told me what ships they wanted at the
anchorage for unloading. . . . The Navy was merely the
operating agency for bringing into port any ship which
the Corps said they wanted.

Elsewhere, the Admiral sheds further light:

I do not remember the exact cause of the mixup in
the Cara Her. Cargo unloaded on the day of her arrival
was dictated by the responsible authorities of the 27th
Division. ... I remember that when they complained
that this equipment was not ashore, no one was able to
find out where it was so that we could call in the neces-
sary ship and unload it for them. . . .0G

After the 105th Infantry had landed, NTLF
ordered Colonel Bishop to designate one bat-

05 Letup, 10-11. u. c. Smith. 105th Infantry Regiment
Report, 4—5, hereinafter cited as 105tli Inf Report.

66 Hill.

talion as a separate reserve. This unit would
assume positions behind the 4tli Marine Divi-
sion so as to provide greater depth in case a
st l ong counterattack developed there. Bishop
selected the 2d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel
Leslie Jensen. USA) for this mission.

The 864th Antiaircraft Artillery Group,
commanded by Colonel Kenneth M. Barager,
USA, was ordered to commence unloading but
experienced extreme difficulty in getting across
the reef, and another day passed before it was
completely unloaded.67

While it is doubtful that individuals lying in
front line foxholes had felt the change, it is
safe to say that thei'e was a great improvement
in our situation on the evening of 17 June.
True, the bulk of supporting ships and planes
had departed to counter the Japanese Fleet
movements, but that was more than balanced
by the numbers of troops and the amount of
equipment now ashore. The Japanese had lost
their best opportunity to throw us back into
the sea. As the NTLF Periodic Report for 17
June comments: “This period showed the first
signs of weakening enemy resistance.” 68

Until now, the enemy’s retreat had been

67 A JTLF (7-3 Report. Periodic Reports 3 and 4.

08 Ibid., No. 3, 2.

OY observation plane readies for the take-off on Charan Kanoa airstrip. The first of these planes landed on this
strip on the evening of 17 June and thereafter performed invaluable reconnaissance and fire direction assistance.

orderly and had followed a definite pattern.
They had carried away their dead and
wounded so that our troops were unable to see
how great was the damage of our fires. After
17 June, dead and wounded Japanese would
often be found where they were hit, indicating
a deterioration in their system of evacuation.
The divisions now held better ground, although
the summit of Mount Tapotehau still afforded
the Japanese complete observation of the
beachhead and continued to do so for several
days to come. On the beaches, shore parties
operated with efficiency, though still weather-
ing occasional shellings.

Just before dark, several carrier-embarked
observation planes (OY-l’s) landed ashore,

four at the recently repaired Charan Kanoa
strip and one on the road opposite Beach Yel-
low 1. From then on, these planes extensively
used the Charan Kanoa strip.09

Night of 17-18 June

Only the 2d Marine Division had noteworthy
action on the night of 17-18 June. Intermit-
tently throughout the rainy night, small groups
of Japanese (usually not more than one or two
squads) attempted to penetrate the lines, look-
ing for a weak point through which substantial
forces could be poured. At about midnight, an
attack was directed at the boundary between

fi9 .//th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 18. 2d Mar Re-
port, Section VI, 5.

the 6th and 8th Marines. In the latter’s zone,
15 or 20 Japanese overran two machine guns
of Company K, but the attack was repulsed
and the original line restored.70

The line of Lieutenant Colonel Nutting’s 2d
Battalion, 2d Marines, occupying the right of
the 6th Marines’ sector, was breached at about
the same time, and contact with the 1st Bat-
talion, 8th Marines, temporarily lost. Nutting
committed a portion of Company F (3d Pla-
toon and a machine-gun section) to fill the gap ;
the Japanese were expelled from the area, and
contact reestablished.

The diary of Misao Naito (rank and unit
unknown) mentions this activity as follows:
“Two squads, 15 men, went out for a night at-
tack below Regimental Headquarters at Oreai
equipped with antitank grenades.” The return
of these two squads — or the success or failure
which they experienced — is not indicated in the
diary.71 It should not be assumed from this
account that two squads represented the total
night attack force, but rather that the Japa-
nese were following a faulty technique (of
which they were often guilty) of sending a few
troops from one unit and a few from another,
without any attempt to preserve tactical unity
or to achieve coordination.

Having landed from the sea, the Marines
were well aware that the enemy could do like-
wise, using the same beaches. A night thrust
against the landing force rear, if successful,
could create untold confusion among logistical
and command installations and, if executed in
strength, could jeopardize the entire Saipan
venture. To protect against any such activity,
beach defense was coordinated between the
shore party, 2d Marines, and available am-
phibian vehicles.

The beach defense system almost got an early
test. At about 0430, 18 June, approximately 35
barges, apparently loaded with Japanese sol-
diers, were spotted oft’ Flores Point, north of
Garapan. The 4tli Battalion, 10th Marines,
opened on the vulnerable target, as did U. S.
vessels in the vicinity. The latter were in the

70 1st Bn, 8th Mar Report, 3.

77 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item *10.053.

best position and inflicted the most damage ;
13 barges were destroyed, the remainder turned
back. The threat was over.72

Japanese Air Strikes

Owing to Admiral Spruance’s order that
transports not required for immediate unload-
ing be withdrawn from the Saipan area, Head-
quarters, Expeditionary Troops (TF 56), was
removed from the area for several days.
Shortly after the convoy got underway on the
early evening of 17 June, it was subjected to an
attack by a “formation” 73 of enemy aircraft.
LST 84 was set afire by a Japanese bomb; but,
after raging furiously for a time, the blaze was
brought under control and extinguished. The
damage was not vital, and the ship remained
operative. Gunfire from ships of the Northern
Attack Force shot down three of the attacker’s
dive bombers.

At about the same time (1800-1830), Carrier
Support Group One (TG 52.14), operating to
the west of Saipan, was attacked by another
enemy formation. A 250-pound bomb, which
hit the escort carrier Fanxhaiv Bay on the after
elevator, put her out of action for the remain-
der of the Marianas operation. The ship re-
tired to Eniwetok for repairs. Because of the
lateness of the attack, interceptor planes had
to land on the carriers after dark, with re-
sultant- operational losses of 19 planes. U. S.
fighters claimed they shot down eight Japanese
planes and ships’ gunfire accounted for “sev-
eral” more.

Carrier Support Group Two (TG 52.11) was
next to receive an attack. Here, however,
enemy planes failed to achieve a single hit and
suffered losses in the process. Ships’ gunfire
accounted for five planes, while U. S. fighters
destroyed “considerable.”

For Fire Support Unit 52.17.6 (part of Fire
Support Group One), ploughing through
waters 12 miles west of Saipan, the air alarm
sounded at 1900. The subsequent Japanese at-

72 NTLF G-2 Report, 14. TF 56 G-2 Report, 14.

73 In some instances it was impossible to make an
accurate count of participating enemy aircraft. On
these occasions, reports mention “several,” “consider-
able.” or a “formation,” instead of a definite total.

100

Afetna Point

Indicates Progress of 15 June

PROGRESS LINES 16 and 17
JUNE 1944

■

tack, however, resulted in no hits by either side.
A busy evening came to an end.74

Enemy air attacks were as consistently in-
effective as they were annoyingly frequent.

In a recurrence of what happened to the
California and Braine on II June and to the
Tennessee on the 15th, the destroyers Philip
and Phelps were fired upon at 0544, 18 June,
by shore batteries on Saipan, one located just
north of Garapan and the other southeast of
that town. The Philip was not hit, but the
Phelps was struck by two 8-incli shells, one ex-
ploding in the wardroom with extensive but not
serious damage, the other in Number 8 fire-
room, putting Number 3 boiler out of commis-
sion and causing minor damage to steam lines
and Number 4 boiler. The two destroyers de-
livered counterbattery fire and silenced the
enemy guns.75

It is doubtful that the message of inspira-
tion received that night from the Chief of Staff
(Hideki Tojo) in Japan was accorded com-
plete circulation to the hard-pressed front line
defenders of Saipan :

Because the fate of the Japanese Empire depends on
the result of your operation, inspire the spirit of the
officers and men and to the very end continue to destroy
the enemy gallantly and persistently ; thus alleviate the
anxiety of our Emperor.

The reply from the chief of staff of the be-
leaguered 43d Division (Colonel Takuji Su-
zuki) showed that he, at least, had been in-
spired :

Have received your honorable Imperial words and
we are grateful for boundless magnanimity of Imperial
favor. By becoming the bulwark of the Pacific with
10,000 deaths we hope to requite the Imperial favor.76

D-PLUS 3—18 JUNE

The chief of staff of the 31st Japanese Army,
Major General Keiji Iketa, drafted a message
on the morning of 18 June to the commanding
general at Yap Island and the chief of staff in
Tokyo. In it he summarized the situation as
he saw it and, in the process, revealed how very
little he knew of what was taking place about

74 TF 51 Report, 6, Annex 1. and Enel I,. TF56 G-3
Report, Periodic Report No. 4.

75 TF 51 Report, Enel L, 2.

76 CINCPAO-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 8 and 30.

him. Not that the general was caught in the
bog of apathy, nor was lie too f lightened or
lazy to find out what was going on; it was
simply impossible for him to penetrate the
shroud of obscurity resulting from ruptured
communications in the vast area over which
the action was taking place. Moreover, even
the meager information that he did possess
proved in at least one instance (paragraph
four) to be false:

1. The Homare Unit 1 43d Division] Headquarters is
about 2,500 meters southeast of Oreai | Charan Kanoa],
The forces at its disposal are not over three companies.

2. The situation of the other units is completely un-
known.

3. The enemy is gradually advancing under cover
of fierce naval gunfire and bombing and strafing and
the southern half of this island is generally under the
subjugation of the enemy.

4. Homare Unit Headquarters underwent an enemy
attack this a.m. and the division CO died along with
his staff officers.

5. Army Field Headquarters is in the mountains 1,800
meters east of Garapan pier. The enemy in force is
advancing from the south of Garapan and is closing in
on the field headquarters.

In another dispatch later in the day, General
Iketa corrected his error in regard to the di-
vision commander’s death, reporting that Gen-
eral Saito was “all right,” but that his “staff
officers were wounded.” Also, in this second
message of 18 June, Iketa gave a more specific
disposition of Japanese forces:

The army is consolidating its battle lines and has
decided to prepare for a showdown fight. It Is concen-
trating the Homare Group in the area east of Tapot-
chau. The remaining units (two infantry battalions of
I35th Infantry, about one composite battalion, one
naval unit), are concentrating in the area east of
Garapan. This is the beginning of our showdown fight.

The high command in Tokyo received a tan-
gible clue of the hopelessness of the Japanese
situation at Saipan when General Iketa re-
ported that “the secret documents in custody
of the 31st Army Headquarters . . . were com-
pletely burned at 1830 of 18 June. . . .” 77

The NTLF Operation Order for 18 June
(D-plus 3) called for an attack by all three
divisions; the two Marine divisions at 1000 and
the Army at 1200 (to allow the 27th Division
time to move the 105th Infantry into position

77 Ibid., 8-9.

101

on the right flank along the south coast).78

Into the Coconut Grove

The 2d Marine Division’s lines advanced
very little on 18 June because the pivot to the
north had already begun; and, since the divi-
sion's left Avas the anchor of the pivot, its move-
ments had to be restricted to prevent overex-
tending lines. Colonel Wallace’s 8th Marines,
however, did attack on the right. The previous
day had found the regiment in possession of
the 0-1 ridge line but receiving heavy tire from
a coconut grove to the south.

Because of the proximity of 4th Division
troops to this grove, it Avas necessary that sup-
porting fires be delivered Avith a great deal of
caution and finesse, lest errant shells claim Ma-
rine casualties. Well equal to this exacting
task Avere the industrious 75mm pack hoAvitzers
of the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines. FolloAving
a diligent 15-minute preparation, Major Cham-
berlin’s 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, attacked
and carried the grove. As this move pro-
gressed, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, kept
pace by SAvinging its right flank abreast of
Chamberlin’s unit.

Here, for the first time, large numbers of
dead Japanese Avere found (although no actual
count Avas made), giving further indication
that the enemy system of evacuation Avas de-
teriorating. With the advance to the coconut
grove, contact Avith the 4th Division was es-
tablished. As will be seen, hoAvever, 4th Divi-
sion elements pulled back at dusk and a lateral
gap Avas again created. This Avas not serious,
hoAvever, inasmuch as Lake Susupe Avas Avithin
a stone’s throw of the 2d Battalion, 8th Ma-
rines’ right flank. The other tAvo regiments of
the 2d Division did not advance their lines but
patrolled areas to their front in preparation
for later moAres.79

Drive to the East

The 4th Marine Division attacked toward the
east coast Avith three regiments abreast : 25th
Marines on the right, 24th Marines in the
center, and 23d Marines on the left. The 3d

78 NTLF Operation Order 6-44.

79 2d Mar Dir Report, Section VI. 5. 8th 1 far Re-
port, 3.

Battalion, 24th Marines, remained attached to
the 23d Regiment.

Good progress was made by the 24th and
25th Marines, although the former sustained
an attack at 1015 by tAvo Japanese tanks which
surged to Avitliin 350 yards of the front lines.
The situation for aAvliile Avas alarming: U. S.
tanks had departed for rear areas to refuel and
re-arm so that only bazookas Avere immediately
available for antitank defense. Though the
24th Marines’ Weapons Company Avas immedi-
ately alerted, it arrived too late to participate
in the fight. The enemy tanks Avere finally
chased by bazookas and artillery, but not be-
fore they had sprayed the area (causing 15
casualties) with machine-gun and small cannon
fire.

A portion of the 0-3 line (see Map 13) was
reached by the 24th and 25th Marines during
the day, placing the latter along the coast of
Ma gicienne Bay. This healthy gain severed
the island's southern portion, including Kafu-
tan Point, from the remainder of the island.
The XTLF Staff expected no serious trouble
from the foe in the isolated southern area.

To maintain the momentum of the attack
and avoid the long delay of a mopping-up
process, the 24th Marines by-passed the south-
ern extremity of a heavily defended cliff line
running north and south through its zone of
action. IIoAvever, since the direction of attack
for the division would soon SAving north
through the by-passed area, it was necessary
to secure the cliff line. This mission Avas as-
signed to the division reserve, 1st Battalion,
25th Marines.

This, the unit’s first experience with cleaning-
cave positions, proved a sIoav, unpleasant and
dangerous task. There Avas no simple method
of cleaning caves. It Avas a matter of Avorking
into a position from Avhich a demolition charge
or flame throAver could either destroy the caA7es’
inhabitants or trap them inside by sealing the
entrances. Getting to such a position usually
demanded “mountain goat” tactics. Rather
than a coordinated move, the task took the
form of a series of small, separated actions,
each employing groups of four or fhre men.
The unpleasantness of crawding oATer rough,

102

plowed field, devoid of cover and concealment, was in striking contrast to rugged terrain in many other parts of
the island. Here men of the 4th Division are utilizing armored LVT’s in assault gun fashion. Although lightly
armored, these vehicles were effectively employed during the first days of the battle in missions normally as-
signed to tanks.

jagged rocks plus the peril of receiving a burst
of enemy tire at point-blank range, totalled
“cave-cleaning.” 80

Preliminary operations and reorganization
were necessary in t lie 23d Marines’ zone of ac-
tion prior to the 1000 attack. At 0730, the 3d
Battalion, 24th Marines (attached to the 23d),
relieved Haas’ 1st Battalion on the division’s
left wing and commenced the move on 0-2,
which would serve as the line of departure. As
will be seen, however, events of the day pre-
vented the regiment from reaching this line.
Organizational readjustments within the 23d
Marines included the attachment of the 3d Bat-
talion’s rifle companies and 81mm mortar pla-

80 4th Mar Div Report, Section VI. 18-10. 25th Mar
Report, 5. Ur from r.tCol It. Itothwell to CMC, 14Jan50,
hereinafter cited as Rothwell. Roux.

toon to Dillon’s 2d Battalion and forriiation of
a composite battalion from the 1st Battalion
and the 3d Battalion Headquarters (under the
command of the 3d Battalion commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Cosgrove). The latter unit
would support the attack of the other two bat-
talions from positions on Mt. Fina Susu.

Machine-gun fire stopped the 23d Marines’
left elements after an advance of 200 to 250
yards. Most of this fire came from a clump of
trees to their front, but a definite location of
enemy weapons was impossible. Frequent bar-
rages of Japanese mortar fire hampered efforts
to spot the enemy, and the attack faltered. At
this juncture, Cosgrove’s composite battalion
was committed on the left of the 3d Battalion.
24th Marines, in an attempt to retain the im-
petus, and the attack again moved forward.

103

But the advance was slow. By IT 15, the 23d
Marines had moved to a line about 400 yards
short of 0-2.

Prior to darkness, 23d Marines’ patrols were
dispatched to the east. On the right, these
patrols reached 0-2, but on the left machine-
gun fire denied movement as far as 0-2. Colo-
nel Jones, the 23d Marines’ commander, re-
quested permission from General Schmidt to
withdraw to more favorable ground for the
night. General Schmidt approved, and the 23d
pulled back to a position about 400 yards east
of Lake Susupe, breaking contact with the 2d
Division.81

During the afternoon a report from the 23d
Marines reached the 4th Division Headquarters,
then Corps, that t lie enemy was using gas. The
alarm was sounded. Gas; the possibility that
the Japanese woidd at some time resort to this
dread weapon had lurked in the background
of every operation. But. as quickly as it began,
the flurry subsided. An investigation by the
23d Ma lines, immediately instituted, revealed
that a half-track, operating in the 2d Battalion
zone, had fired into a cave which housed a
picric acid plant. A rolling yellow cloud, con-
taining pungent fumes, emitted from the cave
aperture, causing two casualties (from extreme
nausea) and much excitement.82

This episode illustrated a long-recognized
fact : gas masks were the most useless things in
the world, until (and here was the big “until”)
there was a gas attack or threat of gas attack,
at which point they became the most valued of
all items of equipment. The scramble for
masks that followed the gas alarm gave con-
vincing proof, if any were needed, that gas was
indeed a frightening weapon. It appeared to
many officers and men that the moment of retri-
bution was near for all the bad care they had
given their masks. And, for at least a short
time after this scare, the masks were faithfully
carried and cared for.

This gas scare temporarily relieved one in-

81 Mar Mr Report, Section VI, 18-19. 23d Mar
Report, 37-38.

82 Ibid. Marine Corps Gazette, “Observations on
Saipan,” Jan45, LtCol I!. A. Hochmuth. Interview with
TitCol Hochmuth, 4.Tan49. L. R. Jones.

dividual of either his inhibitions or his eye-
sight : General Schmidt, 4th Division com-
mander, reports that, without pausing for any
formalities, “a young lieutenant came rushing
into my dugout and asked me if I had a spare
gas mask.” 83

Seizure of AsSito Airfield

For the attack of 18 .June, the commanding
officer of the 165th Infantry was somewhat con-
fused as to his regiment’s status. Was it still
under 4th Division control ? Or had it reverted
to the 27th Division? Of this situation the
165th's commander, Colonel Kelley, has
written :

I was unable to determine (by telephone conversa-
tion with Hq 4th Marine Division) whether I was still
attached to the 4th Marine Division or had passed to
the Command of CG 27th Div. I had my S-3 call D-3
4th Marine 1 livision to inform that office of the progress
of t lie attack and what I planned to do. This in view
of the absence of formal orders from 4th Marine Divi-
sion Headquarters. As I remember the report of my
S-3, the D-3 (or assistant) had stated that I was to
do as I had been ordered (in connection with my pro-
posed action). He later tempered his remarks when
advised that I had received no orders and indicated
that we might be under the direction of CG 27th Divi-
sion. Shortly after this Major General Ralph Smith
visited my CP and advised me that I should receive
notice of my release from the Marines and revertion
[sic] to the 27th Division. I did receive notice from the
27th Division but never received such orders from 4th
Marine Division Headquarters.84

Attacking ahead of schedule, the 165th In-
fantry captured Aslito Airfield without opposi-
tion at about 1000. 85 The field, found in rela-
tively good condition, contained the largest
cache of airplane parts and damaged airplanes
captured from the Japanese up to this time.
Also discovered and put to good use : an oxygen
plant, a power plant, a million-gallon reservoir,
and a number of shelters and warehouses with
steel reinforced concrete walls. The runway
had a four degree incline, compared with a

83 Ltr from Gen H. Schmidt to CMC, 8Jan50.

84 Kelley.

85 The 27th Division renamed Aslito Airfield Gar-
diner Conroy Field. Later, NTLF changed the name to
Isely Airfield, in honor of Commander Robert H. Isely,
a naval aviator, who lost his life while attacking the
field prior to its capture.

104

grade limit for United States fields of half a
degree. The field became operational for light-
ers on 22 June, for Liberator bombers on 9 Au-
gust, and for B-29's on 15 October.86

Apparently, Japanese troops had moved out
in such haste that no demolition or destruction
was accomplished. The outer defenses were in
excellent condition, and a safe containing some
confidential documents was found.

The Seabees (personnel of the 18th and 121st
Naval Construction Battalions) soon arrived
at the airfield and commenced repairing it for
our owm use. They were joined on 2 July by the
first of five aviation engineer battalions of the
VII Air Service Command.

Southeast of the field the ridge that had
troubled the 1st Battalion, 165th Infantry, on
the previous afternoon was regained without
special difficulty. At this point the formation
was altered. This came as a result of an order
from General Ralph Smith, narrowing the

86 The 11/’ Against -Japan, 189-191.

165th Infantry's broad zone and inserting the
105th Infantry into the right of the division’s
front. With its zone compressed, the 165th In
fantry adopted a formation of 1st and 2d Bat
talions abreast, 1st on the left, 3d in reserve,
lor the push to the east coast.

The 105th Infantry, meanwhile, had moved
in on the 165th’s right and launched its attack
along the south coast. Available to this regi-
ment were but twTo of its battalions, since the
2d was still under NTLF control. Progress
wTas slow; the right battalion (3d, Lieutenant
Colonel Edward T. Bradt, USA) found the
coast line pitted with caves, all of which had
to be investigated. As noted earlier, cave-clean-
ing is a tedious process, requiring deliberate,
painstaking effort. The left battalion (1st,
Lieutenant Colonel William J. O'Brien, USA )
found itself confronted with vast canefields.
In these, the intense heat retarded the rate of
advance. Because of the 105th Infantry’s slow -
ness, the 165th could not reach the east coast
without severing contact with its sister regi-

165TH infantry moving across the flat near Aslito Airfield on the morning of 18 June.

889590°- -50— 8

105

ment.87 (See Map 13 for 18 June front lines.)

At about noon of 18 June, General Holland
Smith and his chief of staff, General Erskine,
arrived for a visit at the 27th Division com-
mand post, then located about 1,000 yards in-
land from Yellow Beach. According to Major
General Ralph Smith, ‘‘both these Marine offi-
cers again expressed satisfaction over the prog-
ress of operations of the 27th Division and the
capture of the airfield.” 88

General Harper, Corps Artillery com-
mander, and his advance parties continued
their reconnaissance, being joined at dawn of
the 18th by reconnaissance details from the
145th Field Artillery Battalion. By late after-
noon the 225th Field Artillery Battalion, with
eight 155mm howitzers in position southeast of
Charan Ivanoa, began firing. Two Corps Ar-
tillery liaison planes also landed during the
day on Charan Ivanoa strip and were pressed

87 Lemp, 1 1. R. C. Smith, 3. 165th Inf Report, 3. 27th
Inf Div, G-3 Periodic Report 1800, 17 June to 1800, 18
June 1944.

88 R. ('. Smith. 4.

into the immediate task of locating targets.80

General Holland Smith, concerned that cer-
tain supplies were running short, requested
from Admiral Turner that the ships which had
departed on the evening of the 17th he re-
turned for unloading.90 Rather than returning
all ships as requested, however, Turner held to
the original plan of returning only those ves-
sels needed for immediate unloading.

The evacuation picture improved greatly on
18 June with the arrival of the two hospital
ships iSolace and Bountiful. These ships took
aboard 1,099 casualties, which, together with
the gradual decrease of the casualty rate to 500
per day, helped relieve the overload on medical
facilities of the transports.91

Japanese Air Activity

During the afternoon, the enemy attempted
limited air interference over Saipan, and two
Japanese planes were shot down. One of the

89 Corps Arty S-3 Report, 6.

so TF 56 G-3 Report, Periodic Reports, 18-19 June.

91 COM IRC IT P-007, 5-19.

pianes from escort carriers, like the Kalinin Day, operated at Saipan on combat air patrol missions and in close
support of ground troops.

106

pilots, captured by the 2d Battalion, 105th In-
fantry, near Aslito Airfield, stated that he had
been one of the two remaining pilots on
Guam.92

Against our ships, Japanese aircraft had
been more active and somewhat more success-
ful. Early in the morning (0540) of 18 June,
“several” enemy aircraft attacked Task Unit
52.17.6, then steaming about 12 miles west of
Saipan anchorage. The raiders achieved no
hits, although the Maryland reported near
misses off her starboard quarter. Ships’ gun-
lire succeeded in downing one Japanese lighter.
In the afternoon, at 1650, three tankers of Task
Unit 16.7.1 were damaged in an attack by 10
enemy planes. The results of this attack were
entirely favorable to the Japanese, since none
of their planes were lost. Two of the damaged
oilers ( N enhanic and Saugatuck ) were able to
remain at Saipan while the third ( Saranac )
was more seriously hit, losing all power. After
temporary repairs the latter ship returned to
Eniwetok.

Carrier Support Unit Two (TU 52.11) was
attacked near Saipan by a “formation” of
Japanese aircraft. While achieving no hits, the
Japanese lost five fighters as a result of ships’
gunfire and aircraft from the carriers. The
real naval tragedy of the day occurred when
U. S. planes were forced to land on their car-
riers after dark. This difficult feat resulted in
the loss of 31 planes. Following these losses,
the CYE (escort carrier) Kalinin Bay was sent
to Eniwetok for replacements.93

The Japanese air attacks that struck Saipan
on 18 June were made by scattered remnants
of a large conglomerate force of 120-130 naval
planes which was to hit the landing beaches
and landing ships. To assemble this force, the
Japanese had been obliged to scrape the bottom
of the barrel in both planes and men. The
planes were of various types, ranging from
medium bombers to fighters; two-thirds of the
pilots were experienced, the remainder were
students. En route from Yokosuka to Saipan,
the force was intercepted by U. S. carrier air-

92 TF 56 0-2 Report, 14. NTLF 0-2 Report., 14.

93 7 /.’ .5/ Report, Enel L, 2 and Annex 1 to Enel A.

craft with the result that most of the enemy
force was knocked down.94

Night of 18-19 June

The night was relatively quiet. All divisions
reported only sporadic sniping and minor in-
filtrations.

Some of the optimism which had character-
ized previous Japanese reports was absent from
the operation order of Colonel Suzuki, com-
manding officer of the 135th Infantry Regi-
ment, issued on the night of 18 June:

1. Since Red landings there are . . . about 100 tanks
. . . north of tiie airfield [undoubtedly referring to our
tanks]. Our forces will reorganize their lines and pre-
pare for decisive battle.95

On Tinian, meanwhile, Japanese were at-
tempting to piece together the jigsaw puzzle of
vague details and to figure out what was occur-
ring under the smoke and noise on Saipan and
in the seas around them. Such radio messages
as had been received were obscure in meaning
and only served to heighten the curiosity.
Typical of the wonderment is an entry in the
diary of an unidentified noncommissioned of-
ficer stationed on Tinian : “18 June — At 0800,
Admiral Toyoda, CinC Combined Fleet, re-
ported ‘We have the enemy just where we want
him.’ Where is the fleet? The enemy continues
to land on Saipan.” 96

D-PLUS 4—19 JUNE

The Approach to Nafutan Point

The NTLF Operation Order for 19 June in-
structed the three divisions to “complete mis-
sions assigned” in the previous day’s order.
Successful execution of this would place the
landing force lines along Objective line 0-3
(See Map 13). 97

The 27th Infantry Division continued its at-
tack at 0730, 19 June, and in the zone of the
165th Infantry reached Magicienne Bay to the

94 USSBS No. 434, Interrogation of Captain Akira
Sasaki, I.TN, a member of the Yokosuka Air Corps
from March to July 1944.

95 NTLF G-2 Report, 15.

98 C I N CP AC-CI N CPO A Item #11,405.

97 NTLF Operation Order 7-44.

107

north of Nafutan Point.98 Contact existed with
the 4th Marine Division on the left. Slower
movement by the 105th Infantry along the
south coast caused a break between the flanks
of the two regiments, and it was necessary for
the 165th to patrol this interval.

In the southern part of the division zone the
advance led straight onto Nafutan Point.
Dominating the approaches to the point itself
is a sheer hill mass, the jagged western face of
which is almost as precipitous as a cliff. It was
against this formidable obstacle that the 1st
Battalion, 105th Infantry, made several un-
successful ventures. The terrain virtually de-
fied movement from the west. The 3d Bat-
talion, 105th, still investigating caves along the
south coast and urging cave occupants to sur-
render, lagged behind. Large numbers of
civilians were takes from the caves by this unit.
But by late afternoon, a gap had developed
between it and the 1st Battalion, and it was
necessary to commit the 1st Battalion, 165th
Infantry, in order to tie them in.99

The 4th Division Left Progresses

In the 4th Ma rine Division zone, only local
successes were achieved, but these all added up
(o an improvement of the situation and an
integration of forces for the continuation of
the attack. At 0700, a large assemblage of
Japanese troops and tanks, apparently forming
for a counterattack, was observed near Tsu-

9SIt is interesting to note that while 27th Division-
Marine controversies were agitated following the op-
eration, none were brewing on 19 June when Major
( leneral Ralph Smith, the 27th Division commander,
said in a radio recording at Aslito Airfield: “. . . this
is an appropriate point to emphasize the perfect team-
work that has existed between the Navy, Marines, and
the Army. It irritates me a little to read these stories
hack home because a soldier and a Marine get in a
light in a saloon that the relations between services are
at cross purposes. Nothing could be farther from the
truth out here in the field. ... I want to stress the very
cordial feeling that exists between the outfits. One of
the IGoth's officers remarked to me this morning that
Saipan has sealed the blood brotherhood between the
services." Recording made by Radio Recording Unit,
\ Amphibious Corps, Public Relations Section on 19
June 1944.

Lamp, 12. R. C. Smith, 4-5. 105th Inf Report, 5.
165th Inf Report, 4.

tsuuran. Immediately, all battalions of the 14th
Marines registered on this area and poured in
massed tires. The Japanese quickly dispersed,
and no more was seen of them.

The 24th and 25th Marines continued mop-
ping-up operations and readjustment of the
lines throughout the day. The 3d Battalion,
25th Marines, designated as division reserve,
moved to an assembly area in rear of the 23d
Marines as protection for the left flank.

The 23d Marines, with Vandegrift’s 3d Bat-
talion, 24th, still attached, attacked following
a preparation fired on 0-2 and the western
slopes of troublesome Hill 500 by the 1st Pro-
visional Bocket Detachment (4.5-inch rockets
mounted on trucks) and the 2d and 4th Bat-
talions, 14th Marines. As the attack progressed,
the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines — the cent ex-
battalion — was pinched out, Cosgrove’s com-
posite battalion and Dillon's 2d Battalion
(reinforced with the 3d Battalion’s rifle com-
panies) taking over the assigned regimental
frontage.

The day’s gains were considerable, a line 400
yards west of 0-3 being reached. Here again,
however, concern about the ai-ea between divi-
sions caused the 23d Marines to pull back about
400 yards where the terrain was more favorable
to the protection of the left flank. Patrol con-
tact was established with the 8th Marines (2d
Mari ne Division) on the left. Both regiments
exchanged patrols throughout the night. (See
Map 13.)

The 23cl Marines suffered a critical loss dur-
ing the day: Lieutenant Colonel Cosgrove, one
of the division’s ablest officers and leader of
the composite battalion, was wounded by an
enemy rifle bullet.100

Active Patrolling

Aggressive patrolling was the principal activ-
ity in the 2d Marine Division zone of action.
Patrols from the 2d Marines encountered three
Japanese tanks near the beach road to Garapan
and destroyed two of them. At noon the 2d
Begiment was strengthened by arrival of its
1st Battalion, which reverted from division

100 I/th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 20. 23d Mar Re-
port, 38.

108

reserve to parent control. Another shift took
one company (F) of the attached 2d Battalion,
6th Marines, from 2d Marines’ control and re-
turned it to its own regiment.101

Attachments and detachments of companies
and battalions had been demanded by the
normal confusion of the amphibious assault.
As units arrived at the beach, it. was often
necessary to feed them into the lines where they
were needed, rather than adhering rigidly to
principles of tactical unity. To well-trained
tactical units these shifts were accomplished
with very little difficulty; loyalty was extended
from subordinate to senior and from senior to
subordinate, regardless of the composition of
the command.

Patrols from the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,
discovered that a dominating hill (790) to the
front, strongly defended previously, was now
abandoned, and the battalion moved forward to
occupy it.102 Why the Japanese chose to evacu-
ate so powerful and thoroughly prepared a
position remains a mystery.

Patrols from the 8th Marines sought, in
addition to enemy information, routes of sup-
ply and evacuation for projected moves to the
north and northeast. The 8th Marines’ zone,
including the summit of Mt. Tapotcliau, pre-
sented logistical problems of great magnitude.
No roads ran through the area, and such trails
as existed were impossible of negotiation by
trucks. Along the right flank ran a valley,
ending abruptly in a deep gorge. To the front
there was no apparent break in the cl i ft's. To
the left was a tortuous nightmare of dead-end
gulleys and blind-alley ravines. There was no
single, simple solution to this problem.103

Artillery Situation

General Harper’s Corps Artillery had by
now assumed an important role in the tight.
Twenty-one of its 24 155mm howitzers and 11
of its 24 155mm guns were in position and
firing. Long-range destruction, night harass-
ing, and interdiction fires were begun in general

101 2d Mar Report, 3.

102 6th Mur Report, G.

103 8th Mar Report, 3.

support and reinforcement of the 10th and
14th Marines and, subsequently, of the "27th
Division Artillery. Observers in liaison planes
made possible registration deep in enemy ter-
ritory, to prevent movement and assembly of
troops during daylight hours, to place destruc-
tion fires on permanent enemy installations, to
seek and search for targets developed and re
ported by intelligence agencies, and to keep
units informed of the trace of front lines.104

Cooperation between artillery units at Sai-
pan left little to be desired throughout the
campaign. Instances of faulty coordination
later in the campaign were failures of organi-
zation and technique — not of cooperation. As
a case in point, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick
J. Karch, R— 3 of the 14th Marines, described
a series of conferences between General Harper
and operations officers of the three divisions'
artillery units. The purpose of these meetings
was to insure coordination and maximum etfec
five employment of artillery resources.

After looking over the tire plans presented by
the various operations officers, the general
would coordinate these, designate corps artil-
lery units that would reinforce the fires of the
divisions’ artillery, and explain how and why
it would be done. His manner instilled a feel-
ing of confidence and good will and left no
doubt that his only concern was to bring the
greatest amount of artillery fire where it would
be needed most,105

Unfortunately, these conferences were dis-
continued as the operation progressed; there
after, detailed coordination of field artillery
fires was lacking. Coordination of supporting
arms continued to be exercised at Northern
Troops and Landing Force command post.100

An artillery fire mission, delivered on 19
June under somewhat makeshift circumstances,
exhibited both cooperation and ingenuity. A
1st Battalion, 14th Marines, forward observer
noted a Japanese field artillery battery in posi-
tion near Magicienne Bay. Sitting in an aban-

104 Corps Arty S-3 Report, G-7.

105 In his book, Holland Smith is loud in praise of
General Harper. Coral and Brass, 167.

106 Karcli.

109

cloned Japanese observation post, using cap-
tured Japanese 15-power field glasses, the
observer communicated his tire mission to his
battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC) by
means of an SCR 300 Radio. It was necessary
to relay this request through another forward
observer’s radio, since the first set would not
reach the FDC. The 1st Battalion already had
a direct support assignment which precluded
its firing the task, so the mission was further
relayed to the regimental FDC by telephone.
As none of the 14th Marines’ organic battalions
were unemployed, the mission was sent by
radio to the XXIV Corps Artillery, whose
155mm howitzers fired the mission with very
good effect.107

Rear Installations

Idie ever-mounting number of captives de-
manded establishment, on 19 June, of a prisoner
of war stockade at the southern edge of Cha-
ran Kanoa. Seriously ill or wounded prisoners
of Avar were hospitalized under guard in a
nearby unit of the hospital maintained by the
Medical Battalion, A" Amphibious Corps. In-
terpreters on duty at the enclosure facilitated
the handling of prisoners, and use was made of
enemy noncommissioned officers to supervise
and control them. Japanese and Koreans Avere
kept in separate enclosure because of their
characteristic hate for one another. The Cha-
morros, Avhile technically, not prisoners of
Avar, required handling by ciAril affairs per-
sonnel and added to an already great problem.
Captured materiel fulfilled the greater part
of the requirements for food, clothing and
shelter.108

At Aslito Airfield, construction and repair
work continued. To provide some measure of
protection from raids by enemy aircraft, one
gun battery and one automatic Aveapons bat-
tery from the 864th Antiaircraft Artillery
Group Avere installed at the field during1 the
day.109

107 ./. /•’. Ryan, 10.

nw y7'/j/-’ (i— i Report, 9.

mn / /.' <1—3 Report , Periodic Reports. 19—20 June.

CHAMORRO being questioned by Spanish-speaking Marine.
Since the Chamorros were able to speak .Japanese in
addition to their native tongue, they were helpful in
relaying questions to Japanese prisoners and back to
United States Spanish-speaking interrogators. Chamor-
ros hated the Japanese soldiers.

Night of 19-20 June

The most vicious action of the night occurred
in the sector occupied by the 2d Battalion, 24th
Marines. Starting at about 0350 and lasting
until daylight, an enemy force of approx-
imately 75 attacked the Marines with grenades
and bayonets. In the close-in fighting that
ensued, 11 Marines Avere Avounded, but, in the
process, the enemy attack Avas broken. By day-
light, many of the attackers Avere spraAvled for-
Avard of the Marines’ foxholes, the rest had
taken to their heels.110

ElseAvhere there Avas little activity, though
the 6th Marines experienced a brief flurry when
15 Japanese attempted to infiltrate the lines.
In most sectors, it Avas almost a restful night.* 111

It is of interest to note that the Japanese
Avere still worried about a landing at Magi-
cienne Bay. At 1300 on 19 June, General Saito
issued an “order of fhe Southern Marianas
Force," Avhich said, in part, as follows:

110 Roth well.

111 3d Mar Dir Reports. Section VI, 7.

110

baby sitters were available at Saipan. Civilians were at first afraid of United States troops but grew to trust
them as time went on. Many civilians, saturated with Japanese propaganda to the effect that the Americans
would torture them, committed suicide rather than surrender.

2. The Division will hold the areas shown on this
map [Map 13] and together with reorganizing its units
will interrupt the plan of the enemy which has previ-
ously landed.

3. The 1 1 St 1 1 Infantry Regiment will hold the area
shown on the map and particularly it trill prerent the
enemy'* plan of landing on Magieienne Hay. [Author’s
italics.]

6. The main strength of the tank unit will assemble
in the area of their maintenance unit [believed to have
been Chacha Village], It will cooperate with the 11.8th
Regiment and together prevent the advance of the
enemy from the beach and prepare a counterattack
lilan against enemy landing in Magicicnne Hay area.
[Author’s italics.]

Why the possibility of a Magicienne Bay

landing should have so captured the Japanese
attention that they actually deployed their
forces in anticipation of it, is one of the un-
answered questions relative to the campaign.
It perhaps indicates that their intelligence
officer was over-emphasizing this one capabil-
ity, or, perhaps, General Saito had projected
himself into the attacker's position and was
countering a move which he would have
favored.112

By perusing the estimate of combat strength
made by General lketa, chief of start’. 31st

112 NTLF G-2 Report, Id.

Ill

Army, on 19 June, we may better appreciate
the effectiveness of the offensive to date:
Division — about 4% infantry battalions (3% already
destroyed) ; 1 battalion artillery (2 battalions already
destroyed ) .

Mixed Brigade — infantry unknown; no artillery (2
battalions already destroyed).

Other Infantry — about 1 composite battalion (2% bat-
talions destroyed).

Tanks — about 2 companies (3 companies destroyed).
Army Artillery (under Army command — none (2 bat-
talions destroyed).

Anti-Aircraft Artillery — about 1 battery (4 batteries
destroyed ) .

independent Engineers — none (3 companies destroyed).

113

Eager to notice any diminution in the vigor
of the U. S. effort, General Iketa wrote on the
evening of 19 June :

The enemy bombing and shelling is relatively scat-
tered compared to yesterday. . . . Targets were area
east of Aslito Airfield and gun positions east of Gara-
pan.

Enemy troops have apparently infiltrated into Aslito
Airport. ... It is planned to carry out a concentrated
shelling of the three places where the Navy has stored
250 800-kilogram bombs at the airfield.114

Though the airfield was subjected to Japanese
shelling from time to time, the cache of bombs
was never hit.

BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA

On 19 June, while conducting survey opera-
tions off Tanapag Harbor, a mine sweeper
(VMS 323) received direct hits from a 4.7-
inch battery on Mutcho Point. The ship was
holed in two places below the waterline and a
tire started forward near the magazine. For-
tunately, the Japanese projectiles were armor
piercing and did not explode. With the assist-
ance of salvage tubs, the tire and flooding were
brought under control.

“Several” Japanese aircraft attacked ship-
ping in Saipan anchorage at 1900 with negative
results on both sides; no U. S. ships hit, no
Japanese aircraft down.115

113 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 10. A later
report corrected this estimate in one respect : “Our
previous message that there is no more artillery is a
mistake. We have nine type 95 field pieces.” It should
also be noted that this estimate does not include navy
troops on the island.

114 Ibid., 11-12.

lir> TF 51 Report, Annex 1 to Enel A and Enel L, 2.

Farther at sea, meanwhile, Admiral Spru-
ance’s forces sought the Japanese Fleet (report
of whose movement toward Saipan on 15 June
had occasioned withdrawal of the bulk of the
shipping from nearby waters). In point of air
and surface striking power, the American
naval force was the strongest armada ever
assembled up to that time.116 On 19 June began
the engagement later called the Battle of the
Philippine Sea. (See Map 12.)

The action of the 19th consisted of a large-
scale, lengthy attack by enemy aircraft on
Spruance’s ships and two air battles over
Guam. The results of the day’s action were
extremely favorable to us: of 545 Japanese
planes seen by U. S. pilots, 402 were de-
stroyed.117 as against 2G American planes lost
and minor damage to five U. S. ships. This
massacre of enemy planes has frequently been
referred to as the “Saipan Turkey Shoot.” The
South Dakota was the only ship to receive a
direct hit (250 kg. bomb), while near misses
were scored on the Minneapolis , W asp and
Bunker IHU. One Japanese plane crashed
against the side of the Indiana at the water
line but caused only superficial damage. Fight-
ing efficiency was promptly restored to all
ships.

With decisive air attacks against Saipan un-
likely because of heavy carrier plane losses,
Spruance’s fleet headed to the westward at 23
knots, hoping to bring the Japanese fleet to
action. Operating in a related action, U. S.
submarines accounted for two 30,000-ton enemy
aircraft carriers.

June 19th had, indeed, been devastating to
the Japanese. The 402 planes, had they not
been destroyed, might have delivered telling

110 Task Force 58 had been reinforced with units
from TF 51 (Joint Expeditionary Force) to counter
the Japanese threat. On 19 June, the force contained
seven large carriers ( Hornet , Yorktown, Bunker Hill,
Wasp, Enterprise, Leicington and Essex), eight light
carriers (Bataan, Bell can Wood, Monterey, Cabot. San
Jacinto, Princeton, Cowpens and Langley), seven fast
battleships ( Alabama , South Dakota, Indiana, New
Jersey, Iowa, Washington and North Carolina ) , 21
cruisers and 67 destroyers.

117 Numbers of planes seen and destroyed probably
includes some duplication.

112

blows on U. S. shipping and granted a brief
reprieve to t lie faltering Japanese war machine.

Throughout most of the following day (tit)
June) the U. S. fleet sought the retreating
enemy. It was not until late afternoon, how-
ever, that search planes finally made contact
with enemy ships; and. by the time heavy
strikes (210 planes) were sent out, it was nearly
sunset. The Japanese force was so far to west-
ward that the attacks had to be made at extreme
range. Despite the heavy barrage of anti-
aircraft tire and interception by small groups
of fighters (totaling about 35 planes), the Japa-
nese Fleet was kept under continuous attack
from 1820 to 1900.

Precarious shortage of gasoline and the
coming of darkness cut the attacks short. On
the return our pilots had difficulty in locating
their carriers, and many landed in darkness.
The scene became a nightmare of feverish con-
fusion as carriers turned on searchlights, white
truck lights, and fired star shells in a desperate
effort to home their planes. This part of the
operation was to be slow and costly ; the battle
against darkness and distance was to claim
many more casualties than the enemy. Of the
216 planes that had taken off on the afternoon
strike, only 116 landed safely; of the 100 that
failed, 20 were shot down in combat or un-
accounted for, the remaining 80 lost in water
landings because of fuel shortages or in deck
crashes. Over 75 percent of those personnel in
the planes making water landings were picked
up in the dark by destroyers and cruisers. The
damage inflicted on the Japanese ships and
prevention of enemy interference of operations
at Saipan, however, made our losses a fair, if
tragic, price to pay in return. One enemy car-
rier and two tankers were sunk; four carriers,
a battleship, a large cruiser and a tanker were
severely damaged. In addition, 22 Japanese
planes were shot down.

Because of the disorganization of IT. S.
carrier task group screens and (he shortage of
fuel in the destroyers, pursuit of the enemy
fleet during the night could not be pressed, and
a speed of 16 knots was maintained as the ships
ploughed on to westward.

Following its crushing defeats on 19—20
June, the Japanese Fleet retreated full speed

toward Okinawa. I . S. search planes located
the enemy ships on the 21st, but planes sent out
to attack failed to gain contact. Admiral
Sprua lice’s primary mission precluded getting
out of range of the Marianas, and. by evening
of 21 June, he abandoned the chase. I he Batt le
of the Philippine Sea had broken Japanese
efforts to reinforce the Marianas; thereafter,
the capture went forward without serious out
side interference'.118 (See Map 12.)

The death blow had thus been dealt to Japa
nese carrier-based air power. In attempting
again to rebuild his carrier groups, the enemy
had to start from scratch. This handicap,
heightened by short fuel supply, was too great.
With their retirement from the Marianas, tin*
Japanese carriers virtually retired from the
war.119

The reaction of Japanese Corporal Tai
Suzuki, stationed on Guam, to the activities
which were exploding about him is indicated
in his diary entry of 19 June:

Heard that a powerful air unit took part in a battle
,out here. Today, I saw the much hoped for air battle.
Our planes shot down some enemy planes in a short
time. I heaved a sigh of relief. Since our planes had at-
tacked enemy ships, fuel was running low and ammuni-
tion was exhausted after eleven hours of continual
flight. Just before they landed, enemy planes attacked
them and they made forced landings. I wonder how
they felt. I hear that there tire a number of pilots wlm
are only 17 or 18! !! ... I heard that the enemy has 500
ships and 7,500 planes in the Central Pacific Area and
that the climax of this battle will come in about a week.
I am worried as no word has been received since the
landings were made on Saipan.120

D-PLUS 5—20 JUNE

TDe attack on 20 June was again a pivoting
movement to the north. The two Marine divi-
sions would attack toward Objective line 0-4.
and the 27th Division would “complete the
seizure of objective 0-3” (which included all of

ns Campaigns, 214-215. 5 th Fleet Initial Report.

8-13. JAN AG. The Nan/s Air War, 208-213. Kina.
110.

119 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey
(Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, The Air Effort
Against Japan, 50-51.

120 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #10,802.

113

Nafutan Point, the southernmost extremity).121

Surge to 0-4

In the 2d Division, the 2d and 6th Marines
confined their activities principally to patrol-
ling, since they were the hinges of the swinging-
gate movement. Combat-reconnaissance pa-
trols from Lieutenant Colonel Johnston’s fid
Battalion, 2d Marines, moved almost to the
southern outskirts of Garapan. In the foothills,
a short distance southeast of the town, the
Marines found an abandoned Japanese tank in
operating condition with full fuel tanks. They
destroyed the machine with demolitions and
returned to their lines.122

Patrols sent out by the 6th Marines dis-
covered no defensive positions of consequence
within 500 yards to the front. Orders to main-
tain contact with the 8th Marines, however,
precluded any forward movement of the regi-
ment's lines.123

The 8th Marines, meanwhile, continued the
attack, making its main (and only) effort
on the right, in the 2d Battalion zone. This
battalion, after 4th Marine Division units came
abreast, was required to swing northward along
the front of the 0-1 ridge line. An unusual
feature of this action was that other battalions
of the 8th Marines, from their positions on top
of the ridge line, could watch the entire attack
of the 2d Battalion (like a military school
demonstration) as it passed below them.

Progress was rapid; by lfiOO, the 2d Bat-
talion had pushed the 8tli Marines’ front to
objective 0-4, having met virtually no resist-
ance. This advance and swinging movement
so reduced the regiment’s frontage that it was
possible to withdraw two of its four battalions
from the lines. As the regiment dug in for the
night, the 1st and 2d Battalions were along the
front, while the fid Battalion and the 1st Bat-
talion, 2fith Marines, were in reserve.124

121 XTLF Operation Order 8—44.

2d War Report, 3.

2d Mur Dir Report, Section VI. 5-6. tlth Mnr Re-
port, 0.

124 8 tit Mur Report, 3.

The Capture of Hill 500

The 4th Marine Division, on the right of the
swinging gate, completed its change of direc-
tion and achieved long gains. General Holland
Smith had ordered the 27th Division to extend
its front and take over the 25th Marines’ zone
along the coast of Magicienne Bay. Since the
25th Marines’ combat efficiency was considered
less impaired than the 23d Marines’ however,
General Schmidt immediately ordered it to
assume the 23d’s frontage on the division left
and continue the attack.

The original jumping-off hour had been
0900, but a delay was necessitated in order that
the 25th might move the entire width of the
division’s front to its newly assigned zone. At
1030, the attack was launched, 25th Marines on
the left, 24th on right, and 23d in reserve.

The zone of the 25th Marines, formerly
assigned to the 23d Marines, was sufficiently
narrow to permit it to attack in a column of
battalions, with Lieutenant Colonel Chambers’
3d Battalion leading. The day’s objective was
an important one: Ilill 500. This dominating
feature had provided the Japanese with excel-
lent observation-post sites, caves for com-
mand posts, as well as a natural defensive posi-
tion. Colonel Oka, commander of the 47th
Mixed Brigade, had at one time used the hill
for bis command post, although he had decided
prior to 20 June that other localities (farther
to the rear) were more suitable to his needs.

Colonel Chambers’ plan for the attack of
Hill 500 was conventional in most respects.
The formation was two companies forward (I
and L) and one in reserve (K). Preparatory
fires were to be furnished by rockets (1st
Provisional Rocket Detachment), artillery (1st
and fid Battalions, 14th Marines), 37mm guns
(from the 25th Marines’ Regimental Weapons
Company) and the fid Battalion’s own 81mm
mortars. The one unusual feature of the at-
tack plan was that the movement over the flat,
open terrain just south of Hill 500 was to be
screened by smoke. All too often at Saipan
(as elsewhere throughout the Pacific War), this
valuable weapon was neglected.

Because smoke would complicate the 3d Bat-
talion’s problems of control, coordination and

114

PALAU IS )

•fr^NANSEI SHOTO

BONIN

■» IWO JIMA

VOLCANO IS

OKINAWA JIMA

CORREGIDOR

PANAY

MARIANAS IS

®@©Oy SAIPAN
' TINIAN

U A M

TRACK CHART OF OPPOSING FORCES
BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA

O 60 120 ISO

NAUTICAL MILES

MAP 12

GUAM

SCHEDULE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS — BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA

EVENT

TIME

0900,

J13

JAPANESE ACTIONS

U. S. ACTIONS

Group One, 3 battleships, 9 cruisers, 9 carriers, and 27
destroyers, departs Tawi Tawi.

Bombarding Saipan.

2100,

J13

Group Two, 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers,
departs Batjan anchorage.

J14

Submarine reports that large Japanese naval forces,
present two days earlier, had sortied from Tawi Tawi.

June

Submarines report the passage through San Bernadino
Strait of large Japanese naval forces.

Mom-
16 June

Groups One and Two rendezvous and refuel.

Admiral Spruance announces plan of action. 1

1700,
17 June

Fleet departs rendezvous area enroute Southern Mari-

Noon,
18 June

Fleet 600 miles west of Saipan. Carrier planes search
for U. S. Fleet.

Task Force 68 rendezvous.

After-
18 June

Fleet changes course to southeast, continues search.

Tender-based patrol planes search 600 miles west from
Saipan. Negative results.

Night.

18-19

Fleet continues to southeast.

Putrol planes execute radar search 600 miles west from
Saipan. Negative results.

10.

0720,

jl9

0800,

J19

Naval aircraft rise from Guam fields to engage U. S.
carrier aircraft.

Large number of carrier aircraft arrive at Guam,
expecting to refuel.

Combat air patrol from TF 68 sights enemy planes tak-
ing off from Guam fields.

TF 58 rushes additional fighters into the air battle
over Guam and inflicts heavy losses on Japanese.

11.

1004,

jl9

Carrier planes launch all-out attacks on ships of TF
68, continue throughout day, infliet minor damage on
SOUTH DAKOTA and INDIANA.

Fighters over Guam recalled, additional fighters take
off from carriers to intercept enemy planes. Ships'
AA exacts heavy toll from Japanese attackers.

12.

After-
19 June

Carriers TAIHO and SHOKAKU sink as a result of
morning torpedoing by U. S. submarines.

13.

Night,

19-20

Fleet withdraws to westward, planning to refuel and
return towards Marianas.

TF 68 heads to westward at 23 knots, hoping to catch
the Japanese Fleet. Radar searches by patrol planes
from Saipan give negative results.

14.

0626,
20 June

Fleet unable to pause for refueling because of proxim-
ity of U. S. scouting planes, continues westward all
day.

TF 68 launches planes to try to locate enemy fleet,
results negative until about 1616, when enemy fleet
contacted about 260 miles west of U. S. Fleet.

16.

0630,
20 June

216 planes take off from TF 68 carriers to attack
enemy ships.

16.

Night.

20-21

Carrier HIYO and two tankers sunk and seven ships
damaged by U. S. air attacks.

U. S. planes return and land on carriers in darkness,
suffer heavy losses.

17.

June

Fleet retires toward Okinawa.

Carrier planes search for Japanese cripples, negative
results.

18.

Eve-
ning,
21 June

TF 68 retires toward Saipan to protect Attack Force.

RO 7095

FOLDOUT BLANK

maintenance of direction, a road which crossed
the unit’s zone of action (Laulau Road) about
500 yards south of Hill 500 was designated as
a phase line. At this road, a quick reorganiza-
tion was to be effected, the direction of advance
reoriented (if necessary), and the assault on
Hill 500 begun.

The 3d Battalion’s attack was as well-ex-
ecuted as it was well -planned. The principal
resistance (rifles and machine guns) was en-
countered by Company I, on the right, and this
from a wood southeast of the hill. After
pausing briefly at the road for a quick re-
organization, the assault of Hill 500 was
launched. By this time, the objective had been
subjected to a severe, thundering beating ad-
ministered by the 4.5-inch rockets. As the
Marines charged up the hill through the thin-
ning smoke, artillery shells walked ahead in
sturdy escort. Shortly before noon the hill was
seized, and mopping up of the cave network
began. Compartments at different levels and
angles made it possible for the Japanese occu-
pants to retreat from one cave-room to another,
and the cleaning out process was a slow one.

The price for Hill 500 was not light. Cham-
bers’ battalion suffered 49 casualties, nine of
whom were killed. Counted Japanese dead
numbered 44. Upon examination, it was found
that Hill 500 had been well organized for de-
fense but that the positions were not strongly
manned. As darkness approached, the Marines
dug in to defend their newly won possession.125
(See Map 13.)

To Chambers’ right, meanwhile, the 24th
M arines set the pace for the 20 June surge.
Located as it was, on the end of the landing
force swinging-gate, the 24th Regiment was
required to move the greatest distances in order
to reach the day’s objective — G-4. Attacking
with two battalions abreast, 1st along the east
coast and 2d in contact with the 25th Marines,
it made excellent progress.

The delay in attack hour, occasioned by the
25th Marines’ passage of the 23rcl Marines’
lines, allowed time for unusually thorough
planning of the day’s attack. All commanders

125 3d Bn, 23th Mar Report, ft—1 7.

made good use of available time, and results
achieved speak well for the adequacy ol their
preparations. This was particularly true in the
2d Battalion zone where, because of excep-
tionally good tank terrain, the regimental com
mander assigned 12 medium and three flame-
thrower tanks, as well as four LVT(A)’s. The
battalion commander. Lieutenant Colonel Roth
well, spent considerable time orienting sub
ordinate commanders and readying for the
jump-off. The day’s 2,700 yard advance pro
vided a lift to the morale and, according to
the battalion’s action report, “proved to be the
best coordinated tank and infantry attack of
the operation.”

By late afternoon, the 24th Marines dug in
on objective O—l.126 (See Map 13.)

Securing the Cliff

Two days before, the 24th Marines, in order
to maintain the momentum of its attack toward
the east coast, had by-passed a cliff-like ridge
line. Since it would be unwise to leave behind
such a potential source of trouble, Mustain's
1st Battalion, 25th Marines, had been assigned
to clear it. The assignment was not an easy
one. On the 19th, Mustain’s attack had struck
the cliff from the west, directly into its face.
This attack, involving a cross-compartment
move, was unsuccessful, since Japanese rifle-
men, peering from the shelter of caves, could
bring accurate fire to bear on anyone approach-
ing them. Mustain’s battalion made practically
no gains on the 19th, and on the debit side of
the ledger suffered 26 casualties.

With the coming of darkness, Mustain went
to the division command post (the battalion
was operating under division control at this
time) to get approval of his plan for 20 June:
to attack the cliff line from the south. The plan
approved, and subsequently executed, called
for the tanks of Company A. 4th Tank Bat-
talion, to move from the south along the low-
land at the west edge of the cliff, destroying
any enemy positions located. This move was
to be repeated three times, with the 1st Bat-
talion’s company commanders riding along on

12B 1st Bn, 2-rith Mar Report. 3. 2d Bn, 2 j Mar Re-
port, 4. Roth well.

115

rugged coastal area, zone of the 24th Marines, frequently slowed the advance as much as did the enemy. Hill 500
was the scene of the 25tli Marines’ bitter 20 June action. On 23 June the Japanese contested hotly the 23d
Marines’ seizure of Hill GOO.

the first trip to get a good view of the terrain.
On the third trip, men of the 1st Battalion
would move with the tanks and the cliff would
be cleaned out and secured.

Generally, the scheme worked out as planned.
The first two runs by the tanks, however, were
un remunerative, inasmuch as the wily Japanese
held their fire and did not reveal their posi-
tions. When the infantry moved out with the
tanks, it was another story : plunging fire rained
down upon the Marines as they made their way
along the base of the cliff. But all in all. the
attack from the south, which restricted Japa-
nese observation, was infinitely more successful
than another one from the west would have
been. As with a person looking from a window
of a tall building: it is easier to observe some-

one approaching from some distance off than
someone moving along the sidewalk at the
base of the building.

Slowly — but surely — the caves were cauter-
ized with flame-throwers and sealed with demo-
litions. Some caves, because of their location
on the sheer cliffside, were inaccessible to the
infantrymen and became the destruction-re-
sponsibility of the tanks. Around noon the
proceedings were delayed when a Japanese
bomb-dump exploded in the midst of Company
A. The explosion, caused either by the detona-
tion of a Japanese mortar shell or by a creeping
canefield fire set by tracer bullets, disorganized
the company. Three of its four remaining
officers became casualties, and the lone officer
unscathed could count but 45 men left in Corn-

116

nafutan point as it appeared from Hill 500. At such distance, the terrain appears more gentle than it did to the
2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, who fought on the point until 3 July.

pany A.

While Company A struggled along at the
base of the clifF, Company 11 worked from the
top down, burning and blowing up caves higher
on the cliff. Some Japanese, flushed by Com-
pany B’s cleaning methods, were found to be
armed with U. S. M-l rifles and in possession
of type “C” rations and American five-gallon
water cans. How and where the Japanese had
obtained these items was never revealed.

Following Company A’s disastrous experi-
ence with the exploding bomb-dump, Company
C took over the zone at the base of the cliff,
came abreast of Company B, and the reduction
of the troublesome cliff line continued. After
reducing this by -passed defensive point in the
division rear, the 1st Battalion was released
from division control and returned to the 25th
Marines. It then occupied an assembly area in
regimental reserve.127

I larkness of 20 June found both Marine divi-
sions facing north. The wheeling movement
had been completed. (See Map 13.)

127 1st Jin, 25th Mar Report, 8-12.

Punches at the Point

The 27th Division, meanwhile, continued its
attack to seize Nafutan Point. Because further
attacks from the west might be extremely
costly, the division selected a scheme of maneu-
ver involving attack from the north and
northwest. The 105th Infantry Regiment, from
its sector along Magicienne Bay, would exe-
cute the main effort, using its 2d and 3d
Battalions and the 1st Battalion. 105th In-
fantry, attached for this maneuver. The 1st
Battalion, 165tli, was to remain on the shore of
Magicienne Bay and maintain contact with
the 4th Marine Division.

With the assistance of artillery, 4.2-inch
mortars, tanks, self-propelled mounts,128 naval
gunfire and air support, the attack was
launched. The terrain was rugged and the
advance slow, but by nightfall a foothold on
the high ground at the northwestern end of the
point was seized and the entire line moved

128 Designated M16, the self-propelled mount has a
turret enclosing four .50-caliber machine guns mounted
on a half-track chassis.

117

about 1,000 yards. During the advance, units
were subjected to artillery fire from across
Magicienne Bay. Naval gunfire and air strikes
knocked out these enemy guns later in the day.

The 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, continued
its movement along the south coast, clearing-
caves of Japanese soldiers and civilians as it
went. This type of work was extremely time-
consuming and progress was slow.

In regard to its cave-cleaning task the 105th
Infantry reported :

The enemy action in this area consisted of indi-
viduals and small groups, not only of service personnel,
but also of civilians, taking positions in the crevices,
holes and caves along the seacoast and along the cliff
dividing the coastal plain from the Aslito Plateau
from which they would fire at our units as they ad-
vanced. There seemed to be no coordination of the
enemy positions or their fires but they did evidence the
utmost stubborness in the defense of their individual
positions. Because of the presence of an appreciable
number of civilians, it was attempted to convince them,
through the use of loudspeakers mounted on tanks,
and interpreters, to come' out from the caves and sur-
render. In a few cases this technique was successful,
three hundred thirty five civilians — men, women and
children — being rescued in this manner. In the majority
of cases, however, because of the presence of enemy
soldiers, the civilian element ignored our pleas and
continued to fire at our soldiers.129

Colonel Bussell G. Ayres’ 106th Infantry
Regiment, which had remained afloat in Joint
Expeditionary Troops Reserve, landed on 20
June on Yellow Beaches and assumed the status
of XTLF reserve, 1st Battalion in rear of the
2d Marine Division and the remainder of the
regiment behind the 4th Marine Division.
With the arrival of this unit, the 2d Battalion,
105th Infantry, was released from XTLF re-
serve and moved to an area near Aslito Airfield
in 27th Division reserve.130

The decision to land the 106th Infantry was
not made without a great deal of thought and
consideration. This move had been first recom-
mended on 16 June b}7 the advance head-
quarters of the landing force. Admiral Turner,
however, took no action on the request, bolding
it in abeyance because it would have a delaying

129 105th Inf Report, 6.

130 R. C. Smith. 5-6. 100th Infantry Report, 2, here-
inafter cited as 106th Tnf Report. 165th Inf Report, 4.

effect oil the Guam operation, which at that
time,- was scheduled for 18 June. The latter
1 auding would require a reserve and it was
hoped that this would be the 106th Infantry.

On the evening of 18 June, General Holland
Smith formally recommended to Turner that
the regiment be landed “in order to maintain
the continuity of the offensive.” The next
morning (0810, 19 June) Turner requested
that Smith give further consideration to the
recommendation, since landing the 106th at
Saipan would postpone the Guam attack. In
(lie same message, Turner also requested advice
as to whether the Guam landing force (Task
Force 53) would any longer be required in
the area as a floating reserve for Saipan.

Shortly after noon, Holland Smith sent an-
other message to Turner stating that there was.
indeed, urgent need for the 106th Infantry
ashore and renewing his recommendation that
it be landed. In regard to Task Force 53, Smith
recommended that it return to Eniwetok, since
Guam could not be attacked without sufficient
reserves. He also expressed the opinion that,
after the decisive terrain on Saipan had been
captured, it might be possible to spare one regi-
ment to act as the reserve for Guam.

This time Turner concurred, and the 106th
started coming ashore the following day (20
Dune). He directed, however, that the regiment
land as little material and equipment as pos-
sible in order that it could be reembarked on
short notice. Task Force 53 was retained in
die area for the time being, but on 25 June
the ships carrying the 3d Marine Division were
ordered to Eniwetok, followed on the 30th by
(hose transporting the 1st Provisional Marine
Brigade.131

Late in the evening of 20 June the first
American plane landed on Aslito Airfield.
Many were to follow, and the sanctity of the
Japanese home islands would soon be violated.

This date also marked the first time the
island of Tinian, some six miles to the south,
would feel the impact of artillery fire originat-
ing on Saipan. One battery of 155mm guns of

131 Enclosure (A) to Commander Amphibious Forces
Top Secret Letter Serial U0UI5G of 4Sep44.

118

(lie Corps Artillery (Battery B, 531st. Field
Artillery Battalion) emplaced its aims to bear
on this new target. Lateral observation posts
were established along Saipan’s southern coast,
and counterbattery and destructive fires were
commenced. This single unit provided only a
subtle introduction to the crescendo of fire
which would later shatter the island.132

Reports of the enemy’s use of mines and
booby traps were being received by the NTLF
G— 2 (Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Yancey,
USA). Prior to the 25th Marines’ capture of
Hill 500, a Japanese effort to sow a controlled
mine field on the slopes of that hill had been
spotted and dispersed by artillery fire. This

plan thwarted, the enemy liberally sprinkled
the area with booby traps, using pull -type
friction igniters attached to four pounds of
picric acid. Thirty of this type of booby trap
were later found thereabouts. On White Beach,
on the southern coast, antiboat or antitank
mines were discovered, along with at least five
horned mines. Numerous land mines and booby
traps were found around Aslito Airfield, and
one road in the southern part of the island was
found to be sown with crude booby traps con-
sisting of hand grenades with strings attached
so that a disturbance of the string would pull
the pin and detonate the grenade.133

In regal'd to the Japanese antitank mine

132 Corps A rty 8-3 Report, 7.

133 NTLF (1-2 Report, 17.

119

supply. Major General Iketa wrote oil ID June:

A quantity of usable explosive power material
(usable against tanks) was not distributed because of
lack of time and is now being manufactured. The ef-
fect of adhesive mines is great. Furthermore Molotov
cocktails 134 (liquid flame bottles) are effective.135

Night of 20-21 June

Principal activity during the night of 20—21
June took place ou Hill 500, seized during the
afternoon by the 3d Battalion. 25th Marines.
From caves on all sides of the hill, small groups
of Japanese armed with grenades and bayo-
nets or knives lashed to the ends of bamboo
poles (“idiot, sticks”), crept out to cause as
much trouble as possible. These Japanese, al-
though uncoordinated in their efforts, succeeded
to (lie extent that Marines on the hill spent a
tense and anxious night. When morning came,
31 dead Japanese were found within the 3d
Battalion’s lines.136

FI se where along the fronts of all three divi-
sions the night was quiet, with only minor
enemy activity, an occasional round of Japa-
nese artillery lire, or a star shell fired by our
supporting naval vessels to disturb the silence.
On a quiet night, uncertainty and tension could
sometimes be as insomnia -provoking as a night
full of sound and fury.

Like a broken phonograph record, individual
Japanese repeated their expressions of deter-
mined patriotism with unfaltering vehemence.
Tokuzo Matsuya, a member of the 9th Tank
Regiment (rank unknown, presumably a junior
officer), echoed the usual phrases:

20 June — The remaining tanks in our regiment now
consist of six Type Cl 11 and six Type 05, making a
total of 12. . . . Even if there are no tanks, we will fight
hand to hand. ... I have resolved that, if I see the
enemy, 1 will take out my sword and slash, slash,
slash at him as long as I last, thus ending my life of
twenty-four years.137

In his summary of the evening of 20 June,
General Iketa showed uncanny prescience in
regard to the 2d Marines at Garapan’s out-
skirts: “The enemy is doing construction work

134 Molotov cocktails, only distantly related to Mar-
tinis, are bottles of combustible liquid, which when
thrown against a tank hurst into flame.

135 CTNCPAC-CINCPOA Item #0983-85, 11.

130 .'Id tin. 25th Mar Report, 7.

137 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #10.238.

south of Garapan and at present it dues not
look as if he will advance. . . .” [author’s ital-
ics.] 138 The general’s estimate was correct. The
2d Marines did not undertake a sustained drive
into Garapan until 2 July, 12 days later.

D-PLUS 6—21 JUNE

The Pause before the Northern Push

With the important pivoting movement to
the north accomplished, General Holland Smith
ordered that 21 June be spent in reorganization,
resupply, mopping up and patrolling, and that
the attack should continue the following day
(22 June). Patrols from the 24th and 25th
Ma lines moved as far as 1,000-1,500 yards to
their front without discovering any sizeable
enemy force. In the vicinity of Chacha Village
on Kagman Peninsula, however, enemy activ-
ity was noted, causing patrol leaders to pre-
dict later difficulties.

On Hill 500, men of the 3d Battalion, 25th
Marines, continued their task of cleaning the
caves and surrounding area. Two Japanese
soldiers, taken prisoner, were questioned by an
interpreter and identified as privates first class
and gunners of the 25th Antiaircraft Artillery
Regiment. They had been stationed at Aslito
Airfield, but after the D-Day air strike had
fled to Hill 500. At the suggestion of the bat-
talion commander. Lieutenant Colonel Cham-
bers, the Japanese agreed to go into the caves
and try to persuade their comrades to sur-
render. Supervised by personnel from the bat-
talion intelligence section and some riflemen
from Company I, the endeavor resulted in the
capture of two badly-wounded Japanese. Four
others came out of the caves but were killed
when they tried to resist.136

For the first day since the landing, the 4th
Marine Division had had an opportunity to
catch its breath. General Schmidt displaced
his command post from the beach area to the
high ground along O-l. The division artillery
regiment (14th Marines) busied itself firing on
targets of opportunity and suspected Japanese

133 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 13. The
“construction work” here referred to was the prepara-
tion of defenses by the 2d Marines.

139 3d ltn, 25th Mar Report, 7-8.

120

positions. Though levels of artillery ammuni-
tion were never critically low, some shortages
developed from time to time. Colonel Louis G.
DeHaven, commanding the 14tli Marines, later
wrote :

. . . My worst head-ache during the operation was the
shortage of artillery ammunition from about the fifth
day until the final arrival of a much delayed replace-
ment, and had it not been that the Army did not seem
to need their reserves, which they left near the beach,
our situation may have been different.140

Patrolling to the 2d Division’s front pro-
duced only one instance of positive informa-
tion. A 25-man patrol from the 2d Marines
discovered and thoroughly reconnoitered an
enemy outpost on the rising ground which
overlooks Garapan from the southeast. Since
it was apparent that the Japanese position was
too strongly-manned for the Marine patrol to
attack, the latter returned without casualties.141

During the afternoon, the 8th Marines
juggled its lines in preparation for the next
day’s attack. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines,
relieved the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, on the
right flank, the latter reverting to regimental
reserve, along with the 3d Battalion.

Patrolling of the rugged terrain forward of
the 6th and 8th Marines failed to reveal any
enemy positions, but no one could feel that this
promised easy going in the future. A suspicion
existed that perhaps the Japanese had recog-
nized Marine patrols as such and had withheld
fire in expectation of more profitable targets.142

Searching the Swamp

Around Lake Susupe, in the swampy areas,
a large number of Japanese were still in hiding.
Some had been by-passed in the movement
around the lake, others had infiltrated the front
lines and had selected the swamp as their base
of operations. The nuisance effect of these in-
filtrators was considerable; rear installations
were harassed and the movement of supply
and evacuation vehicles greatly complicated.
A patrol from Headquarters and Service Bat-
tery, 4th Battalion, 10th Marines, entered the
swamp on 19 June with a mission of annihi-

140 Ltr from Col L. C. DeHaven to CMC. 9.Tan50.

141 2(1 Mar Report, 4.

142 8 th Mar Report. 4. Gth Mar Report , 0.

kiting the Japanese concealed there. After sev-
eral skirmishes in which about seven Japanese
were killed and two machine guns captured,
the patrol withdrew with the report that more
substantial mopping-up forces would be re-
quired.

On 20 June, two platoons of the 2d Division
Reconnaissance Company were ordered to un-
dertake the task of eliminating the Japanese
from Susupe swamp. Later, when it became
apparent that the two platoons were insufficient
for the job, 20 artillerymen from the 4th Bat-
talion, 10th Marines, were ordered to form a
secondary skirmish line and follow Recon-
naissance Company personnel through the
swamp. Again, the forces were inadequate;
and, after killing seven Japanese and losing
two of their own men, the units withdrew.

From the progress and reports it was ap-
parent that a much larger force would be
needed to complete the mop-up. Accordingly,
NTLF attached the 1st Battalion, 106th In-
fantry (Lieutenant Colonel Winslow Cornett.
USA), to the 2d Marine Division for the job
of sweeping the area from the old radio station
to the high ground east of Lake Susupe.

Throughout the day, the 10th Marines con-
tinued furnishing fires on enemy artillery,
troops, tanks and dumps with excellent results.
The 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, which had
operated with the 4th Division since coming
ashore on IT June, reverted to 2d Division con-
trol at noon of the 21st and displaced to new
positions northeast of Lake Susupe.143

. . Hold Present Front Lines . . .

On Nafutan Point the 27th Division made
small gains, proceeding slowly because of
numerous enemy positions in caves.144 One bat-

143 2d Mar Dir Report , Section VI, 8. Mix Bn. 10th
Mar Report, 3. Flown. An indication of the relative
inactivity of the Marine divisions on 21 Jane is the fact
that action reports of the six infantry regiments for
this date averaged but four and a half sentences per
report.

144 Lieutenant Colonel John Lemp, USA, an Army
observer, writing of the actions of 21 June, felt that a
“certain amount of inertia,” was manifested by the
105th Infantry. “In this particular instance the divi-
sion might be censured for its lack of offensive spirit
in moving forward particularly in view of the fact that

889590° 50 9

121

WITH fixed bayonets soldiers of the 105th Infantry move in a skirmish line over an open area unusual for Nafu-
tan Point. Note bazookaman at extreme right. Picture taken on 21 June.

tery of 105mm howitzers (B. 104th Field
Artillery Battalion) went into a position from
which it could support the attack with direct
fire onto these caves.

At 1215, while engaged in the Nafutan Point
attack, the 27th Division received a change of
mission and disposition. NTLF Operation
Order 9—44 (a document that was to assume
great importance later) directed the 27th Divi-
sion. less one battalion and one light tank
platoon, to assemble northwest of Aslito Air-
field in XTL F reserve. Control of the division
artillery would pass to the XX I\' Corps Artil-
lery. The designated infantry battalion was
ordered in paragraph 3. e. to “operate in the
Garrison Area.” It would “mop up remaining
enemy detachments, maintain antisniper patrols
within the Garrison Area and along the coast
line to protect installations within its zone of
action with particular attention to Aslito
A i rfield.”145

Ibis whs a continuation of the attack started by the
1 dot h on the preceding day.” hemp, 14.

ur’ Since the “designated infantry battalion” had
been assigned a specific mission in a separate, lettered
subparagraph of paragraph 3 ( the subordinate units
paragraph), the NTLF Staff considered it clear that

At 1700, after consideration of the NTLF
order, Ralph Smith telephoned Holland Smith
and urged that a complete regiment be used to
clean up Nafutan Point, rather than one bat-
talion. He said that he planned to use the
105th Infantry for the job and that he believed
they could finish in a couple of days. Holland
Smith agreed to this but specified that one
battalion of the 105th must be retained in re-
serve for possible use elsewhere. This modifica-
tion was later confirmed in a mailbrief from
NTLF which arrived at the -27th Division com-
mand post at 0830, 22 June. It read as follows:

Instructions contained in Opn O #9-44 are modified
as follows: (a) 1 RCT will continue mission in Gar-
rison Area of cleaning up remaining resistance and
patrolling area, (b) 106-1 will be in Corps Res in
assembly area in zone of 2d Mar Div. (c) 27th Div
(less 1 RCT and 1 Bn) await orders in NTLF Res in
area assigned.140

At 2000, 21 June, following his telephonic
conversation with Holland Smith but before

the unit would execute its mop-up task as an immediate
subordinate of NTLF. Unfortunately, as will be seen,
this same interpretation was not made by the 27th
Division Staff.

140 27th Infantry Division G-3 Journal, 22.Jun44.

122

receiving (lie mailbrief, Ralph Smith issued
an order to his division, paragraph 3. a. of
which follows:

RCT 105 (Reinf) will hold present front line facing
Nafutan Point, with two battalions on the line and one
battalion in regimental reserve. It will relieve elements
of RCT 165 now on the front line by [0630 22 June].
The battalion in reserve will not be committed to
action without authority of the division commander.
Reorganization of the present front line to be effected
not later than [1100, 22 June] and offensive operations
'against the enemy continued. Reserve battalion will
maintain anti-sniper patrols in the vicinity of Aslito
Airfield.147

This single paragraph was to have gigantic
repercussions. General Holland Smith con-
sidered it clear that the 105th Infantry had
been removed from 27th Division control and
that orders to it should come from NTLF only.
In this connection Holland Smith has written :

. . . NT&LF Operation Order No. 9-44 placed the 27th
Infantry Division in a reserve status, and removed the
105th Infantry from tactical control of the 27th In-
fantry Division for independent operations directly
under control of NT&LF. NT&LF order directed the
105th Infantry to conduct offensive operations to mop
up enemy units in the NAFUTAN POINT area. The
27th Infantry Division Field Order No. 45 contravened
the NT&LF Operation Order No. 9-44 by ordering the
105th Infantry to hold its present positions, although
the 105th Infantry had been removed from the tactical
control of the Division Commander.148

From this it may be seen that Holland Smith
was disturbed by two considerations : he be-
lieved, first, that the 27th Division should not
have issued an order to the 105th Infantry,
and, second, having issued it, that the instruc-
tions to “hold present positions” counter-
manded the NTLF order. This counter-order
was to be one of the main reasons later ad-
vanced by Holland Smith in support of his
action in relieving Ralph Smith of command
of the 27th Division.

Ralph Smith's stated view on this matter
was that, during the telephone conversation
between himself and the Corps Commander,
“nothing was mentioned . . . about having the
regiment operate under NTLF control. His
written message confirming this change did not
arrive at the CP 27th Division until 0830, 22

147 R. C. Smith, 8. 27th Division Field Order No. 45A.

148 Ltr from CTF 56 to CTF 51, 24Jun44.

June, much too late to have permitted any
instructions for t lie day’s operations. "149

From Holland Smith’s point of view, how-
ever, Ralph Smith overlooked the fact that
Operation Order 9—44 had established the
status of a “designated infantry battalion"
(by giving it a mission in paragraph 3) and
that merely changing t he size of the unit to a
regiment did not remove it from control.

Night of 21-22 June

Enemy activity on the night of 21-22 June
took on varied forms. Just after dark, the
Japanese succeeded in blowing up a 2d Divi-
sion ammunition dump on Beach Green 1.
Whether this was accomplished bv an infil-
trator armed with a demolition pack or by a
rifleman with an incendiary bullet or by some
other more devious means, no one will ever be
sure.

The evidence seems to indicate that an in-
cendiary bullet was responsible. Persons in the
vicinity of the dump heard a 2d Battalion, 10th
Marines, sentry shout a challenge, then a single
shot, then the first of two explosions. Imme-
diately, personnel of the artillery battalion's
supply section moved close to the fire and at-
tempted to extinguish it. The plan at this time
was to isolate the fire where it was then burning
(small arms ammunition) and prevent its
spread to other sections containing mortar and
artillery shells.

At this point, as the Marines fought the
dangerous blaze, a second explosion occurred.
Results were devastating. The oflicer-in-eom-
mand of the fire-fighting detail, Captain Carl
A. Nielsen, later wrote : “To the best of my
knowledge, this explosion killed, or was the
cause of the death of. my entire detail, with
the exception of myself and one other. . . .”

The fireworks continued throughout the
night, many more men being hit by fragments
from mortar and artillery shells which caught
fire in the second explosion. Fortunately, the
2d Division had not had all of its eggs in one
basket ; a large percentage of ammunition had
already been parceled out to subordinate units.

140 R. C. Smith, 7.

123

so that, while the losses were serious, the am-
munition supply situation could not be de-
scribed as critical.150

To prevent any further Japanese infiltration
of beach areas, construction units of the 18th
M arines established a defense line between
Lake Susupe and the 2d Division supply dump
area.151

Elsewhere in the 2d Marine Division, the
night was quiet. Patrols from the 8th Marines
made no contacts; 6tli Marines’ patrols en-
countered a five-man Japanese patrol; the 2d
Marines located an eight-man outpost and a
two-man patrol. One small infiltration attempt
in the 2d Marines’ sector was repulsed without
difficulty.152

In the anchorage off Saipan the night was
disturbed by 12 Japanese bombers at about
01 12. Bombs dropped by these planes failed to
achieve a single hit, although the transport
( 7 ay was straddled by explosions. Only pas-
sive defense was taken against this particular
attack, with ships finding refuge under a smoke
screen. As part of the same attack, a few bombs
were dropped on Saipan itself. No damage was
caused, however, all bombs falling harmlessly
west of the 4th Marine Division command
post.153

On Hill 500 the 3d Battalion, 25tli Marines,
had occasional flurries of excitement, though
nothing to compare with the previous night.
Individual Japanese again emerged from caves
bent on the destruction of as many Marines as
possible. None of these efforts were successful,
and in the process four Japanese were killed.154

The summary of the 31st Army chief of staff
for 21 June admits that at least two important
tactical localities had fallen to U. S. forces:

The enemy is constructing positions in the area south
of Garapan to vicinity of Hill 230 and is cognizant of

1,11 Ltr from Maj O. A. Nielsen to CMC. 13Jan50.

Kl Ltr from LtOnl A. L. Vogt to CMC, 1 3.Tan50.

I 2(1 Mm ' Dir Deport, 8.

'■•'it .7/ I'eport, Annex 1 to Knel A. )th Mur Dir
Report, 22.

II )th Mur Dir Deport. 22. Sri Hu. 25tli Mur De-
port, 8.

the barbed wire on Hill 23U.155

The enemy, occupying Hill 163, 156 ... is gradually
approaching the southern foot of Tapotchau.

Only fleeting mention was made of U. S. sup-
porting arms :

One destroyer is in Laulau Bay [Magicienne Bay]
and is shelling Nafutan Mountain and the north of
Kagman Point. . . . Attacking planes are relatively
scattered today. . . .

On 21 June, the first flurries of an eventual
blizzard of Japanese messages pertaining to
reinforcement from other islands of the Mari-
anas fell. To the commanding general at Yap.
the Saipan chief of staff sent the following:

1 would like reports concerning the following items
on Rota and Guam :

1. Large motor launches. Collapsible boats.

2. Situation regarding enemy sea and air patrols.

3. Exact count of small boat activity at Guam, Rota,
Tinian and Saipan.

To the commanding officer at Tinian went the
dispatch : “I wish to be informed of number of
large motor craft in your area.” A great deal
more would later be heard on this subject.157

Summary of Medical Activities to Date

The medical battalions of the divisions had
begun their outstanding work several days
previous and were in full operation by the
night of D-plus 6.

Company A of the 4th Medical Battalion
had arrived ashore on 16 June (D-plus 1).
and by the next afternoon the entire battalion,
except Company D, was ashore. The latter unit
joined the others on D-plus 5. All companies
brought in equipment to set up field hospi-
tals.158

ir,:’ This reference is to Hill 790, occupied without
opposition by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, on 19 .Tune.
Heights of hills from Japanese sources are in meters,
whereas U. S. forces figured them in feet. Thus, Hill
230 in the Japanese report is Hill 790 in U. S. reports.
This apparent variation (230 meters equals 754 feet)
is explained by the fact that the Japanese determined
heights on the ground, while the U. S. had to rely upon
estimates from aerial photographs. In most instances
these estimates were remarkably close.

156 Here the reference is to Hill 500, seized after a
vigorous assault on 20 .Tune by the 3d Battalion, 25th
Marines.

157 CINCPAC— CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 14.

158 4th Marine Division Medical Report, 2.

124

Company E of t lie 2d Medical Battalion
landed in the late afternoon of D-plus 1 and to-
gether with Company C, which came ashore
the following morning, was fully equipped to
do definitive surgery by 1800 on D-plus 2. In-
itially, this was the only medical establishment
on the island so equipped, and a number of op-
erations were performed. These two companies
established themselves in a captured Japanese
hospital in Charan Kanoa. The remainder of
the 2d Medical Battalion, on board the ships
withdrawn from the anchorage, did not arrive
back on the scene until the evening of 21 June,
coming ashore early the next morning. Com-
pany C remained in the location for some time,
but Company E was moved on D-plus 4 to the
north end of the Charan Kanoa airstrip to act
as a casualty clearing station.159

159 Second Marine Division Medical Report. 7.

The A rmy s 102d Medical Battalion had por-
tions of the unit ashore on D-plus 2 and the
following day established a medical section
headquarters at Yellow Beach. Company I)
(Clearing Company) set up a station on 20
June in a small village about 1,000 yards south-
east of Charan Kanoa.100

At all medical installations the rule was the
same: care for the individual regardless of
where he came from or to what unit he be-
longed. Red tape in the handling of casualties
was non-existent; the tape was all white.101

160 Report of 27th Division Medical Inspector, Saipan
Operation, 1-2.

161 Division Surgeons of the 2d, 4th and 27th Divi-
sions, respectively, were: Commander E. R. Tiering.
(MC) USX : Commander W. C. Ilaty, .Tr.. (MC). USX :
Lieutenant Colonel Abraham Norman, (MC), USA.

(

125

rMpii'N /TTdTtt?

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

CHAPTER IV

Drive To The North

D-PLUS 7—22 JUNE

Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith’s op-
eration order for 22 June directed the continu-
ation of the attack to the north, with 0-5 as the
day’s objective. (See Map 14.) Objective line
0-5 included the village of Laulau (southwest-
ern base of Kagman Peninsula) on the right,
Mt. Tapotchau in the center, and extended
over to the western coast about 1,000 yards
south of Garapan — an optimistic bite to be
sure. Possession of this line would guarantee
observation over the bulk of the island. But it
would also bring up the problem of covering a
wider frontage, for Kagman Peninsula, jutting
from the east coast for a distance of 4.000-odd
yards, expands the island at that point to its
maximum breadth.

In addition to the greater yardage to be cov-
ered. the northward drive presented terrain
difficulties; Mt. Tapotchau’s aquiline peaks and
Kagman Peninsula’s craggy expanses defied
normal attack patterns. Frontages would have
to be reduced and, to effect this, more troops
committed to the attack. "With this in mind,
General Holland Smith ordered the 27th In-
fantry Division (in NTLF reserve) to recon-
noiter routes to the zones of the two Marine Di-
visions for possible commitment. The 105th In-
fantry would remain on its assigned mission —
directly under NTLF control — of clearing
Nafutan Point of Japanese.

The attack hour was set for 0600, following

a 10 minute preparation fired by the two Ma-
rine artillery regiments (10th and 14th), plus
reinforcing fires from the 27th Division Artil-
lery and the XXIV Corps Artillery : a total
of 18 battalions.1

Intermediate Objective 0-4A

General Schmidt determined that an inter-
mediate objective would be desirable for his
4th Marine Division. Objective 0-5 was 4,000
yards away across difficult terrain — a long,
hard drive without pausing for reorganization.
Accordingly, objective 0—4A, approximately
2,000 yards to the front (see Map 14), was
designated. From this point, the attack to 0-5
would be launched. Formation for the attack
was : 24th Marines on the right (along the coast
of Magicienne Bay), 25th Marines on the left,
and 23d Marines in reserve.2

Following the preparatory fires. Colonel
Franklin A. Hart’s 24th Marines moved out at
the specified hour (0600). Attacking along the
coast of Magicienne Bay with the 1st and 3d
Battalions abreast, 2d in reserve, the regiment
made steady progress. But soon the broken
terrain presented special problems. Local de-
tours. necessitated by small cavities or declivi-
ties which dipped to the jagged rocks of t lie
coast line, slowed the regiment's movements

1 NTLF Operation Order 9-44. NTLF G-3 Periodic
Report No. 8.

2 ith Mar Dir Deport, 22-23.

126

and greatly complicated the task of maintain-
ing contact. At one moment adjacent units
would be firmly tied in. At the next, one flank-
ing unit would disappear from view and a gap
would be created. In spite of these digressions,
however, the 24th Marines reached 0-4A at
1330.3

The 25th Marines’ zone of action was suffi-
ciently narrow, initially, to allow for an attack
in a column of battalions, with Chambers’ 3d
Battalion leading, followed to the left and
right rear, respectively, by the 1st and 2d Bat-
talions. Four easily recognizable ridges to the
25th Marines’ front were prescribed as inter-
mediate objectives and labeled O-A, O-B, ( )-C
and O-D. These were invaluable throughout
the day’s action as reference points, plus af-
fording points for checking control and co-
ordination.

Jumping off in the attack at 0600, the bat-
talion forged ahead to O-A by 0630. While it
paused for a quick reorganization, a force of
Japanese attacked, particularly on the bat-
talion left in the zone of Company K. During
the course of the close-in fight, 90 Japanese
were killed and a Japanese tank destroyed.
Company Iv lost three company commanders,
the first killed, two successors wounded. When
the skirmish subsided, a new company com-
mander was sent from battalion, reorganization
was effected, and the attack resumed.

Jumping off from O-A at 0740, the battalion
met only light scattered resistance in its move
to O-B. As a gap had begun to develop between
the 3d Battalion's right and the 24th Marines’
left, the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, was com-
mitted between the two. In the face of tight-
ening opposition, provided principally by
Japanese machine guns and rifles, the regiment
reached O-C by 1400.

As the 3d Battalion moved for O-D (coinci-
dent with division objective OMA), an intra-
battalion contact problem developed. Company
Iv, on the left, was tied in with the adjacent
battalion of the 2d Marine Division (1st Bat-
talion, 29th Marines), while Company I clung
to elements of the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines,
on the right. The strain on the center was too

3 24th Mar Report, 20.

great. The reserve Company (L), therein)1
moved into the middle of the 3d Battalion zone
to strengthen the line. Thus left without a re-
serve company, Lieutenant Colonel Chambers
requested that an additional company be at-
tached to his unit. In compliance. Company B
was moved up at about 1515 and at 1600 was
ordered into the line on the l ight flank.

Just south of O— 4A the 25th Marines encoun-
tered severe Japanese machine-gun li re, ema-
nating from a thick wood just south of the ob-
jective and from caves in the slopes of the ridge
itself. Company L, in the center of the 3d Bat-
talion zone, found itself caught in a deluge of
fire converging from two directions. Forward
movement was temporarily impossible, and the
company withdrew.4

At 1515 a Japanese ammunition dump ex-
ploded near the 3d Battalion’s observation post
and claimed, among others, Lieutenant Colonel
Chambers as a concussion casualty. The execu-
tive officer, Major James Tank then took over
the unit and, following a reorganization, ordered
a, resumption of the attack on O— 4A. Again,
however, well-located enemy positions in the
slopes of the hill stopped the attack as soon as
it began. Lengthening shadows of late after-
noon indicated the advisability of digging in
for the night. Although the day’s objective had
not been reached, approximately 2,000 yards
had been gained in the 25th Marines’ zone.5

Shortly before noon contact between the 24th
and 25th Marines had become increasingly
tenuous, and General Schmidt ordered the di-
vision reserve (23d Marines) to move into the
front between the two assault regiments. After
marching about 2,500 yards to get into posi-

4 During the withdrawal an unusual incident oc-
curred : dragging its wounded, Company I. pulled back,
only to discover that a wounded radio operator had
been left behind. This casualty, lying in a flat, open,
fire-swept area which defied rescue by stretcher bearers,
was in a pitiable plight. But, at this juncture, Lieuten-
ant Robert E. Stevenson, from Company A, 4th Tank
Battalion, ran a medium tank into the area, straddled
the wounded radio operator, and pulled him safely into
the tank through the escape hatch in the tank’s deck.

5 25th Mar Report. 6. 3d Bn, 25th Mar Report 8-9.
The 4th Division planning officer, Lieutenant Colonel
Evans F. Carlson, was wounded while observing action
of the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, during the day.

127

tion, the regiment attacked at 1500 in column
of battalions on an 800-yard frontage: Lieu-
tenant Colonel Haas’ 1st Battalion leading,
followed at 800-yards by the 2d Battalion.

The 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, designated
division reserve, was required to move to three
different assembly areas during the course of
the day. At each area, the unit prepared itself
for the night, digging foxholes, planning all-
around defense and clearing fields of fire. And
each time, just as the men finished their posi-
tions and started to relax, an order arrived to
move to a new area. Although this was normal
for reserve units, it invariably brought forth
grumbles. To personnel unfamiliar with the
over-all situation (the “big picture”), the fre-
quent moves appeared useless and annoying.

Fighting especially troublesome terrain, the
23d Marines made slow progress. Only light
enemy resistance from riflemen and machine
gunners was encountered, but contact difficul-
ties and time lost trudging up, down, around
and through the rugged ground formations,
limited the speed of advance. Progress ceased
at a point about 200 yards south of objective
O— IA, where the unit dug in.0

But stopping for the night brought no end
to the 4th Marine Division’s problems of con-
tact and coordination. In the 24th Marines’
sector it was necessary to move the reserve 2d
Battalion into a separation between the other
two battalions. Even with the advent of this
unit, however, a gap existed throughout the
night. Fortunately, the Japanese did not
exploit the weak point.

In a move designed to facilitate internal con-
tact. the left company of the division (K. 25th
Marines) shifted to its right rear to tighten
front lines. This shift broke physical contact
with the right of the 2d Marine Division (1st
Battalion, 29th Marines). Into this hiatus,
Company C. 25th Marines, was moved, and by
dark the two divisions were firmly tied in
again. Company A, 25th Marines, occupied a
position in rear of Company C to strengthen
the junction further. In the words of the 4th
Division action report : “Contact [was] well
established and defenses coordinated for the

6 2St1 Mar Report. 40. Sri II ». 23 Mar Report. 3.

night.” 7 (See Map 14 for progress lines.)

To Tipo Pale’s Summit

Meanwhile, General Watson’s 2d Marine Di-
vision also made important gains. Attacking
in conjunction with the 4th Division, its main
effort was made on the right, in the 8th Ma-
rines’ zone. All three infantry regiments were
in the lines, from left to right: 2d, 6th and 8tli.
Owing to the 2d Marines’ advanced position
along the beach, however, it was not possible
for that regiment to move farther to the north
without stretching the division’s lines to the
breaking point.

Looking to the north of the 6th and 8th Ma-
rines' lines, a nightmare of sheer cliffs and
precipitous hills could be observed, separated
in criss-cross fashion by deep gashes. Excellent
defensive positions were afforded the Japanese
by these ground formations, but more impor-
tant. since the Japanese did not fully exploit
the defensive potential of this area, was the
challenge to contact and coordination. Dense
foliage which cloaked the region often limited
visibility to a few feet.

The 8th Marines attacked with two battalions
abreast : 1st Battalion on the left and the 1st
Battalion, 29th Marines, on the right. Initially
the movement was reasonably rapid; but. as
the advance reached rougher terrain on the
lower approaches to Mt. Tapotcliau, both bat-
talions were forced to commit reserve com-
panies to maintain contact. About noon it was
necessary to move the 3d Battalion, 8th Ma-
rines. into the center, between the two assault
battalions. Persistent Japanese mortar tire,
showing no favoritism, hopped from unit to
unit, constantly keeping pace with the advance.

By 1300 the 8th Marines reached a ridge on
Mt. Topatehau’s mid-slopes, about 1,200 yards
from the peak. (This yardage was measured
in map-distance — as the crow flies — not as the
Marines would be forced to move.) At this
point enfilading machine-gun fire from a hill
on the right flank (in the 4th Marine Division
zone of action) stopped the forward movement.
Late in the afternoon a company of the 4th

7 '/tli Mar Dir Report. 23. Sri llri. 25th Mar Report. 9.
Sri JSn. 2'itl i Mai ■ Report, 4.

128

Division (Iv, 25th Marines) captured the hill,
and Company B, 29th Marines, made contact
with it there.

Because of the previously -described tighten-
ing of the 25th Marines’ lines, however, Com-
pany K pulled to its right rear, leaving Com-
pany B, 29th Marines, alone on the hill. Get-
ting supplies to the latter was very difficult,
involving hand-carry over a perilous route. In
addition, the company received almost constant
small-arms fire, principally from the open
flank. After about two hours Lieutenant Colo-
nel Tompkins, commanding the battalion,
ordered Company B to withdraw and secure
contact with the 4th Division flank. This was
done when Company C, 25th Marines, moved
into the lines in the manner previously related.

As the 8th Marines dug in for the night,
three of its four battalions, with a total of
eight companies forward, were committed to
the line. The 2d Battalion remained in regi-

mental reserve near the division right flank.

The 8th Marines’ operations around the
Tapotchau massif presented a logistical chal-
lenge of no mean proportions. As well as ob-
servers and patrols could determine, no road
or trail for supply and evacuation existed
within the regiment’s zone of action. Recon-
naissance by the regimental-4 Section, how-
ever, located a break in the cliff which, after
expansion by a bulldozer, served as a main
(though makeshift) supply route for several
days. Since ground reconnaissance revealed
nothing in the way of a better road leading
into the Mt. Tapotchau area, Colonel Wallace,
commanding the 8th Marines, requested that
an observation plane be made available so that
his executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jack
P. Julian, could be flown over the area in ques-
tion, attempting to locate a suitable supply
route as well as to get a closer look at the ter-
rain. The flight was scheduled for the next day

129

(23 June).8

The 6th Marines’ advance was governed by
the necessity of maintaining contact with — and
thus regulating its speed on — the 8tli Marines.
Lieutenant Colonel Nutting’s 2d Battalion, 2d
Marines (still attached to the 6th Marines),
was in position on the right of the regimental
line, in contact with the 8th Marines. By 0700,
advances by the latter unit permitted Nutting’s
battalion to move forward, but after a short
time it became apparent that further advances
would overextend the 6th Marines’ lines. Colo-
nel Riseley, therefore, ordered the movement
held up until the 8th Regiment came abreast.
By 1230 this had been accomplished, and the
6th Marines moved forward again. During the
morning several isolated, by-passed pockets of
resistance within the regiment’s zone were
mopped up by the Scout-Sniper Platoon.

The day’s first resistance developed as the
6th Marines' advance moved upward on Mt.
Tipo Pale’s eastern slopes. Tipo Pale, a wooded
eminence of about 1,100 feet, overlooked the
island’s western beaches. From its topmost
pinnacle, the mountain slopes gradually to the
west and south, but to the north and east it dips
precipitously to heavily-wooded ravines. There
had been some cause for optimism on the previ-
ous day when patrols had climbed to the crest
without encountering any Japanese. But now,
when the coordinated attack moved into the
area, the hill suddenly came alive and bristled
with defenses. Whether the hill had been de-
serted of Japanese when 1 . S. patrols moved
thereon or whether the enemy had lain doggo
awaiting more choice targets is not indicated
in documents consulted.

Company I\. 6th Marines, moving along the
road with plans to climb Tipo Pale’s south-
eastern slopes, ran unexpectedly into trouble
when that route entered a small finger ravine
— infested with enemy riflemen and machine-
gunners — on the hill’s lower approaches. Veer-
ing to the left, Company K found the going
much easier and swept unopposed to the top.

8 ?rt Mar Dir Report. Section VI. 9. 8th Mar Re-
port. 4. / -S’ t IDi. 2!>th Mnr Report. 4-5. Ltr from Col
.1. P. Julian to CMC, 12.Tan50.

The Regimental Scout-Sniper Platoon, con-
tinuing its mopping-up tasks, endeavored to
clear the cantankerous trouble-spot developed
by Company K. It found more than it could
handle. A series of narrow ravines hemmed
by steep bluffs housed a number of automatic
weapons, making movement into this area
suicidal. Under the fusillade directed at them,
the Scout-Snipers withdrew.

The remainder of the 3d Battalion ( includ-
ing Company F of the 2d Marines and Com-
pany F of the 6th Marines) moved to the sum-
mit of Tipo Pale, using the route blazed by
Company Iv, and by 1400 had commenced con-
solidation and readjustment of the lines. From
the newly-won positions atop the hill, the Ma-
rines could observe a company of the 2d Bat-
talion, 2d Marines, as it attempted to clear the
same trouble-point that had denied movement
to Company K and the Scout Snipers. As be-
fore, the enemy positions were well protected
and so located as to afford covering fire one to
another. After destroying several Japanese
emplacements and making slight progress, the
company was forced to retire under a hail of
cross-fire. Enemy in this area remained active
for another two days, finally pulling out before
being surrounded.

Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion’s lines on Tipo
Pale had been consolidated, proper frontage
assumed, and the advances to the north con-
tinued. At first, progress was moderately fast,
but when Marines attempted to move down
from Tipo Pale they discovered an almost ver-
tical drop. Using the one trail which existed
within the zone. Company K attempted the
descent but. thus canalized, was stopped by
automatic weapons and rifle fire from its front.
A few further probes into this area revealed
that the Marines were facing an unusually
well-defended strongpoint. By 1800, when the
order to dig in was issued, little progress on the
reduction of this trouble-spot had been made.
To establish contact with the 8th Marines, it
was necessary to bend the 6th Marines’ lines
back along the eastern slopes of Tipo Pale.
This expansion demanded commitment of all
three companies of the 2d Battalion, 2d Ma-
rines, facing it more nearly to the east than to

130

(lie north. There (he unit prepared defenses.0

The 2d Marines, as mentioned before, already
had occupied 0-5 for several days. Since the
whole maneuver pivoted on this regiment, no
movement forward other than patrolling could
be initiated. In preparation for (he unit’s
eventual advance into Garapan, the systematic
levelling of the town by artillery, air and naval
gunfire continued. As a defensive measure, (he
2d Mai ■ines laid a mine field along the beach
road leading into the left flank. This precau-
tion was taken in respect for the enemy capa-
bility of launching a full-scale counterattack
along the coastal road. The value of this ob-
stacle was never tested by a Japanese thrust,
however.10

The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry (attached
to the 2d Marine Division), swept the Susupe
swamp area from north to south. Beginning at
0830 and finishing at 1345, the battalion moved
through the marsh, killing 15 Japanese and
taking two wounded prisoners. Losses to the
battalion itself amounted to two killed and
four wounded. After completing its task, this
unit was released from 2d Division control and
reverted to NTLF reserve.* 11 Though the sweep
was well conducted, it neither cleaned out all
of the swamp-dwellers nor prevented other
Japanese from moving to the swamp following
successful infiltration of the front lines. More
was to be heard from the enemy in Susupe
swamp.

Commitment in the Center

Major General Ralph Smith’s 27th Division
accomplished the shifts of position ordered by
NTLF, the 165th Infantry pulling off Nafutan
Point and moving into the division assembly
area northwest of Aslito Airfield. Colonel
Bishop commenced adjusting the lines of his
105th Infantry preparatory to seizing the
point. In the afternoon of the 22d, however,
General Holland Smith returned to his ori<n-

9 2(1 Mar Div Report. Section VI. 9-10. 6th Mar Re-
port, 7. Fisher. M. /'. Ryan.

10 2d Mar Div Deport, 10. 2d Mar Deport, 4.

11 2d Mar Dir Deport , 10. 106th fnf Deport. 4. At
0000, 23 June, tlie 106th Infantry, which had operated
under NTLF control since coming ashore on 20 June,
returned to t lie 27th Division.

mil plan of leaving one battalion and one light
tank platoon for cleaning out the Nafutan area.
The unit designated for this mission was the
2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, and the mop-up
was to begin at dawn on 23 .June.11'

The remainder of the 27th Division would
pass “through elements of the 4th Marine Di-
vision within its zone of action," and:

attack at King hour [1000, 23 June], making its main
effort initially on its right. Seize Objective O •”> and.
on Division order, advance and seize Objective 0-0. It
will assist the 2d Mar Div by rapid advance and by
tire and maneuver, on call, in the vicinity of t ho boun-
dary between these divisions. HOT 100 reverts to con-
trol of the 27th Inf Div at 0000, 23 June.

The prescribed zone of action of the 27th Di-
vision would place it in the center, between
the two Marine divisions, in the process reduc-
ing the 4th Marine Division's frontage by pass-
ing through the left regiment (25th Marines).13

The 27th Division’s attack plan placed the
165th Infantry on the right of the division
front and the 106th Infantry on the left. In
reserve would be the 105th Infantry (less its
2d Battalion, operating under Northern Troops
and Landing Force control in the Nafutan
Point area). That General Ralph Smith mis-
understood the status of the 2d Battalion, 105th
Infantry, is indicated by the inclusion of a
mission for it in paragraph 3. d. of Ids field
order for the day. Holland Smith considered
that, inasmuch as the battalion had been placed
under NTLF control at this time, there was
neither cause nor justification for the 27th Di-
vision to assign it a mission.

In this connection, however, it is important
to point out that the mission thus assigned was:
not at variance with the order from NTLF.
Both instructed the 2d Battalion to “continue

12 General Ralph Smith was disappointed by this
change of decision, as he felt that one battalion was in-
sufficient for the job. On 23 .Tune he wri te Holland
Smith on the subject, recommending that personnel in
the vicinity of Aslito Airfied be warned of the possi-
bility of Japanese on Nafutan Point infiltrating the
lines of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, and attack-
ing the field. Ralph Smith asked that Seabees and air
force personnel take steps to provide security against
any such occurrence. The 27th Infantry Dirision In
World W ar II, 194.

18 NTLF Operation Order 10-44.

131

operations to mop up remaining enemy detach-
ments in Nafutan Point area.” As to the time
the “operations” were to begin, the NTLF
order specified “at daylight,” while the 27th
Division order failed to mention tire time.14
This may have been an inadvertent omission
rather than an intentional change. The fact
that gave the NTLF stall' and, particularly,
General Holland Smith the greatest concern
was that a subordinate unit was receiving
orders from two sources. And, where those
orders varied in even the slightest detail, there
was a possibility of confusion.

To forestall any further misunderstanding
on the exact status of the 2d Battalion, 105th
Infantry, the Corps Commander sent a mes-
sage to the 27th Division Commander at 1411,
23 June: “2d Battalion. 105tli by my op order
10-44 not under your tactical control and
should not be included in your tactical orders.
Please take steps to rectify.” 15

Owing to the lateness of the afternoon and
unfamiliar nature of the road network, Gen-
eral Ralph Smith decided to undertake the
movement to the line of departure at dawn of
23 June rather than during darkness. In the
meanwhile, he ordered the commanding officers
of the 1 65th and 106th Infantry Regiments to
reconnoiter their zones and positions. The
106th, which had been in an assembly area a
day longer, made a complete reconnaissance,
but the 165th, freshly withdrawn from Nafu-
tan Point, was frustrated by the coming of
darkness.10

Night of 22-23 June

Along the entire front, the sentence from the
Sth Marines' report applied: “The night was
unusually quiet." By D-plus 7, a night dis-
turbed by only a few rounds of Japanese
mortar fire or an infrequent blast from an
enemy rifleman, could indeed be classified as
“unusually quiet.” And yet, on closer inspec-
tion. men got killed and wounded that night.
And for them, there was never a noisier night,

11 >' Hi Inf Dir /'. O. #4<>. NTLF Operation Order
it 1 0-44.

NTLF G— 3 Journal. 23.Tune44.

1,1 Letup, 14-15. 106 Inf Report, 4.

Four pugnacious Japanese leaped into the
foxhole of Sergeant Major Gilbert L. Morton,
acting platoon leader in Company K, 25th Ma-
rines. Rather than endanger friendly troops
by firing, Morton used his carbine as a bludg-
eon. Marines from nearby foxholes joined the
spirited brawl and killed all of the intruders
in a matter of minutes. During the fracas, one
of the enemy struck the sergeant major over
the head with a rifle butt, but the blow was not
fatal.17

Japanese artillery became suddenly active
during the night. Commencing shortly after
midnight, enemy pieces (estimated as 75mm,
5- and 6-inch) in the vicinity of Mt, Tapotchau,
opened up on the assembly area of the 106th
Infantry and firing positions of the 14th Ma-
rines. The latter retaliated with fires on areas
suspected of concealing the enemy guns, but
the regiments’ flash teams failed to spot the
enemy firing positions.18

Just before midnight Japanese artillery
firing from Tinian shelled Green Beach. This
fire ceased when Battery B, 531st Field Ar-
tillery Battalion, opened with a vehement re-
buttal, (This battery was the only one laid
for firing at Tinian at the time.) Although
damage to beach installations was negligible,
LST 119, which was beached and unloading
supplies, was holed at the waterline. One com-
partment of the LST was flooded by the shell
hole, and steering gear and electrical wiring
were damaged.

Just after the shelling from Tinian had sub-
sided, Japanese aircraft appeared over Saipan
anchorage. Three raids by three to five planes
each developed within the next two and one-
half hours. The only loss was sleep; inaccuracy
of Japanese bombing, as well as of ships’ anti-
aircraft gunfire, made it a bloodless perform-
ance.10

Japanese Situation

On the morning of 22 June, Major General
Iketa, chief of staff of the Japanese 31st Army,
sent a situation report to headquarters of the
29th Division located on Yap:

17 3d Bn. 25th Mar Report. 9.

18 l.'ith Mar Report. 7. 106th Inf Report, 4.

19 TF 51 Report, Annex 1 to Enel A.

132

1. About two companies of enemy have advanced into
valley west of Ilill 28520 south of foot of Mt. Tapot-
chau. In the Laulau Bay area about four or five enemy
tanks have appeared in front of our positions. In the
enemy positions south of Garapan there are three lines
of barbed wire. Naval gunfire is as insistent as before.

2. We have finally completed consolidation of all
units. A part of the Homare [4.‘?d Division] staged a
night attack on Hill 163 21 west of Tsutsuuran last
■ night but results are not known. [See page 124.]

In a message addressed to his assistant chief
of stall', to the vice minister of war, and to the
29th Division’s commanding general, Iketa
summarized the situation regarding unit com-
manders :

Colonel Oka (CO Mixed Brigade) is believed to have
died in breakthrough at Charan Kanoa, dawn of the
18th. Colonel Arima (CO 9th Expeditionary Unit)
wounded in battle, hospitalized. Colonel Goto (CO 9th
Tank Regiment), whereabouts unknown since night of
16th. Believed to have died in battle. Colonel Koga-
nezawa (CO 7th Engineers) missing since morning of
19th, believed to have died in battle. Lieutenant Colonel
Nakajima (CO 3d Independent Mountain Artillery)
wounded, hospitalized.

In a later message, the voluble general esti-
mated Japanese combat strength as follows:

Homare units [43d Division] — four battalions in-
fantry (two battalions have not yet participated in the
battle); 13 field artillery pieces: Mixed Brigade — no
combat strength ; Former Expeditionary Force — one-
half infantry battalion; other infantry units — organ-
ized strength about one battalion; tanks — two com-
panies; Army Artillery — none: Anti-Aircraft — about
one battery ; Machine Guns — about one company ; Army
Engineers — organized strength about one company. The
personnel is comparatively strong and the Division
(including attached units) numbers about 9,000. For
other units although they number about 6,000 in per-
sonnel, their fighting ability is reduced by lack of
weapons.

To the 50th Infantry Regiment located on
Tinian, General Iketa issued instructions to
shell Aslito Airfield “at a time when the enemy
planes are concentrated there.” Plans to rein-

20 Hill 285 (unnamed and unnumbered on U. S. maps)
was located about one mile southwest of Tapotchau’s
crest and less than one-half mile southeast of Tipo
Pale. The “enemy here referred to was elements of
the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines (right unit of the 6tli
Regiment), and the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines (left
unit of the 8th Regiment).

21 Hill 163 was designated Hill 500 on U. S. maps. It
had been seized on 20 June by the 3d Battalion, 25th
Marines.

force the beleaguered Saipan garrison are in-
dicated in his message to the 29lh Division:

Until we break the enemy air and sea superiority
which be has completely at the moment, transporta-
tion of troops from Guam is extremely dillieult.
Furthermore we are investigating the possibilities of
transport of small units from Tinian under cover of
darkness.

Keeping other units informed of the Saipan
activities consumed a great portion of Iketa’s
time. Ilis report on the evening of 22 June
revealed determination and hope while at the
same time admitting that the enemy had made
substantial advances :

The enemy [6th Marines] in vicinity of Hill 230 22
has attacked our positions on the east side of the same
hill. This has been repulsed. The enemy [8th Marines]
south of Hill 343 22 is infiltrating through our positions
accompanied by tanks and it is not known at present
whether we can hold this hill. Division contemplates
smashing the aforesaid enemy tonight.22

But the “aforesaid enemy" had other plans.

Air Activity

The 19th Army Fighter Squadron (P-47’s)
landed on Aslito Airfield during the day and
assumed responsibility for the combat air
patrol. This squadron, part of the 318th
Fighter Group of the Seventh Air Force, was
joined on 23 June by the 73d Squadron, bring-
ing the total of rocket-firing P-47’s at Saipan
to 111. These squadrons were launched from
the CVE’s Natorna Bay and Manila Bay , re-
spectively, 60 miles off Saipan. Admiral Turner
elaborates on the work of the Army P-47’s as
follows :

. . . the P-47’s were very extensively used for troop
support . . . they could make many more flights per day
from the field than could planes from a carrier; they
were available for extensive personal briefing by
troops; and they could carry more bombs and more
rockets than could carrier planes.24

In addition to the P-47’s, two flights of P-61
“Black Widows” of the 6th Night Fighter
Squadron flew to Saipan from Oahu, arriving-
in time to take part in an air defense mission

22 Hills 230 and 343 were unnamed and unnumbered
on U. S. maps. The former was the first high ground
west of Tipo Pale and the latter about 1,200 yards
south of Tapotchau’s crest.

23 CINCPAC-CINGPOA Hem #99.83-85. 15-16. All
foregoing Japanese quotes from this source.

24 Turner.

133

moving UP on the morning of 23 June are men of the
27th Division. Later in the day these soldiers encoun-
tered a stubborn foe in Death Valley.

on 24 June. This was the first appearance of
these planes in the Central Pacific.25

During daylight of 22 June, combat air
patrols from the escort carriers shot down
three Japanese bombers within a 45-mile radius
of Saipan. In the late afternoon, a single
Japanese torpedo plane sneaked undetected
over Saipan anchorage at a very low altitude
and launched a torpedo into the Maryland.
The projectile exploded on the port side, caus-
ing serious damage and reducing the battle-
ship’s speed to 10 knots. The next day, she pro-
ceeded to Pearl Harbor for repairs.26

D-PLUS 8—23 JUNE

The Introduction to Death Valley

The NTLF operation order for 23 June set
1000 as the attack hour. With the arrival of
the 27th Division in the center of the Corps
front, the 4th Division’s zone of action would
be narrowed. This would allow the latter to
pull tlie left regiment (25th Marines) into re-
serve and to swing the attack out on Kagman
Peninsula.

2r> TF 51 Report. Knot A, S. The AAF Against Japan ,
ISO-191. One Damned Island After [nother, C. Howard
and .7. Whitley, Chapel Hill, University of North
Carolina Press, 1946. 223-224. These were U. S. Army
Air Force night fighters. The first U. S. Marine night
fighter squadron (VMF(N)-532) did not arrive at
Saipan until 12 July 1944.

-'•'ll 51 Report. Enel A, 8; Annex 1 to Enel A;
Enel L.

The 27th Division’s movement to the line of
departure, an uphill hike of about four miles,
commenced at daylight. The march was com-
plicated, however, by the 165th Infantry’s
taking the wrong road and ending up on the
same road as the 106th Infantry.27 This situa-
tion caused delay and some confusion; but,
after a conference between Colonels Kelley and
Ayres, commanders of the 165th and 106th,
respectively, the difficulty was ironed out and
the 165th moved cross country to its assigned
route.

The 165th Regiment proceeded to the front
and accomplished the relief of the Marines in
its assigned area at about 1000.28 Lieutenant
Colonel McDonough, commanding the 2d Bat-
talion, recommended to Colonel Kelley that his
unit wait for the 106th to come abreast before
moving out in the attack. Colonel Kelley con-
curred in this recommendation, directing
McDonough to “await the arrival of the 106th
and to push his attack when contact with the
106th had been made.”29

Finally, at about 1055, the 106th Infantry
jumped off, joined by the 165th when the two
units were abreast. The first-named regiment
complained that the line of departure was held
by the enemy and that the 4th Marine Division
lines (through which it was to pass) were
located approximately 400 to 500 yards short
of the line shown on the NTLF Operation
Overlay.30 One Company (Iv, 25th Marines)
had. in fact, been pulled back to its right rear
on the previous evening to tie in the night
defense; but, otherwise, 4th Division troops re-
mained on the most forward ground taken on
22 June.

The nature of the terrain facing the 27th In-
fantry Division was to have an unusually vital

27 The 106th Infantry Report blames this situation
on an error by guides furnished from the 4th Marine
Division.

28 Colonel Kelley felt that it was “. . . of interest to
note here that the Marines we relieved expressed their
happiness at being relieved from this zone of action, as
they considered it the strongest position they had run
up against.”

29 165 Inf Report. 5. Kelley. Letup.

30 1 06 Inf Report, 4.

134

bearing on the unit’s operations for many days
to come. This terrain is well described by the
historian attached to the division at Saipan :

The whole mountain [Tapotehau] was stoutly de-
fended by the enemy, but the situation on the two
flanks of it was Somewhat unusual. On the west side
of the peak, the ground sloped sharply to the sea. On
the east, Kagman Point side, it dropped in sheer cliffs
to a bench or plateau, some six hundred feet below the
summit. This plateau, a saddle-shaped piece of land,
was some twelve hundred yards across and bordered on
the east by a low chain of hills covered with heavy
foliage. Beyond them the ground sloped down to Kag-
man Point on the east or dropped off abruptly to
Magieienne Bay on the southeast. The cliffs of Mt.
Tapotehau and the chain of hills made a corridor out of
the plateau. In the fighting which ensued this corridor
was named I>eath Valley by tbe men who fought there
and the chain of hills came to be known as Purple
Heart Ridge.31

The 165th Infantry, attacked with two bat-
talions in assault, one in reserve. The 1st Bat-
talion, in contact with the 2.3d Marines on the
right, moved forward without serious trouble,
but the 2d Battalion met frontal fire from
Death Valley, and, more seriously, from the
high ground to the left within the 106th In-
fantry's zone. Because of this, the 165th’s 23
June advances averaged only about 400 yards.32

The 106th Infantry, attacking with bat-
talions in column, 3d (Lieutenant Colonel
Harold I. Mizony, USA) leading, experienced
considerable trouble. From the cliff line on the
left flank, Japanese riflemen and machine gun-
ners, hidden in caves, delivered accurate fire on
the soldiers moving below them. A further
slowing factor was a Japanese ammunition
dump which was exploded by weapons of the
3d Battalion's Antitank platoon. The spray
of shell fragmentation continued for about two
hours, completely immobilizing the left assault
unit (Company L).

Following a sound pommeling of the cliff
positions by medium tanks at 1315, the attack
moved out, only to be reversed by the enemy
“cavemen.” A second effort on the heels of a
thundering artillery preparation fired by the
105mm howitzers of tbe 104th Field Artillery
Battalion resulted in similar failure, arid at the

The 27th’* Buttle For Saipan, 12.

32 165th I tif Report, 5.

end of the day the 106th Infantry’s front re-
mained on the line of departure. No physical
contact existed with the 2d Marine Division,
moving atop the cliff line on the left. Late in
the afternoon, Company F, 106th Infantry, was
dispatched on a mission of gaining physical
contact with the Marines; but, though this unit
successfully tied itself to the 2d Division flank,
the situation was not materially improved, in-
asmuch as by then the company was out of
contact with the remainder of the 27th Divi-
sion. More detail on this commitment is con-
tained in the narrative of the 8th Marines on
23 June.

At 1715, the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry
(Major Almerin C. O’Hara, USA), was or-
dered into the lines on the left of the 3d Bat-
talion, and in this formation the 106th Infantry
dug in for the night. The day’s gains were
negligible.33

The 27th Division’s 23 June activities were
extremely disappointing to General Holland
Smith, who, following a mid-afternoon staff
conference, summoned Major General Sander-
ford Jarman, USA, Saipan Garrison Force
commander, to discuss the situation. Of this
meeting, Jarman writes:

. . . He [Holland Smith] outlined to me the many
things that had happened with respect to tbe failure
of the 27th Div to advance. He indicated that this
division had suffered scarcely no casualties and in his
opinion he didn’t think they would fight. He asked my
advice. I could give him none because I didn’t feel it
was up to me to make any recommendation or make
any decisions for him. He stated that if it was not an
Army division and there would be a great cry set up
more or less of a political nature, he would immediately
relieve the division commander and assign someone
else. After discussing the matter with me he asked me
to go see General Ralph Smith, the Div Commander
and see what 1 could do in helping this division to move
forward. I immediately proceeded to the Hq. 27th Div
and waited until General Smith returned at about
1845. I found that General Smith had been up to the
front lines all afternoon and was thoroughly familiar
with the situation. I talked to General Smith and ex-
plained the situation as I saw it and that I felt from
reports from the Corps Commander that his division
was not carrying its full share. He immediately replied
that such was true ; that he was in no way satisfied
with what his regimental commanders had done during

33 106th Inf Report, 5.

135

the day and that he had been with them and had
pointed out to them the situation. He further indicated
to me that he was going to he present tomorrow, 24
June with this division when it made its jump-off and
he would personally see to it that the division went
forward. I explained my interest in the matter was
that I was senior Army commander present and was
anxious to see that the Army did its job as it should
be done. He appreciated the situation and thanked me
for coming to see him and stated that if he didn’t take
his division forward tomorrow he should be relieved.34

Operations at Hill 600

The 4th Division’s 23 June plan provided
for an attack with two regiments abreast, 24tli
Ma rines on the right along the beach and 23d
Marines on the left; the 1st Battalion, 23d
Ma rines, would constitute the division reserve.
Objective 0-5A would be seized initially, fol-
lowed by the move to 0-6 (including all of
Kagman Peninsula) .

The division launched its assault at 1000 as
scheduled.

The 23d Marines, attacking with battalions
in column, Dillon’s 2d Battalion leading, ad-
vanced rapidly over rough terrain against
machine-gun and rifle fire from Hill 600.
Approached from the south. Hill 600 presented
an extremely steep slope; and, in the words of
the battalion commander, “It was all you could
do to climb it, let alone light up it.” The num-
ber of Japanese defending the height was not
great, but the area was admirably suited for
defense and, for about 30 minutes, the fight
was close and vicious. Hand grenades passed
back and forth as in an overgrown, uncon-
trolled game of “hot potato.”

Despite their struggle against gravity and
an obstinate foe, Dillon’s Marines seized the
peak and set up a hasty defense against coun-
terattack. Atop the hill were the bodies of
several men identified as belonging fo the 3d
Battalion, 24th Marines. These were probably
casualties from a patrol which had moved
well forward of the front lines on the previous
day. Among them was a radio operator, who
had managed to destroy his SCR 300 before
succumbing.

From its newly-won position, Dillon’s bat-
talion had an unimpaired view of the whole

34 Memo for Record, MajGen S. Jarman, 23Jun44.

of Kagman Peninsula. This surge had been
executed without benefit of contact with the
27th Division on the left; and, when it was
apparent that the latter was still some distance
to the rear. General Schmidt ordered the 23d
to hold up its advance until Army elements
had tied in.

Though the peak of the hill was securely in
the hands of the 2d Battalion, the battle con-
tinued. The hill’s northern slope, cloaked in
thick vegetation, was alive with Japanese sol-
diers. Dillon endeavored to strip them of their
concealment by burning the area with flame-
throwers, but the efforts were largely unsuc-
cessful. Throughout the remainder of the day
and during the night the grenade pitching con-
tinued.35

While the 23d Regiment worried about its
open left flank and tried to achieve contact
with the 27th Division, Colonel Hart’s 24th
Marines drove along the coast of Magicienne
Bay. Roth well’s 2d Battalion, on the right,
made fast progress, hampered only by flanking
fire from the southeastern slopes of Hill 600.
By midafternoon it had pushed a salient to
objective 0-5. The left assault battalion (3d),
however, was retarded by the necessity of
dragging its inland flank to maintain contact
with the 23d Regiment. The 1st Battalion fol-
lowed the echeloned assault units as regimental
reserve. Results of the day’s activities in the
24th Marines’ zone were good on the right,
perforce retarded on the left.

All in all, the speed of the 4th Division’s 23
June advance was considerably delayed by the
Army unit’s late arrival. Contact was finally
established with the right element of the 27th
Division (1st Battalion, 165th Infantry) by
bending the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, back
along the western slopes of Hill 600.3G

Colonel Batchelder’s 25th Marines, when
passed through by the 27th Division, reverted
to NTLF reserve. The regiment moved to Hill
500, 3,000-odd yards to the rear, and estab-
lished a. perimeter defense around it. This was

35 Dillon. 28(1 Mar Report, 40—42. 2d Bn, 23d Mar
Report, 3—4.

36 21/th Mar Report, 20. 1st, 2d and 3d Bn, 21/th Mar
Reports, 5 of all reports.

136

tlie first day of several to follow during which
the depleted 25th would remain in general re-
serve. Lieutenant Colonel Chambers, a con-
cussion casualty on the previous afternoon,
returned to resume command of the 3d Bat-
talion.37

. . Focal Points of Combat.”

The 2d Division’s 23 June operation order
called for a continuation of the pivoting move-
ment on the 2d Marines, with the 6th and 8th
Marines seizing 0-5.

The 8th Marines began its advance at 1000
except on the right, where the 106th Infantry’s
late arrival made forward movement imprac-
tical. In response to Colonel Wallace’s request
of 22 June, the 8th Regiment was provided
with an observation plane from VMO-2 to
search for routes of supply and evacuation in
the Tapotchau area. The observer, Lieutenant
Colonel Julian, regimental executive officer,
discovered a road along the mountain’s lower
slopes which had not been visible to ground
reconnaissance. News of this was gratefully
received, as the route would he helpful in solv-
ing the critical logistical problems that faced
the regiment. Other points disclosed by the
flight were: the only approach to the top of Mt.
Tapotchau appeared to be the ridge along the
division right boundary, and advance along
this ridge would he possible only after seizure
of a high, rocky cliff formation dominating it
from the northwest.

The 8th Marines’ left and center (in the
zones of the 1st and 3d Battalions) advanced
slowly against light resistance but difficult up-
and-down terrain. By 1130, because of the
inability of the right flank to move, the advance
was held up. The 1st Battalion. 29th Marines,
on the right of the 8th Marines’ front, bent
every effort to locate and contact the 106th
Infantry; but at 1345, when there was still no
sign of that regiment, General Watson ordered
the 8th Marines to continue the attack without
relation to the 106th. Colonel Wallace in turn
ordered the attack forward and moved Cham-
berlin’s 2d Battalion, 8th M arines, into posit ion
behind the 1st Battalion, 29tli, to protect the

37 25th Mar Report, 0.

889590°— 50— 10

right flank. Major Chamberlin immediately
dispatched a Marine patrol into the 27th Divi-
sion’s zone in yet another attempt to establish
physical contact between the two divisions.
And, again, the patrol returned without being
able to locate units in that zone.

After resumption of the attack, the 1st Bat-
talion, 29th Marines, moved rapidly and seized
the cliff that dominated the route to Mt. Ta-
potchau. On the left, however, Hays' 1st
Battalion, 8th Marines, ran into a strong point
of about 30 Japanese riflemen and six heavy
machine guns. The Japanese, dug into the
walls of a ravine overlooking the 1st Battalion's
zone, were well prepared to present a formid-
able challenge to any advance through the
area. With admirable understatement, the
battalion action report described the reduction
of the strong point as “difficult going.”
Throughout the remainder of the day, all
available weapons were concentrated on the
strong point, but the area was still in enemy
hands as darkness fell.

In the late afternoon, Major Chamberlin led
a squad-sized patrol into the 27th Division’s
zone in an effort to gain contact. This time at
last lie was able to locate the command post of
the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, where he dis-
cussed the situation with the battalion com-
mander (Major O’Hara). Pointing out that
it would be desirable for one Army company to
return with him in order to tie in with his
battalion, Chamberlin further reasoned that
it would then be easier for two companies of
the same battalion to establish contact than it
had been for the two divisions. The Army
officer agreed in principle but felt that a
smaller unit would do as well. At this juncture
Major General Ralph Smith, then in the
process of touring his front lines, appeared on
the scene. After listening to Chamberlin’s sug-
gestion, General Smith concurred and ordered
that a company return to the Marine lines with
Chamberlin.

At about dusk Chamberlin came trudging
back with a long file of soldiers — Company F,
106th Infantry. Although this company was
inserted in the line on the right flank to assist
in protecting this exposed area, the situation
otherwise was not materially improved, since

137

the company was then out of contact with the
rest of the 27th Division. Company F remained
atop the cliff with the Marines for several
days, performing all assigned missions in an
excellent manner. Because of separation from
its parent command, the company drew upon
the Marine unit for supplies.

As the 8th Marines dug in for the night, the
right boundary rested on the ridge line which
fell abruptly to a deep gorge (called “Death
Valley” by men of the 27th Division). In tying
in the night’s defenses, it was necessary to
commit all four battalions of the 8th Marines
to the lines; the three assault battalions faced
generally north, while the 2d Battalion bent
back along the ridge, facing toward the ex-
posed eastern flank. To assist further in the
task of refusing and protecting this wing, a
37mm gun platoon of the Regimental Weapons
Company was used in the ridge line-gorge area
with guns pointed east.

The most practicable route for Japanese
tanks into the 8th Marines’ area was a narrow
road entering from the right rear. To prevent
enemy use of this road, a bulldozer was parked,
blade down, at the narrowest point. In this
position, it blocked tank advance down the
road, while the terrain on either side denied
movement around it. A vital (unidentified)
part of the motor was removed to prevent the
Japanese from driving the bulldozer clear of
the area, and the machine remained an effec-
thre road block throughout the night. In the
morning it was a simple matter to replace the
motor part and use the bulldozer for its normal
tasks. This ingenious employment was con-
tinued during the several days that the 8th
Ma rines remained in the immediate area.

Regimental patrols operating north and
northeast of the lines destroyed one small
enemy patrol and observed two others. From
this Japanese activity, it was feared that the
enemy was aware of the gap that existed be-
tween the 8th Marines and the 106th Infantry.
All hands were alerted to the possibility of
Japanese moves through this area, and prepa-
rations were made to stop any thrust.

Late in the day, two platoons of the 2d Divi-
sion Reconnaissance Company were attached

to the 8th Marines. Colonel Wallace, in turn,
sent them to join the 1st Battalion, 29t,h Ma-
rines, with which they remained until 5 July.

The 8th Marines’ logistical problems were
temporarily lessened when a road, spotted by
Lieutenant Colonel Julian on his OY flight
earlier in the day, was reached by assault
units. Immediately, a bulldozer began carving
a lane through a rugged ridge to connect with
the newly found supply route. Even with the
improvement, however, supply and evacuation
would remain great problems in the Mt. Tapot-
chau region for days to come. The logistical
situation would get worse before it got better.38

Soon after the 6th Marines launched its
1000, 23 June, attack, elements of the right
flank battalion (2d Battalion, 2d Marines) were
pinched out by the reduced frontage. At 1100
all of the latter unit had been relieved from
the lines except Company F, which remained
attached to the 6th Marines and occupied the
extreme right portion of that regiment’s lines.
The rest of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines,
moved to an assembly area in division reserve
and in the afternoon reverted to parent control
for the first time since D-Day. In a related
move, the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, which had
operated as part of the 2d Regiment since 16
June, returned to the 6th Marines.

The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, on the regi-
ment’s left (pivot) flank, did not advance dur-
ing the day. Like the 2d Marines (farther to
the left), the positions were already forward
to such a point that further movement would
impose a severe contact strain. For this reason,
the day was spent in patrolling the projected
zone of advance. This paid dividends; one
Jaj lanese mountain gun and several machine
guns, together with their crews, were destroyed
in the foothills southeast of Garapan.

The only significant advance by the 6th Ma-
rines occurred in the zone of Major Rentsch’s
3d Battalion. Here the main difficulty experi-
enced was from the rough terrain which ca-
nalized forward movement to a single narrow

38 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 10-11. 8th Mar
Report, 4—5. 1st Bn, 8tli Mar Report, 6. Interview with
Maj W. C. Chamberlin, 14Apr49, hereinafter cited as
Chamberlin.

138

trail. This condition prohibited rapid travel
or even a coordinated attack. The day’s ad-
vances totalled but 300—400 yards, and the
Japanese strong point north of Tipo Pale
remained aggravatingly intact. But good con-
tact existed on both flanks as the 6th Marines
dug in for the night.30

The constant pressure which the 6th and 8th
Marines exerted against the dominating ter-
rain in Saipan’s center caused the Japanese
31st Army chief of staff to write that Ta-
potchau and the hills to the south and west
were “gradually turning into focal points of
combat.” 40

In preparation for moves forward, the 2d
M arines removed the minefield which it had
placed along the beach road. Other activity
consisted of replacing the 2d Battalion, 6th
Marines, with Kyle’s 1st Battalion, 2d Marines.
In the afternoon, when the 2d Battalion (less
Company F) returned to regimental control,
it was placed in reserve. Anticipating subse-
quent needs upon seizing Garapan, (lie 2d
Division attached a small group of military
police and an armored bulldozer to the 2d
Marines.

During the afternoon of 23 June some of the
2d Division Shore Party personnel became
available for other missions, as the unloading
of ships neared completion. General Watson
directed that initially a provisional battalion
of two companies (each of five officers and
120 men) he formed from these personnel. As
additional shore party troops became avail-
able, more of such companies would be formed
and employed as division reserve units. Even-
tually, they would become a replacement pool
to strengthen depleted units.41

General Holland Smith was greatly dis-
pleased with the failure of the 27th Division
to attack on time. Ilis disappointment with
the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, was for a
similar reason. This unit, removed from the
27th Division to operate directly under NTLF

39 2d Mar l)ir Report, Section VI, 11. 6th Mar Report,
7-8.

40 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 17.

41 2d Mar Dir Report. Section VI, 11-12.

control, was to attack Nafutan Point “at day
light” of 23 June. The battalion did not com
mence its attack until 1330, and then only
minor actions were conducted. The day’s prog-
ress was practically negligible.42

Two unfortunate accidents occurred in this
area during the day. At noon a Japanese am-
munition dump located near the 2d Battalion’s
command post was blown by U. S. Army ord-
nance personnel, the blast resulting in live
casualties. Then, soon after the attack began,
friendly naval gunfire erroneously fired on the
unit’s command post, killing six and wounding
33 men. Among the casualties were several
key headquarters and communications person
nel, a loss acutely felt throughout the re-
mainder of the operation.43

Night of 23-24 June

At dusk a report was received by the three
divisions that Japanese troops and tanks were
massing in front of the 27th Infantry Divi-
sion. The expected enemy attack materialized
at about 1830, when Japanese tanks struck near
the boundary between the 165th and 106th In-
fantry Regiments. The combined efforts of
37mm guns and bazookas in the areas of the
2d Battalion, 165th, and the 3d Battalion,
106th, destroyed five Japanese tanks, but a
sixth escaped.

Tins was not enough for the intruders. At
about 1930, in company with infantrymen, five
more Japanese tanks struck the right center of
the 106th Infantry. The 3d Battalion’s Anti-
tank Platoon and the 1st Platoon of the Regi-
mental Cannon Company accounted for four
of the tanks while the fifth, though suffering
a hit, broke through the 3d Battalion’s lines.
Firing wildly, it sprayed the battalion aid sta-
tion with machine-gun bullets and set lire to a
large ammunition dump nearby. The result-
ant exploding shells forced the right of the 3d
Battalion to withdraw about 100 yards, ret urn -

42 It will be remembered that the 27th Division had
also issued an order to this unit for 23 June, an order
that was similar to the one from NTLF except that it
omitted the time that the move was to begin.

43 Narrative of Events, 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry,
June 22— July 3.

139

ing to its original positions after the lire had
burned itself out.44

Shortly after the attack on the 106th Infan-
try, the enemy lashed out in another tank
thrust, this time against the left of the 23d
Marines. The enemy machines attempted to
climb Hill 600 by moving along the road on
the western side but were met with bazooka
and 37mm fire from the 23d Marines as well
as the 1st Battalion, 165th Infantry. Of the
five Japanese tanks engaged in the assault,
three were destroyed and the other two re-
treated. Throughout the remainder of the
night this area remained a beehive of activity
with numerous but unsuccessful attempts at
infiltration by small bands of Japanese.45

There is indication that all three tank thrusts
were intended as part of the same attack, with
the Japanese tanks deploying in front of the
lines and assaulting in a more or less unco-
ordinated, haphazard manner.

Although the infantry regiments of the 2d
Marine Division experienced only sporadic
local activity, units of the 10th Marines (divi-
sion artillery regiment) were shelled by about
one battery of Japanese artillery, firing from
north and northeast of Mt. Tapotchau. While
many of the rounds (estimated variously as
75mm, 105mm and 6-inch) fell harmlessly,
many more found their intended mark. At
least one round hit directly in the regimental
lire direction center, located near the northern
end of I lie Clniran Kanoa airstrip, killing the
loth Marines’ Executive Officer, Lieutenant
Colonel Ralph E. Forsyth and wounding the
R— 2 (Captain Robert IV. Sullivan), R— 3
(Major Richard Church)40 and several key
noncommissioned officers. In addition, many
communication and control facilities were de-
stroyed. making it necessary for the 1st Bat-
talion to take over direction and coordination
of the regiment’s fire.4"

14 165tli Inf Report. 5. 106th Inf Report , 5.

45 23d Mar Report, 41. L. R. Jones.

46 Church laid assumed the R-3 duties on D— plus 1
after Lieutenant Colonel Howard V. ITiett was
wounded.

47 2d Mnr Dir Report, Section VI, 12. 10th Mar
Report. 3. Ltr from Maj It. W. Sullivan to CMC,
tt. I an. 10.

Captain Russell C. White, R-l of the 10tli
Marines, provides a description of the shelling,
together with an estimate of the fire’s density :

Approximately 39 rounds, fired in 13 three-gun
salvos, covered the regimental headquarters positions
in an area 35-45 feet wide and 100 feet long. The Japs
may have been trying to hit four or five OY’s which
were parked just north of us. In addition to Colonel
Forsyth, Captain Sullivan, and Major Church, we lost
Sergeant Major Baker and Staff Sergeant Michalski
(Operations Sergeant), both of whom died of wounds
received in this shelling.48

Japanese Plans and Actions

Japanese plans to reinforce Saipan by water
had progressed by 23 June to a point where de-
tailed instructions were transmitted. In a
joint order from the 31st Army and the Central
Pacific Fleet to Army and Navy Units on Rota
and Tinian and the 29th Division on Yap, de-
tails of movement to Saipan were prescribed:

1. I would like to have this transmitted to small boat
amphibious units.

a. Although enemy patrolling around Saipan is in-
tense ... it is comparatively light in the southeast,
small boat operations are possible from Tinian in an
easterly direction. Two or three destroyers are always
patrolling Tinian channel and off Laulau Bay.

b. Landing points — 1st plan: Coast east of Chacha,
river entrance at Mt. Hanichiru. . . .

c. As far as possible you should navigate deployed
and land at night. Reply regarding expected time of
arrival.

d. I wish to have the Army Navy Units here co-
operate in the complete concealment of aforementioned
units.

A peculiarity of this order is that no exact time
for the move is mentioned, only the direction to
“reply regarding expected time of arrival.”

On the evening of 23 June, General Iketa
summarized the situation as follows:

1. The enemy is moving the strong point of his
attack to the east and is advancing gradually under
cover of shelling and bombing. Hill east of Hill 230
[Tipo Pale] and Hill 285 have fallen into enemy
hands.40 Even though Hill 343 is still in our hands the
situation is unknown. Part of the enemy has infiltrated
into area east of Hill 343. 50 There is a report of four
tanks and about 200 infantry troops have advanced

48 Interview with Capt R. C. White, 8Dec49.

40 The “enemy” here referred to was the 3d Battalion,
6th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines.

50 The “enemy” here referred to was the 27th Divi-
sion, and more specifically, the 106th Infantry.

140

into Liiulau area.51 Details unknown. [Author's italics.]

2. The Honiara |43d Division] Units with the firm
decision to hold out until the last the hill line in pre-
vious paragraph expects to smash the enemy.

3. While there is no great change in the enemy tank
situation, land artillery is increasing daily. Bombings
against our rear supply areas is gradually increasing
in intensity.

, 4. According to a captured document the enemy is
the 4th Marine Division.

The uncertainty displayed in the first para-
graph of the foregoing report indicates the ex-
treme difficulties the Japanese experienced
maintaining communications among them-
selves. That this situation existed is a tribute
to the volume of artillery, naval gunfire and
air support which battered the Japanese with-
out respite.62

During daylight of 23 June the Japanese
made two feeble efforts at air interference. The
“several” planes that attacked auxiliary ships
(Task Unit 16.17.12) at 1205 failed to achieve
any hits but escaped without loss to themselves.
Later, two Japanese torpedo bombers were
intercepted and destroyed near Saipan by a
four-plane combat air patrol from the Mid-
way.

At 2212 a lone Japanese plane (perhaps try-
ing to duplicate the feat of the one that had
hit the Maryland the day before) dropped
three bombs 1,500 yards astern of the Louis-
ville and hastened from the area.

After midnight (at 0052) “several” Japa-
nese bombers made a reasonably successful at-
tack on U. S. shipping. Dropped over Saipan
from a very high altitude, bombs caused minor
damage from fragmentation to LCT 988. DCS
1461, PCS 1402, LST 222, and the Phaon
(ARB-3).54 A total of 18 casualties was caused
by bomb fragments. All of the raiders escaped
untouched.55

si Thu “200 infantry troops” here referred to were
from the 24th Marines.

52 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 17-18.

53 This was the escort carrier Midway. On 10 October
1944 its name was changed to Saint Lo. A large carrier
was later given the name Midway.

54 This ship, a battle-damage repair vessel, was
formerly LST 15.

55 TF 51 Report, Annex 1 to Enel A and Enel L.

D-PLUS 9—24 JUNE
To Garapan’s Outskirts

General Holland Smith’s attack order for 24
June directed a continuation of the drive to
objective 0—6. (See Map 17.) Seizure of this
would place Ragman Peninsula in L. S. hands
and greatly narrow the landing force front.
The scheme of maneuver involved a swing to
the east for the It It Marine Division and a
drive to the north by the 2d and 27th Divisions.
The time of attack was set for 0800. The 2d
Battalion, 105th Infantry, was ordered to con-
tinue operations at daylight of 24 dune to mop
up remaining detachments on Nafutan Point.
Flie NTLF reserve, Colonel Batclielder's 25th
M arines, would remain in the vicinity of Hill
500 prepared to defend that hill and to send
out antisniper patrols in the area around and
east of Lake Susupe.50

For the 2d Marine Division the attack had
at last progressed to a [joint which allowed the
left flank regiment, the 2d Marines, to advance.
Attacking with the 1st and 3d Battalions
abreast, 1st on the right, the advance started
rapidly, the 3d Battalion moving 500 yards
along the beach in the first hour. The 1st Bat-
talion, however, encountered heavy automatic
weapons fire from a ridge southeast of Gara-
pan, which held up its advance. After estab-
lishing tire superiority, mainly with organic
mortars and 105mm howitzers of the 4th Bat-
talion, 10th Marines, the battalion moved to
the ridge’s crest. This was at 1500.

Almost immediately after the seizure, pe-
culiar activity was observed just forward of
the hill: Japanese officers, brandishing sabers
and shouting strident commands, were attempt-
ing to incite about one platoon of enemy sol-
diers to attack the well -positioned 1st Bat-
talion atop the ridge. From the north, as the
Japanese counterattackers were forced to ap-
proach, the ridge presented a formidable ob-
stacle, being virtually a cliff. Difficulties not-
withstanding, the Japanese made the effort;
but, with two hands required to scale the slope
and another to throw grenades or wave sabers,
they were one hand short from the outset. The

56 NTLF Operation Order 11-44.

141

inching forward at garapan'S desoiate outskirts, men of 2d Murines take advantage of the cover afforded by a small
rise.

ridge’s steepness is revealed in tlie fact that
front line Marines were forced to lean forward
to depress the muzzles of their rifles sufficiently
to hit their attackers.

Following the repulse the 1st Battalion dug
in on the ridge overlooking “Radio Road.”
which, running at right angles to the direction
of advance, was a convenient stopping point.
Not only did it practically coincide with ob-
jective ()— (I, hut also it ran along the northern
slopes of a dominating ridge, an important
tactical locality for the defense of the right
half of the regimental sector.

'Fhe day’s excitement was not over for the 2d
Marines, however. At about 1625, as the left
assault battalion (3d) commenced preparations
for its defense of the flat land along the beach,
seven Japanese tanks suddenly moved from
(iarapan’s southern ruins and attacked. Since
no enemy infantry accompanied this thrust, it

is not clear what the tanks hoped to accom-
plish. “Johnny-on-the-spot" medium tanks
from Company C, 2d Tank Battalion, and four
75mm half-tracks (hastily rushed to the scene)
opened fire accurately on the advancing enemy
machines, destroying six and routing the
seventh. Thereafter, the day was uneventful
with the 3d Battalion holding up its advance
along Radio Road in contact with the 1st Bat-
talion.

The 1st Provisional Battalion, composed of
two companies formed from shore party per-
sonnel. was attached to the 2d Marines in the
late afternoon. Colonel Stuart employed this
unit with the reserve (2d Battalion), now dug
in behind the front lines, thus providing
greater depth to the regiment’s defense. Men
of the 2d Marines were destined to remain
along Radio Road for several days.57

57 2d Mar Report, 4. Kyle. Interview with Maj H. K.

142

JAPANESE LIGHT tanks were no match for United States
medium tanks. This one was knocked out by a 75mm
armor-piercing shell.

In the center of the 2d Division zone, the Gtli
Marines advanced about 900 yards on the left
(1st Battalion zone) but very little on the right
(3d Battalion zone). The difference in yardage
gained was in direct proportion to terrain dif-
ficulties. On the right, thickly-wooded cliffs
and ravines — all of which had to be investi-
gated— retarded the advance. Company K con-
tinued for the third day its task of reducing
the north Tipo Pale strong point. The outer
fringes of the area had been whittled some-
what, but the core remained strong.

As the regiment stopped for the night, the 3d
Battalion, covering a front of 1,500 yards, was
overextended and having difficulty maintain-
ing contact with adjacent units, this in spite of
the fact that the 3d Battalion had live rifle
companies: its own three, plus Company F, 2d
Marines, and Company F, 6th Marines. Good
contact was finally established, however, as the
6th Marines dug in for the night.58

On the right of the 2d Marine Division, the
8th Marines continued the fight over night-
marish terrain. As Lieutenant Colonel Hays’
lsl Battalion moved into the attack, the

Throneson, 20.Tul49, hereinafter cited as Throneson.
Interview with Capt L. V. Brooks, 8Aug49, hereinafter
cited as Brookx.

■'* (ifh War Report, 8.

troublesome pocket, developed on the previous
day, came alive again. Matted with under-
growth and trees, the irregular coral limestone
formation was favorable for the type of de-
fense the Japanese were employing. Improv-
ing the area’s natural assets, they had de
v eloped a honeycomb of underground posi
tions. The 1st Battalion, utilizing the most un-
spectacular of tactics, plodded at its unpleasant
task of sealing the caves and killing the occu-
pants. The former chore proved the easier,
since in most cases the Japanese had not neg
lected to plan routes and methods of escape.
When the “cavemen" had done as much damage
as possible from one position, they would re-
tire to another from which to resume the fight.

Shortly after midday, the coordinated efforts
of combat engineers (armed with flame-throw-
ers, bazookas and demolitions) and riflemen
showed results; the pocket was eliminated and
contact with the 6th Marines again established.
(Contact had been temporarily broken during
the morning while the 1st Battalion struggled
through the labyrinth.) By late afternoon the
battalion reached the edge of a vast cleared
area, desirable from the defense-for-the-night
point of view. Since the next satisfactory site
was TOO yards farther to the north, the unit
halted and dug in.

Major Larsen’s 3d Battalion, advancing
along the base of a cliff, made good progress,
limited only by fairly difficult terrain* (com
mon to the entire Tapotchau region) and the
necessity of maintaining contact with flank
units.

Above the 3d Battalion, along the top of the
cliff, moved Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins’ 1st
Battalion. 29th Marines. Here the cliff was
broken into a rough plateau dotted with
smaller plateaus of coral limestone which con
tinned rising like irregular stair steps toward
Mb Tapotcliau’s crest. The undergrowth in this
area was a tangle of fern trees, the roots of
which spread out three to eight feet above
ground like the ribs of an inverted umbrella,
overgrown and interlaced with a strait-jacket
of vines. On the battalion’s right flank was a
narrow flat ledge covered with grass five feet
high and the usual tangle of trees. This ledge.

143

part of the north-south ridge leading to Mt.
Tapotchau, was within machine-gun range of
the summit.

Moving through this intricate snarl was like
attempting to swim through a fishermen's net,
and Tompkins’ battalion became overextended.
At this juncture Colonel Wallace, command-
ing the 8th Marines, ordered the 2d Battalion
to move in behind Tompkins’ right (as it had
the previous night) to protect the open flank.
As the 8th Marines dug in for the night after
an advance of about 700 yards, it again became
essential to commit the 37mm Platoon from the
Regimental Weapons Company to extend south
along the ridge facing the hiatus between the
2d and 27th Divisions.59

The Troublesome Cliff

On the morning of 24 June, Lieutenant Gen-
eral Holland Smith sent a dispatch to Major
General Ralph Smith indicating his displeas-
ure over the previous day’s actions of the 27th
Infantry Division :

Commanding General is highly displeased with the
failure of the 27th Division on .Tune Twenty Third to
launch its attack as ordered at King Hour and the lack
of offensive action displayed by the division in its fail-
ure to advance and seize Objective 0-5 when opposed
only by small arms and mortar lire. The failure of the
27th Division to advance in its zone of action resulted
in the halting of attacks by the 4th and 2d Marine
Divisions on the flanks of the 27th in order to prevent
dangerous exposure of their interior flanks. It is di-
rected that immediate steps he taken to cause the 27th
Division to advance and seize objectives as ordered.60

As Major General Ralph Smith’s 27th Divi-
sion launched its attack down Death Valley on
24 June, Japanese mortar and machine-gun fire
concentrated on open ground between the 106th
Infantry’s right flank and the 165th’s left,
denying movement through the area. The ter-
rain was favorable to the enemy and he made
the most of it.

To complicate matters of control, heavy con-
centrations of Japanese mortar fire struck the
command posts of the 1st and 2d Battalions,
165th Infantry — the 2d Battalion’s at 0800 just
as the attack was launched, the 1st Battalion’s
at about 1500.

59 Sth Mar Report , 5-6. Chamberlin.

60 NTLF Operational Dispatches, Dispatch from CTO
56.1 to CG 271 h Inf Div, 24Jun44.

Having noticed that the progress of his regi-
ment was being delayed by fire from the enemy
to his left in the 106th Infantry’s zone of ac-
tion, Colonel Kelley ordered the 1st and 2d
Battalions, 165th Infantry, to maneuver to the
right, by-passing local points of resistance.
Soon after the move began, Colonel Kelley as-
signed the mission of mopping-up within the
regiment’s zone of action to the 1st Battalion.
After carefully coordinating the move, be or-
dered his 3d Battalion to detour to the right
through the area already cleared by the 23d
Marines and close up on the latter’s flank. By
darkness of 24 June the move and subsequent
establishment of contact had been accom-
plished. Whereas the gains within the 165th
Infantry’s zone of action had been relatively
small, the over-all result improved the situa-
tion as it affected future action.61

All forward movements in the 106th Infan-
try’s area, meanwhile, were stopped by Japa-
nese occupying positions in the cliff face on the
left flank. Advances of about 100 yards were
made by the 3d Battalion, but these hard-won
yards were relinquished when the positions be-
came untenable, and the battalion returned to
the line of departure. The 2d Battalion, peer-
ing constantly at, the cliff line in search of
enemy positions, made virtually no progress
during the day. In the words of the 106th In-
fantry’s action report :

These cliff positions were practically invulnerable to
our Artillery and mortar fire. Each position had to be
definitely located and brought under direct fire of self-
propelled mounts or tanks before neutralization could
be effected. In addition, it wa"s necessary to occupy
these positions with Infantry before their extermina-
tion was assured.

There was some indication that the 27th
Division’s commanding general was not
pleased tvith the 106th Infantry’s progress.
This displeasure was voiced in two dispatches
which arrived at the 106th Infantry during
the morning of 24 June:

Advance of 50 yards in 1% hours is most unsatis-
factory. Start moving at once.

Your failure to maintain contact with unit on your
left is most embarrassing. Advance on your left at
once.

61 Kelley. 7. 165th Inf Report , 5.

144

At 1150, Colonel Ayres, the 106th ’s com-
mander, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Cornett's
1st Battalion, which had been in regimental re-
serve, to relieve the 3d Battalion. The relief
was effected by 1515, the 3d Battalion moving
to an assembly area as the new reserve.6-

While losing two of its machines to enemy
mines, the 762d Tank Battalion, supporting
the 27th Division, knocked out four Japanese
tanks on 24 June.

As the 27th Division dug in for the night,
one company (F, 106th Infantry) was securely
tied to the right of the 2d Marine Division.
But, between that single company and the re-
mainder of the Army division existed a ver-
tical gap of several hundred yards.

After two days of fighting, Ralph Smith
decided to contain the Japanese forces in the
troublesome cliff with one battalion and to
move the remainder of the division around the
pocket : 165th leading, followed by the 106th
until objective 0-5 was reached. This move
was slated for 25 June.63

On Nafutan Point, meanwhile, the 2d Bat-
talion, 105th Infantry, had again failed to
make substantial headway. At 1000 a staff
officer of the NTLF G— 3 section visited the bat-
talion command post, located approximately
1,500 yards from the battalion’s lines. The bat-
talion commander reported that he did not
know what the situation was as he had not
heard from his company commanders.64

For the attack of 25 June Colonel Geoffrey
M. O’Connell, USA, chief of staff of the Sai-

62 After the campaign, when appearing before a board
of Army officers inquiring into the circumstances sur-
rounding the relief of Major General Ralph Smith,
Colonel Ayres was asked : “In your opinion, if your
regiment had rapidly pressed its attack and advanced
speedily across the open ground in your front, what
would have been the result?” “My candid opinion,”
answered Ayres, “is that the regiment would have
disappeared.”

63 Lemp, 16-17. 106th Inf Report, 6. 27th Division
G-.3 Journal, 24 June 1944.

64 Ltr from CG NTLF, Ser 0063-3, 27Jun44, Sub-
ject: Conduct of Operations by 2d Bn, 105th Inf in the
Nafutan Point Area. This letter omitted designation of
addressee who is assumed to have been Admiral Nimitz.
Admirals Spruance and Turner received copies.

pan Garrison Force, was placed in command
of the Nafutan Point effort, relieving Lieu-
tenant Colonel Leslie Jensen. To support
further attempts, Colonel O'Connell brought
in antiaircraft artillery: two batteries of 90mm
guns (A and B, 751st AAA Gun Battalion)
would fire from their regularly assigned posi-
tions, while four 40mm guns would move for-
ward where direct fire could be delivered
against caves and located enemy st rong points.
Control of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry,
passed to the commanding officer, Saipan Gar-
rison Forces at 1800, 24 June, but the bat-
talion’s mission was unchanged.65

To Chacha and Laulau

While the 2d Marine Division and the 27th
Infantry Division attacked to the north, the
4th Marine Division would swing east ward on
Ragman Peninsula. The attack was launched
at 0800, but a pocket of resistance on the right
of the 27th Division zone of action held up the
23d Marines’ movement from Hill 600. The
24th Marines on the right, however, met little
resistance and progressed rapidly.

About noon the 23d Marines detoured the
pocket and resumed the advance. The 3d Bat-
talion had moved up on the right of the 2d
Battalion, and the two units attacked abreast.
Against “moderate” resistance from enemy
mortars and small groups of infantry and with
its left flank exposed, the regiment, swung
around the arc toward Ragman Peninsula,
pivoting on the 24th Marines. As its outer
perimeter swing accelerated, the gap on the
division left widened. By late afternoon, when
the 23d reached objective O— 5A (which in-
cluded Chacha Village), the gap measured 800
to 1,000 yards.

Colonel Hart’s 24th Marines met only scat-
tered rifle fire from small isolated Japanese
groups in its push along the coast to Ragman
Peninsula. Contact difficulties, however, de-
manded commitment of all three battalions of
the regiment before nightfall. Lieutenant Colo-

65 The 27th’ s Battle For Saipan, 11. Memorandum For
General Richardson from Col G. M. O'Connell, 12.Tul44.
NTLF General Order 2-44, 24.7 un44, file 1990-5-10,
02/247.

145

nel Roth well’s 2d Battalion, moving along the
coast, found an undefended Japanese road
block on the road leading north from Laulau
Village. The obstacle was so located that tanks
and half-tracks were denied passage through
the area, and support of the 24th Marines by
these weapons was delayed for nearly four
hours. Engineers from Company B. 20th Ma-
rines, eventually cleared the road block and
traffic was restored.

Beyond the block, however, a turn in the
road, so sharp that it almost constituted an ob-
stacle in itself, further slowed movement of
vehicles through the area. While Company E,
24th Marines, was advancing near the village
of Laulau, a blockhouse exploded, causing 20
casualties. This was an all-too-familiar experi-
ence for Company E, which, with the rest of
the 2d Battalion. 24th Marines, had been shat-
tered by a similar but more serious explosion
at Roi-Namur. Near the area of the blockhouse
explosion, a flame-thrower tank 66 from Com-
pany D, 4th Tank Battalion, ran over a land
mine and was disabled. When the 24th Ma-
rines dug in for the night, a gigantic stride
had been taken, amounting to about 1,200
yards. Good contact existed with the 23d Ma-
rines on the left, and the right flank was an-
chored on the beach just east of Laulau village.

The 4th Marine Division reserve (1st Bat-
talion. 23d Marines) moved to the crest of Hill
000 to afford protection to the exposed left
flank.67.

General Ralph Smith Relieved

Because he felt that the 27th Division’s rate
of progress reflected poor leadership. General
Holland Smith decided that a change of com-
mand was indicated. In his own words:

I took my map and went aboard the Rocky Mount
to discuss the situation with Kelly Turner. We both
went on board the Indianapolis to see Spruance, who
was in overall command of the operation. I told him the

66 These were M3A1 light tanks which had had their
turret-mounted 37mm guns and ammunition racks re-
moved and Ronson (Canadian) Flame-Throwers in-
stalled in lieu thereof. These improvised flame-throwers
were unsatisfactory, particularly from a mechanical
standpoint.

07 23d Mar Report. 42. 2J/th Mar Report. 20-21. hth
Mar Dir Report. Section VI, 24—25. L. R. -Jones.

facts and said that the situation demanded a change in
command. He asked me what should be done.

“Ralph Smith has shown that he lacks aggressive
spirit,” I replied, “and his division is slowing our ad-
vance. He should he relieved.” I suggested that Jarman
take over the Twenty-seventh Division as a supple-
mentary duty until another commanding officer was
appointed. Turner supported me and Spruance agreed.

On June 24, the following message was dispatched
from Spruance as Commander, Fifth Fleet, to me as
Commander, Northern Troops and Landing Force, and
circulated to others concerned for information:

“You are authorized and directed to relieve Major
General Ralph Smith from command of the Twenty-
seventh Division, United States Army, and place Major
General Jarman in command of this division. This
action is taken in order that the offensive on Saipan
may proceed in accordance with the plans and orders
of the Commander, Northern Troops and Landing
Force.” 68

At the same Indianapolis conference, Gen-
eral Holland Smith and the two admirals
reached another vital decision: the 1st Pro-
visional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) would
be kept at sea in the Marianas area as addi-
tional reserve for possible use at Saipan. As
noted previously, the 3d Marine Division re-
turned to Eniwetok on 25 June while the 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade remained in the
area until 30 June.

About 1530, 24 June, Major General Ralph
Smith received a message from Lieutenant
General Holland Smith directing him to turn
over command of the 27th Division to Major
General Sanderford Jarman and report for
transportation to Pearl Harbor. Later in the
afternoon, General Jarman appeared at the
27th Division command post where the retir-
ing commander informed him on the situation
as it existed. General Jarman then summoned
the regimental commanders to discuss future
plans.

With the advice of General Ralph Smith and
the recommendation of Colonel Ayres of the
106th Infantry, General Jarman approved the
scheme of leaving one battalion to contain and
mop up the cliff strong point while the remain-
der of the 106th Infantry detoured east 500 to
800 yards and then advanced north by a de-
filaded route. In this manner it was hoped that
the regiment could get past the stumbling

68 Coral and Brass. 172.

146

block, reestablish contact with the 2(1 Marine
Division, and resume the advance to the north.
Orders were issued to put the plan into effect.69

The relief of Major General Ralph Smith
was later the subject of a number of bitter ar-
ticles and heated arguments and caused much
bad feeling.70 Headquarters, U. S. Army
Forces Central Pacific Area was even moved
to conduct an investigation, headed by Lieu-
tenant General Simon B. Buckner, USA, into
the circumstances surrounding the relief. This
inquiry concluded that “Lt. Gen. Holland M.
Smith, USMC, had full authority to relieve
Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith, USA, . . .” but, “in
the light of information available to the board,
the relief . . . was not justified by the facts.” 71
These findings, as General Holland Smith later
pointed out, were based on incomplete infor-
mation, the board having confined itself to ex-
amination of Army sources.

Night of 24-25 June

From 1925 to 2208 the transport area and the
Charan Kanoa Beaches were under inter-
mittent air attack. The first three Japanese
planes approached Saipan undetected and
dropped their bombs along the beaches causing
minor damage. Immediately, the smoke plan
was executed, screening the transports to the
attacking planes. Total Japanese planes com-
mitted to the attacks was about 10, but no hits
were scored on U. S. shipping anchored oil'
Saipan. Ships’ gunfire and “Black Widow”
P-61 night fighters were equally ineffective,
being unable to down any of the Japanese at-
tackers.72

Principal activity in the 2d Division sector
during the night of 24-25 June occurred in the
2d Marines area. In addition to the efforts of

69 Memo For Record, S0.Tun44, MajGen S. Jarman,
hereinafter cited as Jarman.

70 Though five Army generals were relieved in the
Pacific Theater during the war, only in this one in-
stance, in which a Marine officer was the initiating
agent, were there any nonoperational consequences.
Infantry Journal , Nov48, “Smith vs Smith,” 8.

71 Proceedings of a Board of Officers convened pur-
suant to letter Orders, AG 333/3, Headquarters U. S.
Army Forces Central Pacific Area, 4.Tul44.

72 TV 51 Report, Enel A, 9 : Annex 1 to Enel A.

Japanese infiltrators to move through (he lines
into Marine rear areas, there were others who
had been by-passed during the day’s advance
trying to get through the lines and back to
their own units. This two-way traffic was not
designed to soothe the nerves of the 2d Ma-
rines and resulted in an all night. 100 per cent
alert. The Marines came off well ahead, how-
ever, suffering 10 casualties while killing 82
Japanese.73

The only other night activity occurred in
the zone of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. Here
enemy riflemen heckled the front line Marines,
while Japanese mortar and artillery fire
showered on the battalion command post, in a
small ravine on the south slopes of Tipo Pale.
First, the rounds crept up the draw, then back
down. By the time the enemy fire had walked
four times through the area, communications
were destroyed and the installation was gen-
erally upset. Major Rentsch, commanding the
3d Battalion, felt that the Japanese observer
who was directing this accurate enemy fire
must be situated nearby, possibly behind the
position. Further, he believed that the fire
might have been directed by means of flash-
light signals. To escape the bull’s-eye, the 3d
Battalion moved its command post about 50
yards to the south, after which no more fire
was received. The shelling, however, put the
command post out of operation until daylight
when normal communications were reestab-
lished.74

The 27th Division, facing Death Valley, and
the 4th Division on Ragman Peninsula, spent
a reasonably quiet night, with only the 2d Bat-
talion, 24th Marines, dug in near Laulau on
the north coast of Magicienne Bay, reporting
activity. There, single Japanese attempted —
unsuccessfully — to infiltrate the Marine lines.75

Japanese Thoughts

On Tinian, the Japanese spent most of their
time in shelters to protect themselves from
U. S. aircraft, artillery and ships’ guns which
maintained almost constant harassing fires on

73 2d Mar Report, 4.

74 Rentsch. 6th Mar Report, 8.

75 2d lin, 2lith Mar Report, G.

147

them. Since 20 June, the 155mm guns of Bat-
tery B, 531st Field Artillery Battalion (XXIV
Corps Artillery), had been emplaced for firing
on Tinian. On 24 June, the other two batteries
of the battalion also turned around to triple the
volume of artillery fire against the island.70 An
unidentified Japanese A CO indicates in his
diary entry of 24 June that the morale was
lowering as a result of this persistent bombing
and shelling:

I heard the Japanese radio news with stories of
great victories. We haven’t heard of any victories
lately. What will we do until the day of our annihila-
tion? I wish my mother could know about the life we
are leading.77

The situation was somewhat obscure on 24
June when Major General Iketa, chief of
staff, 31st Army wrote:

Regarding the situation of the Homare [43d Divi-
sion] Units, as we are not in wire communications with
them, we do not know, hut it is believed that they have
undergone no great change. They are in the midst of
disposing so as to hold Tapotchau firmly.

As wire communications have been cut off since
yesterday by hostile bombardment, analysis of the
situation has become extremely difficult.

Later, when the miasma of incomplete reports
had cleared somewhat, he amplified and cor-
rected his earlier message:

In the sector of the Homare Units, the enemy has
infiltrated and broken through our positions, and one
part of the enemy — about 300—400 troops 78 along with
four or five tanks — have broken through Chacha in the
area of the eastern foot of Tapotchau. The raging battle
is pressing in the area of the Cl’. The fighting strength
of the Homare Unit has fallen to less than two infantry
battalions.

Though our forces have called on all kinds of
methods to hinder the enemy advance, we are regret-
tably reduced to the condition where we cannot carry
out this plan with our present fighting strength.

It is recommended that plan [for reinforcements]
be executed with all haste.

lu another message, Iketa directed the com-
manding officer of the 50th Infantry Regiment
(on Tinian) to “prepare to send one company
of Infantry (with two machine guns and two
rapid firing guns attached) by landing boats

"''•Corps Art ij 8-8 Report, 7.

77 CIXCPAC-CINCPOA Item #11,405.

7S The “300-400 troops” here referred to were ele-
ments of the 23d Marines.

to Saipan. Landing point will be on coast area
east of Chacha if possible.” The message also
requested that Iketa be notified when the Oku
Unit coming from Guam arrived at Tinian.79

From the messages originating with General
Iketa at this time, it is apparent that the Japa-
nese had no hope of defeating the Americans
with the forces and resources at hand. Rein-
forcements were needed. But the reliance
placed upon small boats as a means of trans-
portation represented either wishful thinking
or sublime confidence in their ability to achieve
the utterly impossible. Saipan was virtually
ringed with U. S. naval . vessels whose alert
personnel constantly scanned the waters for a
sign of Japanese movement. Unprotected small
boats or barges, crammed with Japanese
troops, were hardly the craft to penetrate the
U. S. blockade. The Japanese plan, therefore,
must be viewed as a pipe dream born of des-
peration.

It was also on 24 June that General Saito
evacuated his third command post above Cha-
cha Village and set up a fourth in the sheer
white cliffs northeast of Tapotchau ’s peak.
After the battle, investigation clearly showed
that this command post, an elaborate cave dug
into the hard rock, was the best prepared of all
his C.P.’s. The only weakness of the installa-
tion and the reason for Saito’s subsequent
evacuation of it (after three days), was its
vulnerability to naval guns firing from off
Saipan’s eastern coast.80

D-PLUS 10 — 25 JUNE
Ragman Peninsula

Two important objectives faced NTLF on
25 June: Mt. Tapotchau and Kagman Penin-
sula. Seizure of the heights would at last deny
the enemy his excellent observation posts; cap-
ture of Kagman Peninsula would not only
greatly reduce the NTLF frontage but would
provide a vast, plain area suitable for construc-
tion of another airfield. Both objectives were

7» CIXCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 18-19. The
Oku Unit was scheduled as a reinforcement for Saipan.
The exact strength of this unit is not indicated in
documents consulted.

80 NTLF G—2 Report, 29.

148

now within reach and, if all went well, would
be in U. S. possession by evening of 25 June.

The 4th Marine Division, scheduled to at-
tack at 0730, jumped off 45 minutes late. This
delay was caused by the difficulty of moving
the supporting tanks from their assembly areas
to the front lines. Routes forward were over
extremely rough terrain with few roads or
trails, most of which were in very poor condi-
tion for mechanized traffic. The 4th Marine
Division, still composed of but two regiments
(the 25th Regiment was in NTLF reserve),
made its main effort in the center, with each
regiment directed to push the attack along the
boundary between them. The purpose of this
single-pronged effort was to split (he peninsula
into two parts which could then be dealt with
separately. The objective was Mount Ragman
and the high ground in the vicinity of Roro-
gattan on the easternmost tip of Ragman
Peninsula.

Attacking with all three battalions abreast,
2d along the coast, 1st in the center and 3d on
the left, the 24th Marines advanced rapidly
against virtually no resistance. At approxi-
mately 1015, Colonel Hart reported that his
regiment was in possession of Ragman Hill on
the east coast of the peninsula (Objective 0—6).
The balance of the day was spent in patrolling
and in investigating numerous caves along the
coast line.81

Colonel Jones’ 23d Marines moved almost as
rapidly as the 24th. being hampered in prog-
ress across the flat, low ground by a single
Japanese field piece or antitank gun located
on the ridge to the rear. This ridge (called
“Purple Heart” ridge by men of the 27th In-
fantry Division) lay within (he Army divi-
sion’s zone, and, since the latter’s advance had
not overrun the area, the Japanese gunner
fired freely on the backs of the Marines — a
typical, if unavoidable, consequence of the situ-
ation in the center. With the concurrence of
the 27th Division, the 14th Marines massed the
fires of several battalions on this area, tem-
porarily silencing the gun. Later, however, this
“dead” weapon came to life and caused more
trouble. In addition, the 23d Regiment was

R1 ~t\th Mar Report, 21.

subjected to a small amount of rifle lire from
by-passed Japanese in the vicinity of Chacha
Village.

To support the regiment’s advance, one bat-
tery of the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines, moved
four 75mm pack howitzers to the northeastern
slopes of Hill 600, a position admirably suited
to the delivery of close, direct fire missions for
either of the assault battalions.

About noon the 1st Battalion, 23d Marines,
which had been operating in 4th Division re-
serve, returned to parent command. Colonel
Jones then ordered it to the vicinity of Chacha
Village to protect the left flank and rear of the
regiment.

Objective 0—6 fell to the 23d Marines at 1533.
The 2d Battalion found the Brown Beaches
(northwestern portion of Ragman Peninsula)
well fortified against an amphibious landing,
but extremely vulnerable to an attack from the
landward side.82

With the assigned objectives seized. General
Schmidt ordered the 23d and 24th Marines to
dontinue mopping up the peninsula and to
maintain coastal observation within their
sectors. The alacrity with which this phase of
the operation was carried out had a healthy
effect on the morale of the 4th Marine Division.

82 23(1 Mar Report, 42-43. 2d Ba, 23d Mar Report, 4.

combination cave and biockhouse, housing a 20mm gun,
overlooked Beach Brown 2 on the east coast. The 2d
Battalion, 23d Marines, over-ran this position from the
rear on 25 June. Like burrowing prairie dogs, the Japa-
nese usually had under-ground routes of escape from
such positions.

149

After days of slogging slowly and painfully
ahead, it was encouraging to move in rapid
strides. Kagman Peninsula could have been
much more difficult had the Japanese chosen
to make it so; but, as with a man putting off
a dental appointment, the show-down would
come later.83

The morning and evening summaries of the
Japanese 31st Army chief of staff for 25 June
recognized the successes of the 4th Marine Di-
vision :

The enemy in the Chacha area is completing the
seizure of that sector. . . . An enemy of unknown
strength (estimated to be 10 tanks, about 300 infantry)
is advancing towards Don nay. The sound of rifle Are is
deafening. Around Laulau and Donnay some 10 tanks
and about 700-800 infantry are to be seen advancing
from Laulau.84

Failure of a Plan

In the 27th Division sector (now under the
command of Major General Sanderford Jar-
man), the plan of by-passing the cliffside
strong point was placed in operation. One bat-
talion (2d Battalion, 106th Infantry) would
remain behind, contain the enemy in the area,
and institute mopping-up activities. The re-
mainder of the KKith would detour east, follow
a covered route behind the 165th Infantry until
the cliff strong point was passed, then swing-
back into its regularly assigned zone.

That part of the scheme which pertained to
the 165th Infantry worked generally as
planned, though its move was strongly con-
tested on the left. The regiment’s left assault
unit, the 2d Battalion, encountered heavy flank-
ing lire from the northwest which effectively
stopped its efforts to move forward. One sud-
den blast of machine-gun and rifle lire wounded
the battalion commander. Lieutenant Colonel
McDonough, who fell in an area exposed to
enemy lire. The problem of reaching and evac-
uating the colonel was solved when the 4.2-incli
mortal’s of Company C. 88th Chemical Mortar
Battalion, threw a thick smoke screen over the
area. Major Gregory Brousseau became the
new battalion commander. Recognizing the
futility of further frontal pushes across the

83 tli \liu - l)ir Report, Section VI. 2fl.

84 CINCPAC-CINCFOA Item #9983-85, 20.

exposed ground, the regimental commander
ordered the 2d Battalion to assume the mop-
ping-up mission (formerly assigned to the 1st
Battalion).

The 165tli Infantry’s right assault unit (3d
Battalion) made better progress and reached
objective 0-5 by the day’s end. The 1st Bat-
talion, relieved of its mopping-up task, fol-
lowed through the zone cleared by the 3d Bat-
talion and moved in on the latter’s left flank
for the night.85

For the 106th Infantry, meanwhile, plans
had gone awry. Instead of following behind
the 165th as ordered, the 106tli swung too wide,
moving far into the 4th Marine Division zone.
The result was much lost time, some confusion,
and a general contribution to the failure of the
plan. By 1130 one battalion (1st) of the 106th
found itself north of Chacha Village. This
unit took many casualties from a Japanese
strong point on a hill to the west, part of
Purple Heart Ridge (probably the same posi-
tions that harassed the 4th Marine Division's
rear) . 80

AY hen the division commander realized that
the unit was hopelessly astray, he ordered Colo-
nel Ayres to bring the regiment back into posi-
tion and carry out his original mission. During
I he afternoon the 106th moved to the approxi-
mate area that it should have occupied in the
morning.

Late in the afternoon General Jarman or-
dered the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, sup-
ported by tanks, to attack down Death Valley
past the cliffs. Two artillery- batteries occupied
positions from which to support the effort by
direct lire. Moving out at 1630, the soldiers en-
countered little opposition and quickly seized
their objective.87

Considerable firing by the battalion along
the route, however, resulted in its stopping for
the night virtually out of ammunition with no
resupply immediately available. Major O'Hara,
commanding the 2d Battalion, stated that he
arrived at the objective so late that he was nn-

8r> Kelley, 7. Lemp, 17. 165th Inf Report, (1.

8C The .if til's Rutile For Saipan, 13. hemp, 17.

87 Jarman.

150

able to set up a circular defense and added that
battalions must have at least two hours of day-
light. to establish positions.88 The ammunition
shortage and the incomplete nature of the bat-
talion’s defense would have serious conse-
quences.

When General Jarman observed the satis-
factory progress of the 2d Battalion, 100th In-
fantry, he ordered Colonel Ayres to execute —
on 20 June — the original plan of detouring to
the right. To General Jarman's questions of
why he had got his regiment lost. Colonel
Ayres could give no answer but stated that he
would carry out the mission the next day. Gen-
eral Jarman warned Ayres that this was, in-
deed, his last chance: that, if he again failed
to handle bis regiment properly, he would be
relieved.89

As noted before, O’Hara’s 2d Battalion.
106th Infantry, had successfully passed the
troublesome cl ill' area and was dug in on its
assigned objective. The Japanese, operating
as if they were well aware of the unit’s am-
munition shortage, counterattacked during the
night, forcing O’Hara’s men to withdraw down
the valley to a line about 200 yards north of
where the day’s advance had begun.90

That the 27th Division’s pressure was having
its effect on the Japanese is indicated by Gen-
eral Iketa’s summary of the activities of 25
June :

The enemy in the Tapotchau area have moved in
about 1,500 meters on the east of that high point. . . .
The Division Field Command Post ... is surrounded
by fire from artillery and tanks which executed an
enveloping attack.91

Seizure of Mt. Tapotchau

The most significant advance in the 2d Ma-
rine Division zone of action was that of the 8th
Marines; for it was upon this date (25 June)
that Mt. Tapotchau was captured. The zone of
the regiment included the dominant height of
the mountain, with the 1st and 3d Battalions
on the western slopes, the 2d just east of the

88 Lemp, 17.

*!) Jarman.

90 Jarman. Lemp, 17.

91 CTNCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85. 20.

FIGHTING UP-HILL was the normal condition during the
first 10 days at Saipan. Here Marines struggle up Mt.
Tapotehau's rugged slopes. Supplying troops in such
terrain required a disproportionate percentage of the
attacker's total effort.

peak, and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, over
the peak itself. The actual seizure of the crest
was a joint undertaking, with the 1st Battalion,
29th Marines, attacking frontally up a valley
which led to the top and the 2d Battalion, 8th
Marines, striking along a ridge line on the
right flank. Two routes — and, until the attack
was launched, no one could be sure which would
prove the better.

By 0930 there was no longer any doubt on
this point. In the two hours since the- attack
had begun, Tompkins’ unit had made little
progress through the wooded valley because of
rough terrain and well situated enemy riflemen,
while Chamberlin’s 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,
had driven several hundred yards along the
ridge line against practically no resistance.
This advance placed the 2d Battalion’s lines at
the base of a sheer 50-foot cliff just beyond

151

Tapotchau’s soaring peak. Marines of the 2d
Battalion felt more than the discomfort of
having someone reading over their shoulders as
they glanced apprehensively toward the moun-
tain top. Exposed as it was, with a precipitous
drop on the two sides (north and east) and the
crest of the mountains on a third, the battalion
could enjoy little security.

To find out if the feeling of being watched
was caused by imagination or reality, Major
Chamberlin ordered one platoon (1st Platoon,
Company E) to scale the cliff and investigate.
The platoon, led by Lieutenant Walter E. R bu-
rner. moved to the top of the cliff and found no
enemy there. Thus encouraged, Rimmer dis-
patched a smaller patrol which climbed nearly
to the crest of the mountain and returned to
report that the small tableland on the summit
was also unoccupied. (See Map 15.)

Difficulties of moving up the wooded valley,
meanwhile, had convinced Tompkins that this
was a poor route. Why not exploit the gains
of the Marines already half way up the right
shoulder? The only reserve available to him
at this time was a 22-man platoon from the Di-
vision Reconnaissance Company, since all three
of 1 1 is rifle companies were in the lines, en-
gaged with the enemy. Leading this small body,
Tompkins moved up to the 1st Platoon, Com-
pany E, in its position on Tapotchau’s right
shoulder, paused for a quick check with Rim-
mer, and continued on to the top.

The tiny plateau at the mountain’s peak con-
tained an abandoned square, 12-man dugout,
which the Ma rines immediately put to their
own use. Leaving the Reconnaissance Platoon
leader. Lieutenant Marion M. Drake, in com-
mand, Colonel Tompkins went back down the
right shoulder to lead up more substantial
forces.

By the time he returned to his battalion, it
was early afternoon. The difficult task then
remained of disengaging units in close contact
with the enemy, withdrawing them a short
distance and swinging them single file to the
right through the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines’
zone and finally up the right shoulder to Ta-
potchau’s crest. Tompkins determined that one
of his companies (B) should remain in the

lines and maintain contact with the 3d Bat-
talion, 8th Marines, on the left. The other two
companies (A and C) would move up and re-
inforce the Reconnaissance Platoon.

On Tapotchau’s west slopes, meanwhile, Ma-
rines of Major Larsen’s 3d Battalion, 8th
Marines, fought a determined enemy that be-
grudged every foot of terrain. The constant
pressure exerted by this unit aided Tompkins
in the difficult task of disengaging two-thirds
of his rifle strength. Had there been a less
persistent surge on the western slopes, the
Japanese might have foiled Tompkin’s plans.

There was little time for Marines of the
Reconnaissance Platoon to enjoy the scenery
from Tapotchau’s lofty heights. Japanese in
the area at last realized that their prized ob-
servation post was now inhabited by the Amer-
icans and immediately launched a series of
small counterattacks to regain it. During the
course of the afternoon three Marines and 40
Japanese fell from these heated exchanges.
The Marines held.

As the afternoon wore on, Japanese mortars
became more active, particularly against Com-
pany E, 8th Marines. The 1st Platoon, still
perched half way up the right shoulder, be-
came the special target for much of this fire.
To get off the bull’s-eye, the platoon pulled
down to the shelf and joined the rest of its
company.

The task of disengaging the two companies
of the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, had con-
sumed the afternoon, so that it was not until
just before sundown that Tompkins began the
final ascent to the peak.

The 81mm mortars of the 1st Battalion, 29th
Ma rines, laid screening smoke on the moun-
tain’s northern slopes, while all available mor-
tars of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, plus the
105mm howitzers of the 3d Battalion, 10th
Marines, joined in support of the climb. As
dusk fell, the Marines moved single file up the
steep route to the top. During the climb and
in the subsequent establishment of defensive
positions, not a single man was lost.

Digging into the rocky terrain at the sum-
mit was a real challenge. Only occasionally
was there a patch of dirt. Most of the fox-

152

Counterattack

2315, 25 June

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LEGEND

— Tompkins' Route To Peak

THE SEIZURE OF
MT TAPOTCHAU

HASTY SKETCH
NOT DRAWN TO SCALE

MAP 15

R0 7093

at tapotchau’S crest men of the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, prepare positions. In such rocky formations,
Marines built foxholes from the ground up rather than digging in.

holes were built up from the ground rather
than dug into it. These small fortresses proved
adequate when, at a few minutes before mid-
night, a force of Japanese struck Company A
from the west side of the mountain. Most of
the enemy threw grenades, some were armed
with rifles, others had “idiot sticks” (wooden
practice rifles with bayonets or knives tied to
the end). The size of the Japanese force could
not accurately be determined, but 18 Japanese
bodies were lying in the area the following
morning.

Saipan’s key terrain feature had been cap-
tured at last. From this point forward, the
Marines would look down on the Japanese,
who heretofore had enjoyed the advantages of
superior ground observation. And in addition,
the Marines could now tight downhill for

awhile. The change would be appreciated.92

Company F, 106th Infantry, remained with
the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, but with this
one exception units of the 27th Infantry Divi-
sion still were some distance to the rear and
contact had not as yet been attained.

The 1st and 3d Battalions, 8th Marines, made
little progress during the day. Fighting along
the tortuous terrain on Tapotchau’s western
slopes, the 3d Battalion ran into a jumble of
crevasses and narrow ravines which often pro-
vided positions for Japanese riflemen and ma-

92 The foregoing is a synthesis of the following: 8th
Mar Report, Unit Report 25Jun44; 1st Bn, 29tli Mar
Report, 6—7 : Follow Me, Richard W. Johnston. 203-204 ;
Marine Corps Gazette, Jul 40, “The Taking of Mt.
Tapotchau,” Capt J. R. Stockman; Chamberlin; Tomp-
kins.

889590°— 50— 11

153

JAP'S EYE VIEW of Red and Green Beaches and surrounding areas. Here a bedraggled Marine, munching a “C”
ration biscuit, appears to he wondering how United States forces ever got ashore under such ideal enemy
observation.

chine gunners. Movement through this terrain
was necessarily slow and tedious. Farther down
Tapotchau's western slopes, the 1st Battalion
could not push forward without breaking con-
tact with the units on its flanks: the Bel Bat-
talion of its own regiment on the right and on
the left, the 3d Battalion, Gtli Marines, still
punching unsuccessfully at the Tipo Pale
strong point.

Since 23 June men of the latter unit — and
Company K in particular — had been butting
their heads against the pocket on Tipo Pale's
northern slopes. This nuisance had retarded
the advance of the entire regiment, if not the
entire division; and Colonel Riseley, the 6th
Marines’ commander, determined upon a new
scheme to get past the area. The 2d Battalion
would pass through the 3d. leaving one com-
pany to contain and mop up the pocket while
l lie remainder by-passed it and moved into the
attack again.

In compliance with Colonel Biseley’s order,
Company E began the difficult task of clearing

the pocket. To avoid moving down the sheer
cliff from Tipo Pale’s summit, Company E
passed around the right (east) of the hill and
attacked to the west up the ravine’s longer
axis. Support was rendered extremely difficult
because of the proximity of friendly troops;
and, without the necessary support, the com-
pany's progress was negligible. While standing
on Mt. Tipo Pale directing the operations in
this area, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth F. Mc-
Leod. the 6th Marines’ executive officer, was
killed by a Japanese rifleman. Colonel McLeod
was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Russell
Lloyd, who had previously commanded the
2d Division Shore Party.

Darkness found the 6th Marines’ lines only
Slightly advanced and another failure recorded
in the “battle of the pocket.” As the 2d Bat-
talion had not succeeded in passing through the
3d. the day's operations only had the effect of
engaging more troops. In addition to the
three rifle companies of the 3d Battalion, Com-
panies E and F of the 2d Battalion had been

committed. Company F, 2d Marines, attached
to the 6th Marines since landing on D-Day, also
remained in the lines.

On the left of the 6th Marines’ front, the 1st
Battalion could not move forward without
breaking contact with the other units. Thus,
the troublesome strong point on the right flank
still crippled the advance. As previously in-
dicated, however, plans to by-pass the area had
been undone by (lie enemy’s refusal to be by-
passed. While a wider swing around the posi-
tion might have been more successful, the hour
was too late to permit further efforts, and the
regiment dug in for the night.93

On and near the western shore the 2d Ma-
rines viewed Garapan from commanding posi-
tions at the town's southern edge. Further
advance could only carry to less favorable ter-
rain. General Watson, therefore, ordered the
regiment to hold its positions along Radio
Road until units to the right had seized the
high ground on that flank. Meanwhile, security
patrols moved out to the front. One 10-man
patrol from the Scout-Sniper Platoon de-
parted on a reconnaisance mission into Gara-
pan at 2100, returning two hours and a half
later. It received fire from a machine gun
located in the rubble, but otherwise observed
no enemy activity. No casualties were suffered
on this mission.94

Of the 2d Marines’ operations during 25
June, the Japanese chief of staff of the 31st
Army wrote :

The enemy has broken into our line ... at the south-
ernmost edge of Garapan and are reinforcing continu-
ally their troops (20 odd tanks ; 20 odd artillery pieces ;
about 700 infantry troops have been observed).95

The Division Shore Party, no longer en-
gaged in unloading supplies or equipment, fur-
nished 200 replacements to the 6th and 8th
Marines: 110 to the former, 90 to the latter.96

'Phe 25th Marines, assigned as NTLF reserve
on 23 June, remained in its assigned assembly

93 6th Mar Report, , 8-9.

94 2d Mar Report, 4.

95 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 20.

96 2d Mar Dir Report, 14.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS HAROLD G. EPPERSON, 1st P.attalion, 6tll
Marines, posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor
for intentionally smothering a grenade’s explosion
with his own body and thereby protecting several
comrades nearby (25 June 1944).

area in the vicinity of Hill 500. At 1855 the
regiment’s 2d Battalion was attached to the 2d
Mai ine Division and further to the 8th Regi-
ment, which could well use any available troops
to assist in watching over the exposed right.
With this attachment, Colonel Wallace com-
manded live battalions: three from the 8th
Marines, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, and
the 2d Battalion, 25th M arines.97

Stalemate at Nafutan Point

On Nafutan Point the virtual stalemate con-
tinued. The narrative account of the 2d Bat-
talion, 105th Infantry, says that:

Enemy resistance on the ridges was stubborn. The
terrain consisted of steep ridges, deep gulches with
cliffs, ground broken with coral pinnacles and thick
jungles type underbrush which impeded progress. and
made observation impossible.98

97 NTLF G-3 Journal, 25-26 .Tun44. 2d Mar Dir
Report, 14-15, 25th Mar Report, 6.

98 Narrative of Events, 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry,
June 22 — July 3.

155

Saipan CHOO CHOO was an important supply means,
particularly in the Aslito Airfield — Charan Kanoa-
Garapan area. Whistle stop at rear is Charan Kanoa.

The only artillery (excepting naval gunfire)
directly available to the Garrison Force (which
now had the mission of securing Xafutan
Point) was the antiaircraft artillery. In view
of (he nature of the terrain, it was considered
that air bursts in the tree tops, approximately
12 feet above ground level, would be particu-
larly effective. Accordingly, registration fire
was conducted during the afternoon of 25 June
in order to have antiaircraft batteries registered
for preparation fires on 26 June."

On 25 June. Island Command, an organiza-
tion which would administer Saipan after its
capture, assumed responsibility for the south-
ern part of the island. The only infantry unit
available to it at this time was the 2d Battalion,
105th Infantry, still engaged in the Xafutan
Point mop-up. Improvement and development
of facilities at. and around. Aslito Airfield
would hereafter be conducted under Island
Command supervision. The little narrow-
gauge railroad that ran from Charan Kanoa
up to Aslito Airfield was put to good use. gaso-
line and bombs being carried on its tiny cars,
pulled by a hastily repaired steam locomotive.

09 T.tr from Col G. M. O'Connell fo CG, USAFICPA,
2.1 u 1 44. Subject: Operations in Xafutan Point Area,
Saipan. 1. hereinafter cited as O'Connell Letter.

Night of 25-26 June

F rom Sunharon Harbor on the west coast of
Tinian, 11 personnel barges moved out during
darkness of 25—26 June apparently bent upon
reinforcing Saipan. Spotted by the destroyer
Bancroft and the destroyer escort Elden , the
barges were fired upon and dispersed. One was
reported sunk, while the remainder scurried
back to Tinian Town. Later, at about 0225,
LCI(G)’s 438 and 456 observed several barges
moving out of Tanapag Harbor on Saipan’s
west coast. Immediately opening fire, the
LCI(G)’s accounted for one sunk and a second
damaged; the remainder returned to Tanapag.

Both LCI(G)’s received some damage dur-
ing this repulse, however. The 438 received 12
holes in her hull from one of the barges’ 37mm
guns, damaging the fire main, starting batteries
and radar. The 456 suffered less, with only
slight damage to her winch and refrigerator.
The 438 suffered one man killed and two
wounded and the 456 two wounded. A report
from one of the LCI’s that the Japanese barges
had unleashed torpedoes during this action
was later substantiated by a prisoner of war
who stated that there were at least three tor-
pedoes fired at U. S. ships at this time.100

With the exception of barge activity, the
withdrawal of the 2d Battalion, 106th Infan-
try. down Death Valley, and the abortive Japa-
nese effort to push the 1st Battalion, 29th
M arines. off Tapotcliau’s summit, the night of
25—26 June was quiet.

“There Is No Hope for Victory . .

In two dispatches sent to the commanding-
general on Yap, General Iketa estimated that
Japanese front line strength had been cut to
less than 20 percent, leaving major Army units
at the following levels :

118th Infantry Regiment — about 300
135th Infantry Regiment — about 350
136th Infantry Regiment — about 300
47th Independent Mixed Brigade — about 100
7th Independent Engineers — about 70
3d Independent Mountain Artillery Regi-
ment— no weapons
9th Tank Regiment — 3 tanks

wo TF 51 Report , Enel A, 9; Enel L, 3.

156

There is every indication that Iketa underes-
timated the actual figures. But, on the other
hand, it is believable that commanders ol the
various units listed had no more men available
than shown in Iketa’s message, as many Japa-
nese, separated from their parent commands,
were fighting alone or in small groups. As the
Japanese were pushed back and compressed into
the northern end of the island, these totals
probably were raised. Moreover, no figures for
Japanese Navy units were included in the
message.

In the same message, Iketa conveyed infor-
mation that the 47th Brigade was now under
command of a 1st Lieutenant and the 7th Fn-
gineers under a sergeant. Japanese reserve
units (companies and platoons), hospital units,
equipment, maintenance and supply units were
either “completely wiped out or reduced to the
point where no fighting strength [could] be
expected of them.” 101

Elderly General Saito had spent 11 discour-
aging days. He had found that the Americans
continued to move forward despite the best
efforts of his troops. Such counterattacks as he
had been able to mount had been repulsed with
heavy losses. The bulk of his artillery had been
knocked out or overrun by the American on-
slaught. lie had suffered critical losses in his
principal subordinate commanders, and many
of those that remained were not satisfactory
from his point of view. Functioning of his
command post had been seriously retarded by
the insistent probing fires of American naval
vessels. And, perhaps most serious, communi-
cations were so unsatisfactory that it was virtu-
ally impossible for him to make his decisions
known. The avalanche of disappointing details
had drained Saito of all optimism by 25 June,
causing him to send the following message to
the Chief of Staff in Tokyo:

Having; lost the influence of the Emperor due to the
weakness of our representatives, we are not able to
work at at our best here. Please apologize deeply to the
Emperor that we cannot do better than we are doing.

However, the right hand men of the Emperor are
rejoicing because they are not in places of death during
the fight. The Governor General of the South Seas — a
non-combatant, will retreat to t tie north end of Saipan

101 riXCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9083-85, 22.

Island and the army will defend its positions to the
very end, though that he death, to guard the Treasure.
However, because of the units sunk at sea, the various
forces have no lighting strength, though they do have
large numbers; it is regrettable that there has been
considerable disturbance in time of battle from the
points of view of control and of code books and other
secret documents.

There is no hope for victory in places where we do not
have control of the air and we are still hoping here for
aerial reinforcements.

Biggest obstacle to our forces, according to one unit
commander, is lack of care in the selection of battalion
commanders and above.

Praying for the good health of the Emperor, we all
cry, ‘Banzai’ ! 102

Thus the handwriting on the wall had been
transposed to paper.

D-PLUS 11—26 JUNE

Mop-Up on Kagman Peninsula

Tinian, only three nautical miles south of
Saipan, had never had reason to feel left out of
the battle. Task Force 58’s pre-D-Day strikes
against targets in the Marianas had included
Tinian, and since the Saipan landings naval
guns and aircraft had pounded Tinian with
daily regularity. Neither had General Harp-
er’s Corps Artillery forgotten Tinian; one bat-
tery of 155mm guns had turned toward that
island on 20 June, and an entire 155mm bat-
talion assumed the mission on 24 June. After
26 June, Tinian’s defenders would have even
less reason to feel neglected by the Americans.

This date marked the beginning of heavier
and more systematic blows. The new plan,
carefully coordinated between artillery, ships,
and air, divided the island into a north and a
south half. Air and naval gunfire alternated
daily, working first in one half and then in the
other, while artillery fired on any targets es-
caping other attention. A target map was main-
tained, information exchanged and new targets
posted. Cruisers Birmingham , Montpelier and
Indianapolis, using both air and direct (ship-
board) spot, were assigned to execute the naval
gunfire portion of the plan, while planes would
be provided by Carrier Support Groups One
and Two.103

102 CINCPAC— CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 19.

103 Tl' 51 Report , Enel F, 22.

157

Along the front of the three divisions there
was little forward movement on 26 June. Flav-
gm completed its mission of seizing Kagman
Peninsula, the 4th Division, pinched from the
Corps’ front, was designated as NTLF reserve.
Mopping-up was still essential, however, and
the 23d and 24th Marines set about patrolling
assigned sectors and outposting the coast line.
In their roles as NTLF reserve, the 23d and
24th Marines reconnoitered routes to the 27tli
and 2d Divisions’ zones respectively.

Throughout the day Japanese field pieces
emplaced on the high ground (Purple Heart
Ridge) in the Army division’s zone continued
to lire at the Marines on Kagman Peninsula.
While relatively few casualties resulted from
this lire, its harrassing effects were consider-
able. Efforts of the 4th Division to get per-
mission from the 27th Division to fire on these
targets were hampered by discouraging delays.
Though permission was eventually gained, the
loss of time allowed the Japanese to move their
weapons to new locations and the lengthy cycle
was repeated. These delays, not indicative of
uncooperativeness, stemmed from the necessity
for all units checking twice before permitting
other units to fire into their area. Precautions
were necessary.

The 4th Division’s assignment as NTLF re-
serve was short-lived. Before the division
could be completely assembled, a warning order
directed it to move back into the lines the fol-
lowing morning and take over the right of the
Corps’ front. The 25th Marines would remain
at Hill 500 in NTLF reserve.104

"With Kagman Peninsula secured, movement
of equipment began for construction of an air-
field there. Work on Aslito Airfield, com-
menced almost at the moment the field was
captured, had succeeded by 26 June in length-
ening the strip to 4,500 feet and widening it to
300 feet.105

Colonel Stebbins Takes Over 106th Infantry

Progress of the 27th Division was slow. Gen-
eral Jarman’s disappointment with Colonel

104 'ith Mur Dir Ur port. Section VI. 27; 23d Mar
ID port. 42; 2)111 Mur Report, 21 ; 25th Mur Report, 6.

i°5 j>/.’ 5 / Report, Enel A, 9.

Ayres had been magnified by the 2d Battalion’s
withdrawal during the night ; and, when the
106th Infantry failed to launch its attack by
1000 on the morning of 26 June, he took
drastic action. In his words ;

I immediately sent forward General Kernan, the
Artillery Commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Sheldon,
G— 3 of the Division, to look over the situation and see
how the artillery could help them move forward. They
both came back and stated that the battalions were
standing still and there was no reason why they should
not move forward and any artillery fire needed at any
point would be brought to bear. They indicated that the
regiment was somewhat demoralized and they didn't
know whether it would ever move. I immediately re-
lieved the Chief of Staff, Colonel Stebbins (26 June)
and sent him forward to relieve Coloned Ayres, and
brought Colonel Ayres back to my headquarters and
returned him to Pearl Harbor.106

Brigadier General Ross, the assistant division
commander, was then assigned additional duty
as chief of staff.107

At 1409, 26 June, General Jarman sent a
message of encouragement to all 27th Division
units :

This division is advancing against a determined
enemy that must lie destroyed. Upon capturing a posi-
tion, never give it up: hold and send reinforcements.
I know I can depend on every member of the 27th to
get into tins fight with everything he has. Good hunting
to every man.108

After assuming command of the 106th In-
fantry, Colonel Stebbins spent the remainder
of the day organizing the unit and moving the
battalions into position for the attack of 27
June. Such action as was attempted on 26 June
was unsuccessful “due to fatigue on the part of
the men.” 109

M ajor O’Hara, commanding the 2d Bat-
talion, advised General Jarman as to where he
encountered his greatest resistance on the pre-
ceding night. Fires of the 27th Division ar-
tillery were placed on the designated points.
In addition, the Cannon Company, 106tli In-

106 .farm on. Colonel Ayres was ordered to report to
USAFICPA (United States Army Forces In Central
Pacific Area). TF 56, G-l Journal, 1S00, 25 June to
1800. 26 June 1944.

107 Ross.

108 27th Division G-3 Journal, 26.Tun44.

109 Narrative Account of Operations of 27th Infantry
Division During the Period 16 June— 26 June, Colonel
Albert K. Stebbins, I4.Tul44, hereinafter cited as Steb-
bins.

158

troublesome CLIFF on the 106th Infantry’s left flank was pounded by all available weapons. Here, on 26 June,
tank destroyers deploy to tire into the cliff. Ultimately, 27tli Division soldiers reduced the enemy positions
by working from the top of cliffs downward.

fantry, continued to fire 105mm howitzer shells
point-blank into the troublesome cliff face.

On the right of the 27th Division zone the
165th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion, 105th
Infantry, attached, succeeded in by-passing five
valley strong point, and attaining positions
from which to move northward in conjunction
with the 4th Marine Division. On the evening
of 26 June Colonel Ivelley, commanding the
165th, was informed that his regiment was de-
tached from the 27th Division and attached to
the 4th Marine Division.

At about 2100, after reporting to the 4th Di-
vision command post, Colonel Kelley received
orders for the next day’s attack. The 4th Di-
vision would advance with the 165th Infantry
on the left and the 23cl Marines on the right
and seize Objective 0-6. Colonel Kelley there-
upon conferred with Colonel Jones of the 23d
Marines and Colonel Hart of the 24th Marines
to coordinate plans for the next day’s attack.110

110 Jarman. Lemp, 18. Kelley, 7-8. 165th Inf Re-
port, 6.

By-Passing the Pocket

Important to the future action of the 2d Ma-
rine Division was the successful by-passing of
the north Tipo Pale pocket. The tactics were
basically the same as those used the previous
day except that the detour was wider and the
execution successful. Company E, 6th Marines
(which had spent the previous day battering
at the pocket), passed around to the right
while Company F swung left of the irksome
draw. By inserting a platoon of Company (i
between Companies E and F on the pocket’s
north side, contact was regained and the 2d
Battalion’s proper frontage assumed. Com-
pany K, by now familiar with the difficulties
of cleaning the draw, remained behind to con-
tain and, eventually, obliterate this stumbling
block.

By 1400, the 6th Marines had gained contact
with the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, on the
right, and the move to the north was resumed.
With improvement of the situation on the right
of the 6th Marines’ lines, it was possible for

159

Lieutenant Colonel Jones’ 1st Battalion to
move forward. No advance, save for patrolling
of its zone of action, had been feasible for the
1st Battalion since 24 June. Advances on 26
June carried it to positions from which to de-
liver tires in support of the other two battalions
of the regiment.

To the north, the 2d Battalion faced an open
flat field, covered only with the scraggly stubble
of what had once been sugar cane. Since the
objective, a dominating ridge line, lay some 500
to 600 yards away on the far side of the open
expanse, it fell to the 2d Battalion to cross the
flat and seize the high ground. The Marines
had advanced only a short distance when Japa-
nese automatic weapons, emplaced at the base
of the ridge line on the north side of the field,
opened with grazing fire. Company E. on the
right, was particularly hard hit and stopped.
Supi >orting fires, adjusted upon the suspected
enemy firing positions, were effective and some
progress was made, but darkness found the
objective well out of reach.

As the 2d Battalion dug in for the night,
several gaps were discovered in the lines. To
fill these, rifle platoons of Company G were
inserted at various points along the front.
Used thus as piecemeal reinforcements, Com-
pany G lost its unit identity and was not re-
formed as a company until the next day.111

In the 8th Marines zone the day’s advances
were small. On the left the 1st Battalion regu-
lated its progress on that of the 6th Marines.
On the right the 2d Battalion’s advance was
restrained because of the lack of contact with
27th Division elements (except Company F,
106th Infantry). In the 8th Marines’ center,
tlie 3d Battalion and the 1st Battalion. 29th
Marines, made only small gains. The attached
2d Battalion. 25th Marines, remained with the
regiment during the greater portion of the day,
Company E being used in the lines, while the
remainder of the battalion was employed in
mopping-up operations. At 1500. the 2d Bat-
talion. 25tlr Marines, reverted to NTLF re-
serve. This reversion was only temporary,
however, as the unit was reattached the next
day.

111 6th Mar Report, 9. Fisher Intrrriew.

As already noted, the 1st Battalion, 8th Ma-
rines, could move only as fast as the 6tlx
Marines to its left if it were to retain contact.
The cleeply-gashed ground, more than enemy
opposition, governed the rate of advance. One
unusual enemy tactic employed against the bat-
talion at this time is worthy of note: bundles
of picric acid blocks were catapulted upon the
Marines by Japanese soldiers located in the
craggy rocks along the route. This device
showed originality but little else; no casualties
were inflicted upon the Marines.

Higher on Tapotehau’s western slopes, the
3d Battalion also fought through difficult ter-
rain. A statement from the 8th Marines’ action
report gives an indication of the problems in
that zone: “To go from the left flank of 3/8 to
the right flank of 3/8 required a two hour and
40 minute march over rough terrain.”

At some points the Japanese threw or rolled
grenades and demolition charges down upon
the Marines as they struggled through the hilly
thickets. And as if that were not enough, Japa-
nese positioned above directed plunging
machine-gun fire upon the advancing men. The
3d Battalion’s left flank kept pace with the 1st
Battalion, but the right flank lagged behind.
By nightfall the 3d Battalion’s lines stretched
almost north and south along the base of a
steep slope.

On 25 June the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines,
less one company, had secured a foothold on
the summit of Mt. Tapotchau. It remained on
26 June, then, for Company B to move up the
mountain’s western slope 'and join the bat-
talion. W hile waiting for this unit, Lieutenant
Colonel Tompkins sent a 25-man combat
patrol from Company A to seize the northern-
most rise of Tapotehau’s crest. This patrol was
repulsed after some hard fighting, and it be-
came apparent that this area would have to be
thoroughly battered before a successful effort
could be made. In the meantime Company B
reached the mountain top. combing the area on
the way.

From the 2d Battalion position (on the ex-
treme right), the Marines observed men of the
2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, attempting to
move up on the division flank. By the close of

160

nafutan point: Pre-D-Day view of Saipan’s southernmost tip. Japanese defenders slipped through lines of 1 1 it'
2d Battalion, 105 Infantry, on the night of 26-27 and struck Aslito Airfield and Hill 500.

the day, however, a gap of 600 yards still ex-
isted. To protect the exposed flank, the 2d Bat-
talion bent its lines to the shape of a horseshoe
with one company facing north, one east, and
one south.

To sum up, the most important developments
in the 8th Marines’ sector during the day were
the straightening of several small bulges in
the lines and consolidation of the dominating
heights won on 25 June.112

On the left of (lie division. Colonel Stuart’s
2d Marines confined its activities to sending
patrols 400 yards to the front. Those from the
1st Battalion came back with a report of no
enemy contacts, but a 3d Battalion patrol en-
countered and destroyed a Japanese 37mm gun
and its entire crew. Otherwise, 26 June was
uneventful in the 2d Marines area.113

“Seven Lives for One’s Country”

In preparation for the day’s attack on Na-
futan Point, the 81mm mortars of the 2d Bat-
talion, 105th Infantry, commenced softening-
up fires at 0645. The 90mm guns of Batteries A

1,2 2d Mar Dir Report, Section VT, 15. 8th Mar Re-
port, 15. 1st tin, 2!>tli 1 lav Report, 7.

113 2d Mar Report, 4—5.

and B, 751st AAA Gun Battalion joined in the
preparation from 0750 to 0800., then stood by
for all call tires. Further fire support was pro-
vided by three destroyers (Patterson, McNair,
Seif ridge ) whose tires were used against pos-
sible targets along the west side of the penin-
sula’s cliff line. Two 40mm guns and an SPM
(self-propelled mount) were brought up to tii’e
into cave entrances along the cliff line.

In regard to the employment of antiaircraft
guns for support of the attack on Nafutan
Point, Colonel O'Connell, commanding opera-
tions in that area, reported that :

the high muzzle velocity of these weapons, their
rapid rate of lire and the flexibility obtainable by-
raising and lowering height of hurst made them par-
ticularly- effective. . . . There was scarcely- a tree that
had not been scarred and more than half of the enemy
dead observed were badly- mangled.114

The infantry attacked at 0800, spearheaded
by the light tanks of Company D, 762d Tank
Battalion. Although progress was slow and
the day’s advance slight, an enemy strong-
point, containing a 75mm field gun and seven
machine gluts, was reduced. Also, it was felt
that the objective area had been considerably

114 O'Connell. 3.

161

softened as a result of the supporting fires.115

The attack on the strong point had de-
manded the concentration of all three rifle com-
panies of the 2d Battalion in one area of Xa-
futan Point. Since the day’s activities had not
ended until late in the afternoon, it was con-
sidered that insufficient time existed to re-
deploy the battalion over its broad front. In
addition, it was felt that too much time would
be wasted on the following morning reassem-
bling the battalion for the continuation of the
attack. This situation all added up to the fact
that vast expanses of the front were left un-
covered or only under observation by small
outposts. It had been hoped that these outposts
could give warning of any enemy movement in
time for the battalion to shift its strength.116
(See Map 16.)

Life had not been pleasant for the Japanese
Xafutan Point defenders. From seaward, de-
stroyers pounded the rocks and caves unmerci-
fully; from land, a monotonously heavy volume
of lire was maintained by 40 mm and 90mm
antiaircraft guns, and 81mm and 60mm mor-
tars, as well as tires of the light tank platoon,
the self-propelled mount, and small arms of the
2d Battalion, 105th Infantry. Movement on
the point was rendered very difficult, and the
shortage of food and water became acute. Cap-
tain Sasaki, commanding the 317th Independ-
ent Infantry Battalion of the 47th Independ-
ent M ixed Brigade, determined to move his
battalion from the Xafutan Point trap and
join other Japanese forces which he believed to
be in the vicinity of Hill 500. On 26 June Sa-
saki issued the following battalion order:

1. The enemy situation is the same as you have been
informed.

2. The Battalion will carry out an attack at midnight
tonight. After causing confusion at the airfield, we will
advance to Brigade Headquarters in the Field.

6. C. O. of the Ikeda Company will command the first
attack unit. Under his command will be: #3 Company,
the Hira Company, and the Murone Platoon. C. O. of
the Koshiro Company will be C. O. of the second attack
unit and will have under his command the Inoue unit,
the Engineers, the remaining Naval units. Units will
assemble at 1930 in areas to be designated separately.

115 Ibid., 2.

116 The 27th Infantry Division in World War II,
Capt E. G. Love, 219-222, hereinafter cited as Love.

You must carry out the attack from the designated
places.

4. Casualties will remain in their present positions
and defend Nafutan Mount. Those who cannot partici-
pate in combat must commit suicide.

5. We will carry the maximum of weapons and sup-
plies.

6. The password for tonight will be “Shichi Sei
Hokoku” (Seven lives for one’s country).

7. 1 will follow after the second attack unit.

Bn C. O.

Capt. Sasaki.117

Moving undiscovered through the thinly-
spread outposts of the 2d Battalion, 105tli
Infantry, Sasaki’s force headed for Aslito
Airfield. The only indication that men of the
2d Battalion had that the enemy was on the
move came at about 0200 when “an extremely
large group” stumbled into the command post,
about 1,500 yards in rear of the front lines.
After a lively skirmish, in which the soldiers
suffered 24 casualties, the intruders disap-
peared. The next morning the bodies of 27
Japanese were found in the immediate com-
mand post area.118

At about 0230 Sasaki’s force struck Aslito
Airfield. All U. S. personnel in that area were
alerted after the enemy succeeded in setting
fire to one P-47 and damaging three others.

Seabees and engineers quickly rallied to their
unexpected mission, cleared the field of Japa-
nese and set up a hasty defense. At 0430 the
Commander, Air Defense Command, reported
that enemy .50-caliber machine guns and 20mm
guns were firing on Aslito Airfield.

After causing confusion at the airfield, the
force advanced toward Hill 500, where they ex-
pected to find Colonel Oka's 47th Independent
Mixed Brigade Headquarters (which had left
the hill many days before). At about 0520
there were two surprises: the first was to Sa-
saki’s men, who received an unexpected recep-
tion from the 25th Marines (still in NTLF re-
serve) on Hill 500, and the second surprise was
for the 25th Marines, who were not expecting
visitors and. in some cases, found the Japanese
in their midst before they realized that any-
thing was afoot. Both participants quickly re-

162

117 NTLF 0-2 Report. 34.

118 Love, 221.

Hill 500

6000yards (Approx)

Aslito Airfield
3000 yards ( A pprox )

w ^ F Mt Naf utan

-LEGEND-

Positions on 25 June
when Colonel G. M.
O’Connell , USA ,
assumed command

Positions as of
1600, 26 June

■■ Enemy movements

Naf u tan
Point

Sketched from Enclosures
I and 2 to letter from
Colonel G M O’Connell
to CG , USAFICPA , 2 July 1944

RO 7093

POSITIONS OF 2D BATTALION,
105 TH INFANTRY, ON TWO DAYS
PRECEDING BREAKOUT AND
JAPANESE MOVEMENTS ON
NIGHT OF 26-27 JUNE

0 1000 Yd$ (opprox)

MAP I 6

covered from the shock, however, and a lively
small arms and hand grenade battle ensued.

At about the same time, the 14th Marines, in
artillery firing positions between Hill 500 and
Aslito Airfield, was attacked by another por-
tion of Sasaki’s force. The brunt of this assault
was borne by the 2d Battalion (Lieutenant
Colonel Wilson), which held its fire until a pre-
cariously late moment, mistaking the advanc-
ing Japanese column for a large U. S. Army
patrol scheduled to pass through the area at
about this time. A savagely-fought, close-in
battle ensued, virtually annihilating the attack-
ing force. Total 14th Marines’ casualties in the
skirmish were 33 killed and wounded, while
143 Japanese bodies lay sprawled in the regi-
ment’s immediate area.

With the coming of daylight, the 25th Ma-
rines were assigned the mission of mopping up
the stragglers from the abortive enemy effort
of the previous night. Total Japanese losses
in the fight around Aslito Airfield, at, Hill 500,
and in the 14th Marines’ area, plus the 27 June
mop-up by the 25th Marines, amounted to ap-
proximately 500 dead. The participants, some
of whom wore United States uniforms and
carried M— 1 rifles, appeared greatly in need of
water and rations.119

This attack, though better planned than the
average Japanese effort, achieved very little,
and Sasaki’s password “seven lives for one’s
country” remained only a slogan.

Elsewhere on Saipan there was little activity.
The 2d Marine Division, however, reported
Japanese mortar fire (estimated as 90mm)
which traversed the entire front of the division
and denied the men their much-needed rest.120

Although unsubstantiated by any of the
three U. S. divisions, a report by First Lien-
tenant Otsu, commanding the 6th Company of
the Japanese 135th Infantry Regiment,
proudly detailed the news that on the night of

119 nTIjF G—2 Report, 34. TF 51 Report, Enel A, 10.
25th Mar Report, 6-7. 1/th Mar Div Report, Section VI,
27. llfth Mar Report, 10. Ltr from Maj A. E. Buck to
CMC, 26Dec49. Ltr from Maj W. McReynolds to CMC,
14.Tan.r)0. Ltr from LtCol G. II. Wilson to LtCol G. D.
Gayle, 8Feb50.

120 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 15.

26-27 June he and 15 men broke through “sev-
eral lines . . . , destroying at least 150 men,”
and wiping out a command post and about one
company on a hill southwest of Mt. Tapotchau.
For this imaginary feat of valor Otsu later re-
ceived mention in a report from Major General
Iketa.121 The lieutenant deserved much more.

In his summary of 26 June Major General
Iketa felt — correctly — that there had been “no
great change in the battle lines.” Again, how-
ever, mention was made of the fact that com-
munications were difficult because of heavy
concentrations of mortar fire.

Because the battle conditions are as they are [wrote
Iketa to the 29th Division on Yap] we would like the
following articles shipped by fast air. They are listed
in their order of importance and we have listed the
minimum number in brackets ( ).

Type 93 mechanical fuzes — 10,000 (3,000)

Type 1 (Mk 1) ignition fuse percussion primers
2,000 ea (600)

Fuse Wire — 500 meters
B18 dry cells— 1,000 (200)

Mark 4 levels — 500 (200)

Type 88 instantaneous fuses — 5,000 ( 3,000)

By 26 June the volume of enemy artillery fire
had slackened to a mere sprinkle when com-
pared to the deluge of the first days of the op-
eration. This dimunition had been credited to
I he fact that most of the enemy’s artillery had
been destroyed. While this, for the most part,
was true, it appears from the foregoing dis-
patch that at least some of the enemy’s artillery
was curtailed owing to a shortage of fuzes and
other accessories.

Since 22 June the 31st Army staff had at-
tempted to comply with a request, presumably
from Tokyo, to supply “information on actual
condition of the enemy and our sea and air
supremacy in the surrounding sectors of the
Marianas. . . .” With the U. S. strangle hold
tightening about its neck, the 31st Army staff
had difficulty furnishing the information. On
26 June, however, an estimate was made which
concluded :

In short, the enemy at present time has complete
control of the sea and air in the Marianas area. Never-
theless we regard it as a great weak point on the part
of the enemy that in the Saipan area the local air
superiority consists of two CVE’s.122

121 CINCPAC— OJNCT’OA Item #9983-85, 27.

122 Ibid., 22-23.

163

In connection with the latter message, the old
military axiom applied: never underestimate
your enemy. Because oidy two CVE's could be
seen was no reason to assume that there were
no others available to intercept a Japanese
move into the Marianas area.

Japanese requests for reinforcements were
uniformly frantic. On the evening of 26 June
the commanding officer of the 50th Infantry
Regiment on Tinian received another com-
munication treating the subject :

This is a preparatory order. As rapidly as possible
you are to carry out an amphibious operation to Saipan
with two large landing craft. Landing point will be
coast east of Hanichiru. Reply.123

Although the reply to this communication is
not contained in documents consulted, the
move, for some reason, was delayed until the
2d of July, when it met with disastrous results.

During the night of 26-27 June enemy air-
craft again became active against shipping off
Saipan. At 2040 shipboard radar picked up
about 10 Japanese planes heading for the is-
land. Flash Red was immediately ordered and
the smoke plan executed. In an attempt to peer
through (he screen, the Japanese dropped para-
chute flares over the anchorage. At 2130 an
enemy light bomber crashed into the jumbo
boom on the cargo ship (Alv) Mercury , un-
leashing a torpedo as the plane disintegrated.
The torpedo penetrated a living compartment
where the air flask exploded causing superficial
damage. The torpedo’s war head, fortunately,
did not arm.

Aslito Airfield was bombed during the same
raid, causing 11 personnel casualties. Other-
wise, the attack was uneventful, except for a
collision between one U. S. P-61 night fighter
taking off and another landing. Both were lost.

In a later attack, at about 2300, “several”
Japanese planes failed to achieve a single hit
and in the process lost one bomber to ships’
gunfire.124

Progress in Unloading

Since D-Day ( 15 June), supplies and equip-
ment had poured across Saipan’s western
beaches in a steady flow. By D-plus 10 (25

123 Ibid.. 23.

>24 y /.’ ,5j Report, Annex 1 to Enel A ; Enel L, 3.

June) the assault shipping with the exception
of Transport Division 34 125 was completely
unloaded; approximately 60,000 troops and
75,000 tons of supplies (with a daily average
of 6,563 tons) had been landed. This rate of
unloading was very satisfactory, especially
when considered in relation to the following
hinclerances : ( 1 ) artillery and mortar fire on
the beaches until D-plus 4; (2) retirement of
transports during the first two nights and then
continuous retirement of the bulk of the trans-
ports for the next four days because of the
Battle of the Philippine Sea; (3) shoals and
reefs at 1ovt tide which made it necessary to
use “ducks” and LVT’s exclusively during
these periods over Red, Green and Yellow
Beaches; and (4) the narrow and shallow chan-
nel off Blue Beaches which at low tide would
only accommodate LCM’s and LCVP’s.

A great problem, in addition to moving sup-
plies to the beach, was the handling of these
supplies once there. Many types of landing
craft became bottlenecked at the beachline (of-
fering the enemy choice targets) and only the
ducks and LVT’s could move inland to dump
their loads. Fairly extensive use was made of
pallets (large, flat sleds upon which cargo was
lashed) towed behind a duck. Without pausing
for manhandling, the ducks could pull a pallet
from a ship several thousands yards off shore
to a supply dump well inland. So. besides re-
lieving the beach snarl, pallets and ducks also
reduced the amount of labor required.

The two Marine divisions made only limited
use, while the 27th Infantry Division made ex-
tensive use, of palletization: The latter divi-
sion, which had conducted a number of experi-
ments and devoted considerable training in the
handling (he palletized cargo, even requested
permission to palletize beyond the directed
amounts. The Marine divisions were reluctant
to embrace this system whole-heartedly be-
cause: (1) pallets were costly in labor, time,
and material, and consumed considerable ships’
space; and (2) pallets were difficult to handle
by inexperienced personnel.

125 Transport Division 34 was composed of four AP's
and one AK from the Joint Expeditionary Force re-
serve.

164

Indicates progress before 23 June
Advance on 23 June by 2d ond 4th Divisions

Advance on 24 June by 2d ond 4th Divisions

Advance on 25 June by 2d ond 4th Divisions

Advance on 26 June by 2d Division

Positions on 23 June of 27th Division
Positions on 24 June of 27th Division
Positions on 25 June of 27th Division
Positions on 26 June of 27th Division

(NOTE All 27th Division lines from
operation mops of 106th and
165 th Infantry Regiments )

PROGRESS LINES
23-24-25 AND 26
JUNE 1944

NAVY HOSPITAL CORPSMAN administers blood plasma to a wounded Marine near the front lines before evacuating him
to rear areas. Other wounded men wait their turn for attention.

General Holland Smith, while acknowledg-
ing that there was much discussion pro and
con in regard to palletization, concluded that
“the reasons for palletization overbalance the
negative effects,” and. “in the future, consider-
ation should be given to palletizing larger
amounts of assault cargo.120

Medical Situation

It appeared on 26 June that the evacuation
situation was rapidly approaching a major
crisis. On 21 June Group A transports had re-
tired from Saipan carrying 1.474 casualties,
followed the next day by Group B trans-
ports 12‘ with 1,400 casualties on board. Hospi-
tal ships Relief and Samaritan had departed
with 1 ,350 casualties on 23 dune. Transports
of the reserve group left Saipan on 25 June
with 675 casualties. With this exodus, only the
Cambria, Rocky Mount , two hospital ships

128OOMINCIl P-007, 5-7. 5-11. TF HI Report, Enel
A, 9.

127 Group A transports had lifted the 2d Marine Divi-
sion while Group I! had carried the 4th Division.

{Solace and Bountiful) and assorted merchant
cargo ships remained. The latter ships' capaci-
ties were limited due to their lack of medical
personnel, and since the Cambria and Rocky
Mount, were to remain in the area, they could
not be used for evacuation purposes. Fortu-
nately, the casualty rate decreased, and no epi-
demics occurred during the critical period.

Considerable assistance to the over-burdened
medical facilities was provided by the begin-
ning of air evacuation from Aslito Airfield on
25 June. By the end of the operation, 860 casu-
alties had been evacuated to the Marshalls by
this means. Valuable as this method was. Ad-
miral Turner noted that :

During the early stage of air evacuation, planes were
not supplied with medical attendants, nor was a flight
surgeon available for giving advice as to whether or
not patients could sustain an air flight. Several serious
casualties died enroute or shortly after arrival at des-
tination. A flight surgeon with adequate medical at-
tendants should he provided for air fields at the objec-
tive to supervise air evacuation.128

128 COM1NCH P-001 , 5-1!) and 5-20.

165

“Routine” was the word for the activities of
rhe various medical installations on Saipan:
routine in a heroic way. Their routine duties
often extended well into the marginal combat
functions of the Marines and soldiers for whom
they cared. Daily activities of medical per-
sonnel placed them in the most dangerous of
locations; where a man would fall, he would
most often need attention. This help and care,
almost invariably, would be at the hands of
medical personnel who would move into the
very bull’s-eye and provide the necessary com-
fort and assistance. No immunity was ac-
corded them by Japanese, who would tire on a
man with a red cross on his sleeve as on one
without it. And yet, fully aware that they
were moving into an exposed position which
had already claimed one or more casualties, the
“docs” (and they were all called that, whether
doctor or corpsmen) unhesitatingly went on
their missions of mercy. A profound sense of
duty transcended whatever fears they may have
felt. Tn the pursuance of their important func-
tions, these courageous men won the esteem
and respect of all hands.

Related Raids by U. S. Navy

In a move designed principally to keep the
Japanese oil balance and never firmly set for
counterpunches, Pagan Island was raided on
23 June by Carrier Task Group One. Nor were
sister islands in the Marianas neglected; almost

daily photo reconnaissance missions were flown
over Guam and Tinian so that any changes in
the situation or dispositions could be taken into
account before the landings. On 25 June Car-
rier Task Group Three executed powerful
bombing raids against Guam and Rota to
cripple further the airfields and installations
on those islands.129

The first of the post -battle naval raids to
involve more than routine operations was an
attempted strike against the Volcano-Bonin
group which the Japanese turned into an air
battle of impressive proportions. At 0600 on
24 June Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark’s Task
Group 58.1 ( Hornet , Yorlctoion and Bataan)
launched a long-range fighter sweep (48 Hell-
cats) against Iwo Jima which was intercepted
by a large number of enemy fighters. In the re-
sulting action, four U. S. Hellcats were downed
while Japanese losses were estimated at 68
fighters and bombers. This defeat, however,
did not discourage the enemy from attempting
an attack against Clark’s task group with the
remnants of his local air strength. This attempt
proved equally disastrous: U. S. interceptors
shot down 46 more aircraft to raise the day’s
total to 114. Its mission completed without
bombing the airfields, Task Group 58.1 retired
to Eniwetok without incident.130

129 'fp 52 Report, Enel A, 8.

130 The Navy’s Air U’or, 214.

166

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

CHAPTER V

Swing to Tanapag

D-PIUS 12—27 JUNE 1944

Japanese Situation on D-plus 12

Another command post displacement was in-
dicated for General Saito on 27 June. Mount-
ing pressure against his site in the white cliffs
on Tapotcliau’s east side demanded that the
tired old general move farther to the north. 1 1 is
fifth command post was located in a small
jungled depression about 2,200 yards north of
the summit of Mt. Tapotchau. The cave se-
lected, smallest of all his command posts,
served him for two days.

Merger of t lie Central Pacific Fleet Head-
quarters (Xagumo’s command) and t lie North-
ern Marianas Group Headquarters ( Saito "s
command) took place on 27 June. Communica-
tions between the two had been extremely diffi-
cult — sometimes impossible — to maintain, and
this move would relieve the problem. The com-
plicated Japanese command structure, with, its
numerous duplications of responsibility, was
difficult even for Japanese commanders to
understand; and, with the consolidation of the
two in one area, the chances of achieving con-
sistency of orders were improved.

In a brief resume on the morning of 27 June,
Major General Iketa summarized the situation :

The summit of Tapotchau was occupied yesterday
evening’.1 Front line units tried to retake it with a

1 The general’s information was a day late. The 1st

night attack, but did not succeed as planned. In Don-
nay the enemy broke through with a number of tanks,
but their advance was slow. Thereafter, no great
change in the situation.

The defense force, along with the firmest possible
defense of its present front line and its activities
toward annihilation of the enemy, is at present setting
up with a line between Tanapag — Hill 221 2 — Tara-
holio as the final line of resistance. [For location of
this “final line of resistance” see Map 18.]

General Saito originated two messages dur-
ing the day which indicate that he was in a
retrospective mood.

The essential points of English and American land
warfare differ greatly with the common sense con-
siderations of the past. The pressing need of the
moment is that the mistake he not made of allowing
this important experience in the defense of Saipan to
lie put to no practical end, and, the soldiers here to
lie robbed of the fruits of victory after having fought
so bravely.

The general is not specific on what he con-
sidered the departures from the “common
sense” tactics of the past, so that it is impos-
sible to pursue this interesting thought to its
conclusion. Possibly it is another example of
Saito attempting to outguess and anticipate
U. S. intentions; and, when that guess turned
out to be incorrect, he felt that the Americans
were not using “common sense.”

llattalion, 29th Marines, reached Tapotchau's summit
on 25 June.

2 Marines named this hill “Radar Hill.”

167

A tribute to the effectiveness of naval gun-
fire is contained in a second dispatch from
Saito :

The practical experiences of the defense forces of
Saipan . . . have to do with the power of the enemy
naval bombardment. If there just were no naval gun-
fire, we feel with determination that we could tight it
out with the enemy in a decisive battle.

At the large plateau on the extreme northern
end of Saipan the Japanese continued their ef-
forts to finish the Banadero (Marpi Point)
Airfield. Though hampered by U. S. planes
and naval vessels, the work progressed with
feverish intensity. Toil on the field was spurred
by the groundless belief that it would — by some
miracle — provide t lie funnel through which air
reinforcement would pour. General Saito’s
estimate as to when the work would be com-
pleted is significant:

. . . the Banadero airport has not been completed, but
in case the necessity arises, it can be used, and the
Saipan defense forces trust that they can hold out
until the first 10 days of the month (July), awaiting
its completion.

Still obsessed with the opinion that there was
a paucity of U. S. planes over Saipan, General
Saito repeated the familiar refrain on 27 June:

Because the enemy planes which have appeared in
the air are only carrier borne bombers and recon-
naissance planes, the situation is such that our large
tighter formations could seize good opportunity for
daylight sinking of enemy destroyers, etc.

Since there is no indication that Saito deliber-
ately attempted to present a false picture, the
conclusion is drawn that he was grossly mis-
informed as to the status of U. S. air at, and
around, Saipan, and also as to the willingness
and ability of Japanese air to help him.

This, then, was what the Japanese high com-
mand did. thought and wrote on 27 June.3

Rapid Progress on the Right

-Vs noted before, the Northern Troops and
Landing Force attack order for 27 June di-
rected that the three divisions attack abreast
(2d on the left, 27th in the center, 4th on the
right) and seize objective 0-6. Shuffling of
some subordinate units, demanded by the tac-
tical situation, left the divisions somewhat
changed, organically, from their normal struc-

3 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #0983-85, 24-25.

ture. These temporary alterations had de-
veloped the major infantry organizations as
follows :

4th Marine Division 27th Infantry Division

23d Marines 106th Infantry

24th Marines 105th Infantry (less 1st

165th Infantry Regiment and 2d Battalions)

(less 2d Battalion) 2d Battalion, 165th In-

1st Battalion, 105th In- fantry

fantry

(total : nine battalions) (total: five battalions)
2d Marine Division

2d Marines 8th Marines

6th Marines 1st Battalion, 29tli

Marines

(total: 10 battalions)

XTLF Deserve Saipan Garrison Force

25th Marines 2d Battalion, 105th In-

( total : three battalions) fantry

(total: one battalion)4

The Japanese escape from Nafutan Point the
previous night had caused considerable con-
fusion in rear areas of the 4th Marine Division,
particularly in artillery positions of the 14th
Marines. Because of the disturbance, the 4th
Marine Division received permission from
XTLF to delay its appointed attack hour from
0630 to 0730.

Progress in the 4th Marine Division zone on
27 June was rapid. The right assault regiment,
the 23d Marines, advanced against only scat-
tered small arms fire issuing from the villages
of Donnay and Hashigoru. (See Map 18.)
Underwater mines, which the Japanese had
used as land mines, were found along the road
and railroad in the vicinity of Donnay. Tanks
detoured these mined areas without difficulty,
however. A Japanese supply dump, found near
Hashigoru. contained new clothing, ammuni-
tion, and infantry weapons.

Lieutenant Colonel Dillon’s 2d Battalion,
moving through the matted vegetation and
ragged cliff line along the coast, experienced
difficulty keeping abreast of the faster-moving
3d Battalion. Since a detailed search of the
gnarled coast line could not be instituted with-
out sacrificing the momentum of the attack.
Colonel Jones ordered the 1st Battalion to fol-
low Dillon’s unit at 400 yards, mopping up and
investigating suspicious areas. By 1640 the

4 NTLF Operation Order 14-44.

168

rugged cliffs, typical of much of Saipan's eastern coast line, provided numerous hiding places for Japanese
soldiers. Clearing the enemy from these areas was costly in men and time.

23d Marines had trudged to objective 0—6.
Both battalions immediately dispatched secu-
rity-reconnaissance patrols to their front but
made no contacts with t lie enemy.5

Promptly at 0730 the 105tb Infantry (less its
2d Battalion, attached to the 106th Infantry)
moved out. Formation for the attack was: 3d
Battalion on the right (in contact with the 23d
Marines) and 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry,
(attached to the 165th Infantry) on the left.
The reserve of the 165th — the 1st Battalion
would follow the left assault battalion at 600
r‘ 23 d Mar Report, 14. 2d tin, 23d Mar Report, 4.

yards, maintaining contact with the right flank
of the 27th Division. The 165th moved rapidly
through the hills, particularly in the zone of
the right battalion. The left assault unit,
weathering occasional squalls of Japanese
small -arms fire and traversing rougher terrain,
moved somewhat slower.

With the great strides of the 165th Infantry
on 27 TIune and the relative immobility of units
to the left rear, problems of maintaining con-
tact were presented. About noon the 165th’s
commander, Colonel Kelley, advised Colonel
W alter WT. Rogers, chief of staff of the 4th Ma-

889590° -50 — 12

169

line Division, that he feared that the 165tli In-
fantry’s l'eserve battalion had stretched to the
breaking point in order to till the ever-growing
vertical gap. Kelley cautioned that further ad-
vances would make it physically impossible for
the 165th Infantry, with the troops at its dis-
posal, to sustain contact with the 27th Division.
The obvious solution to the problem, and the
one recommended by Colonel Ivelley, was to
move a battalion of the 4th Marine Division
reserve (24th Marines) into the area to assist
in manning the lengthy connection.6

At about 1730, orders came for the 3d Bat-
talion, 24th Marines, to Dll the southern por-
tion of the tenuous link between the two divi-
sions. With commitment of this battalion, the
schematic appearance of the 4th Marine Divi-
sion was peculiar (see Map 18), with a front
of approximately 2,500 yards and a left flank
of about the same length.

No sooner had the 3d Battalion, 24th Ma-
rines, arrived in position when two enemy
medium tanks were sighted to the northwest.
Although fired upon by 37mm guns and 81mm
mortal's, the enemy tanks fired several rounds
and escaped unscathed.

As the 4th Marine Division dug in for the
night after an advance of approximately 3,000
yards, there was concern in the division logis-
tics section created by the ever-lengthening
supply lines and the paucity of motor trans-
port. This unfavorable circumstance caused
the 4th Division action report to comment :
“. . . supply of front line units was not main-
tained at a desirable level.” Fortunately, how-
ever, there were no serious consequences of this
situation.7

Important Localities Seized

As already noted, the 27th Division moved
but little on 27 June. Colonel Stebbins, the
106th Infantry’s new commander, spent the
greater portion of the day getting the regiment
in position for advances on 28 June. While this
resulted in only minor progress, the situation

• 6 Kelley, 8-0.

7 } tli Mar nil ; Report, Section VI. 27-2S. 2%th J for
Report, 21. Ltr from Maj A. B. Hanson to CMC,
14Feb50.

was much improved from the point of view of
future action.

On the evening of 27 June General Jarman
talked to Colonel Stebbins to get the latter’s ob-
servations on the 106th Infantry. According
to General Jarman, “He [Stebbins] stated that
they seemed to lack the will to go forward; he
had to personally get the units in hand and
show them where to go and push the battalions
out.” To Jarman it was “apparent that upon
the first firings of any kind by snipers the bat-
talions immediately asked to be allowed to re-
tire.” 8

In a narrative account written after the op-
eration, Colonel Stebbins indicated no dis-
satisfaction with the fighting qualities of his
regiment :

. . . difficulties of terrain and locating the Jap defenses
were the causes for failure to advance. The cliffs
and hillsides were pocketed with small caves and large
caves. The wooded area was rough, filled with boulders,
and excellent for defensive operations. Bands of fire
were laid by the enemy through the underbrush and
in such manner as to make it most difficult to discover
their locations. ... It was necessary to work forward
taking out each gun in turn, employing tanks to draw
fire so that guns could be located and destroyed. Rush
and die tactics would never have succeeded.9

The most important gain in the 106th In-
fantry’s zone on 27 June was made by the 1st
Battalion, on the left. While one company (C)
remained in Death Valley to contain the enemy
in die cliff by directing fires into the caves from
below, the other two companies (A and B)
skirted to the west, climbed the southern end
of the ridge, and attacked the Japanese posi-
tions from above. Since most of the enemy
weapons in the cliff face were sited for enfilade
fire into the valley, the two companies were
able to approach the strong points from the
rear. In this manner they avoided the heavy
volume of fire that had immobilized movements
across the lower ground for so many days.

Clearing the caves was a tedious task, re-
quiring the coordinated activities of 1st Bat-
talion riflemen and flame-thrower-demolition
teams from the 102d Engineer Battalion. By
late afternoon a solid toehold in the southern

8 Jarman.

9 Stebbins.

170

end of the cliff line liad been seized, a number
of Japanese positions eliminated, and prospects
for future advance through the area much im-
proved. One strong point destroyed during the
day housed about 20 Japanese soldiers, armed
with rifles, machine guns, and three U. S.
Browning Automatic Rifles. How they had
obtained the latter three weapons was never
revealed.

Movement by the remainder of the 106th In-
fantry was rendered difficult because of fire
from Japanese located in that portion of the
cliff line not yet reached by the men on top, as
well as fresh opposition from a hill (desig-
nated “Hill Able”) to the right front. This
latter feature lay within the zone of the 2d
Battalion, 165tli Infantry (attached to the
106th Infantry) ; and, despite the best efforts
of that unit to seize it on 27 June, the hill re-
mained firmly in enemy hands at the close of
the day. (See Map 18.)

Two platoons of medium tanks from the
762d Tank Battalion were attached to the
106th Infantry for the 27 June attack. These
platoons were to move out before the infantry
assault to neutralize Japanese positions in the
cliff line. But plans, unfortunately, went
awry. Soon after the tanks moved out on their
mission, it began to rain. Dust on the tanks
turned to mud, vision from within became
blurred, and the machines lost direction. In-
stead of firing on the planned targets, they
opened upon men of the 3d Battalion, 106th
Infantry.

This miscarriage of plans postponed the at-
tack until 1230, when the 3d Battalion, fol-
lowed by the 2d Battalion, moved out. Again
the enemy in the cliff line opened up, but this
time the tanks found their targets and neutral-
ized them. Despite fire from Hill Able to the
right front, the 3d Battalion pushed on. By
1342 the unit had reached its objective, a small
knoll west of Hill Able, and commenced dig-
ging in for the night. When the advance of
the 3d Battalion permitted, the 2d Battalion,
until then following in reserve, swung to the
right and came abreast of the 3d. There it dug
in for the night. Company F remained some
distance ahead with the 8th Marines atop the
cliff.

At the conclusion of the day’s action, the
commanding general of the 27th Division sent
a message to the 2d and 3d Battalions, 106th
Infantry :

Congratulations on a day's work well done. I have
the utmost confidence in our continued success in a
vigorous push against the remaining enemy. Keep up
the good work. Jarman.10

The 106th Infantry had not been sparing in
the use of supporting artillery fires. From 25
to 27 June, the following amounts of artillery
ammunition had been expended in the regi-
mental zone: 2,606 rounds of light high ex-
plosive (105mm) ; 117 rounds light smoke: 420
rounds medium high explosive (155mm).

The 27th Division’s reserve (105th Infantry,
less 1st and 2d Battalions) remained in an as-
sembly area awaiting orders.* 11

Pinch, Shift, Adjust, Consolidate

Only minor advances were made by the 2d
Marine Division on 27 June. In the first hour
of the attack, the 1st and 3d Battalion, 8th
Marines, advanced about 200 yards along
Tapotchau’s western slopes. Resistance was
light, but the terrain again provided the de-
terrent to rapid movement. At Tapotchau’s
summit, meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 29th Ma-
rines, completed seizure of the main crest and
started the northern descent. The 2d Battalion,
8th Marines, on the division right, conducted
aggressive patrolling in the northeast Tapot-
chau area. Anxious eyes still peered* to the
right rear in search of elements of the 27th Di-
vision, which, as yet, had not moved up on the
flank. Though the 1st Battalion, 106th Infan-
try, had made important gains during the day,
the action had been too far to the rear for the
Marines to observe. At no time could the 8th
Regiment relax attention to the right flank;
the enemy capability of clambering up the cliff
and striking from the rear was one not to be
ignored or forgotten.

At 1000 the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines
(from the NTLF reserve), was again attached
to the 2d Marine Division. After further at-
tachment to the 8th Marines, the battalion

10 106 Inf Report, 9-1 1 .

11 27th Inf Div Periodic Report No. 11, 27Jun44.

171

highway, inland Saipan style. Had as this route appears, it was excellent by comparison with some others
that were used. Jeeps carried messengers and supplies forward, evacuated casualties rearward.

moved to Colonel Wallace’s command post and
again reported for duty with that regiment.
( It had been attached to the 8th Marines on the
previous day but at 1500 had been returned to
XTLF control.) Colonel Wallace ordered the
unit to relieve the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,
of the flank-watching mission so that the latter
could give full attention to the advance. By
late afternoon this relief was accomplished, the
2d Battalion, 25th Marines, being deployed in
an almost north-south line along the 2d Divi-
sion's right boundary. At 1700 the battalion
made patrol contact with 27th Division troops
in Death Valley.

Perhaps the most important result of the
day’s movements in the 8th Marines’ zone was
that the unit’s normal frontage could be as-
sumed. With the release of the 2d Battalion,
8th Marines, from flank security duties, lines
were straightened with resultant reduction in
frontage.12

12 Stli Mar Report, S-7.

Pinch, shift, adjust, consolidate, advance —
these were the 27 June plans of the 6th Ma-
rines. The 3d Battalion (in the center), tired
from days of continuous front line action, was
to be pinched out of the front lines and shifted
to regimental reserve. The 2d Battalion, on the
right, would adjust itself to its new frontage,
consolidate its contact with adjacent units, and
finally advance. The 1st Battalion would move
forward when units to its right had relieved
the contact strain.

Prior to King-Hour (0630) a small counter-
attack struck between Companies F and I, 6th
Marines. Supported by knee mortars, about one
Japanese platoon caused a brief flurry of ex-
citement but little else. The Marines of the two
companies converged their fires upon the
meager enemy force and quickly repulsed it.

By 1-110 the 3d Battalion, completely relieved
from the lines, assembled in reserve, 1 pon de-
termining that good contact existed on both
flanks, the 2d Battalion moved forward. But,
after progressing only a short distance through

172

a cane field, the unit was struck by a fierce
fusillade of small -arms fire coming, as on the
previous day, from the base of the ridge line
to the north. The short stubble of the cane field
gave the unit little or no protection from the
grazing fire of the Japanese. As darkness of
27 June fell, the ridge line north of Mt. Tipo
Pale remained firmly in enemy hands. With the
Short advance of the 2d Battalion, however, the
1st Battalion was permitted to move forward,
seizing more favorable terrain and shortening
its front for future action. Like its sister regi-
ment, the 8th Marines, the 6th had gained but
little during the day.13

Eager to finish a job which they knew was
theirs and realizing that the task became no
easier with waiting, men of the 2d Marines
bided their time along Radio Road outside of
Garapan. The wait was not their choice. Nor
was it anyone’s. To push the regiment — alone
— through Garapan would have demanded that
its former frontage be assumed by another unit.
Since another unit was not available for any
such assignment, it remained for the 2d Ma-
rines1 front to hold and wait until the outer arc
of the swing had advanced abreast of it.

The time was by no means wasted; daily pa-
trols had thoroughly scouted the town’s rubble
and had provided timely information of enemy
activities there. Patrols on 27 June discovered
and routed a small enemy outpost and found an
improvised mined area, employing aerial
bombs, in the streets of the town.14

During the long wait at Garapan ’s southern
edge the 2d Marines constantly improved de-
fense positions. The possibility of an all-out
Japanese counterattack along the coastal flats
was never ignored, and all hands were con-
stantly alert to just such a development. Across
the regiment’s front, “concertina” wire 15 had

13 6th Mar Report, 9-10.

14 2d Mar Report, 5.

15 “Concertina” is a single strand of barbed wire
wound into a lose doughnut shape. When it is de-
sired to put it to use, the two loose ends are pulled
in opposite directions, stretching the barbed wire into
a long cylindrical obstacle. A concertina can be laid
in a fraction of the time that it takes to prepare a
double apron fence.

been strung, and just forward of that sheets of
corrugated tin had been spread in order that
any movement toward the lines would be loudly
announced. More than one prowling pig met
death by blundering upon this ingenious, it
crude, warning device. Individual foxholes
had been converted to tiny fortresses by the ad
dition of overhead cover and, occasionally, by
placement of steel armor-plate shields in front.
The latter items were not issued but rather
represented the fruits of a search through an
enemy building. The Japanese had intended
the shields as individual protection from small-
arms fire, and the Marines were not ones to mis
use acquired property.16

The seizure of Mt. Tapotchau provided an
excellent observation post. From the moun-
tain's towering heights, nearly the entire island
could be viewed. To provide security for the
2d Marine Division observation post located
there, one company of the 1st Provisional Bat-
talion (formed from Shore Party personnel
whose normal function was completed) was
detached from the 2d Marines and moved to
form a cordon around the installation.

Division air observers, operating from the
tiny Charan Ivanoa strip or from carriers since
15 June, now moved to Aslito Airfield together
with their “grasshoppers.” 17 The vulnerable,
little OY planes proved an extremely valuable
means of acquiring enemy information
throughout the operation.

By leaving Nafutan Point on the previous
night, the enemy relieved the 2d Battalion.
105th Infantry, of the worst part of its assign-
ment. On 27 June the soldiers, reporting scat-
tered resistance, swept to the promontory’s
southernmost tip. It then remained for the
myriad coast line caves and crevasses to be in-
spected and cleaned of Japanese. This task
consumed several days of effort. The battalion
subsequently reported counting 850 Japanese
bodies on Nafutan Point. These were in addi-
tion to those killed in the breakout on the night
of 26-27 June.18

16 Throneson.

17 2d Mar Dir Report, Section VI, 10.

18 Memo for Gen Richardson from Col G. M. O’Con
nell, 12.Tul44. O'Connell Letter.

173

D-PLUS 13—28 JUNE 1944

Night of 27-28 June

At 1845 ships in the transport area were
alerted to the approach of Japanese planes, and
the smoke plan was immediately executed. The
radar had not erred; at 2000 and again at 2235,
bombs fell on the transport area : live to eight
in the early attack, 15 in the latter. The num-
ber of attacking Japanese planes was described
as “several”; but, aside from a near miss on the
Cambria , all bombs fell without causing dam-
age. Aslito Airfield felt the impact of enemy
bombs at 2352, but, here again, the only loss
was peace and quiet. Equally ineffective was
the retaliatory fire of ships’ and shore-installed
antiaircraft guns. Nor did the Army night
fighters which rose from Aslito Airfield achieve
effective contact with the enemy formations.19

The fireworks displayed at Aslito Airfield
and in the transport area provided the prin-
cipal diversion during the night of 27-28 June.
The 2d Marines, however, reported “sporadic
enemy mortar fire falling” within its lines,20
and the command post of the 2d Battalion,
165th Infantry, became the special target of
an enemy 40 or 47mm flat trajectory weapon.
The most serious consequence of the latter
shelling was the wounding of the battalion com-
mander, Major Gregory Brousseau, USA.21

A peculiar bit of activity occurred in the 23d
Ma rines’ sector at about 0200. Lumbering con-
fidently along a road leading into the M a rine
lines was a truck carrying 12 Japanese soldiers
and civilians. Whether attempting a bold tactic
or merely lost, the enemy never revealed; ve-
hicle and passengers met a quick end from the
point-blank fires of a 37mm gun.22

lo y/r §1 Report, Enel A and Annex 1 to Enel A.

20 2d Mar Report, 5.

21 Major Brousseau had taken command of the bat-
talion on 25 June when Lieutenant Colonel John F.
McDonough had been wounded. Replacing Brousseau
temporarily was Captain James A. Dooley, USA, who
commanded until Major Dennis D. Claire, USA,
(transferred from the 3d Battalion) arrived to take
over. With Major Claire’s departure from the 3d
Battalion, Major Martin II. Floery, USA, assumed
command of that unit.

22 23d Mar Report, 44.

Not panic, but an ever-growing concern
(nurtured by a steady diet of reverses) reveals
itself in Iketa’s situation report on the morning
of 28 June :

1. Last night all fronts were without great change,
but since dawn, enemy attacks have grown in in-
tensity, particularly against Tapotchau area and the
hill on the northwest side of Cliacha, and the hill west
of Donnay where the enemy has laid heavy artillery
lire. On the south foot of Tapotchau, he seems to have
20 odd mortars, and in the southwest area, over 10
mountain guns and mortars.

2. About 50 men of the 118th Infantry are improving
their positions on the east side of Hill 343, 23 and one
company of the 136th Infantry is improving its posi-
tion on Hill 268, 24 and about 50 men of the 118 Infantry
are digging in on the north side of that hill. The
main body of the 9th Expeditionary Force, about 200
men, and about 100 men from the 9th Tank Regiment
are consolidating their positions north and east of
there in the high ground (Cliacha water area).25
Though surrounded by the enemy, and receiving artil-
lery fire, we are prepared to make stiff resistance along
the cliff line.

3. As the battle progresses numbers of bravely fight-
ing officers and men continue to appear, engaging in
hand to hand combat, taking part in raids and scouting
missions, and holding back nothing in the service of
their Emperor.

4. Parts of our forces are in the midst of preparing
positions against the enemy, in order to make the area
north of Donnay and around Tarahoho secure against
his advances.26

The fact that Iketa made no mention of de-
fenses west of Tapotchau, in the 2d Marine Di-
vision zone, would indicate that he had re-
ceived no word from either the 135th Infantry
Ilegiment or Navy units located in that area.

23 The “east side of hill 343’’ was the cliff line which
had troubled the 106th Infantry for so many days.
The hill itself was about 1,200 yards south of Mt.
Tapotchau.

24 Hill 268, about one mile southeast of Tapotchau’s
peak, lay within the zone of the 165th Infantry. This
hill constituted the southern end of Purple Heart
Ridge.

25 The “Cliacha water area,” not identified on U. S.
maps, was a large fresh water spring on the high
ground (part of Purple Heart Ridge) west of Cliacha
Village. The “water area” was near the 27th Divi-
sion’s right boundary.

26 CINCPAC— CIXCPOA Item #9983-85, 25.

174

UP-AND-DOWN fighting was necessary to clear Japanese from jumbled maze of coral rock characteristic of in-
land Saipan. Evacuating wounded from this type of terrain was a major problem.

Four “Pimples”

In the 2d Marine Division zone the advance
slogged slowly forward. Along the beach the
2d Marines, still unable to advance without
breaking contact with units to the east, con-
ducted monotonous patrolling activities into
Garapan. In preparation for projected moves
through the battered town, artillery, naval
gunfire and air strikes pounded targets located
there. In one air strike three misdirected
rockets fell within the lines of the 1st Bat-
talion, 2d Marines, causing 27 casualties.27 This
unfortunate accident occurred when a pilot
mistook a puff of white smoke in the Marines’
lines for his strike-marker (the target was to

27 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 17.

be marked with a white phosphorous shell.

Major General Watson and Lieutenant Gen-
eral Holland Smith recommended disciplinary
action because of this tragedy; but Admiral
'Spruance, commanding the Fifth Fleet, did not
concur. While pointing out that such accidents
should not be “casually condoned,” Spruance
felt that disciplinary action would have a
“baneful effect on close air support operations.”
In regard to preventing a recurrence of an ac-
cident of this nature, Spruance wrote, “It can
be taken for granted by all that the air force
will take every possible precaution to avoid ac-
cidents of this nature in the future.” 28

28 LtP from Commander Fifth Fleet to Commander
Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, 29Jul44.

175

The length of two football fields or a fairly
long golf drive (200 yards) was the average
forward movement by the 6tli Marines on 28
June. The left assault battalion (the 1st), re-
stricted by the movements of units to its right,
could only conduct patrolling operations. In
this respect, it was more nearly related to the
2d Marines than to its parent unit.

Major Hunt’s 2d Battalion continued to fight
across the open canefield toward its objective,
a low ridge line north of Tipo Pale. Japanese
riflemen and machine gunners, secure in their
hillside grotto, raked the clearing with grazing
lire. Light flame-thrower and medium tanks
were available to the 6th Marines, but their use
in this instance was limited because of difficult
routes of approach to enemy positions, and
support had to be delivered from long ranges.
This left the task to the infantrymen. As every-
where demonstrated, reduction of cave posi-
tions proved a slow, painful job. By late after-
noon the situation had improved slightly and
the volume of Japanese lire had diminished
somewhat, but the 2d Battalion’s unceasing
efforts since 0630 found it still short of the
ridge line objective and very tired. A great
st ore of energy had been burned in moving
across the murderous field, yet more effort
would be required. It appeared that the Japa-
nese were rooted to the pock-marked ridge line.

The Tipo Pale strong point, at which Com-
pany Iv, 6th Marines, had been whittling for
many days, finally was secured on 28 June, per-
mitting the company to rejoin its battalion.
The tenacious Japanese soldiers in this pocket
had sold their lives but had exacted from the
6th Ma rines a high price in time, men and ef-
fort.20

Here today, gone tomorrow; that was the
rule for the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines. At
0730, 28 June, the organization was again re-
moved from 8th Marines’ control and returned
to NTLF reserve. After this change, the 2d
Battalion, 8th Marines, again assumed respon-
sibility for the division right flank.

To the north in the 8th Marines’ zone of ac-
tion. four small Bills could be seen. These hills,
rising from relatively flat ground, looked tiny

29 6th Mar Report, 10. Fisher Interview.

from the “crow’s nest” at the peak of Mt.
Tapotchau and were nicknamed “the Pimples.”
(See Map 18.) Admirably suited for designa-
tion as battalion objectives, the blemishes were
assigned by Colonel Wallace from right to left
as follows: 2d Battalion, 8th Marines — Bill’s
Pimple ; 1st Battalion, 29th Marines — Tommy’s
Pimple; 3d Battalion, 8th Marines — Stan’s
Pimple; 1st Battalion, 8th Marines — Larry’s
Pimple.30

It was hoped that the advance of the 3d Bat-
talion, 8th Marines, would go forward rapidly
since the terrain in this unit’s zone afforded
satisfactory routes for the forward movement
of tanks. Jagged ground in the other bat-
talions’ areas was very unsatisfactory for tank
traffic.

The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, on the right,
was ordered to move out on 28 June in spite
of the fact that 27th Division elements had not
come abreast. Normal precautions would be
taken to prevent the Japanese from exploiting
the gap between divisions, but the push to the
north would no longer be delayed.

Facing the 2d Battalion in its assigned zone
was an abrupt drop which virtually prohibited
movement to the north. A crevice, not over
two feet- wide at most points, provided the only
route of descent. Movement down this slot as
well as the day’s advance over a narrow cliff-
side path demanded that the battalion move in
a formation of companies in column and, fur-
ther. individuals in column of liles. Numerous
caves had to be investigated as the unit moved
parallel to the cliff; but. rather than halting
the entire procession while these searches were
instituted, small combat patrols were dis-
patched to do the job while the remainder con-
tinued toward Bill's Pimple.

The formation and tactics were sound in this
situation, and during the move past the cliff
the battalion killed about 100 of the enemy.
These 100 were no worry, but the Marines’ own
casualties were another matter. The rugged
nature of the terrain required that a single
stretcher be manned by eight bearers. Thus, a

30Tliese nicknames were for Major William C. Cham-
berlin (Bill), Lieutenant Colonel Rathvon M. Tomp-
kins (Tommy). Major Stanley E. Larson (Stan), and
Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence C. Hays, Jr. (Larry).

176

single casualty was, in effect, nine men at least
temporarily out of action. Sad but true: a man
wounded imposed a greater immediate loss on
the unit than a man dead. Supply and evacu-
ation in the 2d Battalion’s area was improved
when a bulldozer carved a lane to the top of
the cliff. Although still not satisfactory for
vehicular traffic, this route was used to man-
handle supplies from the top of the cliff down
to the battalion.

All along the 8th Marines’ front resistance
stiffened. This, plus the fact that observers
noted many enemy moving on and around the
“Pimples,” lent emphasis to the belief that the
main battle positions would be encountered in
that vicinity. By 1600 the 8th Marines had lost
momentum and received orders to hold for the
night. As the regiment halted, it was still short
of the four Pimples. Defensive positions left
something to be desired ; a 400-yard gap existed
between the right of the 2d Battalion, 8th Ma-
rines, and the left of the 106th Infantry. Also,
a precipitous cliff separated the 1st Battalion,
29th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 8th Ma-
rines. So as not to imperil the regiment’s right
Hank, the former unit anchored its flank firmly
on the top lip of the cliff while the latter pro-
vided all-around circular defense for itself at
the bottom.31

The result of this pressure in the north Ta-
potchau area is revealed in General 1 beta’s sit-
uation report on the evening of 28 June:

All our units are consolidating their positions and
fighting hard but personnel has been sharply reduced
by the enemy shelling over a period of many days and
the enemy is gradually infiltrating among our posi-
tions. Especially in the vicinity of Mt. Tapotchau four
or five enemy battalions, supported by several tons of
mortars are attacking but our troops are checking
their advance.32

General Griner Assumes Command of 27th Division

This date, 28 June, marked the end of Gen-
eral Jarman’s command of the 27tli Infantry
Division. Jarman, whose primary post was
Saipan Garrison Force Commander, had com-
manded the division on a temporary basis
awaiting the arrival of Major General George
W. Griner, Jr., USA. At 1000 the new com-

31 Htli 1 for Report, 7.

32 CTNCPAO-CINCPOA Item #9083-85, 20.

manding general arrived at the 27th Division
command post and relieved General .Jarman.
Then followed the usual orientation to the sit-
uation, staff reports, introductions and gen-
erally getting the new leader geared to his
command. General Griner instructed Brigadier
General Ross to continue in his dual capacity
as chief of staff and assistant division com-
mander.33

Since moving into the lines on 23 June, the
27th Division had received mortar and ma-
chine-gun fire from the enemy in the cliffs on
the left flank. No exception was to be enjoyed
on 28 June. Progress, again, was slow.

The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, which had
made some headway against these same cliffs
on the previous day, found the craggy precipice
dotted with caves. Flushing the Japanese from
their hideouts was a lengthy process. Forward
gains were short, but a number of enemy in-
stallations (housing 12 machine guns and sev-
eral mortars) were destroyed.

A faster pace — initially — was maintained by
the 2d and 3d Battalions. These units, advanc-
ing against small-arms lire, progressed about
400 yards before experiencing serious difficul-
ties. Then an enemy field piece, located some-
where to the right front, joined the smaller
weapons in a challenge to forward movement.
In addition, the advance was complicated by
the failure of the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry,
to seize Ilill Able (see Map 18). This com-
manding position, located on the right flank of
the 2d and 3d Battalions, 106th Infantry, was
an uncomfortable thorn in the side of the two
units. Dangerous exposure of this flank caused
the two units to stop their forward movement.34

Among the 3d Battalion’s casualties on 28
June was the commanding officer, Lieutenant
Colonel Harold I. Mizony, USA, killed in ac-
tion when two Japanese tanks unexpectedly
appeared just forward of his battalion obser-
vation post. By chance, the two enemy vehicles
had found a lucrative target; commanders of
the 2d and 3d Battalions, together with their

33 It will be recalled that Colonel Stebbins, the i-egu-
larly assigned chief of staff, had taken over command
of the 106th Infantry on 20 June. Certificate of MajGen
G. W. Griner, 12.Tul44.

34 106th luf Report, 12-13.

177

fire support, delivered by ;i heavy machine gun (foreground) and a 37mm gun (background), assists the
infantry advance on enemy positions. Behind the weapon, two crewmen ready additional belts of machine-
gun ammunition.

company commanders, were gathered to plan
the next move. Tightly grouped a short dis-
tance behind them were the men of the two
battalions, waiting for the orders that would
send them into action. Within a matter of
moments the enemy tankers reaped an awful
harvest — 12 killed, 61 wounded — and disap-
peared unscathed.35

The 3d Battalion had suffered heavy casual-
ties in its Death Valley fight. By June 28 its
effective strength of riflemen numbered ap-
proximately 100, and it was reorganized into a
single rifle company.38 Plans were made to
move the “company" into reserve when relieved
by the 1st Battalion.37

The 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, on the di-
vision right, meanwhile, continued its assigned

as Love, 324-325.

l!Thc unit was still referred to as the 3d Battalion,
however.

17 106th Inf Report , 12-13. 27th Inf Div Field Order

task of clearing Hill Able. This was no easy
job. On 26 June the battalion commander had
reported that his troops occupied the hill, but
morning of 27 June found him in error — the
Japanese were still firmly in possession. Per-
sistent tenants, they refused to budge despite
heavy pressure applied on 27 June. Again on
the 28th. repeated efforts were made, but the
enemy held. One attempt which appeared to
promise certain success inexplicably failed.
This attempt had followed receipt of word that
U. S. stretcher bearers had moved unmolested
along the hill’s western base. Maneuvering
through the zone already cleared by the 106th,
the 2d Battalion, 165th, enveloped Hill Able
from the west. Again the attack was repulsed
and another failure in the struggle for Hill
Able recorded. At 1815 the battalion was de-
tached from the 106th Infantry, with which it
had operated for several days, and attached to
the 105th Infantry, which was taking over the
right of the division zone.

173

Company F, 106th Infantry, meanwhile,
moved down from atop the cliff and rejoined its
parent battalion. This company had been with
the 2d Battalion, 8lh Marines, since the evening
of 23 June. The Marines were sorry to see the
unit leave. During its week atop the cliff. Com-
pany F had proved itself an aggressive, well-
led organization.

As night fell and the division dug in. a short
400 yards had been gained.38

“Hold Present Positions. . .

Holland Smith ordered the 4th Marine Di-
vision to “hold present positions until further
orders.” Its long advance of 27 dune made fur-
ther moves impracticable until the 27th Divi-
sion had come abreast. To assist the latter in
catching up, the 4th Marine Division was di-
rected to “assist advance of 27th Infantry Di-
vision by fire.” During the wait, rear areas
would be mopped up, and two battalions of
105mm howitzers from the 14th Marines were
prepared to pass to control of the Corps Artil-
lery.39 .

In compliance with that part of the order
which directed that tire assistance be provided
the 27th Division, General Schmidt ordered
the 165th Infantry (less 2d Battalion) and the
24th Marines to establish one battalion each
along the division boundary. The 1st Bat-
talion, 165th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion,
24th Marines, found the extension too great
for them to cover. Even with the commitment
of another battalion from the 24th Marines
(the 1st) and readjustment of the 1st Bat-
talion, 105th Infantry’s lines, physical contact
still did not exist with the 27th Division. Four
battalions attempted to cover the open think,
while only three faced the front.

“Hold present positions” was a fluid phrase
as it pertained to a division. It permitted small
changes and shifts (to improve the position
held) while, at the same time, requiring that
the general trace of the front lines remain sub-
stantially fixed. In keeping with this logical
interpretation, the 23d Regiment patrolled for-
ward of its lines to a distance of 500 yards, and

38 27th Inf Div Periodic Report No. 12, 28.Tnn44.

80 NTLF Operation Order 15-44.

the 165tli Infantry occupied a dominating
feature (Ilill 700) a short distance to its front.
With the shifts and minor advances, objective
0-6 was completely occupied within the 4th
Division zone during the day. Patrols from
the 23d Marines made no contacts in the area
to the front but observed indications of recent
evacuation by enemy groups.40

A serious blow befell the 165th Infantry on
28 June: an exploding Japanese mortar shell
wounded the regimental commander, Colonel
Gerard W. Kelley. After Kelley was evacuated.
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph T. Hart, the execu-
tive officer, assumed command.41

The 4th Division’s success in pushing along
the east coast was recognized by the Japanese
chief of staff in his summary of 28 June:

The enemy is steadily increasing his troop strength
opposing our front lines in hill lines west of Donnay
and is closing in on our positions; a few of the enemy
have infiltrated into our positions. The enemy is still
not north of Donnay.

A correction could have been added by the men
of the 4th Marine Division: “We are already
north of Donnay.”

during the battle were indicated by a reference
in General Iketa’s report: “In our front line
units, the troops have been three days without
drinking water but are hanging on by chewing
leaves of trees and eating snails.”42

On Nafutan Point the 2d Battalion, 105th
Infantry, spent the day ferreting Japanese
from the many caves and crevasses there.
Among the weapons and equipment found were
four 6-inch guns of British manufacture and
three 14-centimeter guns. A lien discovered,
only one of the 6-incli guns was in good firing
condition; two were slightly damaged and one
was badly damaged. None of the 14-centimeter
guns was emplaced and one of the three was
slightly damaged.43

40 Jjth Mur Div Report, Section VI, 2S. 23d Mur Re
port, 44.

41 165th Inf Report, G.

42 Roth Japanese quotes from CINCPAC-CINCPOA
Item #9983-85, 2G.

43 O'Connell Letter.

179

Night of 28-29 June

The night of 28-29 June was similar to many
other nights at Saipan. An enemy probing
patrol explored too close to the muzzles of the
Gth Marines’ rifles and suffered a loss of ten
men and two machine guns before it could
extricate itself.44

Even in the grimmest surroundings and
under the most uncomfortable circumstances,
an occasional incident cropped forth to
brighten the situation, a moment of comic
relief in an otherwise somber drama. Such a
moment was provided in the 23d Marines’
sector. Alert Marines peering into the dark-
ness were astounded, sometime after midnight,
to observe ten enemy vehicles, with headlights
burning brightly, approaching via the east
coast road. Not wishing to disclose their posi-
tions, the Marines held their fire, hoping to
blast the enemy at close, final range. The trucks
came on and on. And then — suddenly — as if
awakening from a horrible dream at the brink
of doom, the leading driver realized that he
was on the wrong road, that, in fact, he was on
his last road if he did not immediately reverse
his course. This he did with frantic haste and
strident grinding of gears. The others fol-
lowed suit. Within a matter of seconds the
convoy had evaporated into the night and the
Ma rines were left with throbbing pulses and
itchy fingers.45

Enemy planes attacked Saipan again during
the night. From 2010 to 2137 intermittent at-
tacks were delivered on the transport area and
Aslito Airfield. Of the five intruders, two were
shot down by the antiaircraft weapons of the
864th AAA Battalion. One of the downed
planes jettisoned its bombs in Magicienne Bay
before crashing on Ragman Peninsula. The
other, bursting into flames, fell north of Aslito
Airfield. As it crashed, a bomb in the plane
exploded, causing several casualties among
U. S. personnel nearby.46

44 2d Mar Div Report. Section VI, 18.

45 NTLF Cr—2 Report. 39.

4,5 TF 51 Report , Enel A, 10-11. NTLF 0-2 Re-
port, 39.

D-PLUS 14 AND D-PLUS 15 (29-30 JUNE)

With the operation two weeks old, everyone
on the island felt the weight of fatigue settling
down. Like a runner waiting for his “second
wind” the three U. S. divisions limped slug-
gishly at their tasks. To prevent this weariness
from turning to apathy, the need for outstand-
ing leadership became more pressing.

Everyone is an all-embracing word. Every-
one was tired. For while the U. S. troops had
endured much at Saipan, the Japanese had suf-
fered more. It was effort expended positively
against effort spent negatively, and the latter
was more depressing. Then, too, it was easier
to fight forward than backward.

Apart from the psychological implications,
however, the Japanese had suffered more from
U. S. supporting arms. This was material, this
produced casualties, and even the best calcu-
lated propaganda could not erase its effects.

Despite the difficulties and confusion im-
posed by Ik S. bombardment, Major General
Iketa found time to answer a message from the
Tinian Defense Force (50th Infantry) on 29
June. Still hopeful of receiving reinforce-
ments from Tinian. Iketa admitted that the
waters around Saipan were strongly patrolled
by U. S. vessels, but “it is probably possible for
small boat operations to break through Tinian
channel at night and follow along the east coast
and enter at Hanachiru.” The uncertainty dis-
played by his use of the word probably is re-
peated in the concluding sentence: “The objec-
tive after landing will probably be in vicinity
of wireless station.” 47 From the volume of cor-
respondence that had been exchanged on this
subject, the impression is derived that the
Tinian commander was not anxious to under-
take these moves and was stalling for time.
Then too, there is the possibility that those few
miles of American-patrolled water separating
him from his Saipan superiors had convinced
the Tinian commander that he should do his
own thinking. In any case, it is small wonder
if he quailed at the prospect.

47 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 27.

180

■

Waiting and Patrolling

Since 27 June, when it had advanced 3,000
yards in a rapid sweep, the It h Marine Divi-
sion had been restricted to only consolidation
and readjustment of its lines. Further advance
would merely accentuate an already acute con-
tact, problem, inasmuch as the 27th Division
was still a long distance behind.

The 23d Marines, in position along the east
coast, spent 29 and 30 June profitably: daily
patrols scouted the terrain to the front in prep-
aration for subsequent moves. Though valu-
able for the detailed examination of ground
forms, roads and trails, these patrols made no
large contacts with the enemy. Such few, scat-
tered groups as were located were either cap-
tured or destroyed.48

Having seized Hill 700 in the previous day’s
consolidation move, the 165th Infantry pa-
trolled north and northwest of that feature and
expanded its defenses. To permit the 165th
greater freedom of maneuver in the latter con-
nection. the 23d Regiment was ordered to as-
sume some of the Army regiment’s frontage.
Principal complication to relaxed movement
around Hill 700 was Ja, )anese mortar and ar-
tillery lire coming from the west and north-
west. In rebuttal, the 165th directed long-range
machine-gun and artillery fire into suspected
J apanese positions.49

The 1st and 3d Battalions, 241 h Marines, re-
mained along the 4th Division left boundary,
though they had been unable to stretch far
enough to contact the 27th Division. Daylight
of 29 June revealed that a number of Japanese
had filtered through the gap between divisions.
Once behind the 4th Division’s lines, these in-
filtrators began, an energetic program of har-
assment. Positive action was demanded, and
the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, in division re-
serve, set about the elimination of the hostile
groups. Company G, 24th Marines, remained
at Ragman Peninsula, executing a coastal ob-
servation mission.

The 24th Marines’ situation remained gen-
erally unchanged until about 1700, 30 June,

ia 23d Mur Report, 44-45.

4!l 165th Inf Report , 6.

when the 1st Battalion was pinched out by a
shortening of the vertical connection as the
27th Division moved forward.

A shift in commanders was necessary in the
3d Battalion, 24th Marines; Lieutenant Colo-
nel Vandergrift, wounded two days before,,
was finally evacuated on 29 June and Lieu-
tenant Colonel Otto Lessing, formerly execu-
tive officer of the 20th Marines, took over.’"

The 25th Marines, in N I LF reserve, had ha\
little excitement since the Japanese exodus
from Nafutan Point on the night of 26-27
June. The unit’s action report for the last three*
days in June reads as follows:

I (-plus-thirteen (28 June). Ilegiment continued assign

meat in XT I . !■’ reserve.

D-plus-fourteen (29 .Tune). Same as I (-plus-thirteen.
D-pl us- fifteen (80 June). Same as I (-plus-thirteen. 1

If the action for this period was as dull as the
report, that was completely to everyone's
liking. Certainly the 25th Marines had been
in the thick of the fight earlier in the opera-
tion, and there was no reason to suspect that
they still would not be in for more.

Vertical Gap Reduced

After days of virtual stalemate, the 27th Di
vision’s advances on the last two days of J um,
were indeed gratifying. Lieutenant Colone,
Bradt’s 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, ordered
from division reserve into the lines on the right
of the division front, arrived at the line of de-
parture and attacked at 1100, 29 June. Rapid
progress by this unit reduced the size of the
vertical gap on the 27th Division’s right flank
by about 800 yards. On 30 June, after another
sizeable surge,* good contact was established
with the 24th Marines. This advance cut the
reentrant depth to about 1,200 yards.

Men of the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry
(now attached to the 105th Infantry), con-
tinued their battle of previous days to oust the
persistent foe from Hill Able. This feature,
erroneously reported captured on 26 June, de-
manded the unit’s full effort and attention until
30 June, when il was finally secured.

so2 J,th \lm- Report, 22.
51 25tli Mur Report, 7.

181

On the left of the division’s front, the 106th
Infantry continued its difficult move past the
cl ill's. Lieutenant Colonel Cornett’s 1st Bat-
talion. which had spent the two previous days
in cliff -cleaning operations, moved back into
Death Valley and relieved the decimated 3d
Battalion on the regiment’s left. But in all
other respects the situation was unchanged. On
29 June, the regiment’s advances were small,
being principally hampered by a stuttering
machine gun on its right flank and by several
stationary, camouflaged tanks to the front.
Difficult to locate, these tanks made movement
through the area costly. By 30 June, however,
the volume of lire had diminished and the two
units moved rapidly. Physical contact finally
existed with the 8th Marines on the left.

In division reserve, the tired 3d Battalion,
106th Infantry, mopped up rear cliff areas so
that lines of communication and supply could
operate with greater freedom and safety.52

At 1600 on 29 June when it became apparent
that important gains had at last been achieved,
General Griner sent a field message to his sub-
ordinate units, a portion of which follows:

( 1 ) Contact between adjacent divisions, regiments
and battalions will lie maintained at all cost.

(2) A continuation of the highest Standards of per-
sonal leadership on the part of all officers is expected.

(2) The Corps Commander, after viewing today’s
operation from Alt. Tapotchau, expressly complimented
flie performance of the officers and men of t lie Divi-
sion.53

A Successful Ruse

The left flank regiment of the 2d Division,
the 2d Marines, had had an opportunity to try
a number of patrolling techniques during its
long wait at Garapan's southern edge. Large
patrols, small patrols, combat patrols, recon-
naissance patrols; all proved invaluable both
for the information they brought back and for
the continuous state of unbalance their activi-
ties imposed upon the Japanese.

On 29 June the Marines successfully em-
ployed an unusual stratagem. On a knobby hill

2 1 dd tli Inf Report, 14—16. 27th Div Periodic Re-
ports 13 and 14.

53 27th Div Periodic Reports Xo. 13 and 14. Field
Message 2 from MajGen Griner 29.Tun44.

500 yards forward of the 2d Marines’ Radio
Road positions, about a platoon of Japanese
were well dug-in. This hill, named “Flametree
Hill” for the effusive cluster of reddish-orange
trees there, formed a tiny oasis in a desert of
battered ruins. Once a shrine park, it still con-
tained an austere statue of some long-forgotten
Japanese statesman. During daylight hours,
the bulk of the enemy on Flametree Hill re-
mained in caves, with only a few occupying po-
sitions in the open. The latter were for the
obvious purpose of watching the Marines and
alerting their comrades in the caves of an im-
pending attack. By this means, the greater part
of the defenders were protected from the
shower of supporting fires while at the same
time they were in proximity to their defense
positions should the 2d Marines begin the long-
awaited attack. Even though the size of the
enemy force was not great, the excellent ob-
servation afforded by the hill would allow the
Japanese to play havoc with an organized at-
tack toward Garapan.

The Marines’ problem, then, was to get the
sheltered Japanese into the open so that the
supporting fires could impose casualties. To do
this, a dummy attack was executed on the
morning of 29 June. Commencing at daylight
a thunder of high explosive and white phos-
phorous shells from artillery, 81mm and 60mm
mortars enveloped the hill — the high explosive
to confuse the enemy into thinking that the
fires were in preparation for an attack, the
white phosphorous to deny them observation.
Simultaneously, six .30-caliber heavy machine
guns explored the hill with searching and trav-
ersing fires.

Then, after the sudden deluge, the artillery
lire stopped. Immediately, front line Marines
opened with small arms to create the impres-
sion that the assault was commencing. The il-
lusion was strengthened when mortars and
heavy machine guns dropped out. Apparently,
this was the signal for the Japanese to man po-
sitions, for at this point Flametree Hill sud-
denly came alive: a heavy volume of machine-
gun and automatic rifle fire chattered an omi-
nous challenge to the 2d Marines. The bait had
been swallowed. Immediately. U. S. artillery,
mortars and heavy machine guns opened up

182

again. Previously, the artillery had used high
explosive ammunition against the hill; now,
with the enemy exposed, airburst shells were
employed. Flametree Hill seemed to erupt and
split apart under the concentrated shelling.

When, after several minutes of saturation,
tires were lifted, the hill was quiet, with a
heavy cloud of dust and smoke obscuring all
details. Apparently, the ruse had worked; no
estimate of casualties was possible, but several
days later, when the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,
moved into the area, many bodies littered the
hill.54

The 2d Marine Regiment had more than its
share of accidents : on 28 d line, a plane had mis-
directed three rockets into the 1st Battalion
causing 27 casualties; again on 30 June, a Navy
torpedo bomber, hit by a Japanese antiaircraft
shell, crashed into the 1st Battalion’s lines, re-
sulting in a loss of seven more men. The pilot
parachuted to safety from an unusually low
altitude.55

In the center of the 2d Division zone the 6th
Marines moved but little on 29 and 30 June.
Lieutenant Colonel Jones’ 1st Battalion, on the
left, was still in the same situation as on previ-
ous days. Like the 2d Marines, Jones’ unit
could not move forward until the dominating
terrain on the right had been seized, or more
specifically, until other units had come abreast.
The time was, therefore, spent in patrolling of
the area to the front and such minor adjust-
ment in the lines as could be undertaken with-
out breaking contact.

The right of the regiment’s zone was, and
had been, the scene of the most trouble. The
2d Battalion had punched at the ridge north of
Tipo Pale for two days, and though it had not
carried the objective, it made a substantial im-
provement, principally in the destruction of
several enemy weapons. But the unit was tired.
The light had not been cheap. Colonel Riseley
decided to pass the 3d Battalion through the
2d for the continuation of the attack.

I he shift was accomplished by about noon.

54 2d Mar Report, Enel C. Throne-son.
r,s 2d Mur Div Report, Section VI, 1!). Ltr from Capt
C. Schultz, Jr., to CMC, 16Jan50.

The 3d Battalion, however, met the same de-
termined, if slightly weaker, foe that had
battled the 2d to a virtual standstill. By dint
of great effort, the 3d Battalion was able, at
1630, to seize a toehold which presented a
favorable forecast 50 of the next day’s events.

Off from its starting blocks on 30 June, the
3d Battalion soon hit a minor snag: a previ-
ously unlocated automatic weapon opened
brashly against them, cancelling hope for an
easy ascent. Utilizing supporting fires and
close-in grenade fighting, the Marines knocked
out the position. As if by a cue, a second
strong point asserted itself. The process was
repeated: supporting weapons and grenades,
finally the assault. The treatment was effective.
The enemy was eliminated. After these en-
counters, the Marines swept rapidly to the high
ground. Slower movement by the 8th Marines
on their right, however, restricted the unit in
its forward moves, and late afternoon found
only a shallow gain. But everyone felt that a
great weight had been removed from the unit’s
shoulders. “The day’s advance,” relates the
2d Marine Division action report, “placed CT
6 on commanding ground in the most favorable
position for continuation of the attack since
D-day.” 57

The four Pimples on Tapotehau's northern
face made convenient targets for the fires sup-
porting the 8th Marines, as well as providing
excellent objectives for the battalions. But a
locality worth attacking is also apt to be an
area worth defending. The enemy occupied the
Pimples, during the last days of June, in suffi-
cient strength to make it a fight. No one had
reason to believe that the Japanese would with-
draw without a fierce struggle.

During most of their battle around Tapot-
chau’s rugged heights, men of the 8th Marines
had been without active assistance of tanks.
Though these were available, the terrain so re-
stricted their movements that their use was
curtailed. On 29 and 30 June, the Marines in-
stituted a search for a route over which to

r>6 The forecast: Cloudy: probable showers of gre-
nades: scattered Japanese.

57 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI. 1S-19. 6th Mar
Report, 11.

183

bring tanks into the fight. The possibility of
moving the machines through the 27th Divi-
sion’s zone to the support of the 8th Marines
appeared impracticable because of the time ele-
ment. Then too, it was hoped that patrols
would discover a more convenient route mo-
mentarily. None was found on 29 June, but
the following afternoon a short advance by the
3d Battalion uncovered a route which, after
improvement by bulldozers, served the purpose.
Company A, 2d Tank Battalion, then pro-
ceeded to air assembly area in rear of the 8th
Ma lines’ lines in preparation for the attack of
1 July.

The two battalions occupying the right half
of the regiment’s front (1st Battalion, 29th
Ma rines, ancl 2d Battalion, 8th Marines), fight-
ing through similar terrain near the division’s
right boundary, found it imperative to coor-
dinate their efforts carefully. Likewise, the two
left battalions of the 8th Marines (3d and 1st),
because of kindred terrain problems, assumed
a closely-knit harmony of plan and action.
Colonel Wallace, the regimental commander,
quickly recognized the close integration of
these groups and encouraged this attitude.
Thus, Wallace was somewhat eased of the bur-
den of coordinating the efforts of four assault
battalions and was accorded a greater freedom
of decision.

The most significant move by the 8th Ma-
rines during the last two days in June was the
seizure of Bill’s Pimple, on the division l ight
flank. (See Map 19.) This hill, so tough to
take had the Japanese chosen to make it so,
was seized by the 2d Battalion on the late after-
noon of 30 dune without a serious fight. Im-
mediately after the capture and as a result of
an earlier request by the 8th Marines, a medium
tank platoon of the Army’s 7G2d Tank Bat-
talion arrived on Bill's Pimple to render fire
support. Since the 2d Battalion contemplated
no further moves that day, the tanks were em-
ployed against Tommy’s Pimple to the west.
The latter feature had defied capture on 30
June, all attempts by the 1st Battalion. 29th
Ma rines, to advance against it being stopped.
The 2d Battalion’s advance, plus the avail-
ability of more supporting weapons (chiefly

tanks), made prospects for 1 July good, how-
ever.

The 8th Marines’ picture had clarified and
improved in several respects by the evening of
30 June: tanks were at last in supporting po-
sitions; all battalions, except the 1st Battalion,
29th Marines, now had one company in re-
serve; all, save the 2d Battalion, were now sup-
plied by truck, the open right flank was no
longer such a worry : a company of the Pro-
visional Battalion had moved in behind the 2d
Battalion, and patrols from the Army’s 106th
Infantry now operated in the gap between di-
visions.

A perennial headache, misdirected friendly
artillery fire, made itself felt again on 30 June.
Readying itself for the day’s attack, the 3d
Battalion was enveloped in a thundering bar-
rage emanating from deep to the rear. After
16 days of fighting, the effect of a miscalcula-
tion of tins sort was particularly depressing
and demoralizing. Other battalions had en-
dured similar shellings; but, in spite of vehe-
ment complaints to higher echelons, the acci-
dents continued. The identity of the unit, or
units, responsible was never determined.58

The 8th Marines’ advance on 29 and 30 June
had been slow but steady, using available sup-
porting weapons to the maximum. In this con-
nection, 75mm half-tracks blasted a number of
positions forward of the 1st Battalion while
rocket trucks released string after string of
4.5-inch projectiles at areas forward of the 1st
Battalion, 29th Marines.59

Though all three of its regiments were com-
mitted to the lines, the 2d Marine Division was
not without a reserve, though at times it was
only a provisional or composite group. On 30
June, for example, two companies from the
Provisional Battalion, as well as the 2d Bat-
talion. 18th Marines, whose engineers had been
reorganized into three rifle companies of 175
men each, performed the reserve function.60

68 Some conclusions on the reasons for these accidents
will be found on page 250, Chapter VII.

59 8tli Mar Report, 7-8. Tompkins. Chamberlin.

B0 2d Mar Dir Deport. Section VI, 10-20.

184

rocket barrage in the making. 4.2-inch rocket trucks were effectively employed by the Stli Marines north of Mt.
Tapptchau and later by the 23d Marines at “4th of July Hill.”

Nights of 29 and 30 June

Night activity had seemingly slackened; the
night of 29 and 30 June remained reasonably
quiet in all zones. Individual instances of
sniping and infiltration were so commonplace
by this time that they often were not even re-
ported.

The usual Japanese air attacks failed to ma-
terialize on 29 June, but on 30 June the activi-
ties resumed with renewed vigor. Beginning
just after dusk and lasting until after mid-
night, the air over Saipan was charged with
excitement as “several” Japanese planes made
nine separate raids on the island and the trans-
port area. U. S. ships, hidden by a smoke
screen, escaped damage; ashore, bombs
dropped in the vicinity of Garapan failed to
achieve any important hits. The most signifi-
cant aspect of this particular incursion was

that it marked the first kill by U. S. night
fighters at Saipan.61

Since 27 dune General Saito had remained in
a small cave 2,200 yards north of Tapotcliau.
but by 30 June this seemingly inconspicuous
feature became the target for a booming mor-
tar barrage. This stripped the tiny command
post of its only advantage : seclusion. Saito felt
that a change was indicated. Ilis sixth and last
refuge was another cave, this one located in a
canyon cutting about 1.000 yards inland from
the village of Makunsha. (See Map 19). The
Japanese named the canyon “Paradise Valley.”
It was hardly an appropriate name.62

Retreating Japanese were observed by the
4th Marine Division and the 105th Infantry
during the early evening of 30 June. Generally.

'/ SI Report, Enel A, Annex 1.

02 Men of the 165th Infantry later called it “Valley
of Hell.”

889590° 50 13

185

BAZOOKAMAN (at left) and assistant cautiously search for targets at Garapan’s outskirts. After a lonj
units on the right to come abreast, the 2d Marines finally advanced into Garapan on 2 July.

the withdrawal appeared quite orderly, the 4th
Division reporting Japanese moving in column
of tiles along a road to the north. Indications
are that retrogression continued throughout
t lie night, as moving lights were observed far to
the north. The results of artillery and mortar
lire against these targets could not be judged
because of the long range at which it was de-
livered.03

The reason for the enemy’s general retire-
ment was the desire of General Saito to pull
back and shorten his line, regroup his forces,
and coordinate the defense. With his command
scattered through the roughest terrain, at the
island s widest point, he had been unable even
to disseminate his orders in time for integrated
action. He hoped that the withdrawal would
improve the situation and that he could then

03 XTT.F G-2 Report. 42.

conduct the type of mobile defense in which he
believed.

D-PIUS 16 AND D-PLUS 17 (1-2 JULY)

The Limestone Hill

The Northern Troops and Landing Force
achieved important gains on the first two days
in July. The swing to Tanapag began in ear-
nest.

Reports of t lie general Japanese retreat had
begun arriving at the NTLF command post on
the previous night, and with the coming of
daylight on 1 July, the reports continued.
Along a road to the front of the 27th Division,
the enemy could be observed pulling back to
the north. They were on the run but still ca-
pable of turning around and making it a fight.
There was plenty of venom left.

For the 2d Marine Division, 1 and 2 July
marked the greatest forward surge since the

186

sugarloaf hill dominated Garapan and surrounding coastal plain. 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, skirted these sheer
south and west slopes and seized this feature from the east on 2 July.

D-Day landings. Jn a shift calculated to rest
the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, the latter ex-
changed missions and positions with the 2d
Battalion, 2d Marines.04

Along the beach Colonel Stuart’s 2d Marines
spent 1 July in routine patrolling, but on 2 July
began the long-delayed movement through
Garapan. Attacking with the 1st and 3d Bat-
talions abreast, 1st on the right and the 3d Bat-
talion, 8th Marines, in reserve, Stuart’s men
made excellent progress. The days and weeks
of pounding paid dividends. Supported by
Company C, 2d Tank Battalion, the 3d Bat-
talion05 swept through the rubble-strewn flat-

04 I he 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, had done little
fighting with its parent regiment. Attached to the
(itli Marines on 15 June, it returned to the 2d Marines
on 23 June and remained until attachment to the 8th
Marines on 1 July.

65 Now commanded by Major Harold K. Throneson
who took over the 3d Battalion after Lieutenant
f’nlonel Johnston had been wounded for the second

lands at a steady pace. Encountering rifle and
machine-gun fire, men of the battalion took
grateful advantage of the protection afforded
by the torn hunks of concrete littering the area.
With tanks ricocheting rounds among the shat-
tered ruins, the Marines moved into the very
heart of what had once been Saipan’s largest
town. (LVT(A)’s of the 2d Armored Am-
phibian Battalion provided close fire support
against targets near the beach.

Fighting through foothills overlooking Gar-
apan from the east was Kyle’s 1st Battalion.
Here the going was tougher. Movement of sup-
porting tanks was rendered extremely difficult
by the rough terrain, but, surmounting the
difficulties, the machines lumbered clumsily

time on 21 June. Throneson achieved the distinction
of occupying the most unusual observation post during
the operation when he bridged with a plank the top
corner of a shell-battered, roofless building in Garapan,
climbed into his crow’s nest with li is radio operator,
and carried on business as usual.

187

into positions from which to bring their shat-
tering fire power to bear.

Within two hours after the jump-off, Com-
pany A had enveloped Flametree Hill from
the west, fighting a lively skirmish with a de-
tachment of cave-dwellers there. Then the bat-
talion moved to the north towards the day’s
objective, a dominating eminence about 1,000
yards inland from Garapan’s center. This
feature, an expansive knob with forested slopes,
had been named “Sugarloaf Hill” by the 2d
Ma rines. Approached from north, south, or
west, this feature presented steep, challenging
slopes. From the east (inland) flank, however,
the rise was very gradual and Kyle selected this
approach. Against fairly heavy machine-gun
fire, the battalion swept to the top of the hill,
mopped-up the Japanese defenders and by 1700
established contact with the 0th Marines on the
right.

Ever conscious of the threat of counterattack
along the coastal road, Colonel Stuart ordered
both assault battalions to send out security pa-
trols to their front during the night. To pro-
vide depth to the regiment’s defense, the colonel
ordered his reserve (3d Battalion, 8th Marines)
to establish a secondary defense line about
1,000 yards in rear of the forward elements.00

As had been the case on so many previous
days, the right half of the 6th Marines front
gave the most trouble on 1 and 2 July. Em-
placed in a ravine 500 yards forward of the 3d
Battalion’s lines were three Japanese field
pieces protected by a host of rifles and machine
guns. As the Marines attacked toward this area
on 1 July, rifles and machine guns stuttered
inhospitably, while the field pieces punctuated
the threat with frequent rocking blasts. The
3d Battalion achieved little toward the de-
struction of this enemy stronghold during 1
July; but, with the support of tanks, 37mm
guns and 75mm half-tracks, the unit finally
moved to commanding ground facing the ra-
vine.

The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, restricted its
advance to conform to the slower movement of
the 3d Battalion. Light resistance on its front

'w 2d Mor Report, 5—6. Throneson. Brooks. Kyle.

made rapid strides possible, but the difficulties
of maintaining contact deterred Colonel Rise-
ley from ordering the unit to push on. More
open terrain, or an enemy less adept in infiltra-
tion, may have justified long thrusts by a single
unit; but neither of these situations prevailed
at Saipan. By dark of 1 July, when it was ap-
parent that the ravine strong point would not
he reduced, the 1st Battalion pulled back a
short distance to achieve better contact.

The 6tli Marines were old hands at dealing
with troublesome cores : experience had been
a stern teacher in the north Tipo Pale strong-
point. Without hesitation, unit commanders
applied the tactics that had worked previously :
Company B remained behind to contain and
destroy while the rest by-passed the area and
continued the attack.

Once past this “loaded” draw, both bat-
talions swept rapidly forward. By nightfall of
2 July the Japanese had lost another 700 to
1,200 yards, the greatest gains having been
made on the left and center. Just before dark
the 6th Marines lost a jeep and a half-track
when these vehicles ran over land mines which
the Japanese had strewn haphazardly through
the area.

To assist the 6th Marines in maintaining
contact with adjacent units, two companies
from t lie Provisional Battalion were attached
on 1 July. The presence of these units eased
contact problems, released infantry companies
for (lie vital task of pressing the attack for-
ward. and permitted Colonel Riseley to retain
his reserve (2d Battalion) intact and in a state
of absolute readiness.67 *

Although still broken and heavily wooded in
spots, the terrain facing the 8th Marines was
the most favorable that the regiment had seen
for many days. Tanks, which had found Tapot-
chau terrain awkward, could now move with
dispatch, thus speeding the infantry’s ad-
vances. This factor, coupled with the enemy’s
withdrawal, permitted the 8th Marines to
sweep ahead nearly a mile on 1 and 2 July. And
the welcome sight of the water at Tanapag
spurred the efforts even further.

07 2d 1 fur Dir Report, Section VI, 20-22. 6th Mot-
Report, tl-12.

188

A well -executed tank-infantry thrust on the
morning of 1 July carried the 1st Battalion,
29th Marines, to the top of Tommy’s Pimple
without a fight. Then, in conjunction with the
2d Battalion, 8th Marines, the attack con-
tinued. The two battalions now faced a series
of relatively open ridges leading down to the
coastal flats in the Tanapag vicinity. The ex-
ceptionally good observation facilities were
used to advantage in bringing rocket and artil-
lery fire to bear on any areas that appeared
to offer positions for the enemy.

As the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, pushed its
attack across an open field on the afternoon of
2 July, a small coral limestone hill on the right
flank suddenly came alive. Grazing fire swept
the open field, stopping the Marines’ forward
movement. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines,
also exposed to some of this fire, was slowed
to a virtual standstill. During the afternoon
this unit suffered the loss of another battalion
commander; Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins fell
wounded from a shell fragment. The 8th Ma-
rines’ executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jack
P. Juhan, immediately assumed command.

The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, developed a
stubborn, unseen foe of undetermined strength
in the limestone hill. Hidden in the hummock’s
crevasses and caves the enemy brought accurate
small-arms fire to bear upon the Marines. The
word “accurate” is not used loosely here; few
rounds were wasted. The battalion and Com-
pany G had a joint observation post located in
a small island of trees in the center of the field.
Each time a messenger attempted to run across
the open field and enter the wooded clump, it
was a dash through a gantlet of lead. Often
as not, the messenger could not make the race
to and from the observation post without get-
ting hit. For this reason, this means of com-
munication was not used except in cases of
great emergency.

Major Chamberlin, commanding the 2d Bat-
talion, tried to envelop the point of resistance,
using Company F in a swing to the east. But
the Japanese had not ignored this route of entry
into their position and met Company F with
a prohibitory fusillade. In addition, the Ma-
rines’ envelopment route (the only one avail-

able) was through intertwining, snare-like
underbrush, through which it was virtually im-
possible to move.

In the meantime, evacuat ion of casualt ies had
become a problem: Marines had fallen on the
open field, and all attempts to rescue them only
resulted in more men being hit. The scheme
finally adopted, and the one which brought
success, was for a tank to position itself be-
tween the casualty and the limestone hill. By
following directly behind the tanks, hospital
corpsmen could then move safely to the
wounded, apply hasty bandages, give them a
shot of morphine, and place them on stretch-
ers. Then, carefully coordinating their moves
with the tank (by talking to the driver through
the sound-powered phone on the. rear sponson).
the stretcher bearers would precede the tank
from the site, all the while shielded from Japa-
nese fire. White phosphorous rounds dropped
on the hill by the 81mm mortar platoon plus
frontal blasts from the chaperoning medium
tanks also contributed to the success of this re-
sourceful project. The fact that only small
arms lire spattered against the thick hulls of
the tanks indicated that the Japanese had no
heavier weapons readily available in the lime-
stone hill.68

By dark, all wounded had been rescued, but
the task of seizing the hill still remained. Cap-
tain Edward L. Bale, Jr., commanding Com-
pany A, 2d Tank Battalion, came up at this
juncture with a suggestion both uniqife and
resourceful. He proposed a night tank raid
against the hill using illuminating shells and
medium tank spotlights to brighten the area
while light flame-thrower tanks (which had
just arrived for the night mission) moved in
close for the roast. The bizarre plan had one
routine feature: riflemen and machine gunners
of the 2d Battalion would watch the hill and
shoot any Japanese attempting to dash from
cover to place magnetic mines against the
tanks.

68 Credit for suggesting and supervising this scheme
of evacuation goes to Pharmacists Mate 1st Class
Frank M. Campbell, FSN. On this and many other
occasions, Campbell established himself as one of the
bravest men to wear a uniform.

189

surrender? Japanese soldier stumbles dazedly from a cave following a shattering explosion at the cave entrance.
Marine at left watches, rifle ready.

About an hour after dark the raid was
launched. As planned, the area was bathed in
a lucid, bright light as the little tanks lumbered
toward the hill on their mission. Once there,
they spat at the hill with long streams of flame.
Men of the 2d 11 attalion, 8th Marines, with
weapons at the ready, watched the arson
with keen delight. After completing the
searing process and discharging their flame-
thrower fuel, the tanks returned to the lines.
No one ventured upon the smoldering hill to in-
spect the results, but all felt that some good
had been accomplished.

The two left battalions of the regiment (2/2
and 1/8). meanwhile, seized their Pimples on
1 July and pushed on to the north. Nutting’s
2d Battalion. 2d Marines, which had exchanged

jobs with the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, on the
morning of 1 July, quickly adjusted itself to
the new surroundings and drove forward.
Coral limestone cliffs, similar to those trou-
bling Chamberlin's battalion, caused some dif-
ficulty, however. Japanese holed up in these
formations invariably fought until they had
either been killed or their cave positions sealed.
Whether these Japanese represented that in-
evitable percentage that never gets the word (to
withdraw in this case) or whether they were
carrying out a delaying mission was never de-
termined.

Contact difficulties were experienced at dark
of 1 July between the 6th and 8th Marines. As
already mentioned, the former was stopped by
a strong point and not able to by-pass it until

190

still fighting, although covered at point-blank range, this Japanese attempted to throw an explosive charge, but
alert Marines (see picture opposite page), well familiar with such tactics, were quick to shoot him before he
could pull the pin.

2 July. Progress by the 8tli Marines, therefore,
caused a break to develop. To till this area the
1st Battalion, 8th Marines, committed its re-
serve company. Just as the latter battalion
prepared to halt for the night of 1-2 July, 30
Japanese, operating in the best traditions of a
race that believed in death lunges, charged the
Mi irines. Outnumbered and outgunned, the
Japanese fell before the fence of bullets thrown
out by the men of the 1st Battalion.

On 2 July, the two left battalions of the 8th
Marines forged rapidly ahead, keeping pace
w ith the surge around them. Misdirected artil-
lery fire again marred the day’s successes; just
as the 1st Battalion poised itself to jump off in

the attack, friendly artillery (ire thundered
down and killed or wounded 51 Marines.
Though delayed about 45 minutes because of
the disorganization caused by this mishap, the
battalion quickly caught up with flank units
and moved about 800 yards during the day.69

Gaining Momentum

'Fhe 27th Division by 30 June was indeed a
skeletonized unit; only five infantry battalions
were under General Griner’s command.
Throughout the series of special missions, at-

09 8th 1 Tar Report, 8—9. 1st Bn, 8th Mar Report. 9.
Ovn ter. Ch a m herlin .

191

tachments, and attachments within attach-
ments, only the 106th Infantry remained intact.
The other two infantry battalions under 27th
Division control were the 3d Battalion, 105th
Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 165th Infan-
try, both operating under Colonel Bishop, the
105th’s Commander.

Though General Griner’s field order for 1
July gave missions to two regiments, the total
assault battalions were only three: 1st and 2d
Battalions, 106th Infantry, and the 3d Bat-
talion, 105th.

M aiming the left and center of the division’s
front, Colonel Stebbins’ 106th Infantry moved
2.700 yards forward on 1 and 2 July against
sporadic rifle, machine-gun and mortar fire,
and occasional shelling from hostile artillery —
nothing to compare with that experienced in
earlier days of the Death Valley fight. En-
countered and destroyed on 2 July were five
Japanese tanks (emplaced as pillboxes) and
numerous ammunition dumps. In connection
with the capture or destruction of Japanese
ammunition was the unescapably cheerful feel-
ing that every round not in Japanese possession
was a round that would never be fired at U. S.
forces.

The 3d Battalion, 106th, remained in regi-
mental reserve and continued its systematic
mop-up of the left flank cliff line. Patrols re-
ported no enemy contacts in this area, the first
f ime such a report could be made since the 27th
Division first encountered the sore spot on 23
June.70

The 105th Infantry, attacking with its 3d
Battalion in the assault and the 2d Battalion,
165th, in reserve, met its principal difficulties
from Japanese flanking fire which issued from
hillside caves in the regiment’s zone. Here the
story was an old one: the enemy, hidden in the
deep shadows of natural caverns, tunneled fire
on their attackers. The tactic was as familiar
and predictable as were the caves which abound
on the island. And yet. the task of eliminating
these holed-up individuals became only slightly
easier with practice. (This schooling had too

70 27th Div G— 3 Periodic Reports Nos. 15 and 1G.
lOdth Inf Report, 16-18. 27th Div Field Message 3,
30Jun44. 27th F>iv Field Order 53.

few live graduates). Locating these cavemen
was difficult since it was usually necessary that
they break silence and fire at least one round.
That first round was apt to come from close by
and would very often claim a casualty. With
luck, then, the lair might be discovered with
only a single loss. The hazardous task of seal-
ing the cave, once located, required placement
of the explosive in the cave entrance. This type
of fighting was the work of individuals or
small groups rather than units; and, while they
executed their heroic tasks, the rest could only
watch and wait and provide what fire assist-
ance was possible.

No wonder, then, that the 3d Battalion,
105th, could gain but 300 yards on 1 July. And
this much yardage was possible only because
one hill strong point was by-passed during the
morning, the 3d Battalion leaving one com-
pany behind to contain and destroy it. Later
in the afternoon, elimination of this enemy
pocket became the task of the 1st Battalion,
105th Infantry, which had reverted from its
attachment to the 4th Marine Division at 0900,
1 July. This unit arrived in the 105th Infan-
try's zone in time to take over and complete
the mopping-up mission. The other battalion
of the 105th (2d) was still operating in the Na-
futan Point area under Saipan Garrison Force
control.

The 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, separated
from its parent regiment since 26 June, was
ordered into NTLF reserve on the evening of
1 July, though it would remain in 27th Divi-
sion rear areas. This assignment did not re-
lieve the present reserve (25th Marines), but,
rather, augmented it.

On 2 July, against much the same type of re-
sistance encountered the previous day, the 3d
Battalion, 105th Infantry, pushed about 700
yards. Though this represented over twice the
previous day's gain, the battalion was far out-
stripped by the rush of units on either flank.
The difference in speed was caused by a stub-
born Japanese strong point near Papako (see
Map 20) which defied frontal movement in the
105th Infantry’s zone. From the moment the
3d Battalion nosed into this area, it became ap-
parent that the going would be slow and that

192

(he speed of flank units could not be dupli-
cated. By dark, therefore, both flanks were un-
covered and the unit still faced the Japanese
strong point.

Desiring to fill the gaps, Colonel Bishop,
commanding the 105th Infantry, ordered the
regimental reserve (1st Battalion) to pass to
the left (west) of the hornet’s nest, swing
across the regiment’s front, and tie in with the
165th Infantry on the right and the 106th In-
fantry on the left. This move, commencing
about 1730, was successfully executed, al-
though it was necessary to attach a company
(I) of the 3d Battalion to help man the wide
front. In effect, then, the 1st Battalion had
taken over the 3d Battalion’s zone, with the
latter remaining behind to clean up the strong
point.71

The 165th Infantry (less the 2d Battalion)
had been waiting, as part of the 4th Marine Di-
vision, for the 27th Division to come abreast.
This delay followed the 4tli Division’s rapid
27 June advance which left the 27th Division
a considerable distance behind. To allow the
latter time to knock out the resistance holding
it up and to catch up, the 4th Division had re-
stricted its activities to patrolling, minor ad-
justment of its lines, and lire assistance to the
27th Division.

With the return, on the morning of 1 July,
of the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry, to the
27th Division, only two Army battalions re-
mained under 4th Division control. And even
their period of attachment was rapidly draw-
ing to a close. An NTLF order directed the
165th to revert to 27th Division control at 0530,
2 July. Actually, this reversion had no effect
on the unit’s position on the front lines; it
rather marked the termination of the period
in which it was more convenient to have it at-
tached to the 4th Division than to the 27th.
Advances by the latter now warranted the re-
turn of the regiment to its normal command.

Selecting the same formation as the 105th
Regiment, the 165th attacked on 2 July in a
column of battalions, 3d leading, followed by
the 1st in reserve. To mop up a small pocket

71 10!)1h Inf Report, 8.

of resistance in the regiment’s rear, Company
C remained behind. The 165th’s advance
against virtually no resistance was very rapid,
and by 1445 after a dash of 1,700 yards, Gen-
eral Griner ordered the regiment to hold its
present positions to allow the 105th Infantry
to catch up. A 30-minute concentration laid on
the exposed left flank by the attached platoon
from Company C, 88th Chemical Mortar Bat-
talion contributed to the day’s success. Good
contact had existed with the 4th Marine Divi-
sion throughout the day, and by nightfall the
left was also tied in when the 1st Battalion,
105th Infantry, hooked on to that flank.72

The Surge to 0-6A

Along the east coast the 23d Marines con-
tinued vigorous patrolling of the area to the
front. Though penetrating enemy territory to
a distance of 1,500 yards on 1 July, patrols
made no contacts.

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 24th Marines, op-
erating along the boundary between divisions,
mgde minor movements to conform to the ad-
vance of the 27th Division. As the gap nar-
rowed, the battalions kept pace. The regi-
ment’s 1st Battalion, pinched out on the previ-
ous day, assumed the coastal observation
mission on Kagman Peninsula.73

For the attack of 2 July the 3d Battalion.
25th Marines, returned to the 4th Division. The
rest of the 25th Marines, however, remained in
NTLF reserve, an assignment first received on
23 June.

By 1345, 2 July, the division, attacking with
the 23d and 24th Marines abreast, had ad-
vanced practically unopposed from 0-6 to di-
vision intermediate objective 0-6 A. (See Map
20.) The assault unit of the 24th Marines, the
1st Battalion, suffered but one man wounded,
an indication of the relative ease of the day’s
move. The 23d Marines reported mine fields
and road blocks, covered by small detachments
of riflemen and machine gunners, which tempo-
rarily impeded the 2d Battalion, but the other

72 H)5th Inf Report, 6-7.

73 This disposition represented an exchange of jobs
hy tiie 1st and 2d Battalions 24th Marines.

193

assault battalion (the 1st) experienced no diffi-
culty whatsoever.

Like the 165th Infantry, the 4th Division
had pushed so far ahead of the 105th Infantry
that further moves would present serious prob-
lems of contact. For this reason, the division
was ordered to stop and dig in. Owing to the
uncertainties of the left flank, the 3d Battalion,
24th Marines, was placed along the division
boundary facing to the west, prepared to coun-
ter any Japanese threat from that direction.

As soon as the division halted, patrols were
dispatched toward 0-7. Although continued
throughout the night, patrolling failed to lo-
cate any strong enemy installations. This news,
more evidence of the general Japanese with-
drawal, was as welcome as sunshine on a
picnic.74

The Corps Artillery Commander, Brigadier
General Harper, had found the rate of prog-
ress at Saipan “very disappointing” and was
moved to write a statement which was delivered
to Headquarters, NTLF, on 1 July. It con-
cluded that the reason for the “very disap-
pointing” progress was that the available artil-
lery support was not being exploited by the in-
fantry as it should be. “It is basic,” says Har-
per's statement, “that a terrain feature and its
approaches either merits softening up by the
maximum employment of fire in mass or it
should be assaulted and captured without delay
if the enemy’s resistance is weak.” 75

General Holland Smith agreed with Har-
per's opinions and immediately sent a dispatch
to all units directing that massed artillery be
more extensively employed. While this repre-
sented neither new doctrine nor new policy, it
came as a timely reminder to those units which
had become overly sparing in the use of this
valuable arm.

Either an interesting coincidence or evidence
of prompt, direct results is revealed in the fol-
lowing statement from the 2d 155mm Howitzer
Battalion’s action report for 2 July (the day

74 'fth Mar Dir Deport, Section VI, 30-31. 32d Mar
Deport, 45. 21/tli Mar Deport, 22-23. 1st Bn, 2!{th Mar
Deport. 9.

75 Utilization Of The Artillery In The Attack, 1Ju144,
BrigGen A. M. Harper, USA.

following delivery of Harper’s statement) : “2
July was a memorable day. . . . This battalion
fired 1573 rounds of ammunition, its daily high
for this campaign. Most of the fire was coor-
dinated by the Corps and the effect was ex-
cellent.” 76

The reaction of the 2d Division commander,
General Watson, to the directive regarding
massed arti I Lery fire is of interest :

... I immediately notified Headquarters NTLF (C/S
Brig. Gen. Erskine) that, while I fully appreciated the
value of and wanted to use massed artillery fires,
wherever practicable, the artillery ammunition levels
in the division dumps had never, since D-L>ay, been
high enough to permit extensive use of this type of fire
by Division artillery, lie replied that sufficient ammuni-
tion would be made available. On the morning of 2 July
I directed an artillery preparation be tired along the
division front. This preparation lasted only for a few
minutes.

Yet by mid-morning the expenditure of ammunition
occasioned by this preparation coupled with the normal
fires of the day caused NTLF to notify the Division
that it would be impossible to provide sufficient ammu-
nition to maintain minimum artillery dump levels for
massed tires. Massed tires would therefore have to be
restricted accordingly.

Elsewhere, General Watson showed a disagree-
ment with at least a part of General Harper’s
opinions :

Without detracting from the important role played
by artillery in the battle for Saipan the rate of progress
was not and could not lie primarily determined by the
volume and frequency of delivery of artillery fires. Rate
of progress was determined by the willingness and
ability of the individual front-line Marine and soldier
to rliii out and kill the stubborn and skillful Japanese
defenders.77

Nights of 1 and 2 July

There was very little enemy activity during
the nights of L-2 July and 2-3 July. Appar-
ently. the withdrawal had temporarily ruled
out the possibility of counterattack by more
than token forces. But no one slept well. There
was just enough activity to maintain a state of
perpetual tenseness. Relaxed slumber would
have to wait.

What, exactly, did “little activity” mean on
Saipan during the first two nights in July? On

76 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, V Amphibious Corps
Deport, 3.

77 Watson.

194

the night of the 1st the 6th Marines captured
70 civilians and three Japanese military per-
sonnel through voluntary surrender. Later, a
single Japanese attempting to move through
the lines and return to his own unit met a
quick fate. The same night, men of the 8th
Marines spotted 15 prowlers along their front
and killed them all. When the excitement from
this diversion subsided, three Japanese sol-
diei’s carrying land mines were killed as they
tried to move through the lines. The 1st Bat-
talion, 29th Marines, intercepted and killed
three would-be infiltrators. The 27th Division
experienced sporadic, random firing all along
its front and achieved the satisfaction of kill-
ing live Japanese by means of booby traps set
by the 165th Infantry. In the 4th Marine Di-
vision it was even quieter. Only one instance
of hostile mortar lire, which fell on the divi-
sion command post, was reported.

The night of 2 July was similar. Japanese
patrols continuously sneaked along the 2d Ma-
rines’ front. Of three Japanese endeavoring to
rove through the 6th Marines’ lines, one was
killed and the other two routed. Achieving
the distinction of doing the unusual and un-
expected during the evening, a Japanese sol-
dier strode into the 6th Marines command post
and signified his desire to surrender. This he
was allowed to do.

The 106th Infantry reported that the enemy
was firing flares intermittently from 2100 to
2400. This served to alert personnel to the pos-
sibility of a coordinated attack, but none de-
veloped. A number of violent exchanges be-
tween the soldiers of the 27tli Division and
lurking Japanese occurred throughout the
night, but there was no indication that this
enemy activity was intended as a major thrust.
In the morning when a count was possible, the
105th Infantry found 27 Japanese bodies, while
the 106th and 165th Infantry Regiments
counted 10 and 18, respectively.

To this total for the night the 23d Marines
added 25 more Jaj >anese, caught as they moved
south along the coast on the extreme eastern
flank.78

When the results of these night excursions

78 \TLF G-2 Report, 45-48.

are balanced against I lie damage these same
Japanese might have accomplished had they
remained in caves, the futility of these moves is
clearly revealed.

Shortly alter midnight 1-2 July about live
Japanese planes executed a small attack on Sai
pan and the transport area. The intruders, ap
proaching at a low level to escape detection,
were unsuccessful, achieving no damage to
U. S. ships or units. One of the raiders flew too
low and crashed into the water. Survivors
(five) were captured by the destroyer Ren-
s haw. Another plane was shot down by the
BennJon , a ship of the transport screen. The
rest buzzed around the island for a while, then
departed.79

The meager strength of enemy air over Sai-
pan could give the beleagured Japanese troops
little comfort. The attacks were a nuisance to
U. S. ships and installations, little more. Japa-
nese planes did not raid Saipan again until 5
July.

Saito Changes His Defense

Since 15 June General Saito had been forced
to stare grim reality in the face. 1 1 is plans to
drive the Americans into the water had been
discarded in favor of a mobile defense. But
most of the mobility had been backwards. Now
he sought to delay the inevitable decision as
long as possible. By midafternoon of 2 July
mounting pressure along the entire front indi-
cated the need for another withdrawal, and
Saito issued a formal operation order which
would pull the defense back from the Garapan
— Tapotchau- Ragman Peninsula line to the
general line: Tanapag — Hill 221 -Hill 112. 80
The 31st Army chief of staff, Major General
Ikefa, had mentioned a withdrawal to this same
general area in his resume of 27 June (see page
167), but the detailed assignment awaited
Salto’s order. This operation order and sketch
fell into U. S. hands on I he night of 3-4 July
when one of Saito’s principal subordinates
(Colonel Ogawa) was killed in the command

70 TF 51 Report, End A and Annex 1 to Enel A.

80 As noted previously, Hill 221 was named “Radar
Hill” by Marines; Hill 112 appeared as “Tarolioho” on
U. S. maps.

195

street fighting, the first experienced by Marines in
World War II, was hot and heavy in Garapan. A
flame-thrower is used here to roast an enemy hide-
out in the rubble.

post of the 165tli Infantry.81 (Details of this
episode will be covered later in this chapter.)

D-PLUS 18 AND D-PLUS 19 (3-4 JULY)
Garapan Seized

The crumbling Japanese defense assumed
landslide proportions on 3 and 4 July as all
three U. S. divisions swallowed huge hunks of
terrain. It was much like pushing against a
stuck door, then suddenly feeling it yield. The
quick rush was apt to shake one’s equilibrium.
But with scarcely a stumble the three divisions
spurted forward. As he encouraged the troops
of the landing force to even greater speed.
General Holland Smith was applying one of
his favorite maxims, written by the great Ger-
man military thinker and writer, Karl Vote
Clausewitz :

For t lie victor, the engagement can never be decided
too quickly; for the vanquished, it can never last too
long. The speedy victory is a higher degree of victory ;
a late decision is on the side of the defeated some
compensation for the loss.

Holland Smith wanted Saito to get as
little “compensation for the loss” as possible.

For the 2d Marine Division the objective for

NTLF G-2 Report. 50-51.

3 July was 0-7, which included the town of
Garapan and the seaplane base at Tanapag
Harbor. With half of shattered Garapan be-
hind it, Colonel Stuart’s 2d Regiment readied
itself to complete seizure of the town and
Mutcho Point, jutting from Garapan’s north-
western outskirts.

Duty in the town had little to commend it :
battered skeletons of what had once been build-
ings, and humans, and animals, dotted the
area; the choking smell of death hung about
like a fog. And everywhere were the pieces of
corrugated iron which the Japanese and na-
tives had used as rooting for almost every
structure from the hen house to the bank. To
step on one of these huge rattling sheets was
to inform everyone thereabouts of one’s pres-
ence.82 Garapan’s trash and garbage dump ap-
pearance was further enhanced by odd cloth-
ing, shoes, papers, books, and miscellaneous
bric-a-brac strewn through the area. Perhaps
the only bright point was the copious wells,
providing adequate water for the 2d Marines to
bathe away some of the tilth on their bodies.

Dodging their way through the rubble, men
of the 2d Marines made good progress : by
noon of 3 July, despite .abortive efforts of a few
Japanese who determined to make a street fight
of it, the 3d Battalion (on the left) had swept
nearly 700 yards. In the center of the regi-
ment's zone, several pillboxes were encoun-
tered, slowing movement there but allowing
both flanks to advance. Light flame-thrower
tanks and medium tanks seared and plastered
the front of the pillboxes, while assault en-
gineer teams, covered by riflemen and machine
gunners, moved to the flanks or rear and placed
their shattering explosives. Thus, the enemy
positions were systematically reduced.

One position defied neutralization : this was
located on a tiny islet in the center of a
swampy pond near Garapan’s northern end.
Here a Japanese machine gunner had posi-

82 These corrugated sheets served another purpose,
not only at Garapan, but all over the island : U. S.
soldiers and Marines placed them over their foxholes
in an attempt to stay dry during the torrential rains.
Such improvisation was usually frustrated because the
sheets, almost without exception, were riddled with
shell holes.

196

aerial bombs were extensively employed as land mines by the Japanese. Buried with noses protruding above
ground, the bombs could be set off by almost any United States vehicle. This 123-pound bomb was found in
Garapan.

tioned himself and from there engaged anyone
moving near the swamp’s banks. Secure in the
knowledge that he could be approached only
by lizards, ducks, and other Japanese, he
plagued the 2d Marines’ efforts to clear the
area. This point target seemed ideal for mor-
tars, but it was soon discovered that the shells
would not detonate in the spongy bog. Direct
fire weapons could not be employed because of
the danger to other Marines moving on the
other bank. In his wet sanctuary the Japanese
maintained his troublesome activity through-
out the day. Nothing was heard from this de-
termined individual on the following day, per-
haps indicating that be evacuated his position

during the night. Or maybe he is still there.8"

The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, advanced
through the foothills on Garapan’s eastern en-
virons. Progress until noon was not great
(400 yards), but in the early afternoon the
unit began to gain momentum. By 1800 it had
pushed to 0-7, at, that point on the water’s
edge north of the town. This speedy thrust
cut off the Japanese remaining in the Garapan
vicinity.

During the rapid suige on the right, the
left (3d) battalion was not idle; after clearing
the Japanese from the remainder of the town’s

83 Th roneson .

197

the 8ATTLE was intimate, lonely and personal, even though
thousands of troops were present. Here a single
Marine advances “on the double” near Tanapag Har-
bor.

streets, it swung out upon Mutcho Point, a
movement chiefly complicated by annoying air
bursts from a Japanese heavy antiaircraft gun
in position north of Tanapag. By about dusk
the advance halted for t lie night with only
t()0 yards of the point unconquered. The noose
was tight and the Japanese who had retreated
to the tip of the point were neatly trapped.

The -tlh of July was almost a holiday for the
2d Marines. The 3d Battalion quickly mopped
ii]) the unfortunates on the point and estab-
lished a coast line defense of the Mutcho Point

(iarapan area. Remaining to be captured by
the 1st Battalion was the boat basin which
appears to hang suspended into Tanapag Har-
bor (see Map 20). Only one dryland approach
existed: over the open, concrete ramp from
the shore. Since troops moving upon this
would be extremely vulnerable to grazing fires
from any point in the boat basin or in the
breakwater that surrounded it. the battalion
commander decided to execute the move in
amphibian tractors, landing at the end of ihe
basin. Fire support would be furnished by the
BVT(A)*s of the 2d Armored Amphibian
Battalion.

This landing was complicated by communi-
cations failures between the amphibians and

the troop commander but, nonetheless, was
successful. Only a few Japanese were in the
basin and these were incapable of more than
token resistance. Only one Marine was
wounded.

With this conquest the 2d Marines were
pinched out of the attack and briefly, at least,
could enjoy the prospect of not facing enemy-
held terrain. At 1500 came word that the regi-
ment, less 2d Battalion, would stand detached
from the 2d Division to assume the role of
NTLF reserve. The unit then entrucked and
moved to an assembly area in rear of the 4th
Marine Division.84

In a repetition of so many previous days, the
0th Marines moved faster on the left than on
ihe right, where the Japanese had exploited
the defensible terrain. Keeping pace and acting
in concert with the 2d Marines' on 3 July, the
1st Battalion swung its left flank to the beach
(0-7) while its right was echeloned far to the
rear to contact the 3d Battalion. The latter
unit moved rapidly at first; but, as the Ma-
rines approached the last high ground over-
looking Tanapag Harbor, a heavy volume
of Japanese rifle and machine-gun fire bid
them unwelcome. By now the procedure at
such times was clear: blast the area with all
available supporting weapons, establish fire
superiority, move in for the kill. By late after-
noon the 3d Battalion seized the commanding
ground; but, inasmuch as a distance of 1,000
yards still remained before the coast could be
reached, Colonel Riseley ordered the unit to
hold for the night.

Although contact between' the two battalions
of the 6th Marines was tenuous, nothing save
desultory rifle fire occurred during the night.

The activities of 4 July resembled a mop-up
more than an attack. By shortly after noon the
3d Battalion had completed the descent from
the high ground, moved across the Tanapag
flats, and joined the 1st Battalion on the beach.
(See Map 20.) Then began the routine task
of clearing the omnipresent snipers from the
area.

At 1640 the 6th Marines were ordered de-
tached from the 2d Marine Division and as-

84 2d M or Report, 6. Throneson. Brooks.

193

trapped Japanese, north of Garapan, attempted to gain refuge during the first days in July by getting to their
sunken ships in Tanapag Harbor. Artillery and naval gunfire made quick work of the hulks, however. Dead
Japanese soldier had no opportunity to reach the ships.

signed as NTL F reserve. In tlie latter func-
tion the regiment was to “reconnoiter routes
and positions within the zone of the 27th In-
fantry Division” and to maintain a single
battalion on antisniper missions within the
general area: Flores Point — Tanapag Harbor
— Garapan, extending to the high ground well
inland of those areas. Colonel Riseley ordered
his 2d Battalion to carry out this patrolling
mission. The remainder of the regiment moved
to an assembly area about 1,000 yards inland
from Garapan’s northern edge.8"’

Farther out on the end of the 2d Division’s
swinging-gate movement was the 8th Marine
Regiment. Just before launching the day’s
attack, the 1st Battalion again became the un-
fortunate recipient of friendly artillery shells.
Compared to the 51 lost for the same reason
on the previous day, however, the five casu-

85 6th Mar Report, 13.

allies of 3 July seemed light. Although this
blunder delayed the unit’s attack for 45 min-
utes and had the effect of making the personnel
more “gun-shy” of their own artillery80 than
the enemy’s, the battalion quickly caught up
with units on its Hanks and enjoyed a rapid
advance against virtually no resistance.

The two center battalions of the 8th Marines
(2/2 and 1/29 from left to right) moved for-
ward rapidly, maintaining contact all the
while. On the extreme right the 2d Battalion.
8th Marines, found the small limestone hill still
a tough nut to crack, despite hundreds of mor-
tar, artillery and tank shells hurled at it and
the thorough roasting administered by the
light flame-thrower tanks the previous night.
Rather than hold up the advance of the entire

86 The term “own artillery” is here used to refer to all
U. S. artillery at Saipan, since the unit, or units, re-
sponsible for these miscalculations was never definitely
identified.

199

tanapag harbor on 4 July had fireworks to spare as Japanese vessels burned in the harbor. The boat basin was
seized shortly before, and the seaplane base shortly after, this picture was taken.

regiment while neutralizing this strong point,
the battalion commander (Major Chamberlin)
ordered his unit to skirt to the left of the hill,
leaving Company F to contain and destroy it.

Once past this sore spot, the battalion moved
rapidly forward, maintaining contact with
units on both flanks. Company F whittled and
chipped at the limestone hill throughout the
day and tightened the noose about it, but
Japanese hidden in the nooks and crannies
continued to pop up with telling bursts when-
ever the Marines ventured too close. At dark
of 3 July the 2d Company of the Provisional
Battalion arrived to relieve Company F of its
task. The latter rejoined the 2d Battalion, by
then over 1,000 yards ahead.

Independence Day was nothing more than a
large scale mop-up, or a “rabbit hunt,” as one
Marine put it. Men of the 8th Marines moved
rapidly down the hills to the Tanapag flats,
beating the bush as they went, and by early
afternoon reached the coast line in the vicinity
of the seaplane base (see Map 20). There
they ranged through the buildings and bomb
shelters in search of strays but found very few.

Like Garapan, the seaplane base was a
weird scene of destruction and desolation.
Grotesque and deformed girders stood as mute
testimony of the effectiveness of U. S. naval
and air bombardment. Several charred planes
lay scattered in the ramp area as a reminder
that this had, indeed, once been an important
installation at Saipan.

After weeks of trudging through the rough-
est terrain that the island could offer, the 8th
Marines received good news on the afternoon
of the 4th; the regiment would move to a
bivouac-rest area. Under different circum-
stances, word of setting up a camp area any-
where on the fly-infested island may not have
been exciting, but the conditions and situation
being what they were, the word was as welcome
as a reprieve to a condemned man. The rest
area was located 2,000-odd yards inland from
Beach Bed 3, requiring a march of several
miles. But no one complained.

At this time the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines,
which had operated as part of the 8th Marines
since D-Day, reA'erted to 2d Division control.
Lieutenant Colonel Jack P. Juhan, who had

200

commanded the unit since 2 July, resumed his
regular job as 8th Marines’ executive officer,
and Major William W. McKinley succeeded
him as battalion commander. Two days later
the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, passed to the
Saipan Garrison Force under direction of
which it conducted patrol operations for weeks
to follow.87

The Thrust to Flores Point

The cross-island turn of the 27th Division on
3 and 4 July carried it to the Flores Point
region on Saipan’s west coast and objective
0-7 (see Map 20). The point itself lay within
the zone of the 105th Infantry, while the other
two infantry regiments would strike the beach
on either side of it — the 106th to the south, the
165th to the north.

With its formation unchanged (1st and 2d
Battalions abreast), the 106th Infantry swept
rapidly through its zone. Here, as elsewhere
along the corps’ entire front, the Japanese
withdrawal had allowed a swift advance. All
U. S. units capitalized on the situation. A few
Japanese delaying groups remained behind
to slow the U. S. drive, but most of these were
quickly destroyed.

The 106th Infantry’s left battalion (1st) met
an unusually persistent delaying detachment
on the morning of 3 July. This enemy group
focused heavy machine-gun lire into the sol-
diers as they moved into the attack. Positioned
as it was, near the boundary between the 106tli
Infantry and the 8th Marines, the enemy
pocket was ideally situated to cause real
trouble. But not for long, for the tank-in-
fantry combination immediately went to work.
The pattern was simple, yet effective. Tanks,
each sheltering a cluster of infantrymen, ad-
vanced on the enemy position, blasting a path
en route. Once the tanks had approached as
close to the installation as terrain would per-
mit, the surrounding infantrymen assumed the
starring role and rushed the position. Even if
the tanks completed the mission without in-
fantry assault being necessary, the latter’s pres-
ence served to discourage individual Japanese

Kill Mar Report. 9. Wallace.

from attempting to place magnetic mines
against the tanks. The combination worked to
the advantage of both.

In addition to the gain of approximately
1,000 yards on 3 July, the 106th made even
greater headway on the 4th, reaching the beach
just south of Flores Point by 1600. Besides spo
radio outbursts from Japanese small arms and
mortars, the unit experienced minor delays
from two well-defended blockhouses. These
ideal artillery targets were carefully pin-
pointed and destroyed. “Although there were
considerable numbers of enemy encountered,”
commented the G-3 Periodic Report, “they
appeared to be very much disorganized and
confused.”88

The 106th Infantry’s reserve (3d Battalion)
spent the two days in mopping up rear areas
as the assault units lunged forward.

The 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry, was the
connecting link between the two flank regi-
ments. On the evening of 2 July when the 3d
Battalion had found itself embroiled in a fire
fight with a well-entrenclied enemy in the
vicinity of Papako, the 1st Battalion had by-
passed the strong point and tied in with the
faster moving flank units. On 3 July the latter
maintained a steady advance against negligible
opposition, while the 3d Battalion completed
its task of eliminating the stumbling block.

An important development on 3 July was
the return to the 27th Division, at long last, of
the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry. This unit,
detached on 22 June, had been operat ing under
NTLF and Saipan Garrison Force control.
Upon its reversion, the battalion occupied an
assembly area in division reserve. It remained
in this status until the following evening,
when it returned to the 105th Infantry.89

27th Div Periodic Reports 18 and 19. 106th Inf
Report, 18-20.

8!i There was apparently some confusion as to the
exact status of the battalion on 3 and 4 July. The 105th
Infantry believed it to be under regimental control at
1300, 3 July and at 0940, 4 July ordered the unit to
“comb area in Regtl zone. . . .” This is contradicted
by 27th Division Field Message 5 issued at 1800, 3 July :
“2d Bn, 105th Infantry, Division Reserve, will remain
in present position.” And in 27th Division G-3 Periodic
Report for 1600, 3 July to 1600, 4 July, mention is made

889590'1 — 50 — 14

201

Maintaining its rapid pace, the 1st Battalion
moved down from the foothills to the coastal
flats and by late afternoon of 4 July secured
Flores Point. By dark it was discovered that
a sizeable interval existed between the left of
the 105th and the right of the 106th. The
recently released 2d Battalion was thrown into
this hiatus and the flanks were firmly tied in.
In compliance with an order from the 27th
Division at 1545, the 3d Battalion went into the
front lines on the 1st Battalion’s right, taking-
over a portion of the 165th Infantry’s former
area in the process.90 (Considerations which
dictated this change will be discussed later in
this chapter.)

The 165th Infantry, ready to move out at
0800, 3 July, discovered that the 4th Marine
Division was directing an air strike and that
any forward movement might be dangerous.
The 4th Division, meanwhile, thought that the
165th was holding up awaiting units farther
to the left. At 1100. however, following this
faltering start, the 165th and the 4th Division
got their signals straight and launched the
attack.

With its battalions in column. 3d leading,
the 165th Infantry moved forward steadily on
3 July, gaining about 500 yards. Enemy
mortar and machine-gun fire, issuing mainly
from the left front, plagued the soldiers
throughout the day but failed to accomplish
more than slowing their rate of advance.

During the night of 3—1 July the 165tli
Infantry command post became the scene of
violent activity when 27 Japanese advanced
into the installation, apparently by mistake.
All of the Japanese intruders were killed with
no loss to personnel of the 165th. In the
morning, when an identification could he made,
Colonel Ogawa, commander of the Japanese
136th Infantry, was discovered among the
dead. Piecing the story together, it appears
that Ogawa and his headquarters group had
been by-passed by FT. S. advance and that he

that tin* battalion had remained “in Div Res at TA 213.”
latter. 27th Division Field Order 54. issued at 2200, 4
July, formally returned the 2d Battalion to the 105th
Infantry.

!l027th Div Periodic Reports 18 and 10. t05th Inf
Report, 8-0.

was attempting to displace to the northeast
when lie blundered into the 165th’s command
post. Many papers and documents found on
the Japanese commander were sent to higher
echelons for processing, translation and inter-
pretation. One of these, a Japanese field order,
contained detailed instructions relative to the
establishment of new defensive areas to the
north.

On the morning of the 4th, Lieutenant
Colonel Joseph T. Hart, who had relieved the
wounded Colonel Kelley as the 165th’s com-
mander on 28 June, ordered the 1st Battalion
to pass through the 3d and continue toward
the west coast. This shift was accomplished
without difficulty, and at 0730 the attack was
launched. Progress was favorable against vir-
tually no opposition until the unit reached the
high ground overlooking Flores Point. Here
slower movement of the 105th demanded a
short wait. But when the latter came abreast,
the attack regained its momentum and, during
the early afternoon, carried rapidly towards
the coast.

Nearing the coastal flats, the regiment met
the heaviest Japanese automatic weapons fire
experienced during the day. While attempting
to locate and neutralize the source of this
resistance, the 165th received a division order
changing its boundaries and swinging the di-
rection of attack to the northeast. (Considera-
tions which dictated the change of zones will be
discussed later in this chapter.) The new zone
of action included the area occupied by the
two left battalions of the 4th Marine Division,
so that a relief of these was indicated. As part
of the same move, the 2d Battalion, 165th
Infantry, in NTLF reserve since 1 July, re-
turned to parent control. Lieutenant Colonel
Hart, therefore, ordered his 2d and 3d Bat-
talions to relieve the Marines in the new zone.

As the 27th Division accomplished the pre-
scribed shifts, internal gaps developed, one
between the 165th and the 105th, another be-
tween the 1st and 3d Battalions, 165th. The
first mentioned break was filled shortly after
dark, but the second remained vacant until
nearly midnight, allowing the Japanese to use
this area as an infiltration route. As a con-
sequence the 3d Battalion, 165th, in the center

202

of the regiment’s sector, spent a lively evening.
A total of about 100 Japanese, in a series of
thrusts, unsuccessfully attacked the unit's left
during the night. With the coming of daylight
the results of the skirmishes lay crumpled for-
ward of the soldiers’ lines: about 80 dead .Japa-
nese were counted.91

The Struggle for the Hills

Usually, to front line troops, one hill was
like any other hill, even though one might be
tall, another squatty, another wooded, another
bare. It was only when a hill presented some-
thing distinctly unique in the way of appear-
ance or — especially — enemy resistance that its
name became familiar to all. In this connection
witness the rash of “Bloody Nose” hills and
ridges which dotted the islands of the Pacific.

Lying within the zone of the 4th Marine
Division were four hills which became all too
familiar during 3 and 4 July. Two of these
were named for their heights in feet : 721 and
776; a third, nothing more than a nose pro-
truding from the southeastern face of Hill 721,
was appropriately designated “4th of July
Hill;” the fourth. Radar Hill, was so named
because of Japanese radar installations there.
(See Map 20.) AVhile every Marine in the
division was not compelled to scale each of
these, it is safe to say that everyone got into
the act.

As noted previously the 4th Division had not
jumped off promptly on the morning of 3
July because it thought that the 165th Infantry
was waiting for other elements to the rear.
The 25th Marines were released to parent
control on 3 .July with the proviso that the
2d Battalion could not be committed without
approval of the landing force commander.
With this extra strength the 4th Division
started its advance at 1100.

The formation was unusual : three regiments
abreast and each in column of battalions. The
reason for this was that the division was cut-
ting across the island so that each st ride un-
covered additional yardage on the right Hank.
It was conceivable that the right regiment

01 165 th hif Report . 7-8. L!711i Div (5—3 Reports 17,
18 and 10.

would soon be entirely committed in facing the
ever-widening north Hank. This method, (ien-
eral Schmidt considered, would require less co-
ordination and would be simpler of execution
than to detail a reserve regiment for the job.
The 23d Marines, already on the division right,
would peel off Hank protection as the lines
advanced.

The three assault battalions (from right to
left: 3/23, 3/25 and 1/24) moved over the
rugged terrain without difficulty for the first
few hours; but at 1615 when the light bat-
talion ventured toward the lower slopes of “4th
of July Hill” and Dill 721. it encountered a
sudden deluge of rifle, machine-gun and mor-
tar tire. W hat had appeared as a series of
contours on the map and as a pair of innocuous
rises on the ground suddenly attained an
ominous significance. Best estimates placed
the enemy strength at about one battalion, with
personnel nestled into every recess, cavity,
cleft and cave. Hill 721 was reasonably open,
while “4th of July Hill" was heavily wooded;
both were well-notched with hiding places.

The 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, made several
attempts to capture the position, both by
frontal assault and by envelopment. All efforts
were repulsed. Neither tanks, so valuable in
this type of fighting, nor 75mm half-tracks
could move closer than 1,000 yards to the hills
because all approaches were heavily mined.

The assault battalions of the other two regi-
ments, meanw hile, were unable to progress past
the hills without placing themselves at the
mercy of Japanese located there. Progress of
the entire division, then, revolved about the
seizure of Hill 721 and its wooded appendage.

By 1715, after several abortive ventures, it
became obvious that the area would not be car-
ried on 3 July. For this reason. Colonel Jones.,
the 23d’s commander, ordered the 3d Bat-
talion to withdraw about 300 yards so that
artillery lire could safely be directed against
the hills. Major Paul S. Treitel, the battalion
commander, then received permission from the
regimental commander to maintain the 3d Bat-
talion command post in its present position so
that evacuation of casualties could be ex-
pedited. This placed the command post in a

203

vulnerable location approximately 150 yards
forward of the front lines. Fortunately, no
serious situations developed.

The other two battalions of the 23d Marines,
meanwhile, were employed in protecting the
north flank which now extended from the east
coast about 2,500 yards inland. It was prob-
ably at this time, as plans were being made
for continuation of the struggle the next day,
that the apt name “4th of July Hill” was first
applied.

As the 25th Marines dug in for the night, a
single battalion (the 3d) occupied the front
lines, while the 1st was in reserve. Contact
difficulties soon demanded the services of two
companies of the 1st Battalion, however; Com-
pany B went into the lines on the right and
Company C on the left of the 3d Battalion.
The 2d Battalion, which had been in NTLF
reserve in rear of the 2d Marine Division,
started the long, tiresome march to rejoin its
parent unit. After its arrival (about mid-
night, 3 July) the battalion was designated
as division reserve.

M en of Colonel Hart’s 24th Marines estab-
lished themselves on Radar Hill (1,000 yards
southwest of Hill 721) for the night after
shifting the 1st Battalion into reserve and
moving t he 2d and 3d Battalions into the lines.

Two command shifts were effected by the
24th Marines during the period 3—4 July.
Lieutenant Colonel Vandegrift, evacuated on
2!) dune, returned to the 3d Battalion on 3
duly and relieved Lieutenant Colonel Lessing.
The following day, Lessing got a new job:
command of the 1st Battalion. Lieutenant
Colonel Brunelli, who had functioned as 1st
Battalion commander since 18 June, then re-
vetted to his regular assignment as regimental
executive officer.

Throughout the night of 3-4 July the 14th
Marines poured volley after volley into “4th
of July Hill” but otherwise the night was
quiet.

Preliminary to the general advance of 4 July
the 4th Division ordered the 23d Marines to
conduct a local attack to secure the troublesome
heights. This move was to be preceded by a
30-minute artillery softening. Though good
on paper, the plan was thwarted in so far as

the artillery was concerned. As soon as fires
began, a blizzard of “cease fire” green star
clusters appeared over the 25th Marines, and
telephones and radios buzzed with the word
that artillery was falling on friendly troops.92
Another attempt was made and again the 4th
of July sky was filled with skyrocket protes-
tations.

Since the artillery preparation had been such
a disappointment and since it was felt that
softening was still necessary, a rocket barrage
was requested and effectively delivered on “4th
of July Hill.” Following this the 1st Battalion
passed through the 3d and moved up the slopes.
Against light machine-gun and some mortar
fire, the unit swept to the top of the first hill
and from there continued to the top of Hill
721. The contrast in opposition to that of the
previous day indicated that the bulk of the
defenders had withdrawn.

This substantial advance had been achieved
prior to noon, so that sufficient daylight re-
mained for the attack to continue. Hill 767,
approximately 700 yards to the northeast,
would be next. But here the tactics would be
different: while the main force remained at
Hill 721, a strong combat patrol from the 1st
Battalion would move to the objective and
investigate. Enjoying greater success than
anyone dared to hope, the patrol (led by Cap-
tain William C. Eisenhardt) found Hill 767
unoccupied and immediately took possession.

To make certain that the enemy did not re-
occupy the hill. Colonel Jones ordered the 2d
Battalion to move out and set up a defense
there. Getting into positian was not altogether
painless, however: the unit was harassed by
enemy small arms firing from a palm grove to
the northeast. But the retaliatory rounds of
the 81mm mortar platoon apparently had good
effect and enemy firing slackened. By night-
fall it was necessary to bend the battalion's
right flank back in order to contact units of
the 1st Battalion.

The 3d Battalion, meanwhile, patrolled the
area to the northeast for a distance of 1.500
yards. When patrols met no resistance in that

92 The 28d Marines Action Report blamed this situ-
ation on the fact that the 25th Marines had “errone-
ously reported its position.”

204

HILL 767 LOOMS in distance as men of the 27th Division watch United States tanks move along a ridge into firing
positions. Hill 767 was seized by the 4th Division on 4 July. Japanese 20mm dual-purpose automatic cannon
was apparently abandoned during enemy withdrawal.

area, the battalion moved out and occupied the
dominating terrain just short of Objective
()-7Z (see Map 20). By darkness the 23d Ma-
rines were solidly tied in across their front:
3d Battalion extending from the east coast
inland about 1,000 yards; 2d Battalion on Hill
707 ; and the 1st Battalion in the center con-
necting the two.

While the 23d struggled for the hills, the
other two regiments had kept pace. Nor had
the going all been smooth.

The 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, passed
through the depleted 3d Battalion93 and con-

The 3d Battalion was reorganized on a two corn-
pony basis at this time. Company 1,, which had no

tinned the attack. Though Hill 721 had not
been seized at the time of the unit’s jump oil.
Lieutenant Colonel Mustain, the battalion
commander, received permission to move out.
By 1130, when it had pushed about 600 yards
west of Hill 721, the direction of attack was
changed. The battalion would execute a right
turn and strike Hill 7<»7 from the southwest.
(This order was issued prior to the 23d Ma-
rines’ successful combat patrol).

As it turned out, the 1st Battalion’s route

officers left, was dissolved and its personnel assigned to
the other two rifle companies. This move placed three
officers and 151 men in Company I and three officers
and 164 men in Company K.

205

was a difficult one. Between Hill 721 and 776
the ground sloped stair-step fashion toward the
western coastal plain in a series of cliffs and
plateaus. It was necessary, therefore, for the
Marines to move along these plateaus in their
attack toward Hill 776. Shortly after changing
direction, the left of the unit met a fusillade
of enemy rifle and machine-gun lire. In an
endeavor to knock out this resistance, Mustain
ordered the attached tanks to overrun the
Japanese troublemakers. Here, however, there
was a complete miscarriage of plans. The
tanks became lost and wandered 700 yards to
the unit’s left front. The imbroglio became
complete when two of the tanks were knocked
out by “something” — the crews could not de-
termine whether it was mines, mortar or artil-
lery fire. One platoon from Company A moved
against heavy opposition to the disabled tanks,
where the crewmen were besieged by Japanese
soldiers eager to toss grenades in upon them.
It was necessary to abandon the tanks, but the
personnel returned safely.

Meanwhile, the battalion had broken through
the resistance that had occasioned the original
employment of the tanks and continued on to
Hill 767. There the unit dug in for the night
in contact with the 23d Marines. The 3d Bat-
talion, 25th which had followed in reserve dur-
ing the day, moved into the lines on the left,
placing it along the top of the cliffs, over-
looking the village of Makunsha. The 165th
Infantry, after relieving most of the 24th Ma-
rines during the afternoon, moved up on the
left flank and coordinated defenses with the
Marines.

On the division left, the 24th Marines kept
pace with the flank units as the advance swung
toward the sea. Machine-gun fire which issued
from the right front slowed the advance of the
right battalion (3d), but with the assistance
of tanks the unit forged ahead. Marines of the
left battalion (2d) had an enjoyable day
sniping at retreating Japanese soldiers on the
coastal flats below.

Late in the afternoon when NTLF changed
the direction of attack to the northeast, 27th
Division units relieved the 2d Battalion and
began the relief of the 3d. The latter, since it
had one company (G) of the 2d Battalion

attached, was four companies strong at this
time. As the 3d Battalion halted awaiting re-
lief by the 165th Infantry, the formation from
left to right was : Iv, L and I with Company G
in reserve behind Company I. By 1600, Com-
panies I and G had been relieved. Iv and L had
not. The latter two units remained in their
positions throughout the night, right flank in
contact with the 165tli Infantry, left exposed.
No trouble developed, however. The two Ma-
rine companies were finally relieved the fol-
lowing morning (5 July) and returned to their
battalion.

The 4th Marine Division made substantial
advances during the day, executing a change
in direction of attack, and disposing itself
along favorable ground just short of 0-7Z.
(See Map 20.) 94

Change of Direction

As the 2d arid 27th Divisions swept to the
coast in the Tanapag Harbor — Flores Point
region and the 4th Division to the very heart
of the northern part of Saipan, the necessity
for a change of direction became apparent.
The entire northern part of the island re-
mained to be seized, including the important
Marpi Point area; and this demanded a swing
of the axis of attack to the northeast. Holland
Smith, therefore, split the unconquered portion
in half, assigning the left segment to the 27th
Division and the right to the 4th Division. To
allow sufficient time for the juggling of front-
ages and zones, the attack hour was delayed
until noon of 5 July. Generals Griner and
Schmidt, of the 27th and. 4th Divisions re-
spectively, were to “conduct such adjustment
of their lines or make minor attacks prior to
King-hour as they [deemed] necessary to
launch a coordinated attack. . . .” The 4th Divi-
sion’s thrust had pushed well into the newly-
assigned zone of the 27th Division, so that the
previously described l'eliefs and shifts were

94 The foregoing is a synthesis of the following
sources: 1/th, Mar Div Report , Section VI, 31-32; 2Sd
Mar Report, 45-47; 21/th Mar Report. 23: 25th Mar
Report. 7-8: 2(7 Bn, 23d Mar Report. 5; 3d tin. 23d Mar
Report. 7 ; 2d Jin. 22/111 Mar Report. 9-10; 3d Jin. 21/th
Mar Report. 9-10: 1st Bn, 25th ifar Report. 16-19;
3d Bn, 25th Mar Report, 12; Treitel; T,. R. Jones.

206

necessary. Although, the formal operation
order outlining the change was not issued until
1800, 4 July, oral warning orders had placed
the plan in motion in midafternoon.95

Mindful of the significance of the day in
American history and pleased with progress
at Saipan, General Holland Smith distributed
the following message to the landing force on
the evening of July 4th:

The Commanding General takes pride on tills INDE-
PENDENCE DAY in sending his best wishes to the
lighting men on Saipan. Your unflagging gallantry and
devotion to duty have been worthy of the highest praise
of our country. It is fitting that on this 4th of July you
should be extremely proud of your achievements. Your
fight is no less important than that waged by our fore-
fathers who gave us the liberty and freedom we have
long enjoyed. Your deeds to maintain these principles
will not be forgotten. To all hands a sincere well done.
My confidence in your ability is unbounded.

Naval Activities from 27 June to 4 July

Most of what the U. S. Navy did at Saipan
was so closely-related to ground actions that
to separate the functions would be to present
a false picture. With gunfire and aircraft the
Navy assisted the ground troops directly and
daily. Elsewhere, the constant pressure of
naval power was more apparent to the Japa-
nese than to the Americans ashore at Saipan.

On 27 June Mine Sweeping Squadron Four
swept Magicienne Bay, clearing about 25
square miles in the process. On 28 June net
cargo ship (AKN) Keokuk laid 10,000 feet of
antisubmarine net off the entrance to Garapan
anchorage as a positive barrier to Japanese
underwater venturers. On the evening of 2

*s NTLF Operation Order 22-44.

July (lie destroyer Melvin spotted two Japa
nese landing craft moving from Marpo Point
on Tinian. Without waiting to determine their
destination, the Melvin sank one and drove the
other aground. Having secured the NTLF sea
flanks in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the
Navy continued to protect those flanks against
amphibious infiltration.

In addition, steady, daily raids were directed
at those islands close enough to mount air
attacks against Saipan. Among these. Rota
was a favorite because it was felt that many
enemy raids originated there. Tinian, although
unable to launch an air attack from its bat
tered fields, was struck with daily regularity.
Here, the thought was towards softening the
island for subsequent amphibious assault.
Guam another convenient and important target,
felt the impact of recurring blows. Both Guam
and Tinian were the subjects of a number of
photographic missions designed to keep higher
echelons informed of latest developments.91.

If the routine of these raids became mo
notonous to the Japanese, some variety should
have been provided on 3 July when two car
rier task groups (58.1 and 58.2) of Admiral
Mitscher’s Force hit I wo Jima. A sweep of (>.”>
U. S. planes over the island shot down 5<>
fighters and destroyed an undetermined num-
ber of planes on the ground. On 4 July the
two groups carried out a heavy flight schedule
against Iwo, Chichi and Haha Islands.97

The U. S. Navy’s covering operations* effec
tively isolated Saipan from outside Japanese
interference.

96 TF 51 Report, 10-13.

97 Nan/s Air U'ar, 214.

207

CHAPTER VI

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Saito’s Last Battle

D-PLUS 20—5 JULY

The Japanese were in a trap, the jaws of
which were ever tightening. But, like cornered
rats, they were capable of frenzied reaction.

Every indication supported the belief that the
enemy remaining in the island's upper end were
ill-equipped, ill-supplied, and, in many cases,
ill. Communications had suffered almost a com-
plete breakdown, hospital facilities were prac-
tically non-existent, and the shortage of food
and water was telling on their moral. Passion-
ate phrases of patriotism, which Japanese com-
manders erupted on the slightest provocation,
were hard to swallow on an empty stomach.

And yet, to say that the Japanese were de-
moralized would be stating an untruth. After
all, who had imposed this sorry condition but
the hated American devils? And what better
way is there to vent one’s wrath and relieve
one’s gnawing hunger than to kill an American?
Though these questions be surmise, the Japa-
nese reaction in the last days of the campaign
points convincingly to their accuracy.

As noted previously, Holland Smith’s order
for 5 July had designated 1200 as the attack
hour. In the hours of daylight prior to noon,
however, the two assault divisions were to con-
duct preliminary moves necessary to initiate a
coordinated attack.

Tanapag Plain

For the 27th Division, assigned the left sector
(see Map 21), these preliminary actions in-
volved moves of approximately 1,600 yards for

units along the beach and only minor adjust-
ments for those on the high ground inland.

Terrain was varied in the division zone : the
left half included an 800-yard expanse of
coastal flatland, while the right faced the tur-
bulent maze of hills and ravines that is inner
Saipan ; near the center, an abrupt escarpment
divided the extremes. The coastal flat and the
hills which immediately dominate it were as-
signed the 105th Infantry, while the rugged
interior fell to the 165th. The 106th Infantry
had been pinched out of the attack on the pre-
vious day and reverted to division reserve.

In addition to mopping up the Flores Point
area, the 105th Infantry was to push its front
abreast of the 165th Infantry, occupying the
high ground inland from Tanapag. Events of
the day, as will be seen, prevented the regiment
from achieving the desired gains.

The left assault battalion (the 2d) inched
along the beach, investigating extensive de-
fensive installations which the Japanese had
prepared to counter U. S. landings. Although
virtually no resistance was encountered, each
position had to be carefully explored, lest dan-
gerous thorns be left behind. The units moved
steadily along the beach, through the scattered
remains of Tanapag Village, and toward Road
Junction 2. As the battalion neared that junc-
tion, the Japanese opened suddenly, fiercely,
with a fusillade of machine-gun fire. The
advance stalled.

As was so often the case, the enemy could not
be located. And the Japanese discouraged curi-

208

osity with frequent, well-placed bursts of lire.
Finally it was believed that the lire was issuing
from a battered Japanese landing barge
beached off to the left front. Two medium tanks
were immediately dispatched along the coast
road to destroy this supposed source of the
trouble. After blasting the barge and appar-
ently silencing the Japanese lire, the tanks
swung off the road for the return to U. S. lines.
This proved a bad move : the vehicles had driven
into a Japanese mine field and one was com-
pletely wrecked before the truth was known.
As if by signal the Japanese opened fire again,
this time more heavily than before.

The rest of the day was spent in attempting
to locate the enemy positions, all to no avail.
The 2d Battalion dug in for the night just short
of Road Junction 2. (See Map 21.)

The 105th Infantry’s right assault battalion
(the 3d) faced a zone that included a portion of
the plain and also the rugged bills that closely
fringed it. To negotiate this sector, it was nec-
essary to advance one company (L) along the
top of the bluffs while another (K) moved be-
low on the flat. To the north of the battalion’s
lines, two narrow gorges could be seen, each
cutting deep into the escarpment. Along the
high ground between the two ran the bumpy,
winding cross-island road. The 3d Battalion’s
right and the 165th Infantry’s left, would bisect
the necks of the draws while the open mouths
yawned toward units on the coastal flat. The
near draw caused no trouble, but the second
(later named “Harakiri Gulch”) developed
into a stubborn core of enemy activity.

The 3d Battalion moved well at first, but as
the left company (K) approached a palm grove
about 800 yards east of Tanapag Village a hail
of enemy fire immobilized it. The fire emanated
from the grove itself as well as the choppy
ground to the east. A thrust by machines of the
762d Tank Battalion into the coconut grove
failed to diminish the Japanese resistance and
the company held up for the night. Higher on
the bluffs the right company (L) had traversed
the first draw without difficulty, but in moving
across the road toward Harakiri Gulch, it was
greeted by file from cliff positions on the far
side. Several battalions of 27th Division artil-
lery were registered there, along with point-

blank bursts from a 3d Battalion antitank gun,
but the enemy was not dislodged and became
less hospitable than ever. In this unenviable
position the battalion dug in for the night :
Company L atop the spur facing Harakiri
Gulch, Company K below and just southeast of
the palm grove.

During the day the 1st Battalion had re-
mained in regimental reserve, occupying an
assembly area south of Tanapag Village.1

The 165th Infantry was not required to con-
duct as extensive preliminary operations as the
105th. The change in direction and reassign-
ment of zones had placed it well ahead. At 1300,
however, the regiment launched its attack,2 2d
Battalion on the right, 3d on the left. The.
former, in contact with the 4th Marine Division,
moved without difficulty, but the latter, battling
the upper reaches of the Harakiri Gulch cross-
compartment, was stopped after a short 100
yard gain. Like elements of the 105th Infantry
to its left, the 3d Battalion encountered heavy
machine-gun fire from the draw’s northern wall
as well as mortar fire, which often made upright
movement suicidal.

With the right extended well ahead in contact
with the 4th Marine Division and the left
checked on the high ground overlooking Hara-
kiri Gulch, the regiment established its night
defense. The 1st Battalion had remained in an
assembly area just northeast of Radar Hill in
reserve.3

The day’s advance in the 27th Division zone
had been disappointing, but General Griner
hoped that the next day would see the unit mov-
ing rapidly again. In a message issued at 1800.
5 July, the general instructed the 105th Infan-
try and the left battalion of the 165tli to move
out at 0700, 6 July, and advance their lines to
Makunsha, in elongation of the line held by the
right battalion of the 165th Infantry. This was
to be accomplished by 0900, so that the division
could attack with units abreast. Stressing the

1 War Department Historical Division Booklet,
“Small Unit Actions, The Fight on Tanapag Plain,”
06-73, hereinafter cited as The Fight on Tanapag
Plain. 105th Inf Report, 9.

2 Originally scheduled for noon, the attack was de-
layed until 1300 by NTLF order.

3 165th Inf Report, 8.

209

dominating position, captured by 105th Infantry, flanked Tanapag-Makunsha Plain. For once, the Japanese were
caught in the open, vulnerable to fire such as that being delivered by this heavy machine gun.

import since of the move, G filter’s message
stated: "It is imperative that the left of the
Division line lie advanced to be abreast of the
other units for the coordinated attack at 0900.
The early advances will be pushed aggres-
sively.” 4

From 0-7Z to 0-8A

General Schmidt's order to his 4th Marine
Division on 5 July specified that the 23d Ma-
rines conduct preliminary operations for the
seizure of () 7Z (the regiment had patrolled
just short of this objective on the previous day).
This would provide a favorable line of depar-
ture for the day’s attack. I he move was to be
completed by noon so that the other two regi-
ments could pass through and continue to di-
vision objective 0—8 A, some 1.400 yards for-
ward of ( )-7Z. Included as the principal terrain
feature of intermediate objective 0-8 A was the
high ground on the north side of Karaberra
Pass, a deep gouge in Saipan’s upper middle.

* 27th I'iv Field Message (5, 1800, 5 July.

From the pass, the objective line ran in a south-
easterly direction to a cove on the east coast,
labelled Inai Fahan (see Map 21).

The scheme was executed with only minor
hitches.

The first of these occurred when the 23d Ma-
rines took somewhat longer than expected to
occupy 0-7Z. Moving with three battalions
abreast, the regiment made rapid progress on
both flanks, but the center unit (1st Battalion)
was delayed by the nightmarish terrain through
which it was forced to move. To remedy this
situation the two flank units, already on the
objective, stretched their lines to cover the va-
cant middle. Colonel Jones reported the ob-
jective occupied at 1315, 5 and the passage began.
The task of mopping-up its difficult zone of
action took the 1st Battalion until 1500, at

5 Contradict ions are found in the 4th Marine Division
report which gives the time as 1155 and in the 25th
Marines report which complained that it was forced to
fight 400 yards before reaching the designated line of
departure.

210

which time it joined the rest of the regiment in
division reserve.6

Assuming the left half of the division front,
the 2-fth Marines made good progress. Initially
the regiment had been slowed by the failure of
the 25th Marines to appear on the right flank;
but, subsequently, when Colonel Hart ordered
his battalions to move out anyway, the sweep
Was rapid. By 1600 the unit was in possession
of its portion of 0-8 A, having seized the high
ground on both sides of Karaberra Pass and,
to prevent Japanese infiltration, extended its
lines through the pass itself.

The 1st Battalion, moving in contact with the
27th Division, experienced little difficulty. The
speed of its movement was regulated chiefly by
units on its flanks. For the right assault unit,
the 2d Battalion, the going was tougher:
wooded draws and ravines lying within its zone
contained many troublesome caves. The enemy
in these required systematic extermination. As
has been so often indicated, cave cleaning was
a slow process. Karaberra Pass brought more
of the same: here grenades and antipersonnel
mines were rolled down upon the Marines as
they trudged the valley floor. This particular
area was extremely defensible and, had the
Japanese chosen to make it so, could have been
much worse than it was. By late afternoon the
24th Marines occupied the high ground on both
sides of the pass as well as the floor itself.

The 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, had remained
in reserve throughout the day. Two of its com-
panies (Iv and L) had spent the previous night
in the Army division’s lines, but by 1 100, 5 July,
both had been relieved. With the coming of
darkness the battalion was ordered to establish
a secondary line, one company (Iv) being at-
tached to the 1st Battalion to bridge a break on
the left flank.

Since the 24th Marines had moved out in the
attack prior to the arrival of the 25th Marines
on the right flank, no contact existed between
the two units until after 1500, when a patrol
from the 25tli Marines began operating through
the area. When the advance stopped for the

11 23d Mar Report, 47. L. R. Jones.

night a 400-yard separation still existed. To
prevent the Japanese from using t his as a funnel
through which to pour substantial forces (in-
dividual infiltrators were next to impossible to
stop) , the 25th Marines detailed a strong combat
patrol with orders to rove the interval during
the night. In addition, heavy machine guns
were emplaced and mortars and artillery regis-
tered to cover the area should the need arise.
The effectiveness of this security was not tested
by the Japanese, however.7

Colonel Batehelder’s 25th Marines had a diffi-
cult time schedule to meet: it was to pass
through the right half of the 23d Marines, a
maneuver involving a lateral move of about
2,500 yards. This move, moreover, could not
commence until the 1st and 3d Battalions had
been relieved by Army units. By about 1000
the relief took place, and the lengthy hike began.
Delayed in its start, the regiment was late in
effecting the passage, arriving at about 1330.
Batchelder ordered his 1st and 2d Battalions
to attack abreast, 1st on the right. The 3d Bat-
talion would follow the assault battalions at 500
yards, using a route generally in the center of
the regiment’s zone.

The 1st Battalion started the day in an ex-
citing way. In the early morning hours, prior
to relief by Army units, the Japanese had set up
a machine gun in Company A’s thinly-spread
front lines and began spattering bursts through
the battalion command post. The proximity of
friendly troops precluded the use of mortars
against this target and dictated infantry as-
sault. Designated to expel these intruders were
the men of the attached 1st Platoon, Company
A, 20th Marines, whose normal engineer func-
tions were temporarily shelved. At 0540 the
engineers attacked, killed or routed the Japa-
nese, and restored the position. This incident
cost a total of 12 Marine casualties.

After passage of the 23d Marines’ lines, the
1st Battalion drove forward without encounter-
ing resistance. The heat and humidity were
terrific, however, and the long hike resulted in

7 2lilh Mur Report , 23. 1st Jin, 2 '/ 1 h Mar Report. 11-12.
2d Bn, 21/th Mar Report, 10-11. 3d Bn, 21/th Mar Report.

30.

211

many heat exhaustion casualties.8 Also proving
a hindrance to swift movement were several
aerial bombs (250-pound) buried along the
coastal road. These bombs, installed with noses
barely protruding from the ground, were in-
tended to destroy U. S. vehicles moving along
the road. Fortunately, these explosives were
spotted before damage was done. The battalion
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mustain, or-
dered the attached engineers to begin detona-
ting the inverted bombs; and, since the task
appeared too great for a single platoon to ac-
complish, he requested services of the engineers
attached to the 3d Battalion. A bulldozer was
provided to till the holes left by the explosions,
and by 1700 the road was open for traffic.

The itinerant 2d Battalion, meanwhile, moved
on the left half of the 25th Marines’ front. This
well-travelled unit had performed directly
under the control of not only its parent regi-
ment, but 4th Division, Northern Troops and
Landing Force, 2d Division and 8th Marines
as well. Its “Cook’s tour” had left little time for
rest. Back with familiar faces once again, the
battalion advanced steadily to its assigned
objective.

By 1700 the 25th Marines dug in on 0-8A.
With the evening rations came the first fresh
socks, and the Marines gratefully replaced their
limp and soggy ones, which were unceremoni-
ously interred.9

In addition to the 14th Marines, the 4th Ma-
rine Division had the benefit of reinforcing fires
from tbe XXIV Corps Artillery during tlie
afternoon. One small, troublesome plateau for-
ward of the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, had
been effectively pounded by the massed fires of
eight battalions of artillery.10

For the 2d Marine Division, in NTLF reserve,
the day was quiet and uneventful.11

8 These were allowed to rest for a day or two and
returned to their units.

0 25tli Mar Report, S. 1st Bn, 25th Mar Report. 19-20.
3d Bn, 25th Mar Report. 12.

10 'ith Mar Dir Report, Section VI, 38. This unusual
density of tire was available for two reasons: first, only
two divisions were now in the assault on a narrowed
front : second, few counterbattery missions remained at
this late stage in the operation.

11 XT IF (1-3 Journal. 1800 4 July to 1.800 5 July.

Night of 5-6 July

About 2030 the 24th Regiment reported 250
Japanese to its front, apparently organizing
for an attack. Artillery, mortar, 37mm and
machine-gun fire converged upon the area and
the Japanese dispersed. Later, at about 2300,
there were minor attempts at infiltration in the
regiment’s zone, but no counterattack material-
ized.

Patrols from the 27th Division observed ap-
proximately two companies of Japanese north-
west. of Hill 767 as well as scattered smaller
groups in the vicinity of Makunsha and north-
east of that village. Here again, artillery fires
kept the enemy stirred up and disorganized, and
nothing more than desultory rifle fire developed.

Japanese aircraft made a feeble effort during
the night. Just after dark three to five planes
came over Saipan but failed to press anything
resembling an aggressive attack. Two bombs,
dropped near Aslito Airfield, achieved the
rather unspectacular feat of slightly damaging
one U. S. plane and cracking a windshield on
another. While skittering nervously about the
area, one of the raiders was downed by a U. S.
night fighter. From the half-hearted, hesitant
manner in which the raid was executed, the im-
pression was derived that the planes were at-
tempting air evacuation of key personnel. Just
after midnight a single Japanese plane ap-
peared over the island and was shot down by a
night fighter.12

D-PLUS 21—6 JULY
The Ditch and the Gulch

NTLF plans for 6 July had prescribed a push
to 0-8 (see Map 21) with the remaining terrain
on the island divided equally between the two
assault divisions. To allow the left elements of
the 27th Division an opportunity to come
abreast, the 4th Marine Division and the right
battalion of the 27th Division would delay their
attack until 0900.

12 Although never proved, it was believed that this
plane had succeeded in landing on the field (Banederu)
on Marpi Point, had loaded whoever or whatever it
had come for, and had taken off again. It was at this
stage of the proceedings that the U. S. night fighter
intercepted the plane and sealed the mystery.

212

If t li is scheme had worked out, it is likely
that the two divisions would have moved side
by side to the end of the island. But, as will be
seen, the early morning; preliminary attack of
(lie Army division’s left units met stiff resist-
ance, and the plan was thwarted before it could
even begin. When it was apparent to Holland
Smith that the going would be slow and difficult
on the left and rapid on the right, he decided to
change his plan.

The modification, issued shortly after 0900 on
6 July, altered the division boundaries to the
extent that the 4th Marine Division would ex-
pand to the northwest, pinch out the 27th Di-
vision north of Makunsha, and take over the
entire frontage for the sweep to Marpi Point.
This move would not only enable the 27th Di-
vision to mop up properly the Tanapag — Ma-
kunsha— Harakiri Gulch area, but might also
cut off enemy retirement to the north.

The 105th Infantry, which had launched its
preliminary attack at 0700, was deeply em-
broiled in trouble by the time that news of the
change arrived.

The scheme of maneuver for the 2d Battalion
took into account the minefield which had been
discovered on the previous day. To avoid this
area, Major Edward A. McCarthy planned to
swing his companies in column along the beach
until past the minefield, at which time a two-
company front could be assumed.

The battalion moved out under a protective
rolling barrage fired by the 249th Field Artil-
lery Battalion. The first 100 yards’ advance was
rapid, carrying the unit almost past the mine-
field; but, as the artillery lifted to targets far-
ther to the northeast, the soldiers suddenly met
a hail of grazing fire spitting across the coastal
flat. Despite efforts of the battalion commander
to regain momentum, the attack stalled.

Then began the difficult task of locating the
source of the enemy fire. Though no one could
realize it until much later in the day, the Japa-
nese were well established in a shallow ditch only
150 yards to the front. This natural trenchwork,
a drainage rut running from the base of the
escarpment to the sea, was relatively insignifi-
cant when contrasted with the cliffs and gulches
on the right flank and had not been credited

with being as strongly occupied as it was. As
long as artillery fire showered on (lie area the
Japanese had kept their heads down; but, as
soon as it had lifted to the northeast, they had
risen from their shelter and stopped the 2d
Battalion’s advance.

Tanks were immediately requested, but a com-
munication failure delayed their arrival. While
waiting, the 2d Battalion improved its position,
broadened its front, and inched about 50 yards
closer to the ditch. Work on the minefield was
also progressing; one platoon from Com
pany A, 102d Engineer Battalion, had mi
dertaken the hazardous task shortly after 1000.
Necessarily working in the prone position, the
platoon made slow progress. The “mines” were
the same type that had worried the 25th Ma-
rines on 5 July : buried 250-pound aerial bombs
with noses fused to explode under the weight of
vehicles.

At about 1000 five medium tanks from the
762d Tank Battalion arrived at Major McCar-
thy’s command post. How and where should
the tank thrust be made? (As yet no one had
identified the ditch as the trouble spot.) The
road was a possibility, but this could be con-
veniently interdicted by Japanese antitank
weapons; and, also, the spindly bridge across
the ditch would likely be mined or wired for
demolition. The route selected was the railroad
track running through the center of the bat-
talion’s zone.

Moving single file along the thin road bed, the
tanks were soon stymied when the lead tank
snarled its tracks on the narrow steel rails.
While work was in progress to clear a path for
the second tank to move around the first, Japa-
nese antitank weapons opened up and achieved
hits on both. Although shells pierced the vehi-
cles, neither was put out of action. The turn of
events had clearly indicated that this route was
a poor one. By use of a cable both tanks were
hauled clear of the area.

While the tanks were executing their abortive
gesture, a rifleman in the left company (E)
spotted some movement in the ditch ahead. The
target seemed ideal for the 60mm mortars, but
these, unfortunately, were out of ammunition.
An effort by an SPM (Self Propelled Mount)

213

VICTIMS of OOREY'S attack, these Japanese blocked the 6 July advance of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, along
the Tanapag Plain until Dorey’s tanks arrived on the scene.

was also disappointin'*;: after moving up the
coast for a short distance the driver, discour-
aged by near misses from the same antitank
weapon that had hit the two tanks, abandoned
the undertaking.

Fhe next attempt, though boldly conceived,
was also unsuccessful. One rifle squad rushed
the position, but was repulsed after a wild
skirmish.

At last the source of the trouble had been
definitely located. P>ut now what was to be done
about it ?

The situation was generally unchanged until
about 1530 (except for the commitment and
ultimate detachment of the battalion reserve.
Company G, which will be described later). At
this time three Army light tanks, previously

operating with the 3d Battalion around Hara-
kiri Gulch, appeared in the 2d Battalion’s zone
in search of a mission. This they were not
denied. Upon learning about the situation,
Lieutenant AVillis Iv. Dorey, USA, decided to
roam out and examine the ditch.

I )orey moved to the ditch unhampered by
antitank fire and found a tanker’s dream target.
Japanese soldiers were jammed along the ditch,
almost shoulder to shoulder. One of his tanks
was put out of action when an enemy soldier
placed a magnetic mine against its side; but,
after leaving his third tank to protect the crip-
ple. Dorey ranged on alone. Using machine
guns and cannister on the tightly-packed foe.
Dorey slaughtered from 100 to 150 as he blasted
the ditch from end to end.

214

At 1700, following this massacre, men of the
2<1 Battalion advanced with no difficulty. Such
few Japanese as remained alive were incapable
of resistance. The long, hard struggle for the
ditch was over.

The 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, had found
the going no easier. This unit, as noted before,
was straddling the cliff line with one company
on the flat and another atop the bluffs. The
morning attack would depart from the line
seized on the previous day: the left just short
of the palm grove and the right facing precipi-
tous Harakiri Gulch. In accordance with Gen-
eral Griner's order, the battalion moved out at
0700 to bring its lines abreast of units farther
to the right.

Selecting a defiladed route, the left company
(Iv) moved to the edge of the grove without
receiving fire. Once the unit emerged from its
cover, however, two machine guns contested
further approach. Savior in this situation was
Lieutenant Dorey,13 whose tanks ploughed into
the grove and destroyed the two machine guns.
This relieved the pressure and the soldiers
quickly swept to the northern edge of the trees.

Fire from the upper lip of Harakiri Gulch’s
mouth, meanwhile, had made all movement
across the flat costly. Any further advance
would place the left company directly in the
fire-lanes. Capture or effective neutralization
of the gulch area was therefore imperative if
forward movement with a reasonable degree of
safety were to be made.

With hopes of neutralizing the fire from this
direction, or at least minimizing it, Lieutenant
Dorey’s tanks commenced working over the
area. This measure appeared effective; the vol-
ume of enemy fire diminished and, finally,
stopped. When, at about 1000, Dorey was
forced to leave the area to replenish ammuni-
tion, the small arms fire of the 3d Battalion
maintained the spray of rounds against the
cliffs. The enemy remained dormant.

At this point in the proceedings word was
received of the change in division boundary and
the effect this would have on the scheme of ma-
neuver. The weight would shift from left to

13 The same officer who later in the day furnished
such vital assistance at the ditch.

right as the division pivoted toward the sea.
Strong pressure would be exerted by the l()5th
Infantry to swing down from the hills and to
the beach north of Makunsha.

With the shift in balance, the 2d Battalion,
105th Infantry, would take over the entire
frontage on the coastal plain, allowing the 3d
Battalion to utilize its ful I st rengt h on the bin ffs
above. This involved relief of Company K by
Company G. The latter had spent the early
morning hours mopping up in the vicinity of
Tanapag Village. Relief took place at about
noon following an unusual train of events.

Upon receiving notification of t he change in
attack plans, Company Iv’s commander decided
to undertake seizure of a small knoll north of
the palm grove. Since Dorey’s tanks had re-
turned after supplying themselves with ammu-
nition. these would be used to prevent Japanese
interference from Harakiri Gulch and the cliffs
around it.

Almost as soon as Company Iv moved out to
seize the knoll, however, the enemy opened with
devastating effectiveness from the cliffs to the
right. It appeared that they had been biding
their time awaiting just such a move. The right
of the company was stopped. As the left hinged
forward in a determined effort to carry the ob-
jective, the Japanese also started moving: from
the cliffs towards the ditch immediately in rear
of the knoll. What threatened to be a savage
hand to hand struggle never materialized, for
at this precise moment a blasting, crashing ex-
plosion rent the air, hurl ing Japanese and pieces
of Japanese in all direction. The terrific con-
cussion knocked most of the men of Company
Iv from their feet, but the Japanese suffered
more. What had been a thriving surge was
suddenly — nothing. As a result of this blast,
all enemy fire ceased in this area for nearly an
hour.

What had caused this terrific explosion?
The most plausible explanation seems to be that
the leading Japanese of the counterattack
group had blundered upon a mine, detonation
of which set off a number of others.

Disorganized and slightly dazed by the con-
cussion, Company Iv did not immediately move
to the objective. By the time the unit had re-

215

gained its composure and was ready to move up,
Company G arrived and effected the relief.

The tanks had not escaped excitement either.
While cruising near the mouth of Harakiri
Gulch, the machines were met by two Japanese
soldiers who ran out and attached a magnetic
mine to one and threw a Molotov cocktail at the
other. Both tanks were put out of action. Lieu-
tenant Dorey ordered the surviving vehicles to
depart from the area. The crews of the disabled
tanks made good their escape on foot.

Higher on the bluff, meanwhile, the right
company (L) of the 3d Battalion made un-
successful ventures into Harakiri Gulch during
the morning. Of the belief that it was impera-
tive to build up suporting tires before attempt-
ing to cross the draw, the company commander
attempted to move base of fire units into posi-
tions from which to cover the advance of the
rest of the company. As part of the same
scheme, tanks moved up from the gulch’s longer
axis into covering positions. Though the efforts
continued throughout the morning, all failed.
In the process, one tank was lost when a Japa-
nese rifleman placed a magnetic mine against
it.14

"While Company L exercised its unsuccessful
stratagems against Harakiri Gulch during the
morning, the change in attack plans had been
made known. For the afternoon attack the 27th
Division would still have four battalions in the
assault, but the emphasis changed from left to
right. The new scheme is well described by an
Army historian :

The basic plan of movement called for the 3d Bat-
talion, lO." th Infantry to attack across Harakiri Gulch
and up onto the high, almost level plateau that covered
the area between there and Paradise Valley. The com-
panies of these two battalions would then wheel left,
go down the face of the cliffs from above, and sweep out
across the Tanapag Plain to the sea, each arriving on
the plain at a point progressively farther east toward
Makunslui. The 2d Battalion, 165th would proceed
north down Paradise Valley, cleaning out this strong-
point, and reaching the beach just above Makunsha.
While this operation was going on in the hills, the 2d

14 The normal practice of sending infantrymen along
with the tanks as protection had not proved feasible in
the gulch. Once inside the draw, riflemen made easy
targets for the well-hidden Japanese.

Battalion, 105th Infantry, on the division’s left wing,
was to make a limited attack northeast along the
beach.15

This simple, direct plan was destined to failure,
however.

The 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, failed to
gain during the afternoon. The commander of
the left assault company (L), decided to under-
take no further moves until he had located and
destroyed the enemy positions which had stalled
his morning efforts. The right company (I),
after moving about 75 yards down into the
gulch, met rifle fire and was stopped. Later in
the afternoon the company withdrew to its
starting point on top of the hill.

A determined afternoon thrust against Hara-
kiri Gulch was made by the 1st Battalion, lG5th
Infantry,16 but here again results were not en-
couraging. The brunt of the 1st Battalion’s
fight fell to Company A.

This company faced the upper part of the
gulch at a point where the 3d Battalion, 165tli,
had been stalled on the previous day. Rather
than attempt another cross compartment move,
the change of direction would allow the com-
pany to advance down the draw’s longer axis.
After descent to the gulch floor, the company
cautiously crept through a series of man-made
ditches that had carved the area to resemble a
huge washboard. All eyes were straining to-
ward the rocky slopes for some sign of the Japa-
nese among the large umbrella-like trees and
little straw shacks that dotted the valley. At
first, all was qniet. Then, unexpectedly, the tiny
shacks rocked with the force of explosion after
explosion. The chain of blasts continued for
about 15 minutes, during which time the sol-
diers kept under cover in the ditches. When
silence returned and investigation was possible,

I lie startling truth was discovered: about 60
Japanese, scattered through the small abodes,
had placed grenades against their abdomens
and committed suicide. It was this incident
that gave the gulch its name.

Hopes that these suicides would mark the end

15 The Fight On Tuna pa g Plain, 89.

16 This unit had relieved the 3d Battalion, 165th,
early on the morning of 6 July, the latter reverting to
regimental reserve.

216

of Japanese resistance in the draw were soon
dispelled; accurate grazing fire stopped the
unit as it resumed the push. In addition, the
shacks were now ablaze. The explosion of the
grenades had turned the combustible huts into
liery patches, and t lie heat forced soldiers near-
by to pull back. To expose one's body for even
a moment was enough to attract a well-aimed
burst, and casualties mounted. Handling their
fallen comrades proved a difficult task for the
men of the company. The number of men killed
or wounded while attempting to evacuate other
wounded was alarming; loss to would-be res-
cuers was altogether out of proportion to the
number of personnel being saved. It was a
vicious circle.

When it became apparent that Company A’s
attack had stalled, the company commander
ordered the unit to withdraw. Extrication was
not easy, since the soldiers were under heavy
lire; and it was after 1500 when they were fi-
nally reassembled at the gulch’s upper entrance.

Probably the greatest contributory factor in
this failure was the fact that the company
had had no assistance on either flank. The 3d
Battalion, 105th Infantry, as mentioned before,
had not advanced during the afternoon. Had
this unit moved, it might have relieved some of
the pressure on Company A’s left. On the right,
terrain prevented all but one platoon of Com-
pany C, 165th Infantry, from attempting to
help the gulch attackers, and even this platoon
was slow in starting. By the time it finally got
underway, Company A had recognized the at-
tack as a lost cause and was withdrawing, so
that the platoon’s lonely venture onto the slopes
of Harakiri Gulch was violently repulsed.

Farther to the right, the 2d Battalion was
unable to proceed down Paradise Valley in its
assigned zone and had received permission to
maneuver through the 1st Battalion’s sector.
This move, of course, was stymied by the 1st
Battalion’s failure to make progress.

In an effort to press the assault down to the
Makunsha Plain area, the 3d Battalion, 106th
Infantry, was attached to the 165th with orders
to attack between the two flank units. By the
time this order (issued at 1500) was translated
into action, however, darkness was approaching
and the battalion failed to move into the lines.

The unit was ordered, therefore, to remain in
an assembly area southwest of Hill 767.

In midafternoon, with forces at Harakiri
Gulch stalemated and the battalion along the
beach immobilized (prior to Lieutenant Dorey's
eminently successful tank foray against the
ditch), General Griner ordered Colonel Bishop
to commit his reserve (1st Battalion), to swing
past the gulch strong point and continue to the
beach 1,200 yards beyond Road Junction 2. To
throttle the gulch while the 1st Battalion moved
past, Company G would swing into position
facing up the draw. For this mission the com-
pany was attached to the 3d Battalion.

The attack proceeded generally according to
plan. Moving out at 1715, the 1st Battalion
advanced rapidly. Enemy fire against the unit
ranged from moderate on the left to heavy on
the right, in direct proportion to the proximity
of the high ground where numerous caves over
looked the coastal flat. With the assistance of
SPM’s, men of the 1st Battalion neutralized the
cliff dwellers and continued their surge toward
Makunsha. By dark between 800 and 900 yards
had been gained, the unit having carried to
about 150 yards from the beach.

At this point, however, the battalion com-
mander, Lieutenant Colonel O’Brien, discov
ered that his front had progressed beyond the
2d Battalion along the beach and that his
troops had swung partially across the 2d Bat-
talion's front. To improve this situation.
O’Brien ordered his forward companies to pull
back and tie in with the 2d Battalion. By
about dark most of O'Brien’s unit had accom-
plished this, but the reserve (Company C).
which had concentrated its attention and effort
on the caves on the right flank, did not com
pletely assemble in the defense area until
2100. Because of darkness at the time of its
arrival, Company C did not find or occupy its
assigned position in the two-battalion defense
area, but, instead, overlapped a portion of the
2d Battalion. Also, the late adjustment in the
lines masked the fires of several heavy ma-
chine guns and one antitank gun positioned in
the 2d Battalion area. O’Brien commented on
this unsatisfactory state of affairs, but it was
considered unwise to make any shifts in the
dark. Later in the night when trouble de-

889590°— 50— 15

217

veloped, these masked weapons opened tire,
pinning down one company (A) of the 1st
Battalion and causing some confusion.

Since units facing Harakiri Gulch had not
moved, the right flank of the perimeter was
open, Company G, 300-odd yards to the south-
east, being the closest friendly unit on that
flank. The latter company, unsuccessful in
sealing the mouth of the gulch, had disposed
itself on dominating terrain from which it
could cover most of the area by fire. (See Map
22 for positions of 27th Division units on the
night of 0—7 July.)

There is some indication that the exact dis-
positions of the 105th Infantry were unknown
to both the regimental and division com-
manders. According to the 27th Division G— 3
Journal, the only message relating to the gap
was received from the 105th Infantry on the
late afternoon (1845) of 6 July: “. . . G Co.
filling gap between 1st and 3d Battalions.”17
At 2000, having received no further informa-
tion on this. General Griner issued a field mes-
sage which merely directed a continuation of
the attack the following day.18 Had the divi-
sion commander known that the gap existed,
he still would have had time to order a reserve
unit to establish a connection. The 3d Bat-
talion, 106th Infantry, was in reserve south-
west of Hill 767, less than 2,000 yards from
the gap.

Despite the discouraging events around
Harakiri Gulch, the late afternoon advance
along the coastal fiat was encouraging in-
deed. But on the other hand, everyone from
the corps commander to the front line riflemen
was well aware of the enemy capability to
strike at any point along the lines and that any
position might find itself in the vortex of an
all-out banzai attack. Since the 15 June land-
ings the western coastal plain had seemed the
most likely area for such a thrust. An enemy
attack there would be no surprise, but no one
foresaw t lie consequences of the battle that
later developed.19

17 27th Inf Div G— 3 Journal, 1845, 6 July.

18 27th Inf Div Field Message 7, 2000, 6 July.

10 The Fight on Tana pa g Plain, 86-113. 106th Inf
Report, 9-10. 165th Inf Report, S.

Expansion of the Front

After jumping off at 0900 on 6 July, the
4th Marine Division’s attack moved well for
about 20 minutes. Then a temporary halt was
demanded by a change in the NTLF scheme
of maneuver. With the 4th Marine Division
taking over the entire island sector for the
final push, it was necessary to insert another
regiment into the lines. Accordingly, General
Schmidt ordered the division reserve (23d
Marines) to move in on the division left flank
and expand the frontage to the west coast at
a point just beyond Makunslia, In effect, the
division would attack both northeast and. tem-
porary at least, northwest.

This deployment, so easy on paper, took con-
siderable time. To get into its newly-assigned
zone, the 23d Marines hiked 4,300 yards, ar-
riving at its line of departure at about 1415.

Here the regiment faced a steep, 300-foot,
clitf which had to be descended to reach the
coastal plain and, eventually, the beach. Jump-
ing off shortly after 1415, the Marines dis-
covered that the clitf was cloaked with heavy,
scrubby underbrush and pitted with scores of
natural caves. Working troops down the de-
clivity was a challenge in itself, there being-
only two paths. As soon as Marines began
filtering down these, Japanese riflemen and
machine gunners countered with well-aimed
lire. Thus denied, the regiment busied itself
in a search for other routes of descent to the
plain.

Since tins portion of the long cliff line dom-
inated the Black Beaches -(northeast of Ma-
kunsha), positions encountered were probably
part of the prepared beach defenses. From
commanding terrain atop the cliff, however,
the Marines could observe large numbers of
Japanese fleeting to the north along the plain.
Many of these, no doubt, had been flushed by
the pressure of the 27th Division. The Ma-
rines cascaded the fire of rifles, machine guns,
mortars, and half-tracks upon these popular
targets.

By dark, after a series of unsuccessful efforts
to work small detachments down the cliff on
ropes, the 23d Marines established a defense
along the lip of the precipice for the night.

218

northern SAIPAN. Alt. Petosukara was seized by the 25th Marines on 0 July, and Alt. Alarpi by the 2d Alarines on
9 July. Rocky coastline offered last ditch positions to stubborn Japanese.

Contact was established with the 27th Division
along the cliff top, but none was attained with
the 24th Marines on the right.20

In the division center the 24th Marines
started the day’s activities with the 165th
Infantry to its left and the 25th Marines to its
right; but, Avith the alteration in division
boundaries, the 23d Marines replaced the Army
regiment. The juggling of units took some
time and the 24th had to wait; an independent
move would greatly endanger the unit’s left
Hank.

About 1400, however, the 24th Regiment was
permitted to push forward again, and the
momentum was maintained until commanding
ground about 400 yards short of Objective
0-8 was reached. During this surge only
sporadic resistance was encountered. The large

20 4th Mar Dir Deport, Section VI, 33-34. 23d Mar
Deport, 47. 2d tin, 23d Mar Deport, 6. L. D. Jones.

gain (1,400 to 1,800 yards) far outstripped
the 23d Marines on the left and the aforemen-
tioned gap developed. To protect this flank
the 24th Marines’ reserve (3d Battalion) was
committed, but a physical tie-in was not ac-
complished.

During the day the left assault battalion
(1st) had encountered an ingeniously-designed
dummy position, containing sham antiaircraft
guns, gunners and radar. The 2d Battalion, on
the other hand, found a very real foe in an
irregular cliff formation to its front. As the
Mai ines approached, about 200 Japanese began
a hasty retreat to the north, speeded by fire
from 75mm half-tracks, 37 mm guns, and
rockets. The infantry then picked up the.
pressure, pursuing the Japanese as long as
daylight permitted.

Though the regiment’s left had not been tied
in, the right was in firm contact with the 25th

219

Marines, which likewise had enjoyed rapid
movement.21

The 25th Marines’ zone on Saipan’s east
coast was similar to that of the 105th Infantry
on Tanapag Plain. Here, however, the coastal
Hat, ended in steep drops to the sea rather than
a gradual merging of beach and water. On the
inland side of the flat there were also cliffs, but
t hese rose precipitously above the plain to a
second, smaller plateau, in turn fringed by
another slope which rose to a third plateau.
Along this escalading terrace the 25th Marines
would move until the levels fused and culmi-
nated into Mt. Petosukara, the dominating
terrain short of 0-8. (See Map 21.)

To negotiate the hodgepodge, the 1st Bat-
talion would move along the coastal fiat, while
the 2d Battalion straddled the cliffs and pla-
teaus inland. The reserve would move along
the second plateau in rear of the assault units.

Off at 0900, the regiment advanced rapidly.
In the 1st Battalion’s zone, well suited to vehic-
ular movement, 13 tanks from Company C, 1th
Tank Battalion, preceded the sweep. One of
these was used as a mobile observation post to
spot naval gunfire. Missions and corrections
were relayed from the tank to Shore Fire Con-
trol Party 251 and from there to the firing ship.
This device worked very well and a number of
missions were directed in this manner. Prin-
cipal naval gunfire targets were enemy posi-
tions in the cliff lines, both the one at the
water’s edge and the one which fringed the
coastal plain.

A glance at the map and a knowledge of the
Japanese system of defense was enough to
convince the 25th Marines that trouble would
come from the cliffs. It did. Men of the 1st
Battalion, particularly, were exposed to plung-
ing fires as they trudged through the hot cane
fields. But, employing coordinated tank-in-
fantry, the Marines systematically destroyed
the troublemakers and pushed on.

More difficult was the problem of the cliff
which dipped from the plain to the water’s
edge. Here Japanese soldiers could remain
concealed in the caves until Marines attempted

21 2 it h Mar Report , 24. 1st Bn, 21ftli Mar Report, 12.
2d Bn, 2Jfth Mar Report, 11 ,3d Bn, 21/th Mar Report, 10.

to approach; then, suddenly, they would open
with devastating bursts. Usually, the cliffs
were too steep to permit descent from the top,
and an approach along the narrow strip of
beach at the bottom was a sure invitation to
disaster. Naval gunfire was helpful in sealing
some of the cave entrances, but the caves were
many and the job was a slow one.

Among the worst features of the situation
was the fact that most of the caves housed
more noncombatants than soldiers. Interpreters
were unceasing in their efforts to get cave
occupants to surrender, and many of these
efforts proved fruitful. In all too many in-
stances, however, civilians were dissuaded by
Japanese soldiers who threatened or took the
lives of any who would weaken to the Amer-
icans’ invitations. After several Marines were
killed in sincere efforts to extricate civilians,
patience became somewhat worn. After that,
the occupants were invited to come out; and,
if they hesitated over-long, the caves were
blown.22

Realizing that seizure of the coast line would
demand considerable time, Lieutenant Colonel
Mustain ordered the assault companies of his
1st Battalion to push on, leaving his reserve to
work the caves. With assault units relieved of
this detailed, time-consuming activity, the 1st
Battalion swept rapidly forward. The in-
fantrymen were glad to have the tanks along,
particularly when two enemy vehicles hove
into view7 shortly after noon. Under the fire
power of the U. S. armor the enemy withdrew.
The tanks were glad to have the infantry along,
too : while firing into the fringing cliff on the
left flank, they were rushed by several Japa-
nese, who were cut down by surrounding Ma-
rines before they could attach the magnetic
mines they carried. Incidents like these nur-
tured a growing mutual respect.

The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, kept pace
through its nightmarish zone. Pushing a co-
ordinated attack over such terrain was a strain
in itself, even had there been no crafty de-

22 Although cited in this one specific instance of the
25th Marines’ move along the coast, this same pro-
cedure prevailed in other units before and after this
particular example.

220

fenders present. By late afternoon, however,
the battalion had moved to Mt. Petosukara.

Establishment of the defensive position for
the night was very difficult, inasmuch as a
vertical gap of about 500 yards existed between
battalions. In the reshuffling process, which
was still underway after dark, the 1st Bat-
talion flushed a covey of Japanese directly
into the id Battalion’s lines. In an effort to
prevent more Japanese from entering its lines,
the latter called down an emergency artillery
barrage which fell among the approaching
left units of the 1st Battalion. Fortunately,
the lire was lifted before any Marine casualties
resulted. After a brief flurry, the enemy was
repulsed.

The situation regarding the separation be-
tween the two battalions was reconciled shortly
and they dug in for the night, 2d Battalion
generally on the west and 1st Battalion on the
east slopes of Mt. Petosukara. The gap was
never filled, although a platoon from Company
C was placed on a dominating point between
them.

Just at dusk, 700 to 800 civilians came
through the 1st Battalion’s lines to surrender.
This produced a delicate and dangerous situa-
tion, since Japanese soldiers could have fol-
lowed the civilians with a strong attack.
Though considerable apprehension was caused
by this possibility, no attack developed.

The 3d Battalion, followed in reserve, com-
mitted only one company during the day. This
company (K) became embroiled in a sizeable
scrap when one of its platoons searched out
some caves in a by-passed hill and found a
virtual beehive. After a lively skirmish, the
hill was cleared of the enemy and 61 Japanese
bodies were counted.23

Night of 6—7 July

The night of 6-7 July was to be long-re-
membered. It produced the most devastating
banzai attack of the entire war. Compared
with the stroke that was launched against the
105th Infantry, all other Japanese efforts dur-
ing the. night take on an extremely pale color.

23 25th Mar Report, 3. 1st tin , 25th \far Report, 20-23.
■Ul tin, 25th Mar Report, 13.

And yet, carrying the comparison further,
these “pale” attacks were more violent than any
that had gone before, and for those individuals
who found themselves in the midst of one of
these, even the smallest conflict may assume
elephantine stature. Ordinarily, the fury of a
battle is judged on its over-all effect, numbers
of troops involved, and casualties but fails to
consider the effect on any one individual.24
The smaller thrusts of this momentous night
will be covered first.

Individuals of the 2d Battalion, 25th Ma-
rines, spent an unpleasant night on Mt. Peto-
sukara. After a series of smaller probing mis-
sions the Jai )anese struck the Marines’ right
with about one rifle company. Coming in the
midst of a heavy downpour, the attack, for a
time, appeared to be making headway. But
60mm mortar shells, dropped within 50 yards
of the front lines, together with small-arms
flies and artillery, broke the enemy. But many
Japanese, who seeped through the 2d Bat-
talion’s lines, set about a vigorous program of
harassment. There was no sleep for anyone
atop Mt. Petosukara for the remainder of the
night. Early in the morning the battalion aid
station was attacked by a small group, but
corpsmen and doctors, plus Marines in the
area, rallied to the threat and repulsed the
enemy. Daylight revealed that between 60
and 70 Japanese had been killed in the abor-
tive punches at the 2d Battalion, 25th Ma-
rines.25

Elsewhere along the 4th Division front
there were numerous instances of minor infil-
tration attempts, with all units reporting ac-
tivity. For the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines,
stationed to protect the regiment’s exposed left
flank, the action was particularly vicious. Just
before dawn the enemy rushed forward, armed
with grenades and “idiot sticks,” encouraging
themselves with loud shouts and screams.
Though this thrust failed to penetrate the
Marines' lines, some of the enemy fell within

24 Major General Merritt A. Hdson was once asked
which was the toughest operation in the Pacific. His
classic answer is apropos: “The one in which you got
hit!”

25 liarrinfier. Joslin.

221

live yards of the foremost foxholes. The action
report of the 3d Battalion, 21th Marines, esti-
mated the number of enemy killed in this
attack at “more than 200.”20

The Banzai Attack

Since the early stages of the Saipan planning
General Holland Smith had been convinced
that, if and when an all-out banzai attack were
launched at Saipan, it would come along the
western coastal plain. It was this belief
(shared by all officers on the Corps staff) that
prompted Holland Smith to caution Major
General Watson to keep the left of his 2d
Mai ■ine Division strong as it advanced up the
coast. Inasmuch as Watson and his staff had
arrived at a similar conclusion, the division, in
its long surge from the Charan Kanoa beaches
to Tanapag seaplane base, had been ever alert
to Japanese attack along the coastal plain.

On 2 July, with the Japanese becoming more
and more compressed in the island’s northern
end, the Corps commander issued an order
warning all units to take special precautions
against a mass attack and to tie in — by physical
contact — all front lines at night.

On 6 July, Holland Smith, accompanied by
Major General M atson, visited the 27th Divi-
sion command post and while there warned
General Griner that “a banzai attack probably
would come down Tanapag Plain late that
night or early the next morning.” Further,
Holland Smith cautioned Griner to “make sure
that his battalions were physically tied in.” To
this, according to General Smith, General
Griner gave assurance that “his division was
prepared for just such a Japanese move.”27

Holland Smith’s warning was timely.

In regard to this conference, General Griner
later wrote:

He [Holland Smith] makes no mention of the change
in orders which was the purpose of his visit. The first
evidence any of us had of the impending counterattack
was the report of a Jap prisoner, captured in the early

26 3d Bn, 2J,th Mar Report, 11.

27 Quotations from Coral and Brass, 194. Another
reference to this same conference may be found in On
To Westward, Robert Sherrod, 181.

evening of July 6 by the 105th Infantry, who was sent
to the Corps G-2 for further interrogation.28

The attack which hit the 1st and 2d Bat-
talions, 105th Infantry, on the early morning
of 1 July was the culmination of a long series
of reverses for Saipan’s defenders. General
Saito had virtually given up hope on 25 June
when he wrote : “There is no hope for victory
in places where we do not have control of the
air. . . .” And since then nothing had occurred
to warrant optimism. By 6 July, according to
the NTLF G-2 Report, the Japanese had two
courses of action remaining: “to fight a with-
drawing action ending in complete annihila-
tion on the northern tip of the island, or to
attempt to muster their disorganized and
crumbling forces into one all out ''banzai''
charge.” Saito chose the latter.

Huddled in Saito’s cave command post at
about 0600, 6 July, his subordinates heard the
general's order:

I am addressing the officers and men of the Imperial
Army on Saipan.

For more than twenty days since the American Devils
attacked, the officers, men, and civilian employees of
the Imperial Army and Navy on tins island have fought
well and bravely. Everywhere they have demonstrated
the honor and glory of the Imperial Forces. I expected
that every man would do his duty.

Heaven has not given us an opportunity. We have
not been able to utilize fully the terrain. We have
fought in unison up to the present time but now we
have no materials with which to fight and our artillery
for attack has been completely destroyed. Our com-
rades have fallen one after another. Despite the bitter-
ness of defeat, we pledge “Seven lives to repay our
country.”

The barbarous attack of the. enemy is being con-
tinued. Even though the enemy has occupied only a
corner of Saipan, we are dying without avail under the
violent shelling and bombing. Whether we attack or
whether we stay where we are, there is only death.
However, in death there is life. We must utilize this
opportunity to exhalt true Japanese manhood. I will
advance with those who remain to deliver still another
blow to the American Devils, and leave my bones on
Saipan as a bulwark of the Pacific.

As it says in the “SEN.TINKUN” [Battle Ethics],
“I will never suffer the disgrace of being taken alive,”

28 Ltr from MajGen G. W. Griner, Jr., to MajGen
O. Ward, 17Dec49. The “Jap prisoner” to whom
Griner refers was a leading seaman from the 55th
Keibitai who stated that his unit had been ordered to
make an all-out attack at 2000. NTLF G-2 Report, 57.

222

•> thrown

the un-
uipment,
ninese to
can lives
pensated
initiation
I by the

noached
patrols,
ions the
seeking
1 diers to
explora-
ird gap
i, 105th
irst and
ons held
nfantry.
it. flank
he rear.
Lunched,
It was
ittalions
lis they
stacked
>ir posi-
et fields

2d Bat-

itampede
le in the
hey leap
just kept
*r stop.30

ponder-
oldiers’
ipanese
ing the

the 3d
ie high
ere the
in ; the
ie lines
rgering

223

and “I will offer up the courage of my soul and calmly
rejoice in living by the eternal principle.”

Here I pray with you for the eternal life of the
Emperor and the welfare of the country and 1 advance
to seek out the enemy.

Follow me.

If the subordinates, had, indeed, followed
the example of General Saito, there would have
been no attack. The tired general, feeling that
he was too aged and infirm to be of use in the
counterattack, held a farewell feast of saki
and canned crab meat and' then committed
harakiki.29

Several days prior to Saito’s final order the
assembly of remaining Japanese forces had
begun. Some Japanese were out of reach be-
hind U. S. lines, others were hidden in the
deep shadows of caves, but all available were
mustered. Marpi Point, Paradise Valley and
Harakiri Gulch were sites for mobilization and
reorganization. Many provisional units were
formed in an effort to achieve some degree
of tactical unity among the assorted groups
and individuals.

Weapons and equipment were wanting and
some Japanese were armed only with grenades
or crudely-fashioned spears. One Japanese
staff officer (Major Iviyoshi Yoshida) who par-
ticipated in the battle estimated the total par-
ticipants at 1,500, many with no weapons. In
the light of subsequent events, however, his
estimate appears too low. Assuming that he
was misinformed on this point, it is not at all
surprising; even at the assembly points, PL S.
artillery and mortar lire hampered Japanese
efforts to organize their troops and an accurate
count was impossible.

As the conglomerate force moved toward
Makunsha, which would serve as a point of
departure, it was subjected to persistent, heavy
concentrations of artillery fire. This resulted
in a limping approach with leaders calling
upon every conceivable device to maintain the
unity of their commands. Greater silence by
the sprawling force would have helped; early
in the evening patrols from the 27th Division
Reconnaissance Troop had detected unusual
activity. This had resulted in the large num-

29 NTLF G-2 Report, 57-58. For a detailed Japanese
account of the days leading up to tins climactic episode,
and the suicide itself, see Appendix IX, page 284.

her of unobserved fire concentrations thrown
into the Makunsha vicinity.

Despite what has been said about the un-
satisfactory state of weapons and equipment,
the willingness of the individual Japanese to
die honorably and to take seven American lives
to repay his country somewhat compensated
for the shortage. Here was a determination
which was seldom- -if ever — matched by the
fighting men of any other country.

Preceding the main force as it approached
U. S. lines were a number of strong patrols.
In their reconnaissance-in-force missions the
patrols poked and prodded the lines, seeking
vulnerable points and goading the soldiers to
open up and reveal positions. These explora-
tions, no doubt, divulged the 300 yard gap
between the 1st and 3d Battalions, 105th
Infantry. The blow fell at 0445. First and
hardest struck were the isolated positions held
by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 105th Infantry.
The attack on these units hit from front, flank
and, after moving through the gap. the rear.
Almost as soon as the attack was launched,
communications to the rear were cut. It was
then simply a matter of two isolated battalions
of soldiers fighting for their lives. This they
did and did well. Some of the soldiers stacked
so many dead Japanese forward of their posi-
tions that it was necessary to move to get fields
of fire.

Major McCarthy, commanding the 2d Bat-
talion, described the onslaught:

It reminded me of one of those old cattle stampede
scenes of the movies. The camera is in a hole in the
ground and you see t lie herd coming and then they leap
up and over you and are gone. Only the .Taps just kept
coining and coming. I didn't think they'd ever stop.30

The sheer weight of this attack, its ponder-
ous momentum, carried it through the soldiers’
lines. In addition, hundreds of Japanese
moved past the isolated defense area, using the
gap on the right.

The fanatical surge then carried to the 3d
Battalion, 105th Infantry, located on the high
ground overlooking Harakiri Gulch. Here the
soldiers were on better defensive terrain; the
Japanese had to climb up to them. The lines
held, and the Japanese suffered staggering

30 The 27 th's Bottle For Saipan, 15.

223

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM J. O’BRIEN, USA, 1st Battalion,
105th Infantry, posthumously awarded the Medal of
I Ionor for refusing evacuation after he was seriously
wounded during the Tanapag Plain banzai attack and
instead manning a jeep-mounted .50-caliber machine
gun until Ids death.

losses. This portion of the battle did not cease
with the coming of daylight on 7 July but
continued until midafternoon.

Next to feel the impetus of the determined
thrust was tbe 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, in
tiring positions about 500 yards southwest of
Tanapag Village.31 The Japanese mass that
struck this unit was apparently that portion of
the banzai force which had moved through the

31 The 3d and 4th Battalions, 10th Marines, now
attached to the 4th Marine Division, had occupied this
area during G July to provide supporting fires for the
23d Marines in their sweep to the northern tip of the
island. These two artillery units had been formed into
a groupment under the commanding officer of the 4th
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth A. Jorgensen).
After arrival in position areas the later officer had con-
tacted the commanding officer of the 105th Infantry,
informed him of the artillery positions and, at the same
time, secured information as to tbe 105th Infantry’s
front lines. Telephone and radio communications were
established between the Marine artillery and the
1 Oath's command post, and a Marine liaison officer
remained with tbe Army commander. Interview with
Maj W. P. Oliver. .Tr., 16Jan50.

gap between tbe 1st and 3d Battalions, 105th
Infantry. Hardest hit were Batteries H and
Headquarters and Service, in position on the
left of the railroad track (see Map 22). Bat-
teries I and G, set up on the right of the track
also got into the fight, although they were not
as closely engaged as the other two. The only
battery that actually tired its howitzers during
the melee was H, the others being forced to
remain silent by the presence of other artil-
lerymen to their front.

First Lieutenant Arnold C. Hofstetter, an
oflicer of Battery H, tells the story of the
vicious action :

Small arms and machine gun fire was heard to the
front and right front at considerable distance at about
0300, July 7, 1944. No information as to source could
be obtained. Later, the fire appeared to come closer
and, since it appeared that the position might be at-
tacked, the gunners were told to cut time fuzes to 4/10
second in preparation for close in fire.

About 0515, just as it was getting light, a group of
men seen advancing on the battery position from the
right front at about 600 yards. It was thought that
Army troops were somewhere to the front, so fire on
this group was held until they were definitely identified
as .Taps at about 400 yards. We knew that our men
manning the listening post were somewhere to the front,
so the firing battery was ordered to open fire with time
and ricochet fire on the group to the right. Firing was
also heard from the machine guns on the left.

After the howitzers started firing, it sounded to me
like numbers 3 and 4 were not firing enough, so I went
to fhese pieces to get them firing more. I got them
squared away and stayed with number 4 until Japs
broke through wooded ravine to the left, and I heard
that word had been passed to withdraw. The firing
battery fired time fuze and percussion fuze so as to get
a close ricochet. Some smoke shell was fired. Cannon-
eers were shot from their posts "by machine guns and
small arms, . . . which interrupted the howitzer fire
and finally made it impossible to service the piece.

The remainder of the firing battery fell back about
150 yards from the howitzers, across a road, and set up
a perimeter defense in a Japanese machinery dump.
This was about 0700. We held out there with carbines,
one BAR, one pistol, and eight captured Jap rifles, Japs
got behind us and around us in considerable strength.
They set up a strong point in a point of woods to our
rear. . . . About 1500, an Army tank came in from the
right and got the strong point and Army troops relieved
us.

I estimate that 400-500 Japs attacked the position.
They used machine guns, rifles, grenades, and tanks.32

224

32 The presence of Japanese tanks in this attack is
of interest mainly because of the curiosity of these

Some mortar tire fell in the area, but it may have been
from the . . . rear.

During the early phases of the battle, before
Battery II was forced to abandon its firing
positions, one of its howitzers was turned com-
pletely around to engage a Japanese medium
tank which had ploughed through to the rear.
At a range of less than 50 yards the artillery-
men sent 105mm shells crashing into, and de-
stroying, their armored target. Eventually,
however, the pressure from Japanese infantry-
men was too great; Battery IPs outnumbered
survivors pulled back. In the frantic confusion
and haste of the retreat, they failed to remove
the breech blocks or firing locks from the
howitzers. The Japanese, oddly enough, neither
used nor destroyed the weapons while they had
control of the area.

Battery I had been attacked at 0455, with
Japanese advancing astride the railroad track.
The first thrust was repulsed and the Japanese
fell back to reorganize. A series of actions,
followed this same pattern, continued until
0650, when all of the battery’s small-arms am-
munition was expended. At this time the bat-
tery commander (Captain John M. Allen)
ordered the firing locks removed from the
howitzers and the unit to fall back to the posi-
tions of Battery G. Here the two batteries
continued the fight until relieved by elements
of the 106th Infantry later in the day.

Located directly behind Battery H, head-
quarters and service personnel of the battalion
were forced to retire after heavy, close-in
fighting. Among the 136 casualties in the bat-
talion was the commanding officer, Major Wil-
liam L. Crouch, who was killed. Japanese
killed in the encounter numbered 322.33

Even as the Japanese surged directly against

remaining operative after over three weeks of steady
reverses. The vehicles were three in number ; one an
amphibious tank, one a medium and one a light.

33 The foregoing account of the activities of the 3d
Battalion, 10th Marines, is derived from the following
sources : Memorandum to the Commanding General, Ex-
peditionary Troops from Brigadier General Graves B.
Erskine, 19Jul44; Report of enemy counterattack
into position of 3-10 on 7 July 1944, ltr from CO, 10th
Marines to CG, 2d Mar Div with Enclosures (A), (B),
(C) (D), and (E).

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS HAROLD C. AGERHOLM, 4th Battalion,
10th Marines, awarded the Medal of Honor for mak-
ing repeated trips through a fire-swept area in a jeep-
ambulance to load and evacuate singlehandedly ap-
proximately 45 wounded men of the 3d Battalion, 10th
Marines, before he was mortally wounded by an enemy
rifleman.

the 3d Battalion, brother artillerymen of the
4th Battalion, 10th Marines, in position to the
southeast, received pressure from the fringe of
the main enemy tide. In defense of its firing
positions, the battalion killed about 85 Japa-
nese. Despite the turmoil of the banzai attack,
the 4th Battalion responded on the morning of
7 July to an urgent request for support orig-
inated by the 23d Marines, fighting down the
cliffs above Makunsha.34

By 0530 the. lunging stab had pierced another
400 to 600 yards to the command post of the
105th Infantry. Rallying to the defense of the
installation, headquarters personnel met the
Japanese in what was to be the end of the
savage surge. The soldiers fought from de-
serted Japanese positions and exchanged blow
for blow, bullet for bullet, with their attackers.
Their defense perimeter was never penetrated;
and, after several hours of close-in fighting,

34 Interview with Maj W. P. Oliver, 1(5Jan50.

225

the battle was over. The enemy survivors
withdrew.35

While most of the credit for the repulse goes
to the personnel fighting the Japanese at close
hand, the fires of the 27th Division artillery
also contributed prominently to the outcome.
From 0515 to 0615, 7 July, the three 105mm
howitzer battalions fired a total of 2,666 rounds
— an average of more than 44 rounds per
minute for a period of an hour.

Meanwhile, as the main prong of the attack
spent its fury in the manner just described,
two secondary efforts struck up Paradise Val-
ley and Harakiri Gulch. Emerging head-on
into the prepared positions of the 2d Battalion,
165th Infantry, the Paradise Valley Japanese
were massacred as they spurted from the nar-
row funnel of the ravine. The other effort was
just as funereal. Striving to break out of
Harakiri Gulch and seize the high ground to
the south, the enemy were slaughtered by the
1st Battalion, 165th, and the 3d Battalion,
105th, in position along the rim of the gulch.
At dawn, I lie 3d Battalion, 106th, was inserted
in the center of this position.

The same cross-compartment move which
had been attempted by the U. S. soldiers dur-
ing the day was now being tried — from the
opposite direction — by the Japanese. The shoe
was on the other foot, and the Japanese met
murderous lire as they exposed themselves.
Neither of these secondary efforts achieved
anything positive for the Japanese, and in the
process virtually exterminated the entire force.
Not content that their efforts had been re-
pulsed. the Japanese continued to expend them-
selves in futile charges throughout most of 7
July.

After the Japanese banzai attack had passed
over them, men of the 1st and 2d Battalions,
105th, were cut off from friendly troops. Of
those present when the attack started, only 25
per cent now remained, the rest being killed,
wounded or missing. In addition, they had no

3 Majwr Regan Fuller, NTLF Liaison Officer with
tile 27th Division, reported that “there was nothing
going on but a little sniping by 1100 in vicinity of the
C. P.” Ltr from Maj R. Fuller to CMC, 12Jan50.

communications with other units and there
was little ammunition left. Carrying or drag-
ging the wounded, the decimated force started
trudging to the south to reach friendly lines.

Japanese units, repulsed by units farther
south, trickled in small, disorganized bands
toward Makunsha, their starting point, and
more often than not met the battered remains
of the 1st and 2d Battalions on the way. This
resulted in a series of uncoordinated skirmishes
and finally forced the soldiers to form a perim-
eter defense at the village of Tanapag, both
flanks tied into the water. In this position they
fought off a succession of thrusts which con-
tinued for about 15 hours.

As if fate had not been cruel enough, about
noon of 7 July, Army artillery observers spot-
ted the soldiers’ perimeter at Tanapag and,
presuming it to be an enemy outpost, directed
fire down upon it. A great number of the sur-
vivors, driven into the water by the deluge,
were picked up by U. S. destroyers at the
reef’s edge. The remainder was evacuated by
means of amphibian tractors and DUKW’s.
Casualties (killed, wounded and missing) in
the two battalions were heavy: 1st Battalion —
349; 2d Battalion — 319.36

Thus ended one of the most devastating
single battles of the war. The mop-up would
take another two days, but the fight was gone
from the Japanese survivors. Just how many
Japanese were committed to this struggle is
unknown. Major Yoshida’s estimate of 1,500
was doubled by a Korean civilian, Mamoru
Iwaya. who also participated in the attack.
Both agreed that there was a shortage of
weapons (Iwaya said about one-third of the
personnel carried rifles and the rest had
spears). Estimates of the number of machine
guns: Yoshida said one heavy and “a few”
light machine guns, Iwaya said “approximately
10” light machine guns. The latter also thought
that the attack was personally led by General
Saito, who, he thought, was killed in the fight.
In a large jumbled force such as this, no one

36 Among the dead was the 1st Battalion commander,
Lieutenant Colonel William .J. O’Brien, who posthu-
mously was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions
during the banzai attack.

226

BANZAI AFTERMATH. Japanese dead litter Tanapag Plain in the zone defended by the 2d Battalion, 305th Infantry.

could be sure just how many participants there
were.37

The following narrative account by Major
General Griner, the 27th Division Commander,
gives a concise summary of the over-all picture :

At 0530, 7 July, the Commanding Officer. 105th In-
fantry, telephoned that tremendous masses of the
enemy were attacking his 1st and 2d Battalions, that
terrific mortar fire was falling on them, and that the
telephone lines had gone out. He estimated the enemy
attackers to number fifteen hundred (1500). I alerted
the 106th Infantry (less one (1) battalion)38 for move-

37 27th Div Interrogation of Mamoru Iwaya (Kore-
an) 2d class worker (civilian), 7.Tul44. NTLF
Interrogation of Major ICiyoshi Yoshida, intelligence
officer of 43d Division Headquarters, 11Jul44. The
27 th’ n Itiitllc For Saipan, 15-16. 165th Inf Report, 8-9.
105th Inf Report, 10.

38 The one battalion referred to is the 3d battalion

ment and telephoned General Erskine, Chief of Staff,
NT&I.F, giving him the estimate of the enemy strength.
Further investigation of the situation at the front led
me to believe that the enemy strength was underesti-
mated, and at 1100, 7 July, I again telephoned General
Erskine, stating that this was the main enemy counter-
attack and consisted of no less than three thousand
(3000) enemy soldiers. I stated that I was employing
the Division Reserve and requested that a battalion of
the 2d Marine Division be turned over to me as soon as
practicable at a specified location. Tie attached to the
I )i vision the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. Our tank losses
from enemy action were somewhat large. Twice we
requested that an additional platoon of tanks, which
represented only a small fraction of those available to
NT&EF, he made available to the Division. These re-
quests were denied, obviously because that head-
quarters did not accept my version of the importance

which was attached to the 1651b Infantry, in position
on the rim of Harakiri Gulch.

227

SERGEANT THOMAS A. BAKER, USA, Company A, 105th In-
fantry, posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor
for refusing, even though wounded, to leave the lines.
When his unit was forced to withdraw during the
savage banzai attack, Baker, unable to move by him-
self, requested that he he propped against a tree
from which he could carry on the fight alone. Later,
when the sergeant’s body was found, his weapon was
empty, and eight Japanese lay dead before him.

of the action then in progress. At this time, the 4th
.Marine Division was experiencing no opposition in the
advance to the northeast. I issued orders about noon
lo the Commanding Officer, 106th Infantry, to counter-
attack the enemy to relieve the 1st and 2d Battalions,
105th Infantry, and to recapture a Marine Artillery
Battery which, unknown to this Division,39 had taken
positions in the Division Zone of Action six hundred
(600) yards in rear of the forward line of the preceding
night. It later appeared that this artillery was in sup-
port of the Marine regiment, 2d Marine Division, which
was on the left of the 4th Marine Division.40 The 106th
Infantry advanced five hundred (500) yards in front of
their line of Departure but failed by three hundred
(600) yards to relieve the battered elements of the two
battalions of the 105th Infantry. This incident was

39 Though the 27th Division C. P. was not informed
of the presence of Marine artillery, the 105th Infantry
C. B. was. See footnote 31 on page 224.

40 This was the 2d Marines, attached to the 4th Divi-
sion at 0920, 6 July.

witnessed by Major Fuller,41 Liaison Officer from NT&
LF, who reported to his headquarters that the advance
could easily have been continued and subsequently gave
me the same report. Colonel Stebhins, the Regimental
Commander, upon being interrogated later, stated that
the decision to advance no farther was his own and
made despite the protest of one of his battalion com-
manders, that although the enemy fire being received
was not heavy, he realized that masses of .Taps were
being passed over who could fire in his rear. He stated
that the mopping up of the area already gained con-
sumed the remaining period of daylight. When the line
stabilized, I inserted the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,
between the right of the 106th Infantry and the left of
the battalion of the 105th Infantry which was still
intact 42 with instructions that the 3d Battalion, 6th
Marines would advance only to conform to the move-
ment of the right of the 106th Infantry. I also made
arrangements for the evacuation by DUKWs of the
beleaguered elements of the two battalions, 105th In-
fantry. I then called the Chief of Staff, NT&LF, as
was my custom as the daylight hours drew to a close,
to report the existing situation. I advised that the line
was firmly established, without break or gap of any
kind, and stated that another battalion of the 2d
Marine Division would provide sufficient reserve if
made subject to my call. The Chief of Staff then ad-
vised that the 2d Marine Division had been moved for-
ward to a line about fifteen hundred (1500) yards in
rear of the then existing front and that General Smith
was contemplating passing them through the 27th Divi-
sion at daylight the next morning. General Erskine
then asked if the 27th Division could complete the job
and wipe out the enemy. I replied that we could. He
stated that he would call back. Within thirty minutes
he telephoned that the 2d Marine Division would pass
through the 27th Division at daylight and that the Divi-
sion (less 165th Infantry) would pass to NT&LF re-
serve. The 165th Infantry would he attached to the
2d Marine Division.43

As indicated, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 106th
Infantry, were ordered at about noon of 7 July
to counterattack and relieve the battered bat-
talions of the 105th. Though this move re-
gained the positions of the 3d Battalion, 10th
Marines, and pushed farther to the north, the
advance was halted 200 to 300 yards short of the
Tanapag Village perimeter. Since physical re-
lief had not been accomplished, it remained for
the two battalions to be evacuated by amphibian

41 Major Regan Fuller, USMC.

42 The battalion here referred to is the 3d Battalion
which was still on the high ground overlooking the
mouth of Harakiri Gulch.

43 Source of this quote is Major General George W.
Griner’s Certificate of 12 July 1944, para. i.

228

tractors. The LVT’s of the 773d Amphibian
Tractor Battalion supplied the transportation
and at 2200, 7 July, the last survivor left the
perimeter.

With the 106th Infantry’s advance through
the battlefield, the true scope of the enemy at-
tack was revealed: Japanese bodies littered the
plain area. An accurate count would have to
await complete mop-up, however.

When the 106tli Infantry stopped, an interval
existed between it and other 27th Division units
along Harakiri Gulch. To fill this, the 3d Bat-
talion, 6th Marines, was committed. As night
fell the 27th Division’s front was solid, extend-
ing from the beach, across the plain, through
Harakiri Gulch’s mouth, along the top of the
cliffs as far as Paradise Valley, then inland to a
connection with the 4th Marine Division.

Against the coastal portion of this line the
Japanese executed a vigorous thrust during the
night of 7“8 July. Though the strength, organi-
zation and planning of this second attack were
weak by comparison with the previous effort,
the vigor and determination with which it was
executed did not vary. Shortly after midnight
a report came from the observation post atop
Hill 767 ; Japanese force moving south. Enemy
“feeler” patrols probing for weak spots were
engaged as early as 0300, but the information
that they took back to their commanders must
not have been encouraging. No holes existed.

The attack, launched about 0430, struck the
1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, along the beach.
Grazing defensive fires swept across the flat
beach like a scythe, cutting all in its path. The
Japanese never seriously threatened penetration
of the lines and those that attempted to swim
around the flank were spotted and killed.
Shortly after 0700 the Japanese attack petered
out and died. The 106th Infantry estimated
that it had slaughtered about 1,000 of the enemy,
while at the same time its own losses were prac-
tically negligible.

As actions of the tanks on 7 July have not
been mentioned thus far, it will be well to sum-
marize their activities. Available to the 105th
Infantry were two platoons of light tanks and
one platoon of mediums. Early in the morning
of 7 July before the regimental commander was
fully aware of the tragic circumstances of his

1st and 2d Battalions, he ordered one platoon
of lights to proceed to the front lines. After
moving along the beach road as far as Road
Junction 5 (in the vicinity of Battery IPs firing
positions), two of the tanks were lost due to
enemy actions and a third slipped off" the road
and “bellied up.” The personnel of the latter
were rescued by the platoon of mediums which
also had ventured up the road as far as the road
junction. The presence of enemy soldiers along
the route made it apparent that a tank thrust,
unprotected by infantry, would be a costly oper-
ation, and the tanks withdrew to the command
post of the 105th Infantry. There they assisted
the headquarters personnel in the defense of the
installation.

The next tank excursion was not made until
shortly after noon. This followed the shelling,
by friendly artillery, of the beleaguered band
of soldiers in the vicinity of Tanapag. It will
be recalled that the intensity of this fire had
driven many soldiers out onto the reef. Once
there, they were subjected to small-arms fire
from Japanese located along the beach. In an
attempt to eliminate this source of trouble and
relieve the situation, three light tanks sortied.
Bends in the shore line masked their fire, how-
ever, and the three vehicles ventured upon the
reef in search of direct firing positions. This
proved a bad maneuver. All three fell into a
hole and had their motors drowned out.

Meanwhile, two medium tanks advanced
along the beach road and reached the isolated
perimeter. There Major McCarthy, the 2d Bat-
talion commander (and one of two officer-sur-
vivors), went on board one machine and used its
radio to describe his dire situation to the regi -
mental commander. On the tanks’ return trip,
Major McCarthy followed on foot with a small
detachment. After the lattei-’s arrival at the
105th Infantry command post, the entire situ-
ation was reviewed, providing the first complete
summary of what had taken place. This re-
sulted in Griner’s orders to the 106th Infantry
to push out and relieve the men at the battered
perimeter.44

Meanwhile, the 2d Marine Division had been
alerted and moved to a position which would

44 T,o r<\ 495-501.

229

2D division mop-up following banzai attack. Marines had to be alert for wounded Japanese who could still tire
one more shot or hurl one more grenade.

afford depth to the west coast defenses. A line
from Tanapag Seaplane Ramp extending about
3,000 yards inland was established by dark of
7 July. The NTTF Operation Order for 8 July
instructed the 2d Marine Division, less detach-
ments,45 to “advance in the present 27th Infan-
try Division zone of action, pass through ele-
ments of [that] division on its front line,
attack, mop up and destroy enemy elements.
. . . Upon passing through the 27th Infantry
Division assume operational control 165th In-
fantry and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, . . .
assume tactical control within the assigned zone
of action at 0630 [8 July].” Upon passage of
its lines the 27th Division would revert to
XTLF reserve.46

4S Detachments included: 2d Marines and Company
A. 2d Tank Battalion, which were attached to the 4th
Marine Division and the 1st Battalion, 20th Marines,
which was attached to the Saipan Garrison Force.

4R XT IT' Operation Order 25—44.

THE 2D DIVISION’S MOP-UP OF 8 AND 9 JULY

No effective resistance was offered the 2d Ma-
rine Division after it had passed through the
27th Division on the morning of 8 July, al-
though large numbers of poorly armed and
totally disorganized enemy were encountered.
Some Japanese used the familiar device of hid-
ing in caves and firing from the deep shadows,
but the bulk seemed eager to die and made head-
long rushes at the Marines. This foolish ex-
penditure simplified the mop-up.

The 6th Marines, advancing on the division
left, uncovered one strong pocket of resistance
in a wooded swampy area just east of Tanapag
Village. Here an estimated force of 100 holed-
up Japanese set about a lively defense of their
positions. Flame-throwers, tanks, and 75mm
half-tracks blasted at the Strong point, but the
light cont inued. Since this sector promised to be
extremely time-consuming and since it was de-

230

sired that the mop-up continue, one company
(F) stayed behind to contain and destroy the
enemy force while the remainder of the regi-
ment swept on. By dark t lie 6th Marines had
reached the water's edge and stopped for the
night.

Meanwhile, many Japanese had waded out
upon the reef to escape the onslaught. This was
but a temporary reprieve, however, inasmuch
as amphibian tractors, embarking combat pa-
trols, were sent to encourage the enemy to sur-
render and, if they refused, to eliminate them.
The 6th Marines’ action report characterized
the day’s activities as an “attack . . . against a
disorganized, swarming mass of Japs . . . wait-
ing for the final death blow. . . .” Adding the
hundreds found strewn through its zone to the
number that it disposed of, the 6th Marines
made a “conservative estimate” for 8 July of
1,500 dead Japanese in its area.47

A correspondent, who surveyed much of the
battle area on 7 and 8 July, was moved to write :
“The whole area seemed to be a mass of stinking
bodies, spilled guts and brains.”48

On more rugged terrain inland the 8th Ma-
li lies encountered much the same type of re-
sistance. Here, with more caves to investigate,
the sweep was somewhat slower. One wooded
pocket encountered, a deep ravine, caused a
minor delay. The tactic that previously had
worked so well was again employed : one com-
pany stayed behind to contain and mop-up
while the rest continued the push. The 8th Ma-
rines’ zone, being inland of the main path of
the banzai attack, contained fewer enemy
bodies; but, even so, there was conclusive evi-
dence that a terrific battle had taken place.49

As noted before, the 165th Infantry had been
attached to the 2d Marine I )ivision for the mop-
up of 8 July. Actually, however, this regiment
had begun mopping up on 7 July almost as soon
as the Japanese attack dissipated. Fighting
through deeply-gouged Harakiri Gulch was
much easier on 7 July than on previous days.
The banzai attack relieved the soldiers of the

47 6th Mar Report, 15-16.

48 On to Westward, Robert Sherrod, 140.

49 8th Mar Report, 9. 2d Mar Div Report, Section
VI. 25.

sergeant grant F. Timmerman, 2d Tank Battalion, post-
humously awarded the Medal of Honor for his action
during the 8 July mop-up. Timmerman blocked with
his body a Japanese grenade which would have fallen
through his tank’s open turret hatch upon the other
crewmen inside.

worst of their tasks. By dark the 1st Battalion
had moved through Harakiri Gulch and had
reached the plateau overlooking the coastal
plain. The regiment was thus placed in a favor-
aide position for the descent.

On the 8th, however, the soldiers delayed
their sweep, awaiting arrival of the Marines on
their left flank. By about 1 130 the Marines
were abreast and the push was resumed. Mov-
ing down the cliff proved difficult. Wooded
fissures and eroded cuts provided excellent
hide-outs for die-hard stragglers from the
banzai attack and eradication of these was a
Herculean task. Independent smaller actions —
a job for squads and platoons rather than a
coordinated battalion attack — were necessitated
by the great number of indentations in the cliff
face.

While the 1st Battalion, 165th Infantry,
stalked the stragglers in the cliff, the 2d Bat-
talion by-passed Paradise Valley, leaving the

231

following banzai attack, 2d Division passed through the 27th Division and mopped up the area. Here Marines,
deployed as skirmishers with the welcome support of a medium tank, move along Tanapag Plain in search of
enemy stragglers.

mop-up to the 3d Battalion. Phis resulted in
a rapid surge to Makunsha Village for the
former. The valley was still a cesspool into
which many stragglers had drained, and the
task would take time. Darkness cut short the
3d Battalion’s work on 8 July, and the unit
withdrew to positions at the valley’s upper
entrance for the night.

On !) July, while the 2d Battalion waited in
Makunsha. the 1st Battalion finished its cl i IT
task and moved to the coast. The blasting this
cliff received had altered its appearance; much
of the underbrush was gone and many of the
caves and crevasses had been tilled. Paradise
Valle y was also cleared of Japanese during the
day. Pile 3d Battalion systematically combed

die valley's jagged slopes and by about noon
emerged on the coastal plain.50

Activity in the sectors of the 6th and 8th
M arines followed the pattern established on 8
July. The 8th Marines met little difficulty and
devoted a share of its fire power (including
attached tanks) to support the 165th Infantry.

Action against the enemy that had swum
out to the reef continued. Efforts to induce
these to surrender were to little avail: only II
prisoners were taken by the LVT’s patrolling
there, while about 100 resisted and either
were killed or took their own lives. One Japa-
nese officer was observed to behead four of a

50 165th Inf Report, 8-0. 2d Mar Div Report, Sec-
tion VI, 26. Love, 475, 408, 514-518.

?32

group of his soldiers before he himself was
killed by the Marines.

One episode, described by First Lieutenant
Kenneth J. Hensley of Company G, 6th Ma-
rines, indicates the difficulties experienced in
convincing the Japanese on the reef that they
should surrender. Hensley was in command
of four amphibian tractors and 24 riflemen on
9 July when the incident occurred.

. . . We closed to about 100 yards from the 50-60 enemy
on the reef and motioned them to come to the boat.51
They motioned us away. One officer armed with a rifle
and standing on a rock, apparently controlling the
50-60 enemy soldiers, aimed his rifle at the boat several
times. We covered this officer with machine guns and
closed with the LVT(4)’s to about 50 yards. We again
motioned for them to come out to the boats. The Jap
officer then fired at the leading boats, and a machine
gun, apparently about .50 caliber, opened fire on the
boats putting two holes completely through one
LVT(4). Many of the enemy threw hand grenades
from the reef and fired rifles at the leading boats. Im-
mediately all boats opened fire with all small arms and
annihilated these 50-60 enemy on this section of the
reef.52

In addition to its reef -sweeping details, the
6th Marines also cleared the pocket east of
Tanapag Village during the day. One hundred
Japanese bodies were counted there.

Following the precedent of their fallen com-
rades. Japanese emerged during the night from
their hiding places and attempted to pierce
the strong U. S. defense. On the night of 8-9
July the 165th Infantry killed about 75 in
front of its positions. Similarly, the next night
150 more fell from such abortive incursions.
The 6th Marines reported killing “50 or more'5
on each night as the enemy attempted to sneak
through the lines. Just where they were going,
or what they were trying to accomplish, is not
clear. These efforts amounted only to a gesture,
or a final gasp, from a dying Japanese force.53

And so, the Tanapag-Makunsha plain area
was again in U. S. hands. As indicated
throughout the narrative of this phase of the
Saipan fight, the Japanese had suffered an al-
most unbelievable massacre. And yet not un-

o1 “Boat” is here used to refer to amphibian tractors.

52 Statement of IstLt K. .7. Hensley, Appendix K
to NTLK G-2 Report.

53 2d Mar lHv Report, Section VI, 26. 6th Mar Report.
16. 165 Inf Report, 9.

believable, for densely sprawled through the
area for all to see was the hideous evidence. By
the 27th Division’s count, 4,611 enemy dead lay
in the battle area.

To determine accurately just which Japa-
nese were killed by the various participating
units in this battle is impossible. There sire
certain clues, however. In the sectors of the
two battalions of the 105th Infantry which
bore the brunt of the initial attack, 2,295 Japa-
nese bodies were counted. Another 2,016 lay
to their rear. Plow many of these fell prior to
the climactic banzai attack as a result of aitil
lery, naval and air bombardment which had
been almost continuous since 13 June? And
how many, on the other hand, were killed dur-
ing the savage attack and the mop-up that fol-
lowed ?

The questions started very soon after the
battle. On 12 July the G— 1 of the 27tli Divi-
sion submitted a letter to NTLF on the sub-
ject of burial of Japanese dead. General Griner
added an endorsement to the letter which said
in part :

In view of press releases and official dispatches indi-
cating the numerical strength of the enemy counter-
attack on 7 July as between 300 and 500, basic report
is forwarded indicating that by actual count, 4.311
enemy soldiers were buried in the area between the
farthest advance of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 105th
Infantry, and the farthest advance of the enemy. In
the same area, 406 bodies of American soldiers were
found.

A further breakdown of enemy dead indicates that
2,295 were killed in the combat area of the 1st and 2d
Battalions, 105th Infantry, and 2,016 in the combat
area of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 106th Infantry, the
.”>d Battalion, 6th Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 105th
Infantry. These dead represented the number of enemy
that pushed beyond the defensive line of the 1st and
2d Battalions, 105th Infantry.

Basic report is forwarded in the hope that by proper
distribution of the facts, accuracy of historical records
and press releases will he preserved. 54

General Schmidt, who had recently relieved
Holland Smith as Commanding General.
NTLF,55 answered General Griner’s letter on
1 5 J uly. Schmidt did not question the number of

54 CO, 27th Inf Div, 1st Endorsement to ACofS, G— 1
27th Div, ltr of 12.Tul44.

55 Schmidt turned over (lie 4th Marine Division to
Major General Clifton B. Cates (later nineteenth Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps) on 12 July 1944.

889590°— 50 — 16

233

dead Japanese found and buried but seriously
doubted that these had all fallen as a result of
the banzai attack. Also, Schmidt’s letter called
attention to the interrogation of Major Yo-
shicla, who had estimated that only 1,500 Japa-
nese had participated in the attack.

The areas over which the enemy made its counter-
attack [continued General Schmidt’s letter] against
the 105th Infantry on 7 July have, from time to time,
been subjected to naval gunfire, bombing, strafing at-
tacks and artillery tires from 13 .Tune to 7 July, and it
is evident that these fires produced some casualties.
It is probable that some of the dead remained on the
ground as a result of the initial occupation by the 105th
Infantry, and subsequent advance of the 106th Infantry
and elements of the 2d Marine Division in the same
zone of action.

Staff officers and observers, who visited the scene of
attack soon after the ground was recaptured by the
2d Marine Division, have reported very large numbers
of enemy dead within the zone and have also stated
that many of the dead, due to the advanced state of
decomposition, had apparently been in the area for
some time. Some photographs turned in to this head-
quarters bear out these reports.

More than 300 freshly killed Japanese were counted
on S July, in front of and in the positions of the 3d
Battalion, 10th Marines (Artillery) which were over-
run. It is probable that these Japanese constituted
a large part of the enemy force which penetrated the
positions of the 105th Infantry.

General Griner was not long in answering.
11 is letter of 16 July said in part :

It was not suggested that each enemy soldier was
killed by infantry elements of this division, or by its
infantry and artillery, although the 27tli Division Ar-
tillery was the only artillery in direct support of the
action. Our Naval gunfire, aerial bombing, and Corps
Artillery did good work everywhere on the island and
at all times. Any estimate of the casualties inflicted
by them on the enemy is acceptable, provided it is ap-
plied uniformly in all Division Zones of Action.

On the morning of 8 July, over 24 hours
after the XTLF li aison officer with the 27th
Division, Major Regan Fuller, had estimated
the enemy counterattack force at 1,500. XTLF
had sent a dispatch to Admiral Turner which
stated that the 1st and 2d Battalions. 105th In-
fantry. had been “overrun by a considerable
force estimated to be at least 300 to 400 Japa-
nese, supported by two tanks.” 56 It was to this
inaccurate dispatch that Griner next referred
and demanded correction, saying in part :

58 XTI.F G-3 Journal, 1800. 0 July to 1800. 8 July.

The great mass of the enemy dead found in the area
between the extreme advance of the 105th Infantry
and that of the 106th Infantry (2295) obviously were
killed by the 105th Infantry since the enemy counter-
attack had subsided completely prior to the advance of
the 2d Marine Division at noon, 8 July.

In view of the fact that 2,016 enemy dead lay in the
area in rear of the positions of the 1st and 2d Bat-
talions, 106th Infantry, the statement . . . that it is
probable that the 300 Japanese dead found in front
of the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines (Artillery) “consti-
tuted a large part of the enemy force which pene-
trated the positions of the 105th Infantry” is not a
reasonable conclusion. No mention is made of the fact
that this position was relieved by the 2d Battalion,
106tli Infantry, which reasonably could have been ex-
pected to have inflicted casualties in doing so.

As the only General Officer who was present on this
front at any time prior to noon, 8 July; as the Com-
mander of all troops operating in that zone, except a
Battalion of Marine Field Artillery which had entered
the area without the knowledge of this headquarters
and had emplaced certain field guns 520 yards in rear
of the most advanced line, not however for the purpose
of supporting the troops in this area ; and as one who
followed in detail each event as it occurred, I submit
that my personel observations should receive greater
credence than is indicated by the record. I viewed
perhaps a thousand enemy dead and did not see more
than two or three in an advanced state of decomposi-
tion. Paragraph 127 of the Army Medical Field Manual,
“Field Sanitation” (FM 8-40). states that at a tempera-
ture of 85° F maggots will be formed in about eight
hours. rIhe staff officers and observers did not arrive
on the scene until at least thirty-one (0500, 7 July, to
1200. 8 July) hours had elapsed after the launching of
the enemy counterattack.57

Realizing that a controversy was developing
at Saipan, Admiral Nimitz, Commander in
Chief. Pacific, sent a dispatch to Admiral
Spruance, Commander Fifth Fleet, on 9 July
ordering an investigation of the banzai attack.
For this task, Spruance appointed two mem-
bers of his staff, Colonel James E. Jones,
USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel George S.
Eckhardt, USA. These officers developed the
facts of their report by conversations with
General Holland M. Smith, General Griner,
members of the XTLF and 27th Division
staffs, and “such representatives of the troop
units involved as were available for explana-
tion of the action on the ground.” 58

57 Ltr from MajGen Griner to CG, NTLF, 16.Tul44.

58 This investigation has often been erroneously re-
ferred to as the “Spruance Board.”

234

On 19 July Spruance submitted a report to
Admiral Nimitz containing his conclusions
relative to the counterattack. Spruance's re-
port failed to establish the exact number of
enemy that had participated in (he attack, say-
ing: “Estimates of the enemy strength in the
assault run from 1500 to 3000." Though this
figure is not specific, it serves to correct the
first report from NTLF of “300 to 400." The
last paragraph of the report contains com-
ments on the conduct of troops and command-
ers involved in the fight:

(a) The gap between the 1st and 3d Battalions 105th
Infantry could have been readily closed by swinging
the left of the 3d Battalion forward. In any case, this
gap should have been covered by local reserves and/or
planned machine gun fires. These is no evidence of such
measures being taken.

(b) The 3d Battalion 105th Infantry although not
as heavily engaged as the other two, [made] no effort
to go to 1 lie relief of the 1st and 2d Battalions. The
reserve company of the 3d Battalion was not com-
mitted except to protect the battalion command post
which was under attack.

(c) Although the position of the 27th Division was
penetrated to a depth of 1000 to 1500 yards, this pene-
tration was always firmly contained.

(d) There is no question that our troops fought
courageously in this action. The 1st and 2d Battalions
and Headquarters Company, 105th Infantry and the 3d
Battalion, 10th Marines deserve particular mention.

(e) All evidence points to the fact that the front
line units of the 27th Division were alert to the immi-
nence of a Japanese attack at dawn on 7 July 1944. 59

Whatever conclusion the reader may draw
from the facts presented, the statement in sub-
paragraph (d) of Admiral Spruance’s report
should emerge in bold relief above the clouds
and fog of controversy: “ There is no question
that our troops fought courageously in this ac-
tion.,,

D-PLUS 22, 23 and 24 (7, 8 AND 9 JULY)

To the Shore at Marpi Point

It will be recalled that on 6 July the 4th Ma-
rine Division had been ordered to take over
the entire front at a point just beyond Ma-
kunsha. From there it would drive to Saipan’s
northeastern tip. Assumption of its broad zone

:’9 “Report on Japanese Counterattack at Saipan on
Morning of 7 July 1944” from Commander, Fifth Fleet
to Commander in Chief, IT. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific
Ocean Areas, I9.Tul44.

demanded commitment of all three infantry
regiments of the division, and on T July XTLF
attached an additional regiment, the 2d Ma-
rines, to assist in delivering the last punches.
Artillery support had been bolstered a 1 so ; the
3d and 4th Battalions, 10th Marines, attached
to the 4th Division, moved to advanced posi-
tions from which they could deliver fires for-
ward of the 23d Marines. As already indicated,
however, these two battalions suffered heavy
personnel losses in the banzai attack and were
in no condition to provide effective support.
The 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, Y Am-
phibious Corps, executed general support mis-
sions from its newly occupied positions about
500 yards inland from Garapan’s south edge.

The Japanese banzai attack had an impor-
tant bearing on the final drive of the 4th Divi-
sion. Many of the enemy who would have con-
tested the last few miles of Saipan had already
expended themselves in the Tanapag on-
slaught. The several thousand who accelerated
their appointment with death could have pro-
vided a considerable challenge in the rocky ap-
proaches to Mt. Marpi. This result was not
apparent to the men of the 4th Division, since
they were not in the attack’s path but was true
nonetheless. But this is not to say that the last
days at Saipan would go unopposed.

On 6 July the center and right regiments
(24th and 25th respectively) had made rapid
progress, reaching the dominating ground just
short of 0-8. The 23d Marines, howeveV, met
rugged terrain in its expedition to the west
coast. A precipitous cliff, carved with enemy
positions, would have to be descended before
the unit could begin its final, half-mile drive
to the west coast. The newly-attached 2d Regi-
ment was assigned a zone between the 23d and
24th. On its four-regiment front the division
attacked at 0930.

The two right regiments moved at a fast clip
on 7 July, encountering only minor trouble in
the form of sporadic small-arms fire from
small bands or patrols of the enemy. In addi-
tion, the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, reported
fire from a large-caliber gun positioned in a
cave. This weapon was pushed out for one or
two rounds then hastily retracted before the

235

taking cover behind a medium tank, these Marines try to locate the source of the automatic fire cracking about
them. .Man in foreground carries an SClv 300 radio with short antenna. Oak planking on side of tank is to
prevent Japanese magnetic mines from sticking there.

Ml trines could bring clown counter-tires. Bven-
tuallv. however, the enemy gunner selected the
wrong moment to peek his gun from the hiding
place, doing so just as a shell landed in the
entrance. The cave gun and its elusive gunner
were destroyed.

One difficulty during the day was presented
by the great number of civilians pouring
through the lines. I 'util these had approached
close enough for recognition, it was impossible
to distinguish them from enemy soldiers, and
it was necessary to proceed with a great deal of
caution.

By early afternoon of 7 July the two right
regiments had pushed so far ahead of units on

the left that General Schmidt ordered them to
hold up and wait.60

The going had been tougher on the left. Here
l fie problem was to find suitable routes from the
cliff top to the Hat below. In a maneuver de-
signed to exploit the 24th Marines’ success.
Colonel Stuart’s 2d Regiment moved to its
l ight through the the 24th Marines’ zone and
reoriented its direction of attack straight to-
ward the west coast. By dark of 7 July,
Stuart’s Marines were disposed along the high
ground overlooking the coastal plain (see Map
23 ) .

0,1 //Hi Dir Report, Section VI. 34—35. 2Jf Mar Report,
24. 251h Mar Report, 9.

236

through A BATTERED CANEFIELD on the west coast, men of the 2d Marines, accompanied by a medium tank from
Company A, 2d Tank Battalion, push toward the northern end of the island. Hundreds of the enemy were
killed during this phase of the operation.

For the 23d Marines the activities of 7 July
were a continuation of those begun the previ-
ous day. This regiment had to cross the coastal
plain and reach the beach just northeast of
Makunsha, and no amount of detouring would
allow it to execute this until the cliff line flank-
ing Ivaraberra Pass was cleared of enemy
forces. Some imaginative Marine named the
high ground overlooking the pass “Prudential
Hill,” 61 and the title stuck. To attempt to
traverse the plain without first clearing the
cliffs which dominated it would have been an
invitation for the Japanese to deliver fire into
the regiment’s rear.

This was the problem then: the Marines
faced the west coast and the Japanese did also.
The Marines needed the base of the cliff for a
line of departure but this was dominated by

61 Though this name was derived from the Prudential
Life Insurance Company’s trademark, Webster’s defi-
nition, “Prudential — That which relates to or demands
tlie exercise of discretion,” is also apt.

the Japanese in the cliff. In addition, the base
was mined and covered with plunging fire.
The struggle continued throughout 7 July and
most of the caves and positions were destroyed.
The coming of darkness, however, indicated the
desirability of returning to the high ground for
the night with plans to get a fresh start on
8 July. From positions overlooking the coastal
flats, the 23d Marines observed large straggler
groups moving toward Marpi Point and
brought long-range machine-gun and 75mm
half-track fires to bear on them. According to
the 23d Marines’ action report, “over 500 were
killed.” 62

Fighting in and around Ivaraberra Pass was
close-in, personal and. frequently, individual
Marine against individual Japanese. Because
of this, men of the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines,
were especially alert for anyone with oriental
facial characteristics as they cleaned the area.

62 23d Mur Report, 47-48.

237

anticipating A blast, Marines liug cover near island’s northern end. At times like these, one may only hope
and pray.

So it was that one dark-complexioned person,
dressed in a Marine uniform but showing a
poor command of the English language, nar-
rowly escaped death before he was finally per-
mitted to surrender. After being marched to
the 3d Battalion command post, he explained
to Major Treitel, commanding the unit, that he
was a Marine, of Puerto Rican ancestry, who
had the misfortune of resembling the Jap-
anese. It was the third time he had been taken
prisoner by fellow Marines at Saipan. Major
Treitel described him as “one frightened hom-
bre, ” and well he might have been.03

As the division stopped for the night of 7—8
July the lines took on a peculiar appearance.
The left had not progressed, while the right
had moved from 700 to 1500 yards. Connecting
the two extremes was the 2d Marines, facing
the west coast. The night passed quietly.

For the attack on 8 July, General Schmidt
decided to hold the right of his line stationary,

"a Treitel.

while the left moved to the sea. This, in effect,
was a reorientation of the. direction of attack,
since units would he moving to the northwest
rather than the northeast. If successful, how-
ever. this maneuver would greatly reduce the
division frontage, which on the morning of 8
July was 6,300 yards. The scheme affected
units as follows : the 25th Marines and the right
battalion of the 24th (2d) would hold their
positions facing to the northeast, while the re-
mainder of the division swept to the northwest
(see Map 23).

The plan was a good one, having as its most
unique feature the support provided bv rocket
craft — LCI(G)’s- lying off Makunsha and fir-
ing into the cliffs directly below the 23d Ma-
rines. Though delayed somewhat by the ter-
rain, occasional road blocks and mines, and
desultory fire from caves, the advance to the
coast was rapid. After placing the finishing,
blasting alterations on Prudential Hill’s west-
ern landscape, the 23d Marines dashed across

238

the coastal flat and reached the beach at 1410.64

The 2d and 24th Marines, meanwhile, kept
generally abreast and secured their assigned
zones by 1530. A great number of Japanese
were killed during this move and in the subse-
quent mop-up along the coast. Many of those
encountered were no doubt survivors of the
banzai attack which had struck the 27th Divi-
sion. In three operations (Guadalcanal, Ta-
rawa, Saipan), men of the 2d Marines could
not recall a single day in which they had killed
as many Japanese. It is probable that the 1st
Battalion, 2d Marines, with its score of about
800 enemy killed on 8 July, accounted for more

,;4 Dillon.

Japanese on that day than it had throughout
the rest of the operation.60 One company com-
mander observed that “hunting was excep-
tionally good.” 06

An unusual employment of 37mm guns dur-
ing the day is worthy of note. In order that the
1st Battalion, 24th Marines, might use all avail-
able men in the push across the coastal plain,
Major Roger G. B. Broome (Weapons Com-
pany. 2 4th M arines) volunteered to assume,
with two 37mm guns and a few riflemen, a
position from which to protect the right flank
as the unit swept to the coast. After the in-

65 Interview with Capt C. Schultz, IfJJanfiO.

<56 Brooks.

below mt. marpi'S austere height (833 feet), 4th Division’s tanks and infantry push across flat toward the final ob-
jective on 9 July. Many positions on Marpi’s sheer northern face were by-passed by tbe speedy moves, and
Marines laid to return later for tbe mop-up.

239

uncompleted marpi airstrip was overrun by 4th Division’s 9 July dash to Saipan s northern coast. Marines appeal

alert after !2f> days of combat.

fan try had departed, Broome’s isolated posi-
tion was rushed by a numerically superior
it roup of Japanese. During the skirmish, the
37mm crews fired their pieces at ranges of 10
to 20 yards, taking up the brief slack between
rounds by throwing grenades and firing small
arms. For a time the issue was in doubt, but
the Marines held. This exceptional employ-
ment of a weapons unit was necessary and ef-
fective in this situation.07

Ltr from Col O. Lessing to CMC, 1 l.Tan50. Major
I’.roome died from wounds received during this skir-
mish.

The 2d and 24th Marines, after reaching
their objectives, spent the remainder of the day
mopping up the jagged coast line.

Earlier in the afternoon, when it was ap-
parent that the attack to the northwest would
be successful, General Schmidt approved the
25th Eegiment’s request to advance its lines to
the dominating terrain 600 yards to its front.
Patrols had located no enemy in that area, and
Colonel Batchelder deemed it advisable to
capitalize on the situation. The advance had
the additional advantage of providing observa-
tion over the Marpi Point area.

240

Saipan won, the landing force command and unit representatives attend oilicial flag raising at Charan Kanoa.

During the day the division’s left had moved
1,500 yards in seizing the western coastal area
and had advanced the northern portion of its
line approximately 600 yards closer to the is-
land’s tip. At one point in the proceedings
(shortly after noon), General Schmidt had en-
tertained hopes of reaching Mt. Marpi during
the day and issued an operation order to that
effect. Time consumed mopping up beach areas,
however, caused the general to defer the plan
until the next day.

Night activity was confined to the coastal
areas, where groups of civilians and some
military personnel came from the caves to sur-
render.68 Surrender was not on the minds of
the screaming Japanese that attacked the 1st

68 ffth Mar Dir Report, Section VI, 35-36. 23d Mar
Report, 48. 2/,th Mar Report, 24. 25th Mar Report, 9.

Battalion, 2d Marines, however. Tliist bat-
talion, set up on the lip of the coastal cliff,
received a series of miniature banzai attacks
that lasted most of the night. The point of
attack was a logical one: at the right center of
the battalion’s front, where a 30—40 yard break
existed. This break tilted sharply to the water’s
edge, affording the Japanese a corridor for the
climb to the top of the cliff. Whatever the
cause of this unusual formation, it had been
apparent to the men of the 1st Battalion that
this area had dangerous potentialities. In view
of this, machine guns had been emplaced on
either shoulder with sectors of fire interlocking
over the mouth of the chute.

Into these prearranged fires the Japanese
hurled themselves in attack after attack and.
despite the repulse of all attempts, succeeded —

241

electing TO live, these Saipan civilians east their lot with the Americans. This puzzled, tired group eyes appre-
hensively one of the United States invaders to whom they surrendered.

by the sheer momentum of their thrust — in
knocking out both machine guns. These were
replaced, however, and t lie slaughter con-
tinued. Later, one of the replacements was
also destroyed. Vast quantities of incendiary
grenades were used during the night to light
1 lie funnel and expose the enemy, but mortars
or artillery could not be used because of the
proximity of the Marines to their attackers.
Machine guns, rifles and grenades were enough,
however; the enemy soldiers were stopped be-
fore they could really get started. As had
been the case in other such attempts, the Jap-
anese seemed to feel an obligation to get killed
in an attack, as if some higher honor would
thus be accorded them. The coming of day-
light revealed enemy dead thickly stacked in

the narrow confines of the corridor. No accu-
rate count of the bodies was completed, but the
battalion commander estimated about 100. 69

Objective 0-9 (extreme northeastern tip of
Saipan) had seemed very distant on 15 June
1941 when the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions hit
the Charan Kanoa beaches. It seemed to get no
closer as the days grew to weeks, and the num-
ber of casualties climbed from one digit to five,

69 A count, initiated by Gunnery Sergeant Claude E.
Moore, was abruptly terminated when the latter re-
ceived four holes in his buttocks from a single bullet.
While stooping to count the bodies, the sergeant pre-
sented a profile view of his posterior to a Japanese sur-
vivor in a nearby cave, who inflicted the unusual
wound. The bullet bit no bones and the sergeant was
not too uncomfortable to see the humor of the situa-
tion. Kyle.

242

and the young matured to grim old age. As
long as a single wooded hummock separated
the front lines from the farthest tip of land,
objective 0-9 had been an ambition— little
more.

Ambition became reality on 9 July when the
4th Division spurted to the shores of Marpi
Point. The final thrust was made with three
regiments abreast, from right to left, 25th,
24th, and 2d. Men of the 23d Marines, mean-
while, spent the day mopping up along the
northwest coast, assisted by the LYT(A)’s of
the 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion which
fired on cave positions from seaward.

The attack of 9 July produced nothing-
startling in the way of tactical situations or
enemy reactions. Firm pressure was applied all
along the front and a fast pace maintained.
Indeed, many units, anxious to be the first to
reach Marpi Point, moved faster than reason-
able caution would dictate. Many enemy
groups were by-passed with the result that
much time and effort were spent extricating
holed-up Japanese after 9 -Inly.

Along the west coast in the 2d Marines’ zone,
isolated enemy units somewhat retarded the
push, but generally the Japanese realized the
futility of coming out to do battle and instead
chose to remain in the myriad caves along the
coast. Extermination of all of these was not
to be accomplished on 9 July — or 9 August, or
9 September, for that matter.

By 1615 all three regiments had reported
that they were in possession of 0-9. 70 And as
the Marines looked to the north, all that they
could see was water. There was no objective
0-10.

Good news travels fast. In the same minute
that the 4th Marine Division reported seizure
of 0-9, Admiral Turner, the Expeditionary
Force Commander, declared the island secured.
The time was 1615, 9 July 1944.

This was merely a formal declaration, how-
ever. It meant that all organized resistance
had ceased and that the entire island — techni-
cally at least- — was in our hands. Or, as one
M arine put it: “It means that if you get shot
now, you were hit in your own rear areas.”
For the men of the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines,

70 f/th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 36—37.

word that the island was “secured” came as
something of a surprise. In the words of the
battalion’s action report:

At 10i.r> a message was heard from an unknown sta-
tion by tank liaison o Hirer over tank TCS radio, that
tlie island was secured. Part of F Company was pinned
down on t lie beach for four hours by intense enemy
machine gun and r i tie tire from the western cliff face
which resulted in one dead and ten wounded. This
company was not able to pull completely back on to the
high ground until darkness set in. It took live hours
to evacuate the wounded up the treacherous cliff.71

For the Japanese, hundreds of whom still
lurked in the many caves and recesses, “se-
cured” had no meaning. Mopping up of these
die hards continued for months thereafter.
More than a year later, even after the final
surrender of Japan, there were still Japanese
soldiers at large on Saipan.

Naval Activity

During the closing days of the operation, the
Navy bent a good share of its efforts toward
the improvement of facilities at Saipan. Tana-
pag Harbor would figure prominently in the
post-battle value of Saipan, and the task of
clearing mines, wrecked barges and ships was
already underway. By 6 July the Minesweeper
and Hydrographic Survey Group reported that
a 150-foot channel had been swept from Tana-
pag Harbor to the northwest docks. This set
the signal for initiation of work on the piers
and seaplane ramps in the Tanapag-Garapan
area.

There was no diminution in the pressure ex-
erted against other islands in the Marianas.
Tinian, Guam, and Rota were peppered daily
with bombs in preparation for contemplated
landings. On 7 July Admiral Spruance an-
nounced the target dates for two of them :
Guam — 21 July, Tinian — 24 July.

Japanese air activity in the final days of
the campaign was weak and ineffective. Dur-
ing the night of 6—7 July, while Saito’s loyal
subordinates prepared for the final banzai , 12
to 15 planes made two raids against Saipan
and ships near the island. Although the Con-
dition Red lasted from just after dark until
after midnight, the raiders failed to achieve
any hits. In the process, IT. S. night fighters

71 2d Bn, 2J/th Mar Report, 13. Rothwell.

243

from the fast carrier groups downed two of the
intruders and the destroyer Hudson accounted
for a third. Again, some Japanese planes
attempted to land at Marpi Point Airfield and
at North Field on Tinian but, apparently,
were frustrated by ships’ gunfire.

The final air attack executed against Saipan
during the capture and occupation phase of
the operation came at 1945 on 7 July and lasted
until after midnight. In all, the Japanese
launched nine separate raids during the evening
but, aside from the dust, noise and excitement
kicked up by the 25 bombs dropped on Aslito
Airfield, achieved nothing. Night fighters ris-
ing from Saipan and from the fast carriers
divided the honors, each shooting down one
enemy plane.

Much more devastating attacks were launched
against the airfields at Saipan in the months
to follow, but the feeble display of 7 July
marked the last one prior to “securing” the
island on 9 July.72

As noted at various points throughout this
narrative, the Japanese ground troops were not
happy with the poor showing of their aircraft.
Another indication of this appears in the diary
of an unidentified noncommissioned officer sta-
tioned on Tinian : “6 July — Did Vice Admiral
Kakuda (Commander in Chief 1st Air Fleet)
when he heard that the enemy had entered our
area go to sleep with joy?”73

72 TF 51 Report, Enel. A, 13-14, and Annex 1 to
Enel A.

72 OTNCPAC-CINCPOA Item #1 1 .405.

electing TO die, hundreds of Saipan civilians refused surrender offers, flung children and selves upon the jagged
coastal rocks.

244

tanapag harbor's man! agassa island, a nuisance and threat to American shipping, was seized on 13 July by the
3d Battalion, 6th Marines. Ships in this pre-D-Day picture are Japanese. Mutclio Point is in right background.

The Crowning Horror

Following the declaration that the island was
secured, efforts to induce cave-occupants to
surrender were intensified. Interpreters, using
public address systems, pleaded with people in
caves to come out. The device was not only
attempted from land but from sea as well. LCI
gunboats moved close inshore and broadcast
promises of good treatment, for which they
were answered with fire from Japanese soldiers
in the caves. Even some of Saipan’s leading
citizens, who had surrendered and received
good treatment, talked to those in the caves,
urging them to yield. But, for the effort ex-
pended, the results were not encouraging. The
primary reason for this failure was that the
people had been saturated with Japanese
propaganda to the effect that the Americans
intended to torture and kill them. This had
been repeated so often that the people came to
believe it.74

74 Another reason often mentioned is that Japanese

At this time the very zenith of horror oc-
curred. Hundred of civilians, believing that
the end had come, embarked on a ghastly ex-
hibition of self-destruction. Casting their chil-
dren ahead of them, or embracing them in
death, parents flung themselves from the cliff's
onto the jagged rocks below. Some waded into
the surf to drown or employed other gruesome
means of destroying themselves. IIow many
civilians died in this orgy of mass hysteria is
not known. A commander of a patrol craft
(YP) said that progress of his boat around
M arpi Point at this time was slow and tedious
because of the hundreds of corpses floating in
the water.

soldiers would not permit the civilians to surrender
and killed those who weakened. This was not borne
out, however, by an atrocity investigation which was
conducted by five officers from the NTLF G-2 Section.
Approximately 150 Japanese and Chamorro civilians
were interrogated on this point, and none testified that
they were threatened or used as shields by Japanese
soldiers. There is a strong possibility, however, that
those who would have testified differently are dead.

245

Maniagassa Island

One small objective in the Battle for Saipan
remained. This was tiny (250 yards wide, 300
yards long) Maniagassa Island in Tanapag
Harbor. Lying like a possessive apostrophe
some 2,500 yards northwest of the seaplane
base, the isle was known to be occupied. It was
conceivable that Japanese located there could
harass activities within the harbor as well as
provide Japanese on other islands with infor-
mation relative to U. S. ship and plane move-
ments. Even a small radio set could relay
messages to other islands in the Marianas for
further transmission to Japan.

The special assignment of capturing Mania-
gassa went to the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,
commanded once again bv Lieutenant Colonel
John W. Easley.75 Preparations for this mini-
ature operation were as complete as those for a
full-scale campaign. Air observers from the
2d Marine Division conducted the reconnais-
sance, took the necessary aerial photos, and di-

75 This officer had commanded the 3d Battalion, 6th
Marines, during the D-Day landings, but had been
wounded and evacuated by D-plus 1. He returned to
duty in time for the closing stages of the operation.

reefed supporting artillery fires. Naval gunfire
support was furnished by one LCI(G) firing
its 40mm guns. The 5th Amphibian Tractor
Battalion provided 25 LVT’s to transport the
battalion, while five LYT(A)’s from the 2d
Armored Amphibian Battalion rendered close-
in support.

With detailed preparations completed, the
landing was executed at 1100, 13 July 1944. In
the 15 minutes preceding this, the 10th Ma-
rines rained 900 105mm howitzer and 720
75mm shells upon the island. Nearly the en-
tire objective was within the bursting radius
of each shell, and the target was well saturated.
Marines of Companies I and Iv hit the beach
unopposed and hastily set about completion of
their mission. Within an hour Maniagassa was
overrun. Of the 29 Japanese defenders, 15
were captured and the remainder killed. The
M arine casualty report was singular: one man
wounded in action. One rifle platoon and a
60mm mortar section were left to garrison the
new possession, and the remainder of the at-
tacking force returned to Saipan.76

76 6th Mar Report , 17.

246

CHAPTER

(P5H52’

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Conclusions

SUMMARY

Thus, in less than a month, Saipan had been
ripped from the enemy’s determined clutches.
Tangible proof was again provided that per-
sistence and determination are important ad-
juncts to, but never substitutes for, tools and
technique. As emphasized in many instances,
the Japanese were not wanting in individual
heroism. But in their willing hands were in-
sufficient or inadequate tools. They did well
with what they had. It simply was not enough.
With Saipan “secured” the months of mopping
up began. To the men required to stalk and
ferret out the remaining Japanese hidden
about the island, “secured” had only psycho-
logical significance. The enemy whom they
sought was as real on 10 July as on the day
before. Possibilities of meeting death from the
dark shadows of a cave were still present. The
ground was just as hard at night. The flies
were every bit as thick. The canned rations
were monotonous and tasteless.

hat, then, of the psychological implica-
tions? Only this: officers and enlisted men now
felt that caution was a more laudable quality
than bravery; patience more important than
aggressiveness. The unspoken maxim applied:
"Look before you leap.” In the fevered excite-
ment of battle, news of friendly casualties was
accepted with stoic calm; minds, as well as
bodies, became conditioned to combat. But
every man hit after 1) duly — and there were
many — became a matter of personal sorrow to

all that heard of it. At last there was time
to be sad.

Naval Gunfire

In considering the tools that attained the
U. S. success, naval gunfire looms forth con-
spicuously. During the pre-D-Day bombard-
ment certain factors (listed on page 3(>, Chap-
ter 1) limited the effectiveness of preparatory
fires. But these notwithstanding, naval gun-
fire achieved appreciable results at Saipan.
Foremost in achievement was the almost com-
plete rupture of enemy communications. Al-
though this did not represent the fruits of a
single weapon or arm, certainly ships' gunfire
deserves a great amount of credit. Admittedly,
total ammunition expenditure does not neces-
sarily mirror the effectiveness of a weapon, but
it does reflect the vigor of the effort. Total
rounds expended on troop support missions
(not counting pre-D-Day bombardment) by
battleships, cruisers and destroyers in the Sai-
pan operation were 138,391, a weight of over
8,500 tons. In addition to this, 5,882 starsliells
were fired.1

The tremendous impression upon the Jap-
anese created by U. S. naval gunfire is indicated

1 Expeditionary Troops, Marianas Report, Naval
Gunfire Support, Appendix A to Part 2, Enclosure G.
Of the battleships, Tennessee tired the most rounds
with 5,579: of the cruisers, Birmingham led the field
with 12,073, followed by Cleveland with 10,149: de-
stroyer Wadleigh could claim the honors in its class,
tiring 4,598 rounds, over 1,000 more than its closest
competitor (Pringle) .

247

arch of triumph. Marines return from mopping-up
patrol after Saipan was declared secure.

in t lie following extracts from prisoner of war
interrogations and captured documents:

. . . I was horrified by the number of deaths on our
side due to the naval gunfire which continued every
day.

We did not stay long in this fourth headquarters.
Caught in the concentration of naval gunfire the
wounded and dead continued to increase.

. . . most feared . . . was the naval shelling which
managed to reach the obscure mountain caves where
. . . CPs were located.

The greatest single factor in the American success
. . . [was] naval gunfire.

The feeling of everyone is ‘if they would only stop
the naval shelling. . . .’

The enemy naval gunfire, using mainly a shell with
attached instantaneous fuze (land shell) has great de-
structive power. They also use a shrapnel shell. The
call fire on land is extremely quick and exact and until
night attack units are some tens of metres from the
enemy they continue to receive naval gunfire.

. . . The practical experiences of the defense forces in
Saipan in the battle which lasted over half a month
lay only in power of the enemy naval bombard-
ment. . . .

This is by no means a complete list of the
testimonials, but this sampling clearly indi-
cates Japanese opinion of this weapon. As the
NTLF Naval Gunfire Report summarizes:

Naval gunfire is a powerful weapon in amphibious

operations. It has many important uses even after a
successful landing has been made ashore. In order to
properly utilize the weapon and to take full advantage
of its capabilities, its control ashore must be placed
in the hands of highly trained and experienced per-
sonnel. Future planning and training should take this
into account.2

Air Support

Working hand in glove with ships’ gunfire
during the preparatory stages and, subse-
quently, in support of troops ashore was the
aircraft's strafing and bombing. Since 11 June,
when Mitscher’s Task Force 58 trespassed the
Marianas’ waters and skies, the planes had
been engaged in almost constant action. The
Marianas, and more specifically Saipan, placed
the air war on its most equal basis up to that
time in the Central Pacific. The lightning
knockout which had been the rule in the Gil-
berts and Marshalls did not obtain at Saipan.
The unconscious foe kept reviving himself and
contesting the issue.

Why this was true is no mystery : geograph-
ically and strategically the Marianas de-
manded decisive defense. This was basic, sim-
ple and logical. The implications of U. S.
seizure of these islands were more than the
Japanese higher command cared to ponder.
With a prodigality born of desperation and
fright, the Japanese squandered their aircraft.
It was like a gambler attempting to recoup
his losses with larger wagers. While momen-
tarily causing some rearrangement and ad-
justment of U. S. dispositions and plans, this
extravagance finally resulted in a resounding
defeat for the enemy aiid, as noted previously,
after the Battle of the Philippine Sea the Jap-
anese fast carrier fleet virtually retired from
the war. Land-based aircraft, however, flying
from Japan via the Bonins or Volcanos, then
to fields in the Marianas or Palaus, delivered
a series of raids on U. S. ships and installa-
tions at Saipan.

Admiral Mitscher’s fast carriers played the
key role in repulsing the enemy fleet, but it re-
mained for the escort carriers 3 to stave off

2 NTT.F Naval Gunfire Report, 19-21.

3 The escort carriers (CVE’s), used experimentally
in the Gilberts campaign, had performed so excellently

248

united states naval gunfire scored a direct hit on this G-inch naval gun casemate on Agingan Point. After be-
ing overrun, the position served United States personnel as an observation post.

those raiders that penetrated to Saipan itself.
Helping in this task were U. S. Army P-47’s
stationed at Aslito Airfield.

Any recital of the exploits of planes at Sai-
pan which fails to mention the valuable OY
observation aircraft would be an incomplete
one indeed. These vulnerable little planes per-
formed nobly in their myriad assignments. Not
only did they focus the wrath of U. S. artillery
on Japanese troops and installations, but they
acquired a wealth of intelligence information

and proved so valuable that they were a “must” in the
Marianas. Tn all, 12 participated.

by their constant snooping over the enemy’s
holdings.

Close support of ground troops presented no
innovations or departures from accepted tech-
nique. Initially, strike groups for infantry
support were furnished by planes from the
carriers of Task Force 58, while antisubmarine
and combat air patrols, photographic, smoke,
observer, spotter, and air delivery missions
went to planes on the CYE’s. After the fore-
noon of 17 June, however, most of the close
support was furnished by Navy planes flying
from CVE’s and later by Army planes from
Aslito Airfield. During the first days of the

880590” 50 — 17

249

campaign there were, at times, as many as
twelve “urgent” requests for close support mis-
sions. Since it was physically impossible for
aircraft to operate in a restricted area on more
than one mission at a time, a filter system was
devised whereby the officer handling the sup-
port air request net passed the mission to the
air liaison officer at the regimental or division
command post for screening and decision as to
which mission, then pending, deserved priority.

This system of lower-level screening worked
satisfactorily and was the best solution con-
sidering that only one Support Aircraft Con-
trol Party controlled aircraft supporting three
divisions. For this party to perform all screen-
ing itself would have imposed more of a work-
load than it could have handled efficiently.
After artillery had been established ashore,
fewer requests were made for air, and the lat-
ter's missions were confined to targets which,
owing to the configuration of the terrain, could
be struck best from above.

The most oft-heard complaint regarding
close air support at Saipan was that too much
time was required getting strikes executed.
Through the lengthy process of requesting the
mission, effecting coordination, designating the
target, and finally having the mission flown,
infantry units had to wait. A large majority
of the requested missions were cancelled by
reason of the infantry advancing past targets
before the planes appeared.

In his report after the operation, General
Holland Smith expressed the opinion that it
was unwise fo depend upon the fast carriers for
close support, since these would frequently be
needed to battle the enemy fleet (as they had in
the Battle of the Philippine Sea). Further,
these carriers would often be unavailable for
vital rehearsals preceding the various opera-
tions. This, Holland Smith felt, was unfortu-
nate. For these reasons, he recommended:

. . . Hint sufficient air groups lie designated and trained
as direct support groups and be assigned to CVE type
carriers.

. . . that Marine Aviation provide air groups for this
specialized duty. The troop experience of senior Marine
pilots combined with the indoctrination of new pilots
in infantry tactics should insure greater cooperation
and coordination between air and ground units.4

*COMTXCTT P-007. CG JtExpTrps, 2-7.

Favorable action on Holland Smith’s recom-
mendation is indicated by the following para-
graph from Admiral Nimitz’ report:

Four CVE’s have been designated for close (troop)
support and will embark Marine aircraft squadrons.
It is not anticipated that Marine squadrons will fur-
nish all close air support but they will he used with
Marine divisions when the situation permits. In addi-
tion a certain number of Marine aviators are being
assigned to the various amphibious force flagships to
assist in the control of support aircraft.5

Artillery

Certainly the four major artillery units (one
from each division plus XXIV Corps Artil-
lery) performed a vital function at Saipan.6
The total number of rounds fired, 291, 195, 7
tells only part of the story ; time and time again
the 75’s, 105’s and 155’s brought timely, effec-
tive lire on the precise source of enemy resist-
ance. Throughout this narrative the excellence
of this support has been taken for granted, just
as it was at the time. All artillery units were
exceptionally well -trained and well-led and,
once assigned missions, hit their targets. This
excellence of performance must not be forgotten
or mistaken in any subsequent criticism of
artillery coordination.

Only a minute proportion of the accidents
resulting from misdirected artillery fire can be
traced to errors by gunners. In any case, these
can neither be determined nor analyzed. The
bulk of the trouble arose from the fact that

5 Ibid., 2-8.

6 General Harper capsulized the XXIV Corps Artil-
lery’s role by saying that “. . . it reaped a harvest and
accomplished more in furtherance of the common cause
than possibly has ever been done by a similar group of
battalions in the history of the Army. Saipan was a
Corps Artilleryman’s dream.” Ltr from BrigGen A. M.
Harper to CG, USAFICPA, 13.Tul44.

7 This figure is derived from an addition of the totals
of each unit as listed in individual action reports. All,
save the 27th Division artillery, gave a specific figure
for Saipan : the exception gave a grand total for Saipan
and Tinian but did not separate the two. A reasonably
accurate estimate was provided, however, by the fact
that approximately two-thirds of its missions were
fired at Saipan : and, thus, approximately two-thirds
of its ammunition were expended there also. This
total does not include the rounds fired by the cannon
companies of the three infantry regiments of the 27th
Division, nor those fired by the regimental weapons
companies of the Marine regiments.

250

there was no strong , central control of the four
separate artillery units. This meant that no
single source could be consulted to find out who
was firing where. Before an air support mis-
sion could be flown, for example, it was neces-
sary to check with each individual artillery
unit. Though time-consuming, this process had
to be followed rigidly to preclude the possi-
bility of friendly aircraft flying into the path
of onrushing artillery shells. The most serious
consequence of this situation was that troop
commanders, having requested the air strike,
had to delay their moves until it was executed.8

Much more critical than the long waits, how-
ever, were the instances of barrages landing
within U. S. lines. Since it was inconceivable
that a forward observer would deliberately call
in fire upon his own head, the conclusion drawn
was that most of these misdirected concentra-
tions were called by observers on a flank. It
was long-established doctrine that artillery
should not tire outside its own division zone
without specific permission from the adjacent
division concerned; and, since all artillerymen
were well indoctrinated on this point, it must
be assumed that this was general practice. Just
how many, if any, accidents occurred because
of a violation of this policy can not be esti-
mated.

What, then, of the instances where permis-
sion to fire was requested and granted i Nor-
mally, this would appear virtually to guarantee
the mission’s safety. In most cases it did. In
some others, however, there is the possibility
that the front line unit had not accurately re-
ported its position or that the report was incor-
rectly plotted on situation maps. Another
startling possibility is that the unit requesting
permission to fire outside of its zone had erred
in its map reading, failing to orient properly
an area on the ground to one on the map. Thus,
permission to fire on a specific map location

8 Two plans were in effect at Saipan to protect
planes from the high ordinates of howitzers. One plan
restricted the trajectory of shells in a given area to a
specific maximum height. The other stopped all artil-
lery fire within a prescribed area. The latter plan
was the subject of vehement complaints from infantry
commanders, who at times were denied artillery sup-
port for periods ranging from 30 to 90 minutes.

may have been granted, whereas (lie rounds
themselves would fall into a ground area occu-
pied by friendly troops. The map of Saipan,
as indicated before, left much (o be desired,
and on many occasions individuals believed
themselves on certain terrain features located
in one area when in actuality they were in
another.

Obviously, the addition of a strong artillery
coordination agency would not automatically
have solved all these difficulties. Even well-
oiled machinery requires human hands to set it
in motion. But few persons will deny that more
centralized control of the artillery was needed
at Saipan.

The “joint operations section,” an embryo co-
ordination and control agency for all three sup-
porting arms (air, naval gunfire, artillery),
functioned from the NTLF command post.
But, hampered by a shortage of personnel and
communications, it was unprepared to control
properly all the U. S. artillery. Most of its
information had to be secured by roundabout,
indirect means which slowed its processes and
limited its effectiveness. Representatives of all
three supporting arms were present in the sec-
tion, however, and the work they did, with lim-
ited resources, was excellent. The limitations
of the group is indicated in the following ex-
cerpt from the Corps Artillery report :

Each time an air strike was requested by an Air
Liaison Officer to Commander Support Air Afloat, it
was necessary for the Commander Support Ah' to call
Commander Support Air Ashore by radio who in turn
inquired of the Corps Artillery representative [As-
sistant S-3] whether or not the Corps Artillery was
firing in a given area. Tie then had to call the Corps
Artillery FDC (where it was frequently necessary to
call the Croups or Battalions) and pass the informa-
tion back to Commander Support Air Afloat along the
same chain of communications. A similar situation
existed with naval gunfire, hut the time element was
not as vital nor was there the necessity for closely
timed coordination since naval gunfire and artillery
fires do not necessarily interfere with each other.9

Landing Vehiiles

Selection of the LVT as the principal land-
ing vehicle was demanded by the fringing reef
off Saipan’s western beaches. These vehicles

9 XXIV Corps Arty S-3 Report, 12-13.

251

flame-thrower tank shoots stream of fire into an enemy cave. Marine at rear of vehicle is talking on sound-
powered telephone to tankmen.

proved eminently sat isfactory. During the long
D-Day churn from t lie line of departure to the
beach, many officers and men cursed the slow-
ness of the LYT's, but when the tracks ground
into the reef, hung for an agonizing moment,
then clawed for t lie beach, the curses became
murmurs of appreciation.

Bobbing like ping pong balls in the choppy
seas, armored amphibians (or amphibian tanks
as t lie Army called them) preceded t lie troop-
carrying LYT's. It is doubtful that while
afloat armored LYT's were able to locate and
hit point targets, but the fact that continuous
fire was maintained upon the beaches was
enough to confirm their value. During the ship-
to-shore movement there is a short, but critical,

interval in which the troops are too close to the
shore to permit naval gunfire or air bombard-
ment of the landing beaches. During this
period at Saipan the armored LYT’s assumed
i lie starring role. Once upon the beach, these
vehicles suffered heavily.

The name “armored amphibian” presents a
false picture of the invulnerability of this
vehicle. While in the water the vulnerable
points are protected, but once it emerges upon
the dry land of the beach, or hangs for a mo-
ment at the reef’s edge, it presents a huge area
which can easily be penetrated by almost any
caliber of enemy shells. In reality, only the
turret is armored, the remainder is an inviting
Achilles heel.

252

The value of the armored LVT’s did not end
with the ship-to-shore movement. They per-
formed vital missions of beach security during
the nights and executed lire missions against
enemy coast line cliff positions during the days.

Significant in the Saipan operation was the
introduction of the LVT(4) , which included a
ramp for loading and discharge of cargo.
Jeeps, artillery pieces, and other heavy gear
were unloaded without the use of booms or
cranes — and with far less hazard to troops.10

The 4th Marine Division’s plan to move to
the high ground (0-1) aboard LVT’s did not
prove feasible. Only a few of the vehicles made
the trip successfully. The failure of this bold
tactic may be attributed to two causes : first,
the vehicles provided large, slow-moving tar-
gets for enemy weapons, and, second, the ter-
rain at many points forbade movement inland.

Every one of T 19 LVT’s and LVT(A)’s in
scheduled assault waves debarked from LST’s
on D-Day, and over 98 percent of these reached
the beaches as planned. Considering the heavy
volume of enemy fire which peppered the

10 Tar from Maj W. C. Stoll. Jr., to CMC. Iljan50.

beaches, this percentage is surprisin giy 1 1 1
Grouping combat and non-combat losses into
single categories, casualties in amphibian velii
cles for the entire operation were as follows:
armored LVT’s — 65; cargo LVT’s — Iff 9. 11

Tanks

While no startling innovations in tactics or
technique in the employment of tanks were un
veiled at Saipan, the operations of these
weapons were a vital, and often decisive, factor
in each day’s operations. Aside from proving
their superiority over the enemy’s tanks when
ever a duel could be provoked, U. S. armor
blasted pillboxes and caves impeding the in-
fantry advance, assisted in the evacuation of
casualties, carried vital supplies to hard-
pressed front line troops, and, on at least one
occasion, provided a mobile observation post
for the direction of naval gunfire. Throughout
the operation they were valuable to the per-
petuation of a high state of morale among the
soldiers and Marines who felt that virtually

- 11 NTLF T.VT Officer’s Report, 2(;.Tul44. Ltr from

LtCol V. .1. Croizat to CMC, 20Dec49.

medium tanks move through favorable terrain on Saipan. The firepower of these weapons was a vital factor in the
speedy United States success.

253

nothing could stop them as long as tanks were
present.

Saipan marked a further growth in the tech-
nique of tank-infantry cooperation. After the
inevitable growing pains of earlier campaigns
and training areas, the tank-infantry concept
reached full maturity at Saipan. Here,
through terrain more variable than that en-
countered in previous Pacific operations, the
tank- infantry team passed the rigid test of
combat.

At least one item of equipment which made
its first battle appearance at Saipan is worthy
of special note : tanks employing flame-throwers
as their main weapons. Though imperfect in
many respects, these served a useful purpose,
particularly in close assault on troublesome
locales. But against more distant targets the
weapon’s effectiveness was limited by the short
range of its fire stream, together with the un-
availability of napalm, demanding that ordi-
nary fuel oil be burned. Many of the principles
of tactical employment, as well as suggestions
for improvements in design and maintenance,
developed at Saipan.12

The operation also marked the first extensive
use — by the Marine Corps — of the tank-dozer.
This vehicle, nothing more than a medium tank
with a bulldozer blade installed on its bow,
performed vital missions of digging and filling,
while at the same time providing armored
protection to its personnel.

Devices for the added protection of tanks,
such as fencing the sponsons with oak plank-
ing as a preventive measure against magnetic
mines, were further developed at Saipan. Many
vehicles had reinforced concrete between the
planking and the armor plate as well as addi-
tional tank blocks welded to the glacis plate
and turret. Saipan was an important period of
elaboration and development in the technique

12 This was the progenitor of a much improved flame-
thrower vehicle used by the 1st Marine Division a few
months later at Peleliu. Chief improvement of the
Peleliu flame-thrower was a great increase in the
range of the fire stream, but the vehicle upon which
it was mounted — an LYT — was too vulnerable for full
effectiveness. The obvious outgrowth of this was the
installation of the long-range flame-thrower on a
medium Sherman tank. This weapon was used in the
Iwo .Tima operation.

of added protection, a technique that reached
its zenith in the Iwo Jima and Okinawa opera-
tions.

Perhaps the most unusual single items of
equipment relating to tanks at Saipan were
rubber, self-sealing water tanks, fastened to
the bustles of some of the 4th Tank Battalion’s
vehicles, enabling infantrymen to fill canteens
in the midst of a fire fight.13

Engineers

The functions of the engineers, in almost
any campaign, may be brushed over with the
brief notation that they did a good job. And
yet this inadvertently implies that the life of
an engineer is really not so bad after all. Such
cursory handling represents the fact that much
of what the engineers do is routine, unglamor-
ous, and tiresome. Certainly there is little
narrative value in the improvement of a road,
establishment of water purifier, or removal of
a tank barrier; these are tedious and humdrum
activities which are taken for granted. Even
the touchy job of disarming bombs, mines and
booby traps normally becomes an individual or
small group project and captures only passing
interest when performed in the midst of an
island conquest. One may only shudder to
contemplate the effect on the tactical scheme if
all these prosaic engineer duties were not per-
formed, however. Engineer support is inex-
tricably tied to the activities of the infantry,
and it is only fitting and proper that this re-
lationship be recognized in its true light.

The vital shore party function was executed
by the engineers, also. Initially assigned to
this backbreaking labor were the Pioneer (2d)
Battalions of the 18th and 20th Marines (2d
and 4th Divisions respectively) and two naval
construction (Seabee) battalions (18th and
121st). When the two Seabee units left the
beach on 18 June for work on Aslito Airfield,
the Army’s 152d Engineer Battalion (part of
the Saipan Garrison Eorce) took over shore
party functions on the Blue Beaches. At night
shore party personnel assumed responsibility
for beach security.

Later in the operation, when ships were un-
is R. K. Schmidt.

254

COMMUNICATION TEAM OF 1ST JASCO operates its SCR 284. Good United States communications at Saipan were
the key to controlling t lie complex amphibious assault forces. Poor Japanese communications, made worse by
United States tire superiority, were fatal to General Saito’s maneuver schemes.

loaded, shore parties were released for infantry
missions. The ‘2d Marine Division formed its
returning shore party personnel into a Pro-
visional Battalion which was used for a num-
ber of security and mopping-up assignments.
The 4th Division did not reorganize its pioneer
battalion after reversion but attached com-
panies to infantry regiments for “defensive
missions only.”

So far, only incidental mention has been
made of the combat, or assault, engineers. The
1st Battalions of the 18th and 20th Marines
and the 102d Engineer Battalion (U. S. Army)
furnished personnel especially trained in the
assault and demolition of blockhouses, pill-
boxes and caves. These battalions were broken
up into companies and attached to the infantry
regiments on the basis of one combat engineer
company each. Then followed the breakdown

from company to platoon with one assault en-
gineer platoon being assigned to each infantry
battalion.14 These attachments remained con-
stant throughout the operation, and in nearly
every instance in which demolitions were re-
quired, these engineers performed their dan-
gerous specialty.15

With these amplifying remarks, then, it is
safe to say that the engineers did a good job,
without fear that the statement will be under-
valued.

14 On 1 May 1945 a change in Marine Corps Tables
of Organization placed an assault platoon in each in-
fantry battalion. This platoon, similar to the assault
engineer platoons that operated at Saipan, was organ-
ized, equipped and trained to execute missions of assault
on fortified positions.

15 20th Mar Report, 1-13. 102d Engr Report, 1-3.

255

Signal Communications

In any careful analysis of the Japanese situa-
tion at Saipan, the failure of communications
crops forth steadily. Enemy commanders
nearly always found their hands tied by the
absence ot means to pass on instructions to
their subordinates. It would be difficult to de-
termine just how many of the enemy’s ill-co-
ordinated attacks could be traced directly to
poor communications.

U. S. commanders, on the other hand, had
a completely different experience and were
nearly always able to reach subordinates (usu-
ally by several means) to convey instructions,
orders and information. This was a priceless
advantage. One regimental commander pointed
out, in this connection:

. . . our communications worked so well that there is
a general disposition to take them for granted. The
work of signal troops is not spectacular and goes un-
noticed when everything is in working order, but abuse
is heaped upon them for each little failure. Sections
were usually under-manned and their work was never
finished.16

One item of signal equipment left much to
be desired: the infantry platoon leader’s radio
(SCR 536). Unpredictable, fragile, short-
ranged, easily affected by moisture, the tiny
sets did not answer the requirements. The need
for improvement of these radios was apparent
to all who had to depend upon them for com-
munications.17

Logistics

Logistics is “that branch of military art that
comprises everything relating to the movement
and supply of troops.”18 To most fighting men
the term took on a significance as fundamental
as beans and bullets. Few realized, for ex-
ample, that embarked in the assault shipping
for Saipan was a ratio of over a ton of equip-
ment and supplies to each man of the landing
force.1” Only by pausing for a moment over
that starting truth may we realize the tre-
mendous scope of logistical support. And, of
course, the supply of troops did not end with

16 Wallace.

17 1.tr from Capt W. H. Pickett to CMC. 9.Tan50.

1S Modern Military Dictionary, infill. Max B. Garber.

,D COMINCB P-007, 5-4.

the landing, nor even with securing of the
island. It may accurately be stated that the
logistical task is never done.

Tonnage carried by individual ships at
Saipan was greater than in previous operations.
In earlier days of the war, when air supremacy
over target areas was questionable, transports
were lightly loaded with the aim of quick un-
loading and rapid routing to a rear area. With
the air issue no longer in doubt, it followed
that the tonnage could be increased.

In general, throughout the operation, supply
functioned without critical hitches. In the
matter of mortar and artillery ammunition,
however, there were shortages from time to
time. This situation caused General Holland
Smith to comment that “seven units of fire for
artillery and mortar ammunition were gener-
ally inadequate.” In view of this, he recom-
mended that, in the future, ten units of fire
be carried for these weapons.20

Medical

Few persons, indeed, are aware of the great
number of personnel engaged in medical activ-
ities during a combat operation. The surgeon
of the 27th Division shed some interesting sta-
tistical light on this situation:

The medical service of the Division and attached
troops included the 102d Medical Battalion, the 98tli
Portable Surgical Hospital, the 28th Field Hospital,
and the organic Medical Detachments with each regi-
ment, separate battalion, etc. This made a total of
approximately 100 Medical Officers and 1200 Medical
Department enlisted men. or one Medical Department
man for every 1\ ) combatants. [Author’s italics.]21

A check of the rosters of the two Marine
divisions reveals a ratio of about one doctor or
corpsman to every 17 Marines.

It is almost superfluous to state that these
medical personnel were busy. While a great
number of minor wounds were handled directly
in the battalion and regimental aid stations
and never were admitted to division hospitals,
the following table of admissions indicates the
extent of the latters’ activities :

20 Ibid., 5-18. An examination of the Peleliu and
Iwo .Tima action reports reveals that this recommenda-
tion was not adopted for those campaigns.

21 27th Division Surgeon’s Report, 1.

256

saipan hospital was rough but ready. Speedy evacuation and expert medical attention was a key factor in main-
taining high morale.

TOTAL ADMISSIONS (all causes)

2nd Marine Division Hospital 5,150 22

4th Marine Division Hospital 5,203 23

27 1 li Infantry Division Hospital 4,274 24

In addition to the medical units attached to
the divisions were several Corps installations:
Medical Battalion, V Amphibious Corps; 3 1st
Field Hospital (Army) ; i2d and 3d Provi-

22 Report of activities of Medical Department, 2d
Marine Division during FORAGKR Operation, 8.

23 Medical Report, 4th Marine Division, 7.

24 27th Division Surgeon’s Report, Table I. This re-
port actually showed an aggregate of 5,106, 892 of
whom were killed in action. In the interest of con-
sistency with Marine reports (which did not include
KIA’s under Admissions) these 892 have been sub-
tracted from the total.

sional Portable Surgical Hospitals (Army).
And, though not actually on the island, the
doctors, nurses and corpsmen of the hospital
ships ( Solace , Bountiful , Relief and Samar-
itan) further swell the totals of medical per-
sonnel.

Also, though not specifically carried on
muster roles as medical personnel, the Marine
and soldier stretcher bearers were a vital cog
in the evacuation machinery. The lion’s share
of credit for this dangerous, fatiguing task
goes to the men of the division bands, who, in
combat situations, put aside their cornets and
trombones to man the stretchers. Few tasks in
combat are more thankless and heart-rending
than this. Obviously, these specially-assigned
stretcher bearers could not perform the entire

257

evacuation of casualties whs difficult and fatiguing.
Here a ponclio is used as a stretcher, a substitution
often necessary because of a shortage of stretchers.

chore, and it was often necessary to assign
regular combat troops to the job.

Still another category of personnel engaged
in medical support can be made of the pilots
who successfully air-evacuated 8G0 casualties
from Saipan to hospitals in the Marshalls.

The only new medical problem presented at
Saipan was the extra work load imposed by
tbe thousands of civilians, many of whom re-
quired care. Without exception, medical in-
stallations performed all tasks excellently and
earned the esteem and gratitude of all hands.

Japanese Tactical Lessons

In no battle up to that time were the Japa-
nese as conscientious about reporting and ana-
lyzing U. S. combat methods as they were at
Saipan. The volume of messages dealing purely
with tactical lessons clearly indicates that the
importance of this information had been force-
fully impressed on all Japanese commanders.
Some of the conclusions and deductions based
upon these reports are of interest, particularly
since many of them coincide with U. S. opin-
ions on the same subjects.

A staff officer of the Japanese Combined
Fleet, Captain Taisa Shimamura, wrote one of
the more astute studies on the subject of tac-
tical lessons. Prepared in August 1944, the
document was captured at Leyte, Philippine
Islands in October-November 1944. The cap-
tain’s observations as to the place of the U. S.
landings on Saipan is of interest:

Since the 31 Army’s arrival on Saipan in March of
this year all estimates were consistently in agreement
that the enemy would attempt landings at the harbor
on the west coast of Saipan, particularly at Oreai (the
actual landing place), and that he would attempt to
seize the “Aslito” airfield. In May the defending forces
even simulated such an action and executed joint Army-
Navy maneuvers. However, there were many other
suitable landing beaches elsewhere on the island.
Therefore it was not possible to concentrate sufficient
combat strength at Oreai. . . ,25

Shimamura’s remarks regarding the Japa-
nese organization of the ground point up
shortcomings which U. S. reports also em-
phasized :

Although the enemy landing area was anticipated
yet because of the following factors, fortifications had
not progressed much beyond the stage of a single line
of light defensive positions.

a. Coral sand impeded the strengthening of the beach
positions.

b. Cement did not arrive (due to transport sinkings).

c. Although the defense plan had been established,
the defensive positions were not organized in depth
owing to a change in command during preparations.

Light shelters were constructed here and there in the
beach position. There were practically no communica-
tion trenches leading from the beach position to the
rear. There were no obstacles on the beach.26

Relative to tbe conduct of tbe defense at
Saipan, Captain Shimamura observed:

On the night of the IGth (.Tune], we carried out a
large scale night attack [against the 6th Marines].
One battalion broke through a portion of the enemy’s
line and penetrated to his rear, but we suffered great
losses. Contact between higher headquarters and the
attacking force was disrupted and there was even a
rumor that Lt. Gen. Saito had been killed in action.

Further on in tbe same document is a logical
conclusion to tbe tactic of launching all-out
night attacks:

. . . it may be inferred that a more flexible delaying
action might have been executed even though the enemy

25 Captured Japanese document, “Tactical Lessons —
Naval Shelling of Saipan,” Captain Taisa Shimamura,
August 11)44, 2.

26 Ibid., 2-3.

258

had command of sea and air, if fortification and com-
munication had been adequate, if we had made thor-
ough preparations for the effective employment of our
forces, and if we had avoided t lie sudden weakening
of our defensive potential by limiting the number of
troops used in the night attack.27

It is significant to note that many of the
Japanese commanders recognized that the
frantic night assaults were foolish wastes of
manpower; but, rather than recommending
that this long-established tactic he discarded,
they instead suggested that the number of
troops committed to the nocturnal efforts be
reduced. Here is illustrated a basic, funda-
mental flaw in Japanese military thinking
which had been evidenced in every operation
since the war’s beginning: whenever there was
doubt in a commander’s mind as to the suc-
cess of a venture, he cut down the number of
troops committed and, thus, foredoomed it to
almost certain failure.

All of the reasoning leading up to a specific
recommendation in regard to night attacks is
present in the following passages from Shima-
mura’s study, but a helpful conclusion is not
forthcoming :

In the execution of our night attacks, we must give
further study to the coordinated use of our strength,
the use of smoke, and the use of small, picked units.
But the chief consideration [author’s italics] is the fact
that ... a night attack by the hulk of the defending
force might defeat its purpose and help the enemy in
securing his landing.

Thus leaving the reader suspended, the captain
anticlimatically added: “The night attack is
our only recourse against the enemy, but at
present even it has only a slight chance of
success. M

Japanese conclusions in regard to U. S.
naval gunfire have already been quoted, but
Shimamura’s analysis exposes one point which
other enemy sources did not (and which many
U. S. sources did) :

The duration of naval shelling during landing prepa-
rations depends upon the degree of neutralization and
destruction the enemy deems necessary. Apparently
because of heavy losses [suffered by U. S. forces] in
the Saipan landing after only two days of preliminary
shelling, in their subsequent landing on Guam, pre-

27 1 hid., 4-5.

28 Ibid., 8-9.

liminary shelling continued for ton days with the ob-
vious intention of destroying gun emplacements and
positions.29

The lessons learned in regard to the applica-
tion of air power were a summitry of more than
the Saipan operation:

Needless to say, air power is the best means of dis-
rupting an enemy landing. However, there is not a
single instance in the past where tin* enemy was de-
stroyed upon binding or his plans frustrated by air
power. In view of this, the urgent need of the moment
upon which the fate of our nation depends, is to supple-
ment the combat power of the forces responsible for
island defense by the consolidated use of all available
weapons and material.

In another part of the same document Captain
Shimamura commented that the Japanese
forces had been “exposed to such air superi-
ority since Guadalcanal, and . . . have been
completely immobilized by day in battle after
battle.”30

Perhaps the most important tactical lesson
which the Japanese drew from Saipan was the
importance of organizing their defenses in
depth. At Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa,
the enemy did not depend upon a shallow,
linear defense but, instead, prepared positions
in considerable depth. Bitter experience finally
taught its lesson, but the Japanese were re-
luctant pupils.

One of the foremost criticisms of Japanese
tactics by U. S. sources was the failure to mass
artillery fire. Later in the war the enemy cor-
rected this shortcoming, but it is interesting to
note that the weakness is not mentioned in any
cf the Japanese messages or studies prepared
after Saipan.

Japanese Strategical Summary

The decisive defeat at Saipan shook Tokyo
to its deepest roots. Almost unanimously, in-

29 Ibid., G. Unfortunately, Shimamura credited us
with a deduction that we did not make. The lengthy
preparation for Guam was more accidental than
planned, inasmuch as the reason was the delay imposed
by the necessity of returning ships from the Marianas
to Pearl Harbor to lift the 77th Infantry Division. The
commitment of the 27th Division at Saipan had left a
vacancy in the Guam plans which had to be filled.
Spr nance.

30 Ibid., 7-8.

259

the victor at Saipan was t lie front line infantryman,
who, despite t lie tremendous tonnage of supporting
iires, still had to root out and defeat the enemy. Here
a 16-ineh naval shell provides a seat for a ragged
Marine as he returns several days’ accumulation of
topsoil to Saipan. This man’s rifle is clean.

formed Japanese concluded that the war was
lost. Three months before the Saipan opera-
tion began, the Japanese General Staff recom-
mended making peace with the United States
because of severe shipping losses, but it was not
until the jolting loss of Saipan that the opinion
became general. After the shocking news had
reached Tokyo, Premier Ilideki Tojo an-
nounced that: “Japan has come to face an un-
precedentedly great national crisis." Almost
immediately, Tojo, the one man most respon-
sible for his country’s entry into the war, was
relieved as active head of the Japanese army,
which post he held by virtue of his position as
Chief of Staff. This was only the beafinninc
of To jo’s downfall ; on 18 July 1944 Tojo, with
his entire cabinet, resigned, and General Ku-
niaki Koiso succeeded him as premier. The
new government Avas charged with giving

“fundamental reconsideration” to the problem
of continuing the Avar.31

After stating that he considered Guadal-
canal the turning point from Japan’s offensive
to defensive, Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano,
Supreme Naval Advisor to the Emperor, spoke
in forceful terms of that time when Japan’s
hopes for effective defense ended. “When we
lost Saipan, Hell is on us.”32 Vice Admiral
Shigeru Fukudome, Avho had served in a num-
ber of prominent naval positions, spoke along
the same lines: “With the loss of the Marianas
1 felt that the last chance had slipped from us
definitely.33 Lending further testimony to the
same opinion Avas Vice Admiral Shigeyosh
Miwa, Avho said: “Our war Avas lost with the
loss of Saipan. I feel it Avas a decisive battle.
The loss of Saipan meant [that the U. S.J
could cut off our shipping and attack our
homeland.”34

As noted in the narrative of the Battle of the
Philippine Sea, Japanese naval air strength
had been virtually eliminated from the war in
that deciswe engagement. Captain Mitsuo
Fuchida, air staff officer to the Commander in
Chief, Combined Fleet, underlined this fact:

. . . this operation [Marianas] Avas to be a decisive one
because we felt if the Marianas Avere lost there could
no longer be a dependable line even in the Philippines.
So Ave planned an all out attack and used up practically
all of our air strength.35

31 Campaigns, 220.

32 USSBS Interrogation Nav No. 80, Fleet Admiral
Nagano, Osami, Chief of Naval General Staff Apr41-
Feb44; Supreme Naval Advisor to the Emperor, 20
Nov45.

33 USSBS Interrogation Nav No. 115, VAdm Fuku-
dome, Shigeru, IJN, 9-12Dec45. Chief of Staff, Com-
bined Fleet from 1040 to Apr41 ; Chief First Section,
Naval General Staff, Tokyo, Apr41-May43; Chief of
Staff, Combined Fleet from May43— Mar44 ; Comman-
der, Second Air Fleet, .T u 1 44—1 5.T an45 ; Commander,
10th Area Fleet, 15Jan45— Dec45.

34 USSBS Interrogation Nav No. 72, VAdm Mhva,
Shigeyosh, IJN ; successively director Naval Submarine
Department and CinC Sixth (Submarine) Fleet.

35 USSBS Interrogation Nav No. 99, Capt Fuchida
Mitsuo, T.TN, 25Nov45. Senior staff officer of First Air
Fleet in Avliich capacity he seiwed in the Marianas
Sept43-Apr44 ; air staff officer to CinC Combined Fleet
from Apr44 to end of AA-ar.

260

the cost of Saipan was over 3,000 killed. Here a rifle and helmet mark the location of a dead Marine so that
he may be picked up for proper burial.

The Assessment

It is plain, from these expressions, that the
Japanese were fully cognizant of what Saipan’s
loss meant. Their assessment was accurate:
it was the the beginning of the end.

To relatives of fighting men in the far-ofl
United States, news of casualties (see Ap-
pendix III) was staggering. Imperceptible to
many were the facts that the enemy's lleet had
lost the potential of operating beyond the cov-
ering range of shore-based aircraft and that a
base providing adequate airfields for long-
range raids against the Japanese homeland had
been seized. These were vital truths, which
Secretary of the Navy Janies Y. For rest a I ex-
pressed as follows: “The final occupation of
Saipan will enable us to project surface and air

operations that will include the mainland of
Japan, the Philippines, and a greater part of
the Dutch Fast Indies.’'’36

But even for those who took the trouble to
examine a map and found that Saipan was,
indeed, within land-based aircraft striking dis-
tance of the Empire, the true import was not
apparent. To most, Saipan was a dirty little
plot of ground, many thousands of miles from
the United States, where over 3,000 Americans
died. In the frantic flood of war news and the
continuation of the assault against Japan, it is
doubtful that many United States citizens ever
made the real assessment.

Looking back on the battle, realizing its sig-
nificance in the course of the war in the Pacific.

36 Quoted from History of World War II, Miller, (583

261

analyzing its effect on the Japanese military
and citizenry, we may now recognize Saipan in
its proper perspective. In this connection, Gen-
eral Holland Smith wrote:

I have always considered Saipan the decisive battle
of the Pacific offensive. Creasy, establishing the cri-
terion for his Battles defined decisive as an event
which varied the world drama in all its subsequent
scenes. Saipan was decisive because it varied the Pa-
cific drama in all its subsequent scenes.

Iwo .Jima and Okinawa were costlier battles and
carried us closer to Japan, but their capture was made
possible only by our earlier success at Saipan, which
breached Japan’s inner defense line, destroyed the main
bastions and opened the way to the home islands.37

Precisely, how had Saipan “varied the Paci-
fic drama in all its subsequent scenes?” Before
Saipan, the United States and Japan both
had powerful carrier-based air; after Saipan,
only that of the United States was effective.
Before Saipan, U. S. land-based bombers were
beyond range of the Japanese homeland (ex-
cept for the tenuously held air bases in China) ;
after Saipan, land-based U. S. bombers could
rain destruction upon the Japanese cities. Be-
fore Saipan, U. S. submarines were based
approximately 2,400 miles from Japanese home
waters; after Saipan, the distance was reduced
by about one-half, increasing submarine effi-
ciency vastly. Before Saipan, the Japanese
government that had precipitated the war
against the United States was still in power;
after Saipan, the government changed and the
new one was directed to reconsider the feasi-
bility of continuing the war. In these respects
the Pacific drama had been varied.

Saipan was a bold venture in which 1. S.
soldiers, sailors and Marines challenged and
defeated Japanese might. It was a matter of
projecting U. S. arms and resources 1,000
nautical miles from the nearest base into the
very heart of an island group possessing a
powerful potential. Previous island hops had
not exceeded (>()() miles and never had sur-

21 Coral and Brass, 1 SI.

rounding enemy air bases been as close or as
powerful. In this situation the enemy was
brought to his knees.

But on his knees lie fought. And the Japa-
nese fought well in this, or any other, position.
Whenever men of various parts of the world
are compared in fighting tenacity, the men of
Japan must rate among the best. Their fight-
ing psychology has often been called fanati-
cism, but the connotation of that term perhaps
does the Japanese an injustice. Perhaps “in-
spired patriotism” is a fairer appraisal. At
any rate, the Japanese were possessed of fight-
ing characteristics of which any nation could
be proud.

From the acrid beginning until the bitter
end, the Saipan operation represented a tri-
umph of the well -led over the poorly-led, the
more-skilled over the less-skilled, the stronger
over the weaker. Reduced to its basic formula,
this spelled success for one, doom for the other.
And yet, to fail to mention the myriad ex-
amples of personal heroism by U. S. forces
would be a serious omission indeed. In addi-
tion to the six men (four Marines, two sol-
diers) who posthumously received the Medal
of Honor, there were thousands of examples of
heroic acts, most of which were never officially
recognized. U. S. forces, though less anxious
than their adversaries to expend themselves
in battle, showed no hesitancy in executing
assigned missions — even when prospects for
immediate success were not particularly bright.
With all the superiority granted by weapons
and supply, there is still no substitute for
fighting when the enemy chooses to fight to the
bitter end.

From the top commanders who initiated the
strategic planning, to the front line riflemen
who wrested the soil from the subborn de-
fenders, the traditional “well done” applies.
Now, as never before, the United States was
truly at the Empire’s threshold. A strong,
hard fist was hammering on Japan’s front
door.

262

mEEHS

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

APPENDIX I

Bibliography

The preparation of the Saipan monograph
entailed consultation of several thousand docu-
ments. Many of these merely confirmed infor-
mation found in other sources, some contrib-
uted only a single fact or an isolated im-
pression, still others were so general that they
could hardly be considered as valuable. In this
bibliography, therefore, only the most im-
portant and useful will be mentioned. Unless
noted differently, the below listed documents
are filed in the Marine Corps Historical Divi-
sion.

Documents

JICPOA Information Bulletins 7—14 and 29-
44. The former, entitled “Marianas,” gives
detailed facts concerning the islands' ap-
pearance, history, geography, climate and
people. The latter, entitled “Weather Sur-
vey for Carolines and Marianas,” gives
weather statistics for the islands.

VAC G-2 Study of the Theater of Operations,
Southern Marianas. Contains descriptions
of Saipan, Tinian, Aguijan, and Ilota, to-
gether with information on terrain, climate
and meteorology. This document was very
important in the preparations of detailed
landing force attack plans.
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Operation Plan 3-44,
23Apr44. Assigns southern Marianas as a
specific objective. Filed at Naval Records
and Library.

TF 51 Operation Plan A10-44, 6May44. As-
signs detailed missions to troops and ships
of the Joint Expeditionary Force.

TF 5G Operation Plan 3M4, 26Apr44. NTLF
Operation Plan 3—44. 2d Mar Div Operation
Order 18, lMay44. 4th Mar Div Operation
Plan 4-A4, 6May44. These documents give
troop plans for the seizure of Saipan. The
27th Infantry Division prepared 21 separate
plans for possible employment at any of the
Marianas objectives; three preferred plans—
llq 27th Inf Div Opn Plan I, II, and I II—
are filed at the U. S. Army Historical Divi-
sion.

COMINCH P-007, 30Dec44, “Invasion of the
Marianas, June to August 1944.” Prepared
at the Headquarters of the Commander in
Chief, United States Fleet, this document
is a valuable synthesis of action reports re-
ceived from major subordinate units parti-
cipating in the Saipan, Tinian and Guam
operations.

ComFI FTI1 Fleet Reports (Initial and Final)
on the Operation to Capture the Marianas
Islands, 13Jul44 and 30Aug44, respectively.
The former report contains a comprehensive
summary of the Battle of the Philippine
Sea ; the latter draws general conclusions
(chiefly strategic) regarding the entire Mari-
anas campaign.

TF 51 Report on Amphibious Operations for
the capture of the Marianas Islands, 25Aug

263

44. Contains detailed, day-by-day account
of activities of all principal elements of the
Joint Expeditionary Force, 15 enclosures.

TF 56 Report on FORAGER, 20ct44. Basic
report of Commanding General Expedition-
ary Troops, seven enclosures in separate
volumes, covering planning, operations, in-
telligence, logistics, personnel and special
staff officers’ reports.

NTLF Special Action Report of Marianas,
Phase I, Saipan, 12Aug44. Recounts in
detail the day-by-clay progress of the landing
force, from early planning stages to opera-
tion's conclusion, 12 enclosures in separate
volumes. Most valuable source for over-all
summary of ground action at Saipan. En-
closure I contains reports of XXIV Corps
Artillery, NTLF Air Officer and NTLF
Naval Gunfire Officer.

2d Mar Div Special Action Report, Phase I.
Marianas, undated. Narrative account of
division activities from initiation of plan-
ning to the end of the operation. Contains a
number of excellent photographs showing
the terrain over which the division operated.
Action reports of regiments and battalions
of 2d Marine Division filed in separate
folders.

4th MarDiv Operations Report Saipan. 15
Jun— 9Jul44. Narrative account of division
activities from initiation of planning to the
end of operation. Contains, in addition to
reports of staff sectons, reports of major
subordinate units, 12 annexes.

27th Inf Div Report of Operations on Saipan,
240ct44. Narrative account of division's
activities from initiation of planning to the
end of operation. Contains, in addition to
reports of staff sections, reports of major
subordinate units and activities. 14 volumes.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA translations of cap-
tured Japanese documents including field
orders, message files, “lessons learned” sum-
maries, recommendations, organization
charts, and diaries. Of this great mass of
material. Item #9983—85, “Dispatches sent
and received by 31st Army Headquarters on
Saipan from 13 to 29 June 1944 . . .” is by
far the most valuable.

Proceedings of a board of officers appointed to
inquire into the circumstances surrounding
the relief of Major General Ralph C. Smith,
0-4723, USA, from command of the 27th
Infantry Division while engaged in the FOR-
AGER operation. The proceedings, exhibits,
testimony of witnesses, and conclusions con-
tained in this board’s report, though some-
times prejudiced and opinionated, provide a
wealth of narrative detail relating to the
Saipan operation.

Primary Sources

The War Reports of General George C. Mar-
shall., General Henry II. Arnold and. Ad-
miral Ernest J . King. New York and Phila-
delphia : J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The
Campaigns of the Pacific War. Washington :
Government Printing Office, 1946.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey. In-
terrogations of Japanese Officials. 2 Volumes,
Washington : Government Printing Office,
1946.

Secondary Sources

Arnold, Henry U. Global Mission. New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1949.

Buchanan, A. R., editor. The Navy's Air War ,
A Mission Completed. New York : Harper
and Brothers for Aviation History Unit OP-
519B, DCNO (Air), 1946.

Daniel, Hawthorne. Islands of the Pacific.
New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1943.

Haugland, Vern. The AAF Against Japan.
New York and London: Harper and

Brothers, 1948.

Historical Division, War Department, Wash-
ington, D. C. Small Unit Actions. Wash-
ington : Government Printing Office, 1946.

Hough, Frank O. The Island War : The United
States Marine Corps in the Pacific. Phila-
delphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott
Company, 1947.

Howard, Clive, et al. One Damned Island Af-
ter Another. Chapel Hill : University of
North Carolina Press, 1946.

Johnston, Richard W. Follow Me! New York:
Random House, 1948.

264

Josephy, Alvin M., et al. Uncommon Valor:
Marine Division in Action. Washington:
Infantry Journal Press, 1946.

Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports.
New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949.

Knox, Dudley W. A History of the United
States Navy. New York: G. P. Putnams
Sons, 1948.

Krieger, Herbert W. Smithsonian War Bach-
ground Studies Number Sixteen , People of
the Western Pacific , Micronesia and Mela-
nesia. Mli lt:i mo re : Lord Baltimore Press,
1943.

Love, Edmund G. The 27th Infantry Division
in World War II. Washington: Infantry
Journal Press, 1949.

Miller, Francis Trevelyan. History of World
War II. Philadelphia and Toronto: The
John C. Winston Company, 1945.

Pratt, Fletcher. The Marines ’ War. New York :
William Sloane Associates, 1948.

Proehl, Carl W. The Fourth Marine Division
in World War II. Washington : Infantry
Journal Press, 1946.

Robson, II. W. The Pacific Islands Handbook.
19fJf. New York: The MacMillan Com-
pany, 1945.

Sherrod, Robert. On to Westward , War in
the Central Pacific. New York: Duell, Sloan
and Pearce, 1945.

Smith, Holland M. Coral and Brass. New
York : Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1949.

Stockman, James R., et al. Campaign for the
Marianas. Philadelphia: Marine Corps Pub-
licity Bureau for Historical Division, IJ. S.
Marine Corps, 1946.

Yanaihara, Tadao. Pacific Islands Under

889590° — 50 — 18

Japanese Mandate. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1940.

Periodicals

Donovan, James A., Jr. “Saipan Tank Battle."

Marine Corps Gazette , October 194-1.

Ileinl, Robert D., Jr. “Naval Gunfire Support
in Landing.” Marine Corps Gazette, Sep-
tember 1945.

Ilockmuth, Bruno A. “Observations on Sai-
pan.” Marine Corps Gazette , January 1945.
Love, Edmund G. The 27th’s Battle for
Saipan.” Infantry Journal , September 1946.
Sherrod, Robert. “Battalion on Saipan." Ma-
rine (dorps Gazette. October 1944.
Stockman, Janies R. “The Taking of Mt.
Tapotehau.” Marine Corps Gazette , July
1946.

Letters and Interviews

In addition to sources already cited, over
300 officers and men in key positions during
the Saipan operation were consulted by letter
or interview. Many of the letters were in com-
ment on a preliminary draft of this mono-
graph. In addition to correcting errors of
omission or commission, these letters were help-
ful in confirming statements which had been
gleaned from impersonal, frequently confus-
ing, action reports. To list each of these let-
ters and interviews separately would impose
too much bulk upon this manuscript. Suffice
it is to say that these are available in the work-
ing tiles of the Marine Corps Historical Divi-
sion for the reference of any bona fide student
of this phase of military history. Many of
these letters and interviews have been cited at
appropriate points throughout the monograph.

265

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

APPENDIX II

Chronology

1944

1 May

30 January-

U. S. Marines and Army

23 February

troops seize Marshalls Islands.

17—18 February

Task Force 58 strikes Truk,
revealing weakness of that
base. Decision to by-pass
comes soon after.

17-19 May

22—23 February

Task Force 58 strikes South-
ern Marianas.

29 February

U. S. Army troops land at
Los Negros in the Admiral-
ties.

21 May

12 March

Joint Chiefs of Staff direct
that Southern Marianas be
seized, target date 15 June.

25 May

20 March

4th Marines (Reinforced)

seizes Emirau.

Admiral Nimitz issues FOR-
AGER -loint Staff Study set-
ting forth the purpose of the

29-30 May

22 March

Marianas Operation.

U. S. Army troops land at

6—11 June

23 March

I Iollandia.

Admiral Nimitz issues opera-
tion order for Marianas; Ad-

11—13 June

mirals Spruance and Turner
follow suit.

14 June

30 March—

Disk Force 58 strikes Western

1 April

Carolines.

20 April

Expeditionary Troops opera-
tion order states mission

15 June

“. . . to capture, occupy and

defend Saipan, Tinian and 16 June

Guam. .

Northern Troops and Landing
Force issues operation order;
2d and 4th Marine Divisions
to land on Saipan’s western
beaches in the Charan Kanoa
vicinity.

Landing Force maneuvers and
rehearses at Maui and Kahoo-
lawe, IT awaiian Islands.

Six LST’s, embarking assault
elements of the two Marine
divisions, burn at Pearl Har-
bor.

LST’s, carrying assault ele-
ments of the two Marine divi-
sions, LVT’s and artillery, de-
part Pearl Harbor.

Portions of the two divisions
not embarked in LST’s, de-
part Pearl Harbor.

Joint Expeditionary Force at
Eniwetok for final staffing.
Task Force 58 executes pre-
paratory bombardment of
Saipan.

Fire support ships of the
Northern and Southern At-
tack Forces arrive at Saipan
and commence bombardment.
2d and 4th Marine Divisions
land at Saipan.

27th Infantry Division begins
landing at Saipan.

266

1 (> — 17 June

17 June

18 June
19-20 June

22 June
24 June

25 June

28 June

4 July

Japanese launch strong, un-
successful tank-infantry night
attack against 6th Marines.

First observation planes
(OY’s) land at Charan Kanoa
airstrip.

165th Infantry captures As-
lito Airfield.

Battle of the Philippine Sea.
Japanese Navy suffers deci-
sive defeat.

Aslito airfield becomes opera-
tional for fighter aircraft.

Major General Ralph C.
Smith relieved as commander,
27th Infantry Division; Major
General Sanderford Jarman
assumes command.

Alt. Tapotcliau, Saipan’s key
terrain feature, captured by
8th Marines. Ivagman Penin-
sula seized by 4th Marine Di-
vision.

Major George W. Griner, Jr.
assumes command of the 27th
Infantry Division, relieving
Major General Sanderford
Jarman.

Advance reaches Tanapag
Seaplane Base; 2d Marine Di-
vision pinched out of lines.

Japanese launch savage all-
out banzai attack along Tana-
pag Plain; 105th Infantry
and 3d Battalion, 10th Ma-
rines hardest hit.

2d Marine Division passes
through 27th Infantry Divi-
sion for mop-up of Tanapag
Plain.

4th Marine Division reaches
Marpi Point; Admiral Turner
announces Saipan secured;
mop-up begins; 2d and 4th
Marine Divisions get ready
for Tinian operation.

Major General I Iarry Schmidt
assumes command of North-
ern Troops and Landing
Force when Lieutenant Gen-
eral Holland Smith decides to
go to Guam; Major General
Clifton B. Cates assumes
command of 4th Marine Di-
vision.

3d Battalion, 6th Marines,
captures Maniagassa Island.
Aslito Airfield becomes opera-
tional for Liberator bombers
(B-24) .

Aslito airfield becomes opera-
tional for B— 29’s.

Saipan -based B— 29’s raid
Tokyo.

(> — 7 J uly

8 July

9 July

12 July

13 July
9 August

15 October
24 November

267

SIAPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

APPENDIX III

Casualties'

UNIT

Killed or Died of Wounds

Wounded

TOTAL

Officers

Enlisted

Officers

Enlisted

Officers

Enlisted

NTLF Troops2.

148

170

\ X IV ( lorps Art \ I SA '■

2d Marine Division;

Division Troops'

161

178

2d Marines;

H&S and Weapons

1st Bn..

239

300

2d Bn

207

252

3d Bn

243

319

6th Marines;

H&S and Weapons

114

1st Bn

323

413

2d Bn

120

335

455

3d Bn

105

408

513

8th Marines;

II&S and Weapons

1 t lb.

355

445

2d Bn

364

455

3d Bn

304

393

1st Bn, 29th Marines

333

424

loth Marines6

237

325

18th Marines.

355

428

2d Armd Amph Bn

100

136

2d Amph Trac Bn

5th Amph Trac Bn

2d Tank Bn

4th Marine Division;
Division Troops6.

101

117

28d Marines ;

II&S and Weapons

1st Bn

304

388

2d Bn.

278

375

3d Bn

275

370

24th Marines;

II&S and Weapons

1st Bn

319

390

2d Bn

295

373

3d Bn

109

355

464

Murine casualty figures furnished by Machine Records Section, HQMC, on 23Nov49 for period 15 June-9 July 1944.
Included in this category for purposes of this breakdown: V ACHq, Med Bn, Sig Bn, Air Del Sec, Amph Recon Bn,
I Nth and 121st. NC Bns, 7th Fid Dpt, AWS =5, and other Corps Ilq Troops.

3 Figures from XXIV Corps Arty S-l Report.

Included in this category for purposes of this breakdown: Div Hq, MP Co, Sig Bn, Recon Co, Prov Rkt Det, VMO,
JASCO, Ser Bn, MT Bn, and Med Bn.

Also includes 2d 155rn Howitzer Bn, V Amphibious Corps.

Included in this category for purposes of this breakdown: Div Hq., MP Co, Sig Bn, Recon Co, Prov Rkt Det, VMO,
JASCO Ser Bn, and Med Bn.

268

UNIT

Killed or Died of Wounds

Wounded

TOTAL

Officers

Enlisted

Officers

Enlisted

Officers

Enlisted

25 th Marines;

H&S and Weapons

1st Bn . .

267

334

2d Bn

288

376

3d Bn

297

375

14th Marines7 _ .

227

271

20th Marines

140

166

10th Amph Trac. Bn

4th Tank Bn

UNIT

Killed in Action

Wounded

in Action

Missing in Action

T< )TAL

Officers

Enlisted

Officers

Enlisted

Officers

Enlisted

( Ifficers

Enlisted

27th Infantry Division ,8

Special Troops . _

105 th Inf Reg;

1st Bn _ . .

199

276

2.5

521

2d Bn _ .

166

291

486

3d Bn

158

205

Sp Units ._

106

Det 295 JASCO_ _

106th Inf Reg;

1st Bn _

224

270

2d Bn

1-1

206

257

3d Bn

206

256

Sp Units .

Det 295 JASCO

165 th Inf Reg;

1st Bn

237

306

2d Bn

233

284

3d Bn

1 49

188

Sp Units

Det 295 JASCO

27th Div Arty..

102d Med Bn

1165th Engr Group

Co C, 88th Chemical Bn

• 3

102d Engr Bn

773d Amph Trac Bn

762d Tank Bn _

38th Fid I losp9

708th Amph Tank Bn10

155

184

715th Amph Trac Bn10 .

534th Amph Trac Bn10

GRAND TOTAL* 11..

195

2,949

588

10,364

125

786

13,438

7 Also includes 4th 105mm Howitzer Battalion, V Amphibious Corps.

8 Since no revised 27th Infantry Division casualty figures for the period 15 June-9 July are available, 27th Infantry
Division G-l Report for 21 July has been used.

9 From 27th Inf Div G-l Periodic Report, 11Ju144.

10 From “Army Amphibious Tractor and Tank Battalions in the Battle for Saipan, 15 June-9 July 1944", LstLt It. A.
Gugeler, USA, 20Jan45. No breakdown into officers and enlisted was shown.

11 The following U. S. Army organizations suffered no casualties during the operation: 94th and 95th Bomb Disp Squads,
1st Plat, 604th Graves Reg (QM ) Co, and 98th Portable Surgical Hospital.

269

APPENDIX IV

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Command and Staff
List of Major Units'

E.rpedi tion ary Troops

Commanding

General LtGen Holland M. Smith.

Chief of Staff IirigGen Graves B. Erskine.

G-1 LtCol Albert F. Metze.

G— 2 Col St. .Tulien R. Marshall.

G— 3 Col John C. McQueen.

G—4 Col Raymond E. Knapp.

G— 5 Col Joseph T. Smith.

Xorthern Troops lad Landing Force
Commanding

General LtGen Holland M. Smith.

Chief of StalT IirigGen Graves B. Erskine.

G— 1 LtCol Albert F. Metze.

G— 2 LtCol Thomas R. Yancey (USA).

G— 3 Col Robert E. Hogaboom.

G — 1 LtCol Joseph C. Anderson (USA).

2d Marine Division

Commanding

General MajGen Thomas E. Watson.

Assistant Division

Commander BrigGen Merritt A. Edson.

Chief of StalT Col David AT. Slump.

D-1 LtCol James T. Wilbur.

D-2 LtCol Thomas .T. Colley.

D-3 LtCol Wallace M. Greene, Jr.

D — 1 Col Robert .1. Straub.

2d Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Walter .T. Stuart.

Executive Officer LtCol John H. Griebel.

R-1 Capt Leonard G. Hicks.

R-2 Capt John L. Schwabe.

R— 3 Maj Samuel D. Mandeville, Jr.

R-4 Maj Harold “K” Throneson.

1 Changes in commanders only are shown. Officers
listed in other staff positions are those who originally
landed with the unit at Saipan. Casualties other than
commanders are not shown.

1st Battalion, 2d Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Wood B. Kyle.

Executive Officer Maj Wendell W. Andrews.

Bn-3 Maj Charles P. Lewis, .Tr.

2d Battalion, 2d Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Richard C. Nutting.

Executive Officer Maj Michael P. Ryan.

Bn-3 IstLt William B. Somerville.

3d Battalion, 2d Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Arnold F. Johnston

( WIA 21 June).

Maj Harold “K” Throneson
(21 June to 4 July).
LtCol Arnold F. Johnston
(from 5 July).

Executive Officer Maj Benjamin T. Owens.

Bn-3 Capt Richard Phillippi.

6th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col James P. Riseley.

Executive Officer LtCol Kenneth F. McLeod.

R-1 Capt Philip .T. Costello.

R-2 Capt Donald V. Nahrgang.

R-3 Maj Loren E. Haffner.

R-4 Maj Cyril C. Sheehan.

1st Battalion, 6th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol William K. Jones.

Executive Officer Maj James A. Donovan. Jr.

P.n-3 Capt Charles H. Triplett.

2d Battalion, 6th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Raymond L. Murray

(WIA 15 June).

Maj LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr.
(from 15 June).

Executive Officer Maj Howard J. Rice.

Bn-3 Capt Joseph E. Rowland.

270

3d Battalion, 6th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol John W. Easley

( WIA 15 J une) .
Maj John E. Rentsch
(15 June to 2 July).
LtCol John W. Easley
( from 3 July ) .

Executive Officer Maj John E. Rentsch.

Bn -3 Capt Edward L. Singletary.

8th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Clarence R. Wallace.

Executive Officer LtCol Jack P. Julian.

R-l Capt Lloyd E. Iverson.

R-2 IstLt James H. Kavanagh, Jr.

R-3 Maj William II. Souder, Jr.

R-4 Maj Alfred E. Holland.

1st Battalion , 8th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Lawrence C. Hays, Jr.

Executive Officer Maj Robert J. Oddy.

Bn-3 Maj Daniel V. McWethy, Jr.

2d Battalion, 8th Marines

Battalion

(' ini under LtCol Henry P. Crowe

(WIA 15 June).

Maj William C. Chamberlin
( from 15 June).

Executive Officer Maj William C. Chamberlin.

Bn-3 Capt Arthur .T. Rauchle.

3d Battalion, 8th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol John C. Miller

(WIA 15 June).

Maj Stanley E. Larsen
( from 1 5 .1 une ) .

Executive Officer Maj Stanley E. Larsen.

Bn-3 Capt Osborne K. LeBlanc.

1st Battalion. 29th Marines
(Attached to 2d MarDiv)

Battalion

Commander LtCol Guy E. Tannyhill

( WIA 1 7 June 1 .

LtCol Rathvon M. Tompkins
(from 17 June, WIA 2 July).

LtCol. Jack I’. Julian

(from. 2 July, reverted to
8th Marines’ executive officer
4 July).

Maj William W. McKinley
(from 4 July).

Executive Officer Maj William S. Vasconcellos.

Bn-3 Maj William W. McKinley.

10th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Raphael Griffin.

Executive Officer LtCol Ralph E. Forsyth.

R-1 IstLt Russell C. White.

R-2 Capt Robert W. Sullivan.

R-3 LtCol Howard V. Hiett.

R-4 Capt Edward R. Gilbert.

1st Battalion, 10th Marines

Battalion

Commander Col Presley M. Rixey

(transferred to Regimental
Executive Officer on 24 Junei
Maj Wendell II. Best
( from 25 June) .

Executive Officer Maj. Wendell II. Best.

Bn-3 Capt Michael J. Bo.

2d Battalion, 10th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol George R. E. Shell

( WIA Id June).

Maj Kenneth C. Houston
( from 16 June) .

Executive Officer Maj Kenneth C. Houston.

Bn-3 Capt Richard B. Cavanaugh.

3d Battalion. 10th Marines

Battalion

Commander Maj William I,. Crouch

( KIA 7 July).

Maj James O. Appleyard
( from 8 July ) .

Executive Officer Maj Wade H. Hitt.

Bn-3 Capt Alan II. Tally.

J/th Battalion, 10th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Kenneth A. Jorgensen.

Executive Officer LtCol Harry N. Shea.

Bn-3 Maj James O. Appleyard.

2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, l7 Amph Corps
Battalion

Commander LtCol Marvin II. Floom.

Executive Officer Maj Gene N. Schraeder.

Bn-3 Maj Earl .T. Rowse.

18th Marines 2

Commanding ,

Officer LtCol Russell Lloyd

(to 6th Marines on 25 June).
LtCol Ewart S. Lane
( from 26 June) .

2 Command and staff list of 18th Marines is from the
unit’s muster roles. A check of other available records
and letters from officers gives the following additional
information : Lieutenant Colonel Russell Lloyd was
also CO 2d Marine Division Shore Party until 25 June
1944 when he was attached to the 6th Marines. Major
G. L. H. Cooper commanded the division shore party
from 26 to 30 June 1944 when the beaches were turned
over to the Army. Lieutenant Colonel Chester J. Sala-
zar retained administrative command of the 2d Bat-
talion. 18th Marines, throughout the period, although
his unit, with personnel from other regiments and at-
tached units, functioned as the 2d Division Shore Party.
Lieutenant Colonel Ewart S. Laue had administrative
command of the 18th Marines until 25 June 1944 and
tactical command from 26 June.

271

Executive Officer LtGol Ewart S. Laue.

It— 1 Capt Winfield S. Haltom, Jr.

R-2 and R-3 Capt Murdoch J. McLeod.

R-4 Capt Walter J. Hulsey.

1st Battalion, 18th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol August L. Vogt.

Executive Officer ___Capt Joseph G. Polifka.

2d Battalion, 18th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Chester J. Salazar.

Executive Officer

and Bn-3 Capt Jerome R. Walters;.

2d Tank Battalion

Battalion

Commander Maj Charles W. McCoy.

Executive Officer

anti Bn— 3 Capt John C. Richards, Jr.

2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Battalion

Commander Maj Henry G. Lawrence, Jr.

i transferred to NTLF staff as
LYT control officer on 2 July).
Maj Fenlon A. Durand
(from 2 July).

Executive Officer Maj Fenlon A. Durand.

Bn-3 Capt William H. I-lousman, Jr.

5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Battalion

Commander Capt George L. Shead.

Executive Officer Capt William C. Stoll.

Bn— 3 not shown.

2d Motor Transport Battalion

Battalion

Commander Maj Milton J. Green.

Executive Officer Maj Robert II. Sanders.

Bn-3 Capt Harry C. Olson.

2d Serrice Battalion

Battalion

Commander Capt Robert V. Perkins.

Executive Officer T.t Francis E. McElroy.

Bn-3 not shown.

2d Medical Battalion

Battalion

Commander LtComdr Claude It. Bruner.

Executive Officer
and Bn-3 not shown.

4th Marine Dirision

Division

Commander MajGen Harry Schmidt.

Asst. Division

Commander BrigGen Samuel C. Gumming.

Chief of Staff Col William W. Rogers.

B-1 Col Walter I. Jordan.

1 >_- LtCol Gooderham L. McCormick.

^ *-•’ Col Walter W. Wensinger.

H~4 Col William F. Brown.

23d Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Louis It. .Tones.

Executive Officer ___ LtCol John R. Lanigan.

R-l Capt Charlie .T. Talbert.

R-2 Capt Richard W. Mi rick.

R-3 Maj Edward W. Wells.

R-4 Capt Henry S. Campbell.

1st Battalion, 23d Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Ralph Haas.

Executive Officer ___Maj James S. Scales.

Bn-3 Capt James It. Miller.

2d Battalion, 23d Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Edward J. Dillon.

Executive Officer Maj Albert H. Follmar.

Bn-3 Maj Robert H. Davidson.

3d Battalion, 23d Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol John .1. Cosgrove

( WIA 19 June).

Maj Paul S. Treitel
(from 19 June).

Executive Officer Maj Paul S. Treitel.

Bn-3 Maj Robert .T. .T. Picardi.

24th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Franklin A. Hart.

Executive Officer ___LtCol Austin R. Brunelli.

R-4 Capt Kenneth N. Hilton.

R-2 Capt Arthur B. Hanson.

R-3 LtCol Charles D. Roberts.

R-4 Maj Clyde T. Smith.

1st Battalion, 24th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Maynard C. Schultz

(DOW 1G .Tune).

Maj Robert N. Fricke
(16 to 18 June).

LtCol Austin It. Brunelli
(18 June to 4 July).

LtCol Otto Lessing
(from 4 July).

Executive Officer Maj Robert N. Fricke.

Bn-3 IstLt Gene G. Mundy.

2d Battalion, 24th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Richard Roth well.

Executive Officer Capt Claude M. Cappelmann.

Bn-3 Capt Charles C. Berkeley.

3d Battalion, 2J/th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Alex. A. Vandegrift, Jr.

(WIA 27 June, evacuated
29 June).

LtCol Otto Lessing
(29 June to 3 July).

LtCol Alex A. Vandegrift. Jr.
(from 3 July).

272

Executive Officer

and Bn-3 Capt Webb D. Sawyer.

25th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Merton J. Batchelder.

Executive Officer LtCol Clarence J. O’Donnell.

R-l Capt Francis A. Norton.

R-2 Capt Charles 1 >. Gray.

R-3 LtCol William F. Thyson, Jr.

R-4 Maj Arthur E. Buck, Jr.

1st Battalion, 25tli Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Hollis U. Mustain.

Executive Officer Maj Henry D. Strunk.

Bn-3 Capt Fenton J. Mee.

2d Battalion , 25th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Lewis C. Hudson, Jr.

Executive Officer Maj William P. Kaempfer.

Bn-3 Capt Victor .T. Barringer.

3d Battalion, 25th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Justice M. Chambers

( WIA 22 June).

Maj James Taul
( 22 to 23 June) .

LtCol Justice M. Chambers
(from 23 June).

Executive Officer Maj .Tames Taul.

Bn-3 Capt James G. Headley.

11/th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Louis G. L)eLIaven.

Executive Officer LtCol Randall M. Victory.

R— 1 istLt Cecil T>. Snyder.

R-2 Capt Harrison L. Rogers.

R-3 Maj Frederick J. Karch.

R— 4 Maj Richard J. Winsborough.

1st Battalion, l '/th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Harry .T. Zimmer.

Executive Officer Maj Clifford B. Drake.

Bn— 3 Maj Thomas McE. Fry.

2d Battalion, ll/th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol George B. Wilson, Jr.

Executive Officer Maj William McRe.vnolds.

Bn-3 Capt Jack H. Riddle.

3d Battalion, 11/ tli Marines

Commanding

Officer LtCol Robert E. MacFarlane.

Executive Officer Maj Harvey A. Feehan.

Bn-3 Capt Fenton H. Elliott.

S/th Battalion, llfth Marines

< Commanding

Officer LtCol Carl A. Youngdale.

Executive Officer Maj John B. Edgar, Jr.

Bn-3 Maj Roland ,T. Spritzen.

jth 105111111 Howitzer Battalion, V Amphibious dorps

Commanding

Officer LtCol Douglas E. Reeve.

Executive Officer Maj Marvin R. Burdett.

Bn-3 Capt Joe II. Daniel.

20th Marines

Commanding

Officer LtCol Nelson K. Brown.

Executive Officer Capt William M. Anderson.

R— 1 Capt Martin M. Calcaterra.

R-2 Capt Carl A. Sachs.

R-3 Maj Melvin D. Henderson.

R — 1 Capt Samuel G. Thompson.

1st Battalion, 20th Marines

Battalion

Commander Maj Richard G. Ruby.

Executive Officer Maj George F. Williamson.

Bn-3 Capt Martin II. Glover.

2d Battalion, 20th Marines

Battalion

Commander Maj John II. Partridge.

Executive Officer Capt Howard M. Dowling.

Bn-3 Capt George A. Smith.

J/th Tank Battalion

Battalion

Commander Maj Richard K. Schmidt.

Executive Officer Maj Francis L. Orgain.

Bn-3 Capt Leo B. Chase.

lOth Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Battalion

Commander Maj Victor J. Croizat.

Executive Officer Maj Harry T. Marshall, Jr.

Bn-3 not shown on rolls.

J/th Motor Transport Battalion

Battalion

Commander LtCol Ralph L. Schiesswohl.

Executive Officer Maj Vaughan H. Huse.

Bn-3 IstLt Walter W. Alford

'fth Srrriee Battalion

Battalion

Commander Col Richard IT. Schubert.

Executive Officer not shown.

Bn-3 2dLt James T. Willis

/fill Medical Battalion

Battalion

Commander LtComdr George W. Mast.

Executive Officer LtComdr George M. Davis, Jr.

Bn-3 not shown.

27th Infantry Division3

Division

Commander MajGen Ralph C. Smith

(relieved 24 .Tune).

MajGen Sanderford Jarman
(from 24 June, reverted to

3 Complete staff and command list for 27th Division
units not available.

889590° -50—19

273

165th Infantry

Saipan Garrison Force Com-
mander on 28 June).

MajGen George W. Griner
(from 28 June).

Assistant Division

Commander BrigGen Ogden J. Ross.

Chief of Staff Col A. C. Stebbins.

G— 1 LtCol M. Oakley Bidwell.

G-2 LtCol W. M. Van Antwerp .

G-3 LtCol F. H. Sheldon.

G-4 LtCol Charles B. Ferris.

105th Infantry

Commanding

Officer Col Leonard A. Bishop.

S-2 Maj Malcolm M. Jameson.

S-3 Maj Philip E. Smith.

tat Battalion, 105th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol William J. O’Brien

(KIA 7 July). 4

2d Battalion, 105th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol Leslie Jensen

(transferred to Regimental
Executive Officer).4 5
Maj Edward McCarthy.
Executive Officer Maj Edward McCarthy.

3d Battalion, 105th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol Edward T. Bradt.

106th Infantry

Commanding

Officer Col Russell G. Ayres

(relieved 26 June).

Col A. C. Stebbins
(from 26 .Tune).

Executive Officer LtCol Joseph .T. Farley.

1st Battalion. 106th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol Winslow Cornett.

Executive Officer Maj John Nichols.

2d Battalion, 106th Infantry

Battalion

Commander Maj Almerin C. O’Hara.

3d Battalion. 106th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol Harold I. Mizony

(KIA 28 June).

Maj Francis Fisher
(from 28 June).

Executive Officer Maj Francis Fisher.

4 Name of O’Brien's replacement not shown in docu-
ments consulted.

5 Date of this change not shown in documents con-
sulted. Assumed to have been about 1 July.

Commanding

Officer Col Gerard W. Kelley

( WIA 28 June).

LtCol Joseph T. Hart
(from 28 June).

Executive Officer LtCol Joseph T. Hart.

S-l Capt Edward S. McCabe.

S-2 Maj William F. McCahill.

S-3 Capt Charles E. Coates, Jr.

S-4 Capt Herman M. Lutz.

1st Battalion, 165th Infantry

Battalion

Commander Maj James H. Mahoney.

Executive Officer Capt Edward .T. Strong.

S-3 Capt Henry A. Berger.

2d Battalion, 165th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol John F. McDonough

(WIA 25 June).

Maj Gregory Brousseau

(from 25 June, WIA 27 June).

Capt James A. Dooley
(temporary 27 June).

Maj Dennis D. Claire
( from 27 .1 une) .

Executive Officer Maj Gregory Brousseau.

S-3 Capt James A. Dooley.

3d Battalion. 165th Infantry

Commanding

Officer Maj Dennis D. Claire

(transferred to 2d Bn 27 June).
Maj Martin TI. Foery
(from 27 June).

Executive Officer Maj Martin H. Foery.

S-3 Capt Martin E. Nolan.

2' th Dirision Artillery

Commanding

General BrigGen Redmond F. Kernan, Jr.

Executive Officer Col Harold G. Browne.

10/fth Field Artillery Battalion
Commanding

Officer LtCol George P. VanNostrand

105th Field Artillery Battalion
Commanding

Officer LtCol Nicholas D. LaMorte.

106th Field Artillery Battalion
Commanding

Officer LtCol John J. Fitzgerald.

249th Field Artillery Battalion
Commanding

Officer LtCol Dwight McCallum.

XXIV Corps Artillery

Commanding

General BrigGen Arthur M. Harper.

Adjutant Capt Wayne B. Young.

S-2 Maj Milford W. Wood.

S-3 LtCol F. W. Wheless.

S-4 Maj E. P. Waggoner, Jr.

274

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

APPENDIX V

Kyle’s Mission

From its inception, the mission assigned to
the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, in NTEF Opera-
tion Plan 3-44 was the subject of much thought
and discussion. That mission, in part, fol-
lows: “ . . . land on the night of D minus
one-D day, on selected beaches of Magicienne
Bay, move rapidly inland, seize Mt. Tapotcliau
before daylight, and defend same until re-
lieved.”1

To carry the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, to
Saipan for its daring assignment, six de-
stroyer transports (APD’s) were assigned.
To fit this shipping, the battalion commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Wood B. Kyle, reorganized
his unit (normally three rifle companies and a
headquarters company) into live companies
and assigned numbers in place of normal let-
tered designations. Each company, about 125
officers and men strong, was then assigned to
an APD. Three of the companies were basi-
cally rifle units, while the other two each con-
tained an echelon of battalion headquarters,
rifle and weapons units. Remaining personnel,
transportation, and equipment of the battalion
were attached fo the 2d Marines’ headquarters
and transported to Saipan with the 2d Marine
Division convoy. The sixth APD (live were
used to carry the five companies) would trans-

1 NTLP Operation Plan 3-44.

port Company A, Corps Amphibious Recon-
naissance Battalion, which had been attached
for the mission. (See Appendix VII for Task
Organization.)

To preserve mobility, Kyle’s unit would
carry no weapons heavier than 60mm mor-
tars; the heavy machine guns and 81mm mor-
tars, plus five days of all types of supplies,
were embarked aboard two escort carriers
(CVE’s). A portion of the Corps Air Delivery
Platoon was embarked in the designated car-
riers to package and handle supplies and equip-
ment for further parachute-drop to the bat-
talion from torpedo planes.

The battalion’s ship-to-shore movement would
be accomplished in rubber boats, towed by
landing craft to within about 50 yards of the
beach, from which point they were to be pad-
died ashore. The amphibious reconnaissance
company would precede the main landing by
about one hour, find and mark the beach and
hold a shallow beachhead until the remainder
of the battalion had landed. From that point,
the long, hard trek to Tapotcliau’s summit
would begin.2

The desirability of having friendly troops
so located on the morning of D-Day is obvi-
ous; possession of that height would to some
extent limit the enemy’s observation of our

2 Kyle.

275

rugged terrain and a prepared enemy would have confronted the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, in its move from the
shore of Majsricienne Bay to Mt. Tapotehau’s heights. Fortunately, the mission was cancelled.

beachhead and would afford us a precious ad-
vantage. But would this advantage be over-
balanced by prohibitive losses? Or. more spe-
cifically, was there sufficient indication that the
mission would be successful despite the cost?

Gambles frequently pay off ; the Guadal-
canal campaign had proved that. Guadalcanal
had been a tribute not only to the “ready”
Fleet Marine Force but to the willingness of
our higher command to accept risk. The exact
point where gamble becomes foolhardy ven-
ture is sometimes difficult to determine. Look-
ing with historical rather than planning eyes,
it is easy to decide that Kyle’s mission exceeded
the bounds of acceptable risk; but, at the time,
lacking the complete and detailed aerial photo-
graph coverage which had been requested, it
was a difficult decision.

Aside from the risk to personnel, there were
several disconcerting imponderables. Would
possession of the mountain’s summit be suffi-
cient to curtail the enemy’s observation to any
marked degree? The battalion could hope to
occupy only a part of the vast hill mass, and
the remainder would still be available to the
Japanese. Enemy observers might even be
accorded a greater degree of safety by the Ma-
rines’ presence, since U. S. naval gunfire, air
and artillery bombardment of that area would
be somewhat limited.

A 2d Division staff estimate, prepared dur-
ing the planning stage, deduced that Kyle’s
mission was impracticable and would be disas-
trous. Since the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, was
operating as an immediate subordinate unit
of the Northern Troops and Landing Force.

276

it remained for the 2d Division to present its
views to the Corps staff. Lieutenant Colonel
Wall ace M. C xreen, Jr., division operations
officer (D-3), journeyed to Corps Headquar-
ters and was referred to the G— 5 (Planning)
Section. There Colonel Greene presented t he
estimate to Colonel Joseph T. Smith and Lieu-
tenant Colonel Joseph C. Anderson, USA,
with the recommendation that the mission be
cancelled. The estimate was accepted, but
no action on the cancellation of the mission
was taken.3

As part of the same 2d Division effort to
convince Corps’ planners that Kyle’s mission
was unfeasible, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas
J. Colley, 2d Division intelligence officer, flew
to Pearl Harbor and presented his section’s
conclusions to the Corps intelligence officer.
These conclusions, based upon a comprehensive
interpretation of available aerial photographs,
established the fact that the enemy had strong
defensive positions facing Magicienne Bay.4

The mission was finally changed on order
of Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, who
had spent many sleepless nights pondering the
problem. Prior to departure from Pearl Har-
bor for the target area, the general arrived in
the office of Ids chief of staff. Brigadier Gen-
eral Graves B. Erskine. and said something to
the effect: “I’ve decided that battalion won’t
execute that mission.” lie went on to indicate
that the unit would remain under NTLE con-
trol as a ready reserve to be committed wher-
ever a desirable situation presented itself. The
battalion would still be transported in six
APD’s, and supply would still be accomplished
by air-drop. It was too late to change these
details, and indeed, circumstances might later

3 LtGen T. E. Watson’s endorsement to LtCol W.
B. Kyle's Itr. 20.\ov48. The date of Col Greene’s
recommendation is not indicated in documents con-
sulted, but it is assumed to have been in early May 1944.

4 Ltr from Col T. .T. Colley to CMC, 14Jan50. The
photographs concerned in this study, Colley writes,
were “very poor in quality. The photos were taken at
various angles, neither vertical nor oblique, of chang-
ing elevation (and scale) and somewhat fuzzy in de-
tail.” lie felt it was likely that the plane which had
taken the pictures was attempting “to evade attack by
Japanese airplanes.”

develop which would make t lie arrangement
desirable.5

The wheels were thus set in motion to cancel
the mission. It is interesting to note that,
though plans had been cancelled to land Kyle's
unit before the main landings, the unit was to
“be prepared after How-hour [author’s italics]
to land on order on selected benches of Magi-
cienne Bay. or on other beaches to be desig-
nated later.”6 In addition to written changes
to operation orders (Joint Expeditionary Force
published the change on 20 May), there were a
number of conferences between principal com-
manders and all units were informed of the
alteration.

Even now we may breathe a sigh of relief.
Ma gicienne Bay’s coastline bristled with de-
fenses, and the long nightmarish route from
the bay to Mt. Tapotchau would have been a
formidable challenge even had there been no
enemy along the way and had it been under-
taken in broad daylight.

Few schemes of maneuver or plans of action
throughout the entire Pacific war were the sub-
ject for as much argument and discussion as
the one assigned to the 1st Battalion, 2d Ma-
rines. That all of the opinion, even on the
Corps staff, was not favorable to the scheme is
indicated by the following observations of Col-
onel John C. McQueen, G-3, A" Amphibious
Corps :

The G— 3 Section, V Amphibious Corps, did not sub-
scribe to the plan of landing Kyle’s battalion at Magi-
cienne Bay. The section firmly believed that Kyle's
battalion would completely fail in its mission and also
believed that those of the battalion who might suc-
cessfully be landed would he wiped out before getting
very far toward their objective. . . . To us the idea of
this battalion successfully reaching the summit of Mt.
Tapotchau befoi'e daylight, even from the viewpoint
of terrain alone, seemed incredible. When Kyle first
reported to me for secret instructions pertaining to the
type of training his battalion would undergo for the
planned hazardous landing, it was easy to discern that
he knew he was in for an extremely tough assignment,
and he appeared to fully realize the seriousness of the
undertaking. Of course we did not disclose our own
feelings in the matter. Our section’s reaction to the

5 Interview with Col It. E. llogaboom. LtCol J. I
Stewart and LtCol E. \V. Durant, Jr., 3Dec48.

6 NTLF Operation Plan 3 — 14, Change No. 1.

277

plan was made known and discussed with G-5 and the
Chief of Staff. However, those in authority decided to
incorporate the scheme in the operation plans and carry
it out iu the event later intelligence data indicated not
too strong opposition in the Magicienne Bay area. We
were greatly relieved when we learned . . . that the mis-
sion had been cancelled by General Smith.7

Another observation, furnished by Lieu-
tenant Colonel Thomas It. Yancey, USA, G— 2,
Northern Troops and Landing Force, further
clarifies the reasons for the cancellation:

I am sure that what actually prompted General Hol-
land Smith to . . . change the mission of the battalion
was the lack of detailed information concerning enemy
dispositions and defense positions in the Magicienne
Bay area. There was very little information that could
be obtained on this area due to lack of cloud free photo-
graphic coverage of large enough scale to determine
accurately hostile defensive installations.

General Smith and his Chief of Staff, Brigadier
General Graves B. Erskine, were both concerned about
this situation and during the planning phase of the
operation frequently visited the G— 2 Section to empha-
size the importance of obtaining information of the
Magicienne Bay area. When this information was not
forthcoming, it appears logical that the mission as ini-
tially assigned reached the stage when it was more than
a calculated risk and was subsequently cancelled.8

7 Ltr from Col .T. C. McQueen to DirPublnfo, 15Jun49.

s Yancey.

With all that lias been said of the Magi-
cienne Bay plan, it is of particular interest to
note that personnel of the 1st Battalion, 2d
Marines, were in no sense pessimistic about
their assigned task. In this respect, the com-
mander of Company A (Captain Louis Y.
Brooks) has written:

There was probably no doubt in anyone’s mind that
the mission was unusually hazardous, but this very
fact seems to have lent a zest to it which contributed
substantially to the high morale. And morale definitely
was high. Throughout the training phase there was a
sense of exhiliration derived from the knowledge that
the battalion had been selected for something special,
and it was felt by the officers and men of the battalion
that they had been so chosen because they were well
led and had a good fighting record. Such appelations
as “Kyle’s Raiders” and “Suicide Battalion”, given us
by men of other units, merely served to increase our
pride.

Our training took on a special character, and as it
progressed, our confidence in our ability increased.
Along with this was a widespread confidence in Colonel
Kyle’s leadership. This was particularly strong among
those of us who had been with him at Guadalcanal
and Tarawa.

. . . The fact that we had been chosen for a special
mission — alone — and that there might be many out-
comes seemed merely to heighten our enthusiasm.9

9 Memo from Capt L. V. Brooks to author, 25Jul49.

278

APPENDIX VI— BASIC ORGANIZATION, HIGHER ECHELON TASK FORCES

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

APPENDIX VII

Task Organization

Northern Troops and, Landing Force — Lieu-
tenant General H. M. Smith.

Corps Troops

Headquarters and Service Battalion, V Am-
phibious Corps (less detachments).

Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (less
detachments).

Motor Transport Company, V Amphibious
Corps (less detachments).

Headquarters, Provisional Engineer Group, V
Amphibious Corps.

Headquarters, Provisional LVT Group, V Am-
phibious Corps.

7th Field Depot (less detachments) (Rein-
forced).

Medical Battalion, V Amphibious Corps.

■51st Field Hospital (Army).

2d Provisional Portable Surgical Hospital
(Army).

3d Provisional Portable Surgical Hospital
(Army).

Air Warning Squadron #5 (less detachments).

Detachment, 680th Air Warning Company
(Army).

Detachment, 726th Air Warning Company
(Army).

Detachment, 763d Air Warning Company
(Army).

Detachment, Company C, 101st Signal Bat-
talion (Army).

Mobile Communication Unit Central Pacific
(Army).

Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, V Am-
phibious Corps (less Company A).

a. 1st Battalion , 2d Marines ( Reinforced }

Lieutenant Colonel Kyle.

1st Battalion, 2d Marines (Reinforced).
Company A, Amphibious Reconnaissance
Battalion, V Amphibious Corps.

b. 2d Marine Division ( Reinforced ) — Major

General Watson.

2d M arine Division (less 1st Battalion. 2d
Marines).

1st Battalion, 20th Marines.

2d Armored Amphibian Battalion.

2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

715th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Army).
2d Joint Assault Signal Company.

18th Naval Construction Battalion.

1st Amphibian Truck Company.

Detachment, 7th Field Depot.

3d Platoon, 604th Quartermaster Graves Reg-
istration Company (Army).

Detachment, Air Warning Squadron #5.

2d Provisional Rocket Detachment.

2d 155mm Artillery Battalion (Howitzer),
Corps Artillery, Y Amphibious Corps.

c. 1ft h Marine Division (Reinforced) — Major

General Schmidt.

4th Marine Division.

708th Amphibian Tank Battalion (Army).
10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less
Company A) Attached: Company C, 11th
Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

773d Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Army).
534th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Army).
1st Joint Assault Signal Company.

279

121st Naval Construction Battalion.

2d Amphibian Truck Company.

Detachment, 7th Field Depot.

311th Port Company (Army).

539th Port Company (Army).

Detachment, Air Warning Squadron #5.

4th 105mm Artillery Battalion (Howitzer),
Corps Artillery, V Amphibious Corps.

1st Provisional Rocket Detachment.

d. Corps Artillery — Brigadier General Harper,

USA.

XXIV Corps Artillery

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery,
XXIV Corps Artillery.

1st Provisional Gun Group (155mm Gun)
(Army).

1st Provisional Gun Battalion.

32d Coast Artillery Gun Battalion.

225th Field Artillery Howitzer Group
(155mm Howitzer) (Army).

145th Field Artillery Battalion.

225th Field Artillery Battalion.

447th Amphibian Truck Company (Army).

e. Antiaircraft Artillery — Colonel Barager,

USA (from Garrison Forces).

864th Automatic Weapons, Antiaircraft Bat-
talion (less detachments) (Army).

Battery A, 751st Antiaircraft Battalion
(Army).

Battery B, 751st Antiaircraft Battalion
(Army).

f. Saipan Garrison Forces — Major General

Jarman, USA.

Army Defense Troops.

Army Service Troops.

Other units as assigned.

g. Tinian Garrison Forces — Major General

Underhill.

17th Marine Antiaircraft Battalion.

18th Marine Antiaircraft Battalion.

Other units as assigned.

h. 27 th Infantry Division (Reinforced)1 — Ma-
jor General Ralph Smith.

Hq, 27th Infantry Division.

Ilq, Special Troops.

Hq Company.

MP Platoon.

27th Division Band.

27th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop.

727th Ordnance LM Company.

27th QM Company.

27th Signal Company.

105th Infantry Regiment.

106th Infantry Regiment.

165th Infantry Regiment.

Hq, 27th Division Artillery.

104th Field Artillery Battalion.

105th Field Artillery Battalion.

106th Field Artillery Battalion.

249th Field Artillery Battalion.

102d Engineer Battalion.

102d Medical Battalion.

98th Portable Surgical Hospital.

38th Field Hospital.

295th JASCO.

762d Tank Battalion.

766th Tank Battalion.

1165th Engineer Group Hq.

34th Engineer Battalion.

152d Engineer Battalion.

1341st Engineer Battalion.

94th Bomb Disposal Squad.

95th Bomb Disposal Squad.

88th Chemical Battalion.

604th QM Graves Registration Company.
Detachment, 534th Amphibian Tractor Bat-
talion.

1 The 27th Infantry Division, initially in Expedi-
tionary Troops reserve, was released to Northern
Troops and Landing Force control on 16 June 1944.

280

rrretTis?

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

appendix VIII JaPanese Order of Battle-Saipan

STRENGTH AT SAIPAN
ON 15 JUNE

Army Units

31st Army Headquarters — LtGen Hideyoshi
Ohata. Administrative command for Army
troops in the Marianas-Bonins-Marshalls-
Carolines. General Ohata was at Palau when
United States forces landed and therefore did

not participate in Saipan’s defense. 1,100

Northern Marianas Army Group and 43d Divi-
sion Headquarters (combined) — LtGen
Yoshitsugu Saito. Saito’s command included
all Army units on Saipan, Tinian and Pagan. 268

*11 8th Infantry Regiment — Colonel Ito. Three
infantry battalions with one artillery battery
attached to each, regimental engineering, com-
munication, supply and medical companies.
Original strength 3,463, regiment lost 858
men from submarine attack while in transit
to Saipan. This unit did not arrive until the
first week in June 1944. 2,605

* 135th Infantry Regiment (minus 1st Battal-
lion) Colonel Suzuki. Two infantry battalions
with one artillery battery attached to each,
regimental engineering company, supply and
medical units. 1st Battalion of this regiment
was on Tinian. ' 2,200

*136th Infantry Regiment — Colonel Ogawa.

Three infantry battalions with one artillery
battery attached to each, regimental engi-
neering, communication, supply and medical

companies. 3,650

*43d Division Ordnance Company — Captain

Murase. 99

*43d Division Communication Company — Cap-
tain Washizu. 223

* Units marked * were part of the 43d Division.

*43d Division Transport Company — Captain
Yamamoto. 94

*43d Division Field Hospital — I.tCol Fuka-
yama. 246 of the personnel were detached
and sent to Pagan on 21 May 1944. 500

*43d Division Intendance Battalion — LtCol
Okawa. Only 120 of this group were Army
personnel ; the others were laborers and tech-
nicians. 2,500

47th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters
— Colonel Oka. The 315th Independent In-
fantry Battalion, which had been part of the

Brigade, departed for Pagan before U. S.
landings on Saipan. 227

**316th Independent Infantry Battalion — Cap-
tain Eto. Three infantry companies, a ma-
chine gun company and a gun company. 618

**317th Independent Infantry Battalion — Cap-
tain Sasaki. Three infantry companies, a ma-
chine gun company and a gun company. 618

**3d Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment
(less 2d Battalion) — LtCol Nakashima.

Two battalions, each organized into three
four gun batteries. 845

**3d Battalion, 10th Field Artillery Regiment
— Captain Yamane. One battery of eight field
guns, two batteries of seven howitzers each. 323

**3d Company, 25th Engineers Regiment — 1st

Lieutenant Yoneya. 188

9th Tank Regiment — Colonel Goto. Five tank
companies and one maintenance company.

Each tank company equipped with 10 medium
tanks, one or more light tanks and one
tankette. 550

1st Battalion, 18th Regiment — Captain Kubo. __ 600

* Units marked * were part of the 43d Division.

** Units marked ** were part of the 47th Brigade.

281

25th Anti-Aircraft Regiment (less 2d Battalion
Headquarters and the 3d, 4th, 5th and 9th
Batteries) — Lieutenant Colonel Niiho. This
unit included searchlight and antiaircraft
batteries. 600

43d Independent Anti-Aircraft Battery — 1st

Lieutenant Kimishima. 150

44th Field Machine Cannon Battery — 1st Lieu-
tenant Nagatani. 150

7th Independent Engineers Regiment (less 2d
Company — Colonel Koganezawa. Two com-
panies and an ordnance and material platoon.

One company of this regiment was on Guam.

Also known as an Army Fortification Regi-
ment. 600

16th Shipping Engineers Regiment (less 2d
Company and one detachment) — Major
Tsunegana. The second of its three companies
was located on Guam and a detachment at

Pagan. 450

264tli Independent Vehicle Company — Captain

Iwama. 120

278th Independent Vehicle Company — Captain
Arima. 120

Miscellaneous Straggler Units

9th Expeditionary Force. This straggler unit

was originally 1,500 strong. 908

11th Independent Engineer Regiment. 200

150tli Infantry Regiment. 300

14th Independent Mortar Battalion. 580

17th Independent Mortar Battalion. 580

3d and 4th Independent Tank Companies.
Suffered heavy casualties from submarine
attack. Survivors combined into one unit. 118

Navy Units

Central Pacific Fleet Headquarters and 5th
Special Base Force Headquarters (com-
bined)— Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. Ad-
ministrative command for Navy in Marianas-
Marshalls-Carolines. 502

55th Naval Guard Force (Maizuru Keihitai) —

Captain Takashima. 2,000

1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force — - Lt
Comdr Karashima. Three rifle companies bat-
talion gun, demolition, communication, supply,
transport and engineer sections, medical and

intendance units. 800

5th Communication Unit — LtComdr Miyazaki. 369

5th Construction Unit — Rear Admiral Tsu-

jimura. 456

41st Naval Guard Force (Sasebo Keibitai) — A
reinforcement, destined for Truk, not a com-
plete unit. 400

Office of Supplies, Accounts — Paymaster Com-
mander Mihara. 45

Military Stores — Commander Mizumoto ;
Transport — Commander Mizumoto ; Harbor

Master — Ensign Takashima. 100

14th Air Group***

902d Air Group***

Air Flight U 156. 300

Southeast Area Air Base — Vice Admiral

Sato. 500

Aerology Bureau, Saipan — Captain Yamaga. __ 88

115th Airdrome Construction Unit. 269

2.3d Airdrome Construction Unit. 392

14th Hangar Maintenance Section. 29

14th Anti-Aircraft Maintenance Section. 110

Tora Construction Battalion (air mainte-
nance ) . 600

Total Army Forces 22,702

Total Navy Forces 6,690

29,662

*** The majority of these two air groups was gone
at the time of United States landings and only small
elements remained. Intelligence agencies were unable
to establish their strength on Saipan.

282

(penns

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

APPENDIX IX

The Last Days of General Saito

The following is a translation from a cap-
tured Japanese officer's personal account of the
last days of Lieutenant General Saito. the Com-
manding General of all Army forces on Saipan.
The personal story of this officer who partici-
pated in the counterattack against our forces
the morning of 7 July 1944, reveals a vivid pic-
ture of events leading up to the attack that
occurred on the above date.

I don’t remember the exact date too well, because of
the intense bombardment and the naval shelling, but
about the time that the Field Headquarters moved
stealthily in the middle of the night from among the
mountains in CHACHA to the fourth position (4 kilo-
meters into the mountains due EAST of the NORTH-
EASTERN limit of (JAR ARAN Town), the 135th In-
fantry, by now robbed of the summit of TAPOTCHAU,
was chased far into the TALAFOFO area by the enemy
forces along the eastern sea coast.

At the new Field Headquarters a conference was
quickly held to decide how to extricate themselves
quickly from this predicament.

Some officers proposed that “we should die gloriously
in battle with a final charge now, in this place.”

However, General SAITO ordered “Because there
are many military units which were left scattered on
the field of battle, gather these all together and con-
struct positions from here toward the NORTH in the
narrowest portion of SAIPAN Island. You must chew
the AMERICAN forces to pieces.”

At this point the staff determined those positions on
maps. They fell in a line running from NORTH of
TANAPAG through HILL 205.2 to TALAFOFO.

However, in order to carry out the construction of
that defensive line, they had to gather picks and
shovels. They were all in T NADERU.

I did not think that t' ohm, as General SAITO
conceived it, would work under these conditions.

However, before the positions were completed,, the
enemy was upon our front lines and we couldn’t spare
even one man as a runner during that day. This was
2 July. Because our lines of communication were
broken all control had to be carried out at night. More-
over, under these conditions of retreat, it is impossible
to control the situation except at night.

Here is an example of that.

The 135th Infantry drew back to rear positions a day
before they were supposed to. When the Division Head-
quarters learned of this it was already too late t<- stop
it. Because of this, the strategic plan of the Division
was ruined. That is to say, the Naval forces and the
portion of the Army forces which had been fighting
bravely and stubbornly around GARAPAN Town were
cut off from a patch of withdrawal. The 136th Infantry
and other Army units which were on the EAST slope
of TAPOTCHAU were isolated. And what aggravated
the condition most and was most bothersome, was that
we could not transport back to the new positions the
provisions to halt the enemy advances.

We did not stay long in this fourth headquarters.
Caught in the concentration of Naval gunfire the
wounded and dead continued to increase.

We stayed at the fifth headquarters only 2 days. On
about 3 July (I'm not sure of exact, date) we moved
to the sixth and final headquarters.

This area is generally called THE VALLEY OF
HELL [Paradise Valley] and we felt that this was an
unpleasant hint and suggestion concerning our future.

The intelligence which managed to reach me at this
last place was all depressing.

On 4 July, an enemy unit [165th Infantry] appeared
on the other side of the valley and fired at us with
heavy automatic weapons. At that time I felt we were
entirely surrounded and had lost all hope.

General SAITO was feeling very poorly because, for
several days he had neither eaten nor slept well and
was overstrained. Tie was wearing a long beard and
was a pitiful sight.

283

That morning that very valley received intense bom-
bardment (1 don't know whether it was naval gunfire
or pursuing fire from artillery, but it was the second
most intense bombardment I had been in). It was so
fierce that I thought maybe the cave where the head-
quarters was would be buried. At this time the Staff
and Lt. Gen. SAITO received shrapnel wounds.

I felt that the final hour was drawing near.

Lt. Gen. SAITO called his Chief of Staff and held
a secret conference of his unit commanders. The con-
tents of that conference were never revealed to us but
nevertheless it was undoubtedly aimed at taking a final
action in realizing the end in true Japanese Army
fashion. This final decisive action had to be simply one
of two courses. First, to remain as we were and starve
to death or secondly, to make a last attack and fight
to the finish. Of course, the Division Commanding
General and Chief of Staff chose the latter. However,
in order to carry out the latter there were many diffi-
culties to be encountered. First of all, to what extent
could the soldiers be assembled? Even if they could be
assembled, only a few could be supplied with weapons.
Furthermore, it would take two days and two nights
to assemble them and issue the orders. Whereupon,
the evening of 6 July or 7 July was decided upon. Hav-
ing lost the freedom of maneuverability there was only
one road left open, a last all out desperate attack.
There was no hope for success. The final order and in-
structions were written up and undoubtedly resulted
in the order to carry out the forementioned ceremonial
action. The opinion of Vice Admiral NAGUMO was
probably received but even though he was in the
vicinity there was no communication between the two
headquarters. Under these conditions the final plan
was drawn up. However, since the fighting on SAIPAN
Island was under the command of SAITO, combining
both Army and Navy forces, this was quite proper.

Officer messengers took a period of four days and
nights [sic] to disseminate orders to the unit com-
manders in various places.

After issuing the orders, it seemed that the work of
headquarters was finished. Everybody put his personal
belongings in order. By the kindness of the head-
quarters cook a farewell feast for General SAITO
was prepared for the evening of the 5th. However
this consisted of only sake and canned crab meat.

Why did they have this farewell feast? Since Gen-
eral SAITO, because of his age and the exhausted
condition of his body, would not participate in the
attack of the 7tli and had decided to commit suicide
in the cave, it was feted. 10 A.M. 6 July!! This time
was set by the General himself as the final hour. 1
had to be up at the front that morning in a liaison
capacity so I was unable to witness the final hour.

I think that it happened in the following manner.

Cleaning off a spot on the rock himself, SAITO sat
down. Facing the misty EAST saying “TENNO
HEIKA! BANZAI!” (Hurrah for the Emperor!), he
drew his own blood first with his own sword and then
his adjutant shot him in the head with a pistol.

When I returned to the headquarters from my duties,
(10 P.M. 6 July) they had already cremated the Gen-
eral's body. He had probably said “It makes little
difference (in this battle) whether I die today or to-
morrow, so I will die first! I will meet my staff in
YASUKUNI Shrine!” 3 A.M. 7 July.

This was the time ordered for the commencement of
the attack.

Because the units were confused and mixed as de-
scribed previously, from the middle of the night of
7 July, we set out for MATANSHA1 to gather the
troops. However, as usual, we were shelled enroute.

At 0330, the troops who were able to gather at
MATANSHA, the non-combatant troops of the head-
quarters, all together totaled barely 600. Many had no
weapons. The total participants I would estimate at
about 1500, mixed Army and Navy!

The Battle commences !

We had only one machine gun but it kept firing
bravely, making night into day! About the time the
gun was silenced the whole attack came to an untimely
end, fading like the dew on the dawn of the 7th.

7 July! This is a significant day in the war. This
was the day marking the end of the fighting on
SAIPAN ; the day when the brave officers and men of
the Japanese Army followed General SAITO to his end.

I will attack the enemy alone again soon and join
my brave comrades!”

1 Matanslia was a small village about 1,000 yards
northeast of Makunsha.

284

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

APPENDIX X

Navy Unit Commendation

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

THIRD BATTALION, TENTH MARINES, SECOND MARINE DIVISION

FLEET MARINE FORCE

for service as follows:

“For outstanding heroism while serving with the 2d Marine Division in action against
enemy Japanese forces on the island of Saipan in the Marianas, July 7, 1944. When Japanese
forces initiated a final concerted attack down the west coast of the island before dawn of .1 uly 7,
the 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines, was occupying a newly won position astride the railway
along the west coast road, with two batteries disposed on the left of the railroad and the re-
maining two on the right and echeloned to the rear. The mounting enemy attack penetrated
the extreme left flank of our front lines and moved between the coast road and the railway.
Security elements to the front of the forward batteries recognized and gave battle to the on-
coming force of approximately 600 Japanese supported by tanks. Battalion howitzers opened
up at point-blank range, tiring shells with cut fuzes; gunners employed ricochet fire when
the fanatic banzai troops over-ran the forward section ; and the cannoneers, command post and
supply personnel in the rear positions united as one to engage the infiltrating Japanese soldiery.
Under the forceful direction of skilled officers, this artillery battalion functioned effectively as
an infantry unit despite the lack of specific training, the four batteries waging a furious and
prolonged battle from quickly organized strongpoints and holding the line indomitably until
relieved several hours later. Strengthened by fresh troops, the defending garrison continued
its counter-and-thrust tactics and, recapturing the heavy guns which had fallen into hostile
hands, knocked out three of the enemy tanks and annihilated approximately three hundred Jap-
anese troops. By their valor, determination and sustained fighting spirit, the intrepid officers
and men of the 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines, had succeeded in breaking the enemy's last des-
perate effort to oppose the seizure of Saipan, thereby hastening the conquest of this strategically
important base. Their gallant defense of a vulnerable position in the face of overwhelming
disparity adds new luster to the traditions of the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to the 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines, 2nd Marine Division, on July 7. 1944
are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

James Forrestae.

Secretary of the Navy.

285

FTdeTIT

APPENDIX XI

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Distinguished Unit Citation

The 105th Infantry Regiment (less 3d Bat-
talion and Company G) and the Spears Detach-
ment, 762d Provisional Tank Battalion, at-
tached, are cited for exceptionally outstanding
performance of duty in combat against the
enemy at Saipan, Marianas Islands, on 7 July
1911. The regiment attacked north toward the
village of Makunsha on the west coast of Sai-
pan, against increasing enemy resistance. At
dawn on 7 July, this unit was subjected to one
of the greatest Japanese mass attacks attempted
in the Pacific Theater. The 1st and 2d Bat-
talions fought furiously, as the enemy, attack-
ing in great numbers and with fanatical fury,
penetrated the combined perimeter defense and
inflicted overwhelming casualties on the units.
Forced to yield, the survivors of that fierce as-
sault formed successive defensive posit ions and
continued to engage the attacking forces. These
units, faced with a dwindling supply of ammu-
nition, water, and medical supplies, fought off
incessant enemy attacks throughout the day.
Meanwhile the Japanese drive had carried on to
the regimental command post where it was com-
pletely stopped and contained by the determined
stand of Regimental Headquarters and Special

Units. Every available man engaged in the
action. Through the courage, tenacity, and en-
durance displayed by all ranks, this unit and its
attachment, suffered severe casualties, repulsed
the powerful assault launched by a numerically
superior enemy and contributed materially to
the defeat and destruction of the Japanese
forces at Saipan. The conduct of the 105th In-
fantry Regiment (less 3d Battalion and Com-
pany G) and the Spears Detachment, 762d Pro-
visional Tank Battalion, attached, throughout
the battle reflects great credit on itself and is
in keeping with the highest traditions of the
armed forces of the United States. (The fore-
going citation supei’sedes the citation made
previously to a subordinate unit for action in-
cluded in the above-cited period, and does not
constitute an additional citation authorizing the
wearing of an Oak-Leaf Cluster to the Dis-
tinguished Unit Emblem to personnel of Head-
quarters Company, 105th Infantry Regiment,
cited in paragraph 4, section VII, General
Orders 45, War Department, 1946, which is
rescinded.) [General Orders No. 49, Depart-
ment of the Army, 14 July 1948.]

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950 889590

286

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LUZON STR.

^^Piuzc

Lmgoyen G

SOUTH CHINA
SEA u--,

Eniwttokf ' 'n‘® ^Rong

Kwojoltm^k ^

TOP#

MINDANAO PaJou |,#Bot)«llhuop
Palflllur

• T*“

LO. Britain ^

Vallo Lavtilo. *

i NtwGtorgio^ ^ »

Jl'EnlrtcosleouP0'**11

It Guodolconol ^So

MILNE BAY c'

CORAL SEA

Etplrltu Sonto4p .

TABLE

OF DISTANCES FROM SAIPAN

In Nautical Mllti

Cape Gloucester

1250

Chichi jima

725

Eniwelok

1000

Guadalcanal

1720

Guam

101

Kwajalein

1355

Manila

1500

Marcus

705

Midway

2210

Pagan

165

Palau..

840

Ponape

885

Rabaul

1230

Ta'rawo

1810

Tinian

Tti*

590

Yap

570

Yokohama

1285

. E U T I A N

ISLANDS

Dutch Hbr •

Kisko

A N

sMidwoy Is ' /

Frtnch Fn^ots St

• Johnston

• Polmyro

• Howlond
•Boker

PHOENIX #Conton
ISLANDS •

^ m Nuku F*tou
/•^•Funotuti

FIJI ISLANDS

UNION* .
CROUP

SAMOA ISLANDS
Savon ^^jpolu
Tutuilo'

TONGA
ISLANDS
»Tongatobu Go

COOK ISLANOS

date due

•

—

'"y

—

Printed
in USA

San Franciscol

TABLE

OF DISTANCES FROM SAIPAN

In Nautical Miles

Cape Gloucester

1250

Chichi Jima

725

Eniwetok

1000

Guadalcanal

1720

Guam

101

Kwajalein

1355

Manila

1500

Marcus

705

Midway

2210

Pagan

165

Palau . .

840

Ponape

885

Rabaul

1230

T a'rawa

1810

Tinian

Truk

590

Y op

570

Yokohama

■

1285

9+ 0.5451
1/585 s

3i«usv (iinur

<2v

THE SECRETARY of the navy

resldertonh^~^pleas.etop^

the PRESIDE^ UNIT CITATION D

fourth marine division, rein Troops; Divislon

consisting ol:

Sr Battalion; Company C ‘wo.(; 2nd Amphih an Trnc^^^

Amphibian Tank Battalio ( port Compame ( 3 ’ Corps;

t“hMarines(ArtiUerpy),3UthJ I DetaohmenN V Corps

7th Field Depot, ^ „ Squadron #9; 41 ,ArUUery), (less 3rd and 4th

Detachment, Air Warmng H 14th Marines (Arti lie y h ^<^3 Corps,
ArtlUery, V Amphibious Corps,^ LVT Group, V Ampiu uons.

*“** Detachment'

10th Marines (Arti Y fte Sollowtag
for service as sei a

^«assssr®SS^

of the Japanese Valiantly storming blasted the

June 15 to August 1, Fourth Divislon, ^0^dvance over the

of Saipan on Jirne 15.^ enemy in an imdeviat^ casualties, this

stubborn defense es n_ Unilinching despite , Ycross the entire

perilously rugge ^ Japanese relen eotJi nDOSftion for twenty-

gallant group _ pursued ^ bltter oppos£on but a

length of the fance in their none ioi acU ^ DWision

five days to crush h- u t0 reorganize and <1 narrow beaches

brief rest P«^ ^wer against the <^£“»S£U for the

hurled its full rapidly expanded the Unchecked by

of Tinian on July £ supplies and arti y itable men

continued landmg °tacies dr hostile fire, th^Jnese forces before

record of conquests m tnes

rec For the President,

Wu 7d ru^M

Secretary of the Navy

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Full text of "Saipan :the beginning of the end /Carl W. Hoffman, USMC."

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